Maryland case law › Goldston v. Karukas

Goldston v. Karukas

180 Md. 232 (1942) · Court of Appeals of Maryland
Court of Appeals of MarylandDisposition: DismissedJOHNSON, J.✓ Good law
SummaryTwo actions arising from an August 30, 1940, accident in which John Goldston, Jr., an infant, was struck by a truck owned by James P. Karukas, trading as Oriole Baking Company. The infant, by his father and next friend, sued for damages; the father separately sued for hospitalization expenses. Both cases were tried without a jury in the Superior Court of Baltimore City on June 16, 1941, resulting in verdicts of $150 for the infant and $50 for the father. Plaintiffs appealed. The record came to the Court of Appeals without any bill of exceptions and without proper authentication. Appellants contended that under Rule 9(c) of the General Rules of Practice and Procedure, effective September 1, 1941, they were entitled to review on both the law and the evidence. The Court held that the rules effective September 1, 1941, did not govern cases tried and decided before their effective date. Becau
Questions presented
  • Whether the rules effective September 1, 1941, govern and control cases decided before their effective date, where the suits were tried June 16, 1941.
  • Whether, in an action ex delicto, a verdict less than the damages laid in the declaration is sufficient to support the plaintiffs' right of appeal.
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JOHNSON, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. On August 30, 1940, John Goldston, Jr., an infant, was struck and run into by an automobile truck owned by James P. Karukas, trading as Oriole Baking Company, to recover damages for which a suit was instituted in his name by his father and next friend. The father likewise instituted suit against the same defendant for expenses incident to hospitalization of his son. Both suits were filed in the Superior Court of Baltimore City, and the cases came on for trial without the aid of a jury.

The trial court heard the evidence, and in the former case gave a verdict of $150, while in the suit of the father the verdict was $50. From these verdicts below, the present appeals are prosecuted by the plaintiffs. This record comes to us without any bill of exceptions whatsoever, and without any proper authentication of the record, it being appellants’ claim and con 234 tention that on this state of the record he is by virtue of Rule 9(c) of the General Rules of Practice and Procedure, effective.September 1, 1941, entitled to have the judgments reviewed. The rule which he asserts is as follows: “(c) Appeal.

When a proceeding has been so tried by the court, an appeal from the judgment, if allowed by law, may be taken according to the practice in equity. Upon appeal the Court of Appeals may review upon both the law and the evidence, but the judgment of the trial court shall not be set aside on the evidence, unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses. The Court of Appeals may affirm, reverse, modify, or remand, as in appeals from equity.” Thus the issue is raised as to whether the rules effective September 1, 1941, govern and control cases decided before their effective date, as in these cases, the record shows the suits were tried June 16, 1941. Rule 9(a) provides that when such a proceeding is tried upon the facts by the court that the latter shall, after the trial, direct such judgment to be entered as it thinks right upon the evidence and the law, and shall dictate to the court stenographer, or prepare and file, a brief statement of the grounds for its decision, and the method of determining any damages awarded.

Of course, in the present cases this was not done, inasmuch as the rules- were not effective, and to justify us in reviewing the cases we would have to hold that even though the rules were not followed and could not be followed, because not effective, the appeals would still lie. , In other words, while the trial court acted under the 'law as then in force with reference to the trial of cases, we would have to hold that the new rutes which later come into effect bound the trial court retroactively. Another reason is suggested for dismissing the appeal in No. 85. The suit is an action ex delicto, and something more than a claim for damages laid in the narr in excess 235 of the amount actually awarded by the jury is necessary to the plaintiffs’ right of appeal. There must, in addition to a verdict less than the damages laid in the declaration, be error which is in proximate causative relation to the damages recoverable.

Since the rules under discussion have the force of law, there is no reason why they are not controlled by the same principles applicable to legislative enactments. The rule that all laws have a prospective effect unless the language employed indicates a contrary intention on the part of the legislature is here applicable, as retroactive statutes are not favored even when they do not conflict with vested or other rights guaranteed by the Constitution. And where a statute is susceptible of a prospective construction it is the policy of the courts to declare it to be such rather than retroactive, especially if by the latter manifest injury may be done. Nothing appears in the rule from which it could be concluded that it is intended to have a retroactive effect.

To hold otherwise would be equivalent to altering the pre-existing condition of the parties and would interfere with their antecedent rights. Savings Bank v. Weeks, 110 Md. 78, 72 A. 475 , 22 L. R. A., N. S. 221; Hemsley v. Hollingsworth, 119 Md. 431 , 87 A. 506 ; Van-diver v. Fidelity Savings Bank, 120 Md. 619, 87 A. 1086 ; Ellicott City Com’rs v. Howard County, 127 Md. 578 , 96 A. 798 ; Jehvons v. Pittman, 126 Md. 650 , 95 A. 1070 ; State v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 132 Md. 251 , 103 A. 435 ; Bartlett v. Ligon, 135 Md. 620 , 109 A. 473 ; Ireland v. Shipley, 165 Md. 90 , 166 A. 593 ; Dashiell v. Holland Maide Candy Shops, 171 Md. 72 , 188 A. 29 . There being then no bill of exceptions in either case and no proper certification of the record, there is nothing for the Appellate Court to review, and the appeals must be dismissed. Appeal in No. 85 dismissed, with costs.

Appeal in No. 86 dismissed, with costs.