Gomez v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc.

KENNEY, J. Petitioners, the Maryland Commissioner of Financial Regulation of the Department of Labor, Licensing & Regulation (“the Commissioner”) and the Consumer Protection Division of the Office of the Maryland Attorney General (“the Division”) have intervened in this case to challenge the ruling of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County granting the motion ¹³³ of respondent, Jackson Hewitt, Inc., to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim. 1 The Court of Special Appeals affirmed in Gomez v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 198 Md.App. 87 , 16 A.3d 261 (2011). On October 24, 2011, this Court granted certiorari. 2 Gomez v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 422 Md. 352 , 30 A.3d 193 (2011). In their brief, petitioners present two questions, which we have modified slightly and condensed into one: Does the Maryland Credit Services Businesses Act (“the CSBA”) apply to a tax preparer who receives payment from a lending bank for “facilitating” a consumer’s obtention of a refund anticipation loan (“RAL”), where the tax preparer receives no direct payment from the consumer for this service? For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND According to the February 4, 2009 complaint, respondent ¹³⁴ prepared Gomez’s 2006 federal income tax return, 3 and “obtained an extension of credit for ... Gomez in the form of a RAL[ 4 ] from [a] lender,” Santa Barbara Bank & Trust (“SBBT”), “in anticipation of her income tax refund.” Attached to the complaint were six pertinent documents: (1) the 8-K filing to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission filed by Jackson Hewitt Tax Service Inc.; (2) a “Program Agreement” between SBBT and respondent; (3) a “Technology Services Agreement” between SBBT and Jackson Hewitt Technology Services Inc. (“JHTSI”); (4) the “Taxpayer Information Form,” produced by the franchisee of respondent that prepared Gomez’s tax return; (5) the RAL “Application and Agreement,” between SBBT and Gomez; and (6) the RAL “Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA) Disclosure Form,” produced by SBBT. 5 According to the 8-K, Under the SBBT Program Agreement, SBBT will offer, process and administer certain financial products, including RALs, to customers of certain of [respondent’s] franchised and company owned Jackson Hewitt Tax Service locations (“the SBBT Program”). In connection with the SBBT Program Agreement, SBBT will pay [respondent] a fixed annual fee. Pursuant to the SBBT Technology Services Agreement, JHTSI will provide certain technology services and related support in connection with the SBBT Program. ¹³⁵ Under the SBBT Technