Goicochea v. Langworthy

ELDRIDGE, Judge. The issue before us is whether a civil claim that a licensed Maryland physician committed an assault and battery on a patient during a routine medical examination, under the circumstances presented by this case, is covered by the Maryland Health Care Malpractice Claims Act, Maryland Code (1974, 1995 Repl.Vol.), §§ 3-2A-01 through 3-2A-09 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. We shall answer ⁷²² this question in the affirmative and shall reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. I. The petitioner, Dr. Juvenal R. Goicochea, performed a hernia examination on the respondent, John A. Langworthy, to determine the source and cause of pain in Langworthy’s groin area.

Langworthy consented to this examination, which occurred at Goicochea’s office in Bethesda, Maryland. In the weeks and months following the examination, Langworthy complained of persistent pain and discomfort in his groin area. He filed a medical malpractice claim with the Health Claims Arbitration Office (HCAO) pursuant to the Health Care Malpractice Claims Act, alleging that Goicochea’s performance of the hernia examination resulted in chronic pain, abnormal swelling, and the laceration of soft tissue in his groin area. He did not, however, file a qualified expert’s certificate of merit with the HCAO as required by § 3-2A-04(b)(l) of the Act. 1 2 The HCAO, therefore, dismissed the claim.

Prior to the HCAO’s dismissal of his malpractice claim, however, Langworthy filed the instant assault and battery action against Goicochea in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, requesting compensatory and punitive damages. In ⁷²³ his complaint, Langworthy asserted that, during the hernia examination, Goicochea “intentionally assaulted and battered [his] left inguinal area with the full force of his left forefinger for approximately five minutes.” Although he did not allege a precise motive for Goicochea’s actions, Langworthy stated that the “assault and battery” was “malicious” and “willful,” and resulted in “permanently painful injury.” Goicochea filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that, in light of the Health Care Malpractice Claims Act, the circuit court should not exercise jurisdiction over the action. Following a hearing, the circuit court, relying upon this Court’s opinion in Jewell v. Malamet, 322 Md. 262 , 587 A.2d 474 (1991), dismissed Langworthy’s complaint. The circuit court pointed out that Langworthy claimed that he had been assaulted and battered during the rendering of medical treatment by a health care provider, and that the Health Care Malpractice Claims Act was therefore applicable unless the complaint’s factual allegations removed the claim from the Act’s coverage.

The court held that Langworthy’s factual allegations did not remove the claim from the statute’s coverage. In addition, the circuit court reasoned that, by not filing the required certificate of merit, Langworthy had failed to pursue the special arbitration remedy prescribed by the Act. The court concluded that staying the tort action until the conclusion of arbitration proceedings under the Act would be inappropriate because the HCAO had already dismissed Langworthy’s malpractice claim for failure to follow the proper procedures. Langworthy appealed to the Court of Special Appeals which vacated the judgment of the circuit court.

Langworthy v. Goicochea, 106 Md.App. 265 , 664 A.2d 422 (1995). The Court of Special Appeals’ holding, and its view of Jewell v. Malamet, supra, were set forth as follows ( 106 Md.App. at 274-275 , 664 A.2d at 427 ): “Based on the foregoing, we conclude that a wilful and deliberate act other than one usually involved in medical treatment or examination on the part of the physician, such as an assault and battery, does not qualify as a ‘medical injury’ as defined by the Act. A wilful and deliberate act to ⁷²⁴ assault and batter is not a breach of a professional duty because a professional duty is one required in the proper exercise of the profession. “In Jewell , the Court instructed the parties to return to the HCAO so that the HCAO could determine whether the claim fell within the ambit of the Act, before proceeding with the tort claim in the circuit court. The Court’s holding in Jewell creates a curious situation.

