Goff v. Richards

Gilbert, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. In the instant motor tort case, the trial judge, upon motion, granted a directed verdict in favor of the defendant-appellee at the conclusion of the opening statement by counsel for the plaintiff-appellant. ²⁵¹ On appeal to this Court, appellant poses four questions for our review. Because we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for a new trial on the ground that the trial judge is without authority in this State to grant a motion for directed verdict at the conclusion of an opening statement, it is unnecessary for us to consider appellant’s other three contentions. The only Maryland Rule dealing directly with the subject of directed verdicts is Rule 552.

Paragraph a. thereof provides: “In an action tried by a jury any party may move, at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent or at the close of all the evidence, for a directed verdict in his favor on any or all of the issues. Such motion shall state the grounds therefor. An objection on behalf of the adverse party to such motion shall be entered as of course.” 1 Appellee Richards argues that directing a verdict on opening statement was recognized by this Court in White v. State, 11 Md. App. 423 , 274 A. 2d 671 (1971), and by the Court of Appeals in McLhinney v. Lansdell Corp. of Md., 254 Md. 7 , 254 A. 2d 177 (1969). Appellee, however, reads more into White and McLhinney than the respective Courts said.

In White, supra, we considered a criminal case wherein the accused, at the end of the opening statement made by the Assistant State’s Attorney, moved for a directed verdict, which motion was denied. Judge Moylan, for this Court, stated, at 425: “. . . The imaginative attempt of the appellants to take an infrequently invoked and not universally recognized procedure from the trial of a civil suit and to engraft it — by analogy — onto the criminal trial cannot, however, prevail. ²⁵² Although the issue does not appear ever to have been .squarely raised in this State, in civil litigation the power of the trial court in its discretion, on proper motion, to direct a verdict on the opening statement of counsel seems generally, although not universally, conceded.” 2 It was pointed out in White, supra, that the practice, where permitted, of granting directed verdicts based upon the opening statement of counsel is in infrequent use and occurs only where special circumstances imperatively require it. White does not stand for the proposition that in this State a trial judge may grant a directed verdict based upon opening statement of counsel.

McLhinney, supra, is factually and legally inapposite. It holds that in opening statement