Globe Screen Printing Corp. v. Young

KRAUSER, Judge. This appeal arises out of the Workers’ Compensation claim of John J. Young, appellee, for injuries he sustained from an assault that occurred on a public sidewalk between his place of employment, Globe Screen Printing Corporation, and its employee parking lot. Because of the location of that assault, appellee claimed that his injuries were covered by the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act 1 (“Act”) under the “premises” or “proximity” exceptions to the going and coming rule. Following a hearing on that claim, the Workers’ Compensation Commission (“Commission”), without specifying the ¹²⁶ grounds for its decision, found that appellee had sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. 2 It therefore concluded that appellee’s injuries were compensable under the Act.

Thereafter, Globe Screen Printing Corporation (“Globe”) and its insurer, Centennial Insurance Company/Atlantic Companies, appellants, filed a petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Because the facts were not in dispute, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. At the motions hearing that followed, the circuit court affirmed the order of the Commission and entered summary judgment in favor of Young, on the ground that, under the “proximity” exception to the going and coming rule, appellee’s injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment with'Globe. From that order, Globe and its insurer noted this appeal.

The only issue before this Court is whether either the “premises” exception or the “proximity” exception to the going or coming rule is applicable to the circumstances of this case. Because we find that neither exception is, we conclude that ¹²⁷ appellee’s injuries did not occur in the course of his employment. Therefore, his injuries are not compensable under the Act. Accordingly, we shall reverse the judgment of the circuit court.

FACTS Appellee, John J. Young, was employed by appellant, Globe Screen Printing Corporation, as a shipping manager. Although his “normal working hours” were from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., he had obtained permission from his employer, the year before, to start work much earlier so that he could return home in the early afternoon to care for his sick mother. The building that houses Globe is in Baltimore City. It is bounded by three public streets: Hollins Street on the North, Poppleton Street on the West, and Boyd Street on the South.

The main entrance to Globe is on Hollins Street; an employee entrance is on Poppleton Street and another is on Boyd Street. Boyd Street is thirty feet wide, seventeen feet of which are paved. A parking lot maintained by Globe for the benefit of its employees lies on the other side of Boyd Street, opposite the Boyd Street entrance to the building. Because appellee walked to work, he did not use the employee parking lot.

Each morning, he left his home on Ramsay Street and usually walked down Pratt Street, turning left onto Poppleton and then right onto Boyd Street. He would then enter the building, using the Boyd Street entrance. His key to the building “as far as [he knew]” only opened the Boyd Street entrance. Upon arriving, he would turn off the alarm and open up the shipping and receiving department, which was on the Boyd Street side of the building.

On May 18, 1998, the day of the assault, appellee left his home at 2:20 a.m., to walk to work. While walking along Poppleton Street, he noticed a group of men looking at him from across that street. As he reached the corner of Boyd and Poppleton Streets, he turned right onto Boyd Street and took out his keys to unlock the entrance door. Approximately fifteen feet from the entrance, he was attacked by the group of ¹²⁸ men that had been watching him.

At the time of that attack, he was standing on a public sidewalk. After being stabbed in the arm by one of the men, he ran back to Poppleton Street. There, he was pushed up against a car by his assailants and stabbed twice in the abdomen. The attack ended when a neighbor screamed at the men to get off of appellee.

Moments later, the police arrived, and appellee was rushed to the University of Maryland Shock Trauma Center where he was treated for multiple stab wounds. DISCUSSION Appellants contend that the facts of this case fall within neither the “premises” nor the “proximity” exceptions to the going and coming rule. They assert therefore that, as a matter of law, appellee’s injuries did not occur in the course of his employment and, accordingly, are not compensable under the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act. We agree.

The decisions of the Commission are “presumed to be prima facie correct.” § 9-745(b)(l). In reviewing a decision of the Commission, we must determine whether it “(1) justly considered all of the facts about the accidental personal injury ...; (2) exceeded the powers granted to it under this title; or (3) misconstrued law and facts applicable in the case decided.” § 9-745(c). A Commission ruling may be reversed “only upon a finding that its action was based upon an erroneous construction of the law or facts.” Frank v. Baltimore County, 284 Md. 655, 658 , 399 A.2d 250 (1979). “Notwithstanding the deferential treatment of the Commission’s decision, a reviewing court has broad authority and may reverse the Commission’s decision when it is based on an erroneous conception of the law.” Board of County Comm’rs v. Vache, 349 Md. 526, 533 , 709 A.2d 155 (1998). For the reasons set forth below, we find that the circuit court, and by implication the Commission, 3 erroneously construed and ap ¹²⁹ plied the “proximity” exception to the going and coming rule in this case.

