Glidden-Durkee (SCM) Corp. v. Mobay Chemical Corp.

ROBERT M. BELL, Judge. For the reasons to be set forth hereinafter, we will reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City and remand the matter to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Lawrence E. Cook, the Claimant, was employed as a maintenance mechanic by appellant, Glidden-Durkee (SCM) Corp., on June 15, 1967. 1 In January, 1977, Claimant was diagnosed as having lead poisoning and treated at Baltimore City Hospitals. From time to time thereafter he received lead chelation therapy which required him to be off work.

Following the diagnosis of lead poisoning, Claimant filed a claim with the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. Pursuant to a stipulation that Claimant sustained an occupational disease, namely lead poisoning, the Medical Board, on March 7, 1979, awarded claimant temporary total ⁵⁸⁷ disability and the related medical expenses for several periods between January 23, 1977 and January 10, 1979. The Workmen’s Compensation Commission affirmed the findings and award of the Medical Board on September 19,1979 and appellant paid the award. On November 1, 1979, Claimant again was placed on temporary total disability for lead poisoning.

Appellant sold its Pemco plant to appellee, Mobay Chemical Corp., 2 on December 5, 1979. The Claimant returned to work at the Pemco plant on February 10, 1981 and continuously worked from that date until July 6, 1982, when he was hospitalized for six days for lead poisoning. Claimant filed a claim with the Workmen’s Compensation Commission for disability benefits and for payment of medical expenses incurred during his hospitalization. Appellant impleaded appellee.

A hearing to determine which of the two employers was responsible for Claimant’s disability benefits and medical expenses incurred after February 10, 1981 was held before Commissioner Frankel on April 7, 1983. The only testimony taken was from Dr. Keogh, appellee’s witness, who was extensively questioned by Commissioner Frankel and each counsel. Commissioner Frankel did agree to take the testimony of Dr. Chisholm, appellant’s medical witness, who was not then available, and, if necessary, that of Claimant, at a later time. At the conclusion of the testimony, Commissioner Frankel made the following comment: “Therefore this Commission has taken testimony today, which testimony shall be adopted to any testimony to be [sic] in the future, on or about June 1st, which testimony in turn will be considered for a decision as of June 1st or thereafter in 1983.

In order to make this concept legal. Otherwise, we just have to remand it back — if the case was remanded back to the Medical Board, as of June 1st, it would come back to the Commission today. ⁵⁸⁸ “So, unless I hear an affirmative objection from either one of the parties, I will follow through and take additional testimony and make a decision after June 1st.” 2A After the parties agreed, 3 Commissioner Frankel then said: “All right. Here’s what I’ll do: As of June 1st, when I have jurisdiction I will then say, reset this case before the Commission as of June 1st and say, ‘Gentlemen, you want to adopt all the prior testimony, or you want to go ahead and start testimony all over again and go through, the same thing, because I am going to read this, anyway, the testimony before the Medical Board.’ All right. Thank you.” By Order dated April 20, 1983, Commissioner Frankel ruled: “The Commission finds that this Commission has jurisdiction to try this case as no cases are being reset before the Medical Board for Occupational Disease.

All testimony shall be taken and decided on June 1, 1983.” The parties were notified on May 19, 1983, that the case was scheduled for further hearing on June 16, 1983. Thereafter, counsel for Appellant, by letter dated May 24, 1983, enclosing a report by Dr. Chisholm, submitted to the Commission’s decision based upon that report and the testimony taken on April 7, 1983. The Commission’s decision was issued on June 3, 1983 without further hearing or proceedings. 4 That decision addressed two issues: (1) whether temporary total disability and the need for medical care and treatment on or after February 1981 was causally related to the work environment at Glidden-Durkee, Division of SCM ⁵⁸⁹ Corporation, and (2) whether temporary total disability and the need for medical care and treatment on or after February, 1981 to date causally related to the work environment at Mobay/Pemco. The Commission ordered: ... that Mobay/Pemco, employer and Insurance Company of North America, insurer, pay temporary total disability, same to be adjusted between the parties to this case, and provide medical care and treatment to Lawrence E. Cook, Claimant____ Appellees filed a Motion for Rehearing with the Commission on June 14, 1983, 5 which appellant opposed.

The Motion was denied by Commissioner Krysiak. Appellees appealed to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Thereafter, they filed a Petition to Remand the Appeal to the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, to which appellant filed a timely response. In their petition, appellees asked the circuit court to remand the case to the Workmen’s Compensation Commission “so that a proper hearing might be conducted and a proper decision issued based on such a hearing”.

Appellant’s answer questioned the legal justification for remand and professed an inability to understand the legal theory on which appellees were proceeding. Appellant, therefore, asked that the petition be denied and that appellees’ appeal be heard in the circuit court. On March 7, 1984, the trial court held a hearing on the Petition to Remand. No evidence was taken.

Following arguments of counsel, the trial judge remanded the proceedings to the Workmen’s Compensation Commission “... for any testimony anybody wants to present...”. The order giving effect to that ruling was signed on April 3, 1984. ⁵⁹⁰ Decision to Remand Appellant offers two arguments in support of its contention that the trial judge erred in remanding the proceedings to the Commission for further proceedings: a) The Circuit Court Judge erred as a matter of law by exceeding his jurisdiction in remanding the appeal to the Workmen’s Compensation Commission without a hearing on the merits; and b) The Circuit Court erred as a matter of law by taking judicial notice of Commissioner Frankel’s health as a factor in remanding the appeal without a hearing on the merits. a. Authority to Remand 6 Appellant has argued that it was error as a matter of law for the trial judge to remand the appeal to the Workmen’s Compensation Commission without a hearing on the merits. He relies upon Md.Ann.Code, 1957, article 101, § 56(a). 7 Appellant contends that the trial judge did not ⁵⁹¹ conduct a hearing on the merits.

