Golden v. Golden

CATHELL, Judge. Yvonne Golden appeals from a decision of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County rendered during a divorce proceeding that found that there existed an oral agreement to exclude from marital property any property accumulated during the marriage or traceable to assets accumulated during the marriage between herself and Gary Golden, appellee. She presents several questions on appeal: 1. Can the parties to a marriage enter into an oral agreement to exclude from marital property: [a] all assets then known, [b] all assets then unknown, and [c] all ¹⁹² assets acquired during the marriage, subsequent to the alleged oral agreement? 2.

Did the circuit court err in finding that the parties entered into an oral agreement, unsupported by any writing, excluding all known, unknown, and subsequently acquired property from consideration as marital property? 3. Did the circuit court err in finding certain assets not to be marital property, even though the parties stipulated they were marital property? 4. Did the court err in finding that the assets appellee transferred to his family, after having an argument with appellant, came from assets which originated before the marriage? 5. Did the circuit court err in ruling that the appellant should be denied an equitable share of the marital home?

The Facts The parties were married in 1982 1 and divorced in 1995 based upon a two-year separation. When they married, each already owned property located in other jurisdictions. During the divorce proceedings, neither party claimed that these properties that they brought into the marriage were marital property. Both parties were employed during the marriage.

Each kept a separate bank account. Additionally, they established a joint account for household expenses. In 1984, the parties separated, with appellant moving to her District of Columbia residence, while appellee remained at his Virginia property. After efforts to reconcile were undertaken, appellee moved into appellant’s District of Columbia residence.

Shortly after the reconciliation, the parties purchased a home together in Maryland. They each kept their prior residences. Each party contributed $14,000 to the down payment of the marital home, which was located in Cheverly. During the ¹⁹³ period when the parties were reconciled, they shared proportionately in family expenses.

Difficulties again developed between the parties. Ultimately, appellant left the Maryland home and moved back into her District of Columbia residence; this litigation ensued, during which appellee alleged the existence of an oral agreement between the parties as to the disposition of the parties’ interests in marital property. The trial court opined: The nature of the financial arrangements between these parties is crucial to this case. The evidence is abundantly clear that before and after marriage, these parties, with the exception of the joint account for household expenses, handled their money and their investments as though unmarried.

Neither accounted to the other for expenditures nor investments nor loans nor gifts to third parties. Mrs. Golden loaned money to her brother for a car and to her aunt for a beauty shop. They each bought cars in their own names without input from the other, neither drove the cars belonging to the other. They kept separate bank accounts in their sole names, they attended different churches.

He has invested approximately $150,000 since the marriage, some of which came from previous investments, some from his Dale City rental, and some from marital wages. It is not possible to separate and identify which funds were marital.... Even if some of the assets accumulated by these parties are part marital, there is no accurate way to trace the source of funds from this evidence. Each was aware of the monetary gifts by the other to relatives.

No complaints were registered by either. Each kept their financial records inaccessible to the other.... After evaluating the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, this court specifically finds as a fact that at the time of and at all times thereafter, there was an agreement in place between these parties that their property was sole ¹⁹⁴ and separate, except for the marital home in Cheveriy, which is jointly owned. There was a specific intention that no other property, including pensions, was to be marital property, as evidenced by the manner in which they conducted their affairs.

Both parties relied on the agreement in investing and handling their financial affairs. The court does not find Mrs. Golden’s [appellant’s] assertions and claims to be credible. She asserts a “what’s mine is mine, and what’s yours is ours” mentality. Sec. 8-101 of the Family Law Article states that marital partners may make agreements respecting their property.

There is no requirement that such an agreement be in writing. The parties separated in 1993; the joint marital account was closed out four to five months prior to that when the wife stopped contributing. Since the separation, Mr. Golden [appellee], who remained in the Cheveriy house, has paid $35,800 on mortgage payments. Mrs. Golden has paid none.

He is entitled to Crawford payments as set forth hereafter. The plaintiff [appellant] did not satisfy this court by a preponderance of evidence, taken as a whole and evaluating the credibility of witnesses, that the items she claims as marital property are indeed marital property. To the contrary, the agreement between the parties shows there was no intention for any property except Cheveriy to be joint or marital. No acts nor contributions of either contributed to, detracted from, nor otherwise affected the pension or other monetary position of the other.

Had they not married, each would be in the same financial position in which they find themselves today. Because of the marriage they are both richer by one asset only—the Cheveriy house. The only evidence of any agreement between the parties to which we have been directed was their testimony. Appellant’s testimony included: Q. Now, what other [financial] arrangements did you and Mr. Golden make at the time [of the marriage]? ¹⁹⁵ A. We had a joint account that we contributed to ... for the expenses for the marriage.

