Goins v. State

Eldridge, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 591, implemented by Maryland Rule 746, requires that in a circuit court criminal case, a trial date shall be set which shall not be later than 180 days after the appearance or waiver of counsel or after the appearance of the defendant pursuant to Rule 723. The statute further provides that "[t]he date established for the trial of the matter shall not be postponed except for good cause shown by the moving party. ...” 1 Furthermore, the change in trial date must be made by or approved by the county administrative judge or a judge designated by him. 2 ¹⁰⁰ In State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310 , 403 A.2d 356 , on motion for reconsideration, 285 Md. 334 , 403 A.2d 368 (1979), this Court held that the 180-day ** 3 time limit for trying á case was mandatory, and that where the case is not tried within such period, and where there is no postponement of the trial date complying with the requirements of § 591 and Rule 746, "dismissal of the criminal charges is the appropriate sanction,” 285 Md. at 318 .

The Court in Hicks further held that there was one circumstance where dismissal of the criminal charges would not be the appropriate sanction for a violation of the 180-day time limit for trying a case. That circumstance "is where the defendant, either individually or by his attorney, seeks or expressly consents to a trial date in violation of Rule 746.” Id. at 335. In the present case, the defendant’s trial commenced more than 180 days from the appearance of his counsel in the circuit court. The question to be decided is whether the criminal charges should have been dismissed under Art. 27, § 591, and Rule 746, as applied in Hicks v. State, supra.

In light of the issue before us, the relevant facts concern the procedural history of the case rather than the alleged offenses. On October 2, 1979, a ten-count criminal information was filed in the Circuit Court for Howard County charging the defendant, Henry Joseph Goins, with first degree rape, second degree rape, kidnapping, armed robbery, robbery, unlawful carrying of a handgun, use of a handgun in the commission of a felony, theft, battery and assault. 4 On the same day, the appearance of counsel was entered. ¹⁰¹ Consequently, the 180-day period for trying the case would expire on March 31, 1980. Two days after the information was filed, on October 4, 1979, Goins, by his attorney, filed a petition for a reverse waiver to the juvenile court, alleging that he was 17 years of age, that he had never previously been convicted of a crime or adjudicated a delinquent, that, therefore, he had never received the benefit of juvenile rehabilitation programs, and that a transfer to the juvenile court would be in his interest and in the interest of society. Thereafter, the circuit court ordered the Juvenile Services Administration to conduct a waiver investigation and file a report with the court.

Before the report was filed, the assignment office of the circuit court notified the parties on October 29, 1979, that the case was scheduled for trial on January 21, 1980. The report from the Juvenile Services Administration was filed on November 23, 1979, and an addendum was filed on November 27,1979. On November 30,1979, the circuit court held a hearing on the reverse waiver petition, and at the conclusion of the hearing the court indicated that the petition would be denied. By a written opinion and order dated December 10, 1979, and filed on December 11, 1979, the court denied the petition to transfer jurisdiction to the juvenile court.

Also on December 11th, upon the State’s motion, the trial date was moved from January 21, 1980, to January 30, 1980. Just two days after the entry of the written order denying the requested transfer to juvenile court, on December 13, 1979, Goins by his attorney filed a plea interposing the defense of insanity. The circuit court, by written order of the county administrative judge filed on December 21, 1979, directed that the State Department of Health and Mental Hygiene perform a medical examination of Goins with particular reference to his present mental condition and his mental condition at the time of the alleged offense. The ¹⁰² circuit court’s order required that the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene submit a report to the court "before 8 February, 1980, pursuant to the provisions of § 26, Art. 59 of the Annotated Code of Md.” 5 Although this order of the administrative judge necessarily postponed the previously scheduled January 30th trial date, the order itself made no express reference to the trial date.