Also, we find no merit to appellee’s contention that the “premises” exception applies to the facts of this case. The Act provides compensation for accidental personal injuries “caused by a willful or negligent act of a third person directed against a covered employee in the course of the employment of the covered employee.” § 9 — 101(b)(2). Injuries that are sustained by employees going to or coming from work are not covered by the Act unless they fall within a recognized exception. Morris v. Board of Educ., 339 Md. 374, 380 , 663 A.2d 578 (1995); Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane v. Tornillo, 329 Md. 40, 44 , 617 A.2d 572 (1993).

The reason is that the Act “contemplates an employee engaged in a service growing out of his employment. An employee who is merely going to or coming from his work is not rendering any such service. He is therefore exposed to the hazards encountered on such trips, not as an employee, but rather as a member of the general public.” Wiley Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 280 Md. 200, 206 , 373 A.2d 613 (1977) (citing Tavel v. Bechtel Corp., 242 Md. 299, 303 , 219 A.2d 43 (1966); Rumple v. Henry H. Meyer Co., 208 Md. 350, 357 , 118 A.2d 486 (1955)).

Moreover, “getting to work is considered to be an employee’s responsibility and ordinarily does not involve advancing the employer’s interest.” Morris, 339 Md. at 380 , 663 A.2d 578 . In support of his claim that his injuries are compensable under the Act, appellant relies on two exceptions to the going and coming rule: the “premises” exception and the “proximity” exception. The premises exception “is usually invoked where the employee is injured while traveling along or across a public road between two portions of his employer’s premises, whether going or coming, or pursuing the actual duties of his employment.” Wiley, 280 Md. at 206 , 373 A.2d 613 . “A typical application of this exception,” according to the Wiley court, “occurs where injury is sustained by an employee while ¹³⁰ traveling between a company parking lot and his employer’s plant.” Id. But “ ‘if the parking lot is a purely private one, the principle of passage between two parts of the premises is not available, and an employee crossing a public street to get to the parking lot is not protected.’ ” Board of County Comm’rs, 349 Md. at 533 , 709 A.2d 155 (quoting Proctor-Silex Corp. v. DeBrick, 253 Md. 477, 482-83 , 252 A.2d 800 (1969)) (quoting 1 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 15.14 (1968)).

The reasoning underlying this exception is: Since ... a parking lot owned or maintained by the employer is treated by most courts as part of the premises, the majority rule is that an injury in a public street or other off-premises place between the plant and the parking lot is in the course of employment, being on a necessary route between the two portions of the premises.... Wiley, 280 Md. at 206-07 , 373 A.2d 613 (quoting 1 Larson, supra). When appellee was assaulted, he was on his way to work. At the time of the assault, he was neither on Globe’s premises nor traveling between the company parking lot and his place of employment.

In fact, he had not yet arrived at work and was attacked while on a public sidewalk. Although that assault occurred between his place of employment and the employee parking lot, that happenstance does not bring the facts of this case within the ambit of the premises exception. Appellee argues, however, that since the “premises” exception would be applicable to an employee attacked at the same location as appellee if he or she was coming from the employee lot, appellee should not be denied the protection of that exception simply because he was coming from home. In other words, since both individuals would have been injured at the same location, right outside their place of employment, they should be treated, according to appellee, the same for the purposes of compensation benefits.

Merely because appellee had chosen to walk to work and not avail himself of the use of ¹³¹ the employee parking lot, appellee argues, should not be a basis for granting or denying such benefits. In essence, appellee is asking us to extend the scope of the premises exception beyond its present limits without providing a rationale for doing so except the unacceptability, in appellee’s eyes, of the results. The premises exception was created in recognition of the fact that a parking lot provided by an employer for employees is by its very nature an integral part of the premises of that employer’s business and that any street or other area that lies between the lot and business is “ ‘a necessary route between [those] two portions of the premises.’ ” Wiley, 280 Md. at 207 , 373 A.2d 613 (quoting 1 Larson, supra). Therefore, an injury sustained by an employee while using that street or other area to travel between the two is an injury sustained “‘in the course of employment.’ ” Id.

The focus of that exception therefore is not, as appellee claims, where an employee’s injury occurred but whether that injury occurred while that employee was walking from one portion of his or her employer’s premises (the employer-provided parking lot) to another (the plant, office building, shop, etc.). To suggest that it unfairly distinguishes between those employees who choose to walk and those who choose to drive and use the company lot misses the point. The premises exception is not intended to extend an employer’s liability to the public sidewalks and streets around his building but to make an employer responsible for injuries that employees may sustain as they travel between a parking lot, selected for their use by their employer, and their place of employment. Indeed, “ ‘by establishing or sponsoring a parking lot not contiguous to the working premises, the employer has created the necessity for encountering hazards lying between these two portions of the premises.’ ”