Under Jewell , when a claimant is injured while receiving medical care, the claimant must file with the HCAO, which then determines whether the claim arises out of a medical injury; however, in order to file a claim with the HCAO, the claimant must file a certificate of merit of qualified expert. If the claim is unquestionably one for assault and battery, then the claimant will be unable to obtain a certificate of merit of qualified expert. Under the Act, if the claimant fails to file a certificate of merit of qualified expert, then the HCAO can not hear the case. Therefore, a claimant with a legitimate assault and battery claim will never be able to have his case heard.” Thereafter, Goicochea filed with this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted.

Goicochea v. Langworthy, 340 Md. 649 , 667 A.2d 897 (1995).

II

Goicochea argues that Langworthy’s cause of action, despite its “assault and batter/’ label, alleges a “medical injur/’ and is subject to the Health Care Malpractice Claims Act and its requirements. He maintains that the complaint implicates the Act because Langworthy’s injury was allegedly inflicted during the rendering of medical services, and that the complaint’s factual allegations are insufficient to remove Langworth/s claim from the Act’s coverage. Thus, according to Goicochea, the HCAO, and not the circuit court, should make the threshold determination whether Langworthy’s assault and battery action is subject to the Act. In Goicochea’s view, the Court of Special Appeals’ holding “usurp[s] the power of the HCAO to ⁷²⁵ initially evaluate potential malpractice claims when a claimant fails to sufficiently allege conduct outside the Act in circuit court.” Moreover, Goicochea maintains that the intermediate appellate court’s decision allows a claimant to circumvent the Act entirely by filing a civil action in the circuit court alleging assault and battery if the claimant is unable or unwilling to procure the certificate of merit required by the Act.

He asserts that this result makes the Act largely inapplicable, and the certification requirement meaningless, because both can be easily avoided. Langworthy, on the other hand, argues that Goicochea intentionally and deliberately injured him under the pretext of providing medical treatment. He asserts that an intentional assault and battery committed by a health care provider against a patient can never be a “medical injury” and is therefore outside the scope of the Act. While conceding that he consented to the performance of the hernia examination, Langworthy maintains that Goicochea’s intent to injure him stripped the examination of any medical validity.

Finally, Langworthy argues that the intermediate appellate court correctly directed the circuit court, instead of the HCAO, initially to determine whether his assault and battery claim is subject to the Act.

III

Absent a waiver by the parties, the Health Care Malpractice Claims Act requires the submission of malpractice claims against health care providers to an arbitration proceeding as a condition precedent before maintaining a tort action in the circuit court. 2 See, e.g., Goodwich v. Nolan, 343 Md. ⁷²⁶ 130, 151, 680 A.2d 1040, 1050 (1996); Jewell v. Malamet, supra, 322 Md. at 265 , 587 A.2d at 475-476 ; Tranen v. Aziz, 304 Md. 605, 612 , 500 A.2d 636, 639 (1985); Bailey v. Woel, 302 Md. 38, 41 , 485 A.2d 265, 266 (1984); Oxtoby v. McGowan, 294 Md. 83, 91 , 447 A.2d 860, 864-865 (1982); Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 283-284 , 385 A.2d 57, 63 , appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 805 , 99 S.Ct. 60 , 58 L.Ed.2d 97 (1978). See also the discussion of the Act by Judge Chasanow for the Court in Newell v. Richards, 323 Md. 717, 727-734 , 594 A.2d 1152, 1157-1161 (1991). The Act is limited to claims against health care providers for medical injuries. The statute states that “ ‘[mjedical injur/ means injury arising or resulting from the rendering or failure to render health care.” See § 3-2A-01(f).

Thus, the critical question is whether Langworthy’s injury from an alleged assault and battery constitutes a “medical injury” within the meaning of the Act. In Cannon v. McKen, 296 Md. 27, 34 , 459 A.2d 196, 200 (1983), this Court explained the definition of “medical injury” as follows: “[T]he legislature did not intend that claims for damages against a health care provider, arising from non-professional circumstances where there was no violation of the provider’s professional duty to exercise care, to be covered by the Act. It is patent that the legislature intended only those claims which the courts have traditionally viewed as professional malpractice to be covered by the Act.” The Court went on to state that, in order to bypass the