Next, on January 25,1980, the Clifton T. Perkins Hospital Center of the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene sent a letter to the court requesting a sixty-day extension to examine the defendant and submit a report. The county administrative judge, on January 29, 1980, signed an "amended” order which stated as follows: "Because of the unusually heavy demands from the Division of Corrections and from county detention centers for the admission of psychiat ¹⁰³ rically ill patients for treatment at Clifton T. Perkins Hospital Center and the inability of said Clifton T. Perkins Hospital Center to schedule admissions within the time specified in the Order of this Court dated December 21, 1979 regarding the above-captioned matter, "IT IS, this 29th day of January, 1980, by the Circuit Court for Howard County, ORDERED that the Department of Mental Hygiene comply with the Order aforesaid on or before the 8th day of April, 1980 instead of the date of 8th day of February, 1980. "IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all other provisions of the Order dated December 21, 1979 concerning the above-captioned matter, be and they remain in full force and effect.” The amended order, like the earlier order of December 21, 1979, made no express reference to the trial date in the case. Nevertheless, by extending the time beyond March 31,1980, for the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene to furnish its report on the defendant’s mental condition, the amended order necessarily had the effect of postponing the trial date beyond the 180-day limit prescribed by § 591 and Rule 746.

The report on the defendant’s mental condition from the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene was received by the court on April 10, 1980, and the trial began four days later, on April 14, 1980. This was two weeks beyond the 180-day period set forth in § 591 and Rule 746. On April 14,1980, prior to the commencement of the trial, the defendant Goins filed a motion to dismiss the criminal charges based on an alleged violation of Art. 27, § 591, and Rule 746. At the beginning of the argument on the motion, the defendant’s attorney represented that both attorneys had contacted the county administrative judge "who signed the Order extending the time for the examination, and he has authorized us to state for the purpose of the record, by way of stipulation, that ¹⁰⁴ if called to testify, he would testify that upon receipt of Clifton Perkins’ letter of the twenty-fifth of January requesting an extension of time within which to file their report, that he passed such an Order without calculating or considering the one hundred and eighty day Rule, that it was not his intention to waive the Rule, and the Rule was not taken into consideration. ...” Following extensive argument, the motion to dismiss was denied by the court (Nissel, J.).

Because Clifton T. Perkins Hospital is part of the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, a state agency, the trial judge viewed the January 25th letter from the hospital requesting an extension for filing its report as a motion by a party, i.e. the State, to postpone the trial date. In addition, the trial judge viewed the county administrative judge’s order extending the time until April 8, 1980, for filing the hospital report as an order postponing the trial date. Finally, the trial court held that the administrative judge’s order granting the extension was based upon extraordinary cause. Consequently, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that Art. 27, § 591 and Rule 746 were fully complied with.

The trial of the case proceeded, and the defendant Goins was found guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of twelve years on the first count (first degree rape), twelve years on the third count (kidnapping), twelve years on the fourth count (armed robbery) and five years on the seventh count (use of a handgun in the commission of a felony). There were no sentences imposed upon the remaining counts because of the doctrine of merger. The defendant appealed, raising only the contention that the charges should have been dismissed under Art. 27, § 591, and Rule 746, as applied in State v. Hicks, supra.

The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, although for different reasons than the trial court. Goins v. State, 48 Md.App. 115 , 425 A.2d 1374 (1981). Initially, the Court of Special Appeals stated "that it was his [the defendant’s] own dereliction in allowing 72 days to lapse before filing his plea of not guilty ¹⁰⁵ by reason of insanity that was the effective cause for not meeting the projected January 1980 trial date that was well within the 180-day guideline.” 48 Md.App. at 116 . Quoting from State v. Hicks, supra, 285 Md. at 310 , the intermediate appellate court went on to say that it would " 'be entirely inappropriate for the defendant to gain advantage from a violation of the rule when he was a party to that violation.’ ” Ibid.

After setting forth some of the facts of the case, the Court of Special Appeals pointed out that the defendant "does not question the fact that” the postponement of the trial date beyond the 180-day deadline was in the defendant’s "best interests” and "does not question the fact that the necessary wait for [the] report constituted 'extraordinary cause’ for delaying the trial within the contemplation of Rule 746,” Id. at 118. After setting forth the defendant’s arguments that no party made a motion to extend the trial date, and that the county administrative judge "never knowingly granted the change” (ibid.), the Court of Special Appeals went on to apply a "balancing test” to determine which side was responsible for the delay and which side benefited from the delay. Id. at 120-121. Deciding that the "delay-producing behavior” of the defendant was the sole cause of the delay, and that the delay was for the "clear benefit of the defendant” (ibid.), the intermediate appellate court concluded (id. at 121): "It may well be in this case that Article 27, Section 591, as implemented by Rule 746, and as interpreted by State v. Hicks, has been violated.

If that be the case, it is clear that the appellant has been the violator and the State, his innocent victim. It is but to state the obvious to hold that the appellant will not be permitted to profit from his wrongdoing or, in the words of Hicks, 'to gain advantage from a violation of the rule when he was a party [in this case the only party] to that violation.’ ” The defendant then filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari. Because the circumstances of the case and the ¹⁰⁶ opinion of the Court of Special Appeals raised important questions concerning the future application of § 591 and Rule 746, we granted the defendant’s petition. In this Court, as in the Court of Special Appeals, the defendant Goins does not challenge the trial court’s conclusion that the postponement of the trial date until April 14, 1980, was based upon "extraordinary cause.” Instead, the defendant argues that the postponement of the trial date beyond the 180-day limit failed to comply with § 591 and Rule 746 because there was no motion by a party to extend the trial date.

The defendant contends that the January 25, 1980, letter from the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene cannot be treated as such a motion because the "Department” cannot "be deemed a party to this criminal prosecution.” 6 The State’s position in this Court is essentially the same as that adopted by the Court of Special Appeals. Furthermore, the State argues that under the facts here, it was the defendant’s, and not the State’s, obligation to insure that § 591 and Rule 746 were complied with. Therefore, the State contends, the defendant had the obligation to move for a postponement of the trial date, and his failure to do so should not result in a dismissal of the charges. I Although we shall affirm the trial court’s decision, we do so for entirely different reasons than those advanced by the State and the Court of Special Appeals.

Moreover, we flatly reject the approach to § 591 and Rule 746 taken by the State and the Court of Special Appeals. The Court of Special Appeals proceeded on the assumption that the 180-day requirement of § 591 and Rule 746 had been violated. Nevertheless, the intermediate appellate ¹⁰⁷ court held that, in light of the defendant’s "wrongdoing” and "delay-producing behavior,” and because the delay was for his benefit, dismissal of the criminal charges was not a proper sanction for the violation of § 591 and Rule 746. Even if the Court of Special Appeals’ characterization of the defendant’s conduct were supported by the record in this case, there is no basis in the language or purpose of § 591 and Rule 746 for the approach taken by that court. 7 Moreover, the Court of Special Appeals’ reliance upon State v. Hicks, supra, is misplaced.

The passage from the Hicks case invoked by the Court of Special Appeals is as follows ( 285 Md. at 335 ): "A . . . circumstance where it is inappropriate to dismiss the criminal charges is where the defen ¹⁰⁸ dant, either individually or by his attorney, seeks or expressly consents to a trial date in violation of Rule 746. It would, in our judgment, be entirely inappropriate for the defendant to gain advantage from a violation of the rule when he was a party to that violation. In this respect, the situation is analogous to the well-established principle that a criminal defendant who seeks or expressly consents to a mistrial, even though the required 'manifest necessity’ standard for the mistrial may have been absent, cannot take advantage of his own act and prevent a retrial on double jeopardy grounds.” The instant case, even as viewed by the Court of Special Appeals, clearly does not fall within the situation contemplated by the above quotation. Being dilatory in raising an insanity defense obviously is not seeking or expressly consenting to a trial date in violation of § 591 and Rule 746.

At best, it might arguably constitute an implied consent to a postponement of the trial date, depending upon the circumstances. However, in order to avoid such doubts and controversies, Hicks carefully limited this exception to the