Q. ... [H]ow long did that arrangement continue? A. Throughout the marriage. Q. Now, while you lived in Washington, what were the arrangements ... regarding ... family expenses? A. ... [H]e did contribute some toward the expenses ____ Q. Tell us what happened?

A. ... Gary [appellee] wanted us to move back to Dale City. I refused. I figured our problem was that when we were in his house, and he was saying, well, this is mine, this is mine, this is mine.

So, basically, I thought that we would have a chance, if we bought something together.... We would buy this house together. ... [I]t wouldn’t be a thing of mine or yours.... It would be ours[ ] together. She then testified as to their finances in respect to the Maryland house the parties bought together: A. In 1987 I was earning approximately $22,000.

A. He was earning approximately $57,000. A. ... I was paying something like $350 [monthly]. A. He was paying something like a thousand.

Q. And, why was there a difference? A. Because, his salary was much more than mine. Later, she testified further as to the overall financial arrangements during the marriage. She testified as to premari ¹⁹⁶ tal assets, including a settlement from a car accident in which she had been involved and in which her mother was killed.

She also testified as to the existence of a 401-K plan and her bank account. On cross-examination, the following colloquy took place: Q. You are aware of the fact that during that period [the five-year period before the parties’ marriage in 1982] that Mr. Golden was concerned about his finances, and he was very careful about how he spent money, correct? A. That I beg to differ. It changed radically.

Q. When you moved into the Dale City home [after the marriage], were you aware of how much the mortgage was on that home that Mr. Golden was paying? A. No.... Q. And, in fact with respect to your Washington D.C. property, Mr. Golden had nothing to do with the mortgage on there, did he? ... A. ... [I]t was just that it basically evolved that way.

He had his house. I had my house, and [he] paid his, and I paid mine. A. Yes. When [financial] situations would arise, we discussed them, and we decided how to handle them.

It wasn’t really like an agreement or a written agreement or verbal agreement I don’t think at this time. It just evolved that way. Later, she was cross-examined about deposition testimony she was supposed to have given: Q. And, you recall admitting at the time that his money was his, and your money was yours? A. No. I don’t recall saying that.

Q. And, in fact, there never was any suggestion ... that you both maintain all of your income in one account, was there? ¹⁹⁷ A. No, there wasn’t. A. I don’t know about our intentions. It just happened that way. Later, either continuing on cross or on redirect examination, she testified: [W]e could meet each other half and half, but he really did want this home.... 1 was telling him, listen, I don’t bring in but so much, so I wouldn’t be able to meet him, you know, half and half on this, and he was in agreement with this.

Later, on a continuation of cross-examination, she testified: Q. Now, the funds that went into that joint account, those were funds that you and Mr. Golden contributed yourself from your income. Is that correct? A. That’s correct. [Emphasis added.] Then, as to the properties each party owned prior to the marriage and maintained under separate ownership during the marriage, the following exchange occurred. Appellant was questioned initially about her Washington, D.C. residence: Q. But you had purchased that property in terms of the initial interest ... while you were not married to Mr. Golden.

Is that your testimony? A. That’s correct, I did. Q. And since the time that you have been married to him, you have been paying on the mortgage. Is that right?

A. That’s correct. Q. But you still consider that property to be your sole property? A. That is my sole property. Q. ...

And ... at some point during the marriage you were receiving rental income from that property? A. That’s correct. Q. And that rental income ... you put into your own separate account. Is that right?

A. That’s correct. ¹⁹⁸ A similar line of questioning as to Mr. Golden’s Virginia property was then put to appellant. After establishing that appellee paid the mortgage on that property, appellant was asked: Q. But by the same token, you agreed that that property was his sole property? A. Yes. Later, she was asked about her bank accounts and retirement accounts: Q. ... [Y]ou consider those funds to be your sole funds.

Isn’t that right? A. ... [TJhere’s a retirement account at Penn Mutual---- [T]hat’s the IRA. Q. And that was acquired upon your marriage to Mr. Golden. Is that right?

A. Part of it, because its direct from the retirement from—the little bit of retirement that I got from NBW, and I was hired at NBW in ’78. Q. So, a portion of it was acquired during your marriage and a portion of it before you got married? A. That’s correct. She was then questioned about other investments, some before the marriage, and was eventually asked: Q. As far as you were concerned, were those funds solely your money?

A. As far as I was concerned, yes. Q. And most of the money ... was acquired during your marriage. Isn’t that right? ... A. Yeah, I would say so.

The direction of the questioning of her then turned towards appellee’s assets: ¹⁹⁹ Q. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Golden anything about his retirement accounts? A. No, and he never did discuss anything about mine. A. ... [T]he way that it turned out, I already had accounts____ He had accounts, too---- As far as joining or what—it just evolved that way. If wasn’t this is mine or—I’m pretty sure