Therefore, the trial judge failed to comply with the mandate of § 56(a). 8 The issue thus presented is may a trial court, prior to considering an appeal from the Commission on the merits, remand it to the Commission for further proceedings? We believe that the trial court ordinarily must hear the issue presented on the appeal on the merits. 9 Only then can the matter be remanded for further proceedings. We arrive at our conclusion from a construction of § 56(a) in light of the rules for construing a statute and in light of pertinent case law. It is fundamental that when construction of a statute is involved, the reviewing court must determine the true legislative intent of that statute.

Prince George’s County v. Bahrami, 33 Md.App. 644 , 365 A.2d 343 (1976). It is also fundamental that that intent will be determined from the language of the statute, giving it its ordinary and common usage. Radio Com., Inc. v. Public Service Comm., 271 Md. 82 , 314 A.2d 118 (1974). Only if there is an ambiguity or obscurity in the language of the ⁵⁹² statute will it become necessary for the Court to look elsewhere to ascertain the intent of the legislature.

Md. National Cap. Park and Planning Comm., et al. v. Mayor and Council of Rockville, et al., 272 Md. 550 , 325 A.2d 748 (1974). “In other words, the Courts, in the absence of ambiguity, should, as a general rule, confine themselves to a construction of a statute as written, and not attempt, under the guise of construction, to supply omissions or remedy possible defects in the statute, or to insert exceptions not made by the legislature.” Amalgamated Casualty Insurance Co. v. Helms, et al., 239 Md. 529, 535-6 , 212 A.2d 311 (1965). The statute contains language permitting remand of proceedings to the Commission. It does not specify, however, whether the authority thus given is to be exercised before or after the merits have been heard.

It is in this context that we proceed. Section 56(a) requires the reviewing court to “determine” whether the Commission “acted within its powers and correctly construed the law and facts”. If the reviewing court is satisfied that the Commission has, it must “confirm” the decision, otherwise it must reverse, modify or remand the case to the Commission for further proceedings. We believe the language of § 56(a) is clear and unambiguous that a remand to the Commission can be ordered only after the merits of the issue presented by the appeal has been determined.” The term, “determine” is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary, Rev. 4th ed.

(1968) to mean “to bring to an end”; “to bring to a conclusion, to settle by authoritative sentence, to decide” and “to decide, and analogous to ‘adopt’ or ‘accept’ ”. Funk and Wagnall’s Standard Desk Dictionary, 1977 ed. variously defines “determine” to mean “to settle or decide, as an argument, question or debate”; “to ascertain or fix”; “to come to a decision; resolve.” Applying the ordinary and common meaning of “determine”, it is clear that the reviewing court must first ascertain or decide ⁵⁹³ whether the Commission has properly construed the facts and law within its lawful grant of authority and only then may it confirm, reverse, modify or remand. Prior decisions of the Court of Appeals and this court also support our view. Prior to its amendment, 10 § 56(a) provided only for “confirmance”, “reversal” or “modification” of a Commission decision by the circuit court.

The absence of a provision for remand to the Commission has been held by the Court of Appeals to prohibit the circuit court from remanding an appeal to the Commission for further proceedings. In Allen v. Glenn L. Martin, 188 Md. 290 , 52 A.2d 605 (1947), an accidental injury case, the trial court remanded an appeal from the State Industrial Accident Commission to that Commission “for further proceedings.” The trial court’s order was passed after testimony was taken from a commissioner as to how he arrived at his decision in the case. The Court of Appeals reversed because the trial court’s order was passed without authority, citing the absence of a provision in the statute 11 for remand of cases appealed from the Commission. 12 The Court of Appeals reaffirmed this position in General Electric v. Cannella, 249 Md. 122 , 238 A.2d 891 (1968). In that case, an occupational disease case, the court, concerned about the adequacy of the record from the Commission, recognized that a remand for purposes of clarifying the record was not authorized by law.

It quoted, with approval, the following passage from Beechwood Coal Company v. Lucas, 215 Md. 248, 258 , 137 A.2d 680 (1958): ⁵⁹⁴ The Commission did not trouble to state the reason or reasons for its conclusion. Judge Harris, in the Circuit Court described the record as “contradictory, confusing, incomplete, and, of course, unsatisfactory.” We share his views. The law makes no provision for remanding the case to the commission for the purpose of making a more understandable record. It is not our province to weigh evidence, and the statute ... requires the courts to accept the findings of facts of the Commission.

There is, however, an implicit condition — that there must be some evidence or sufficient evidence to sustain the findings. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) Despite there being no express remand provision, the circuit court’s remand of proceedings to the Commission after a decision on the merits of the issue presented by the appeal has been approved by the Court of Appeals and by this Court. McCulloh & Co. v. Restivo, 152 Md. 60 , 136 A. 54 (1927); Caled Products Co., Inc. v. Sausser, 199 Md. 514 , 86 A.2d 904 (1952); Saylor v. Black and Decker Manu Co., 258 Md. 605 , 267 A.2d 81 (1970); Trojan Boat Co. v. Bolton, 11 Md.App. 665 , 276 A.2d 413 (1971). In Trojan Boat Co. v. Bolton, supra; at 668-669, 276 A.2d 413 , we observed: Neither the Court of Appeals nor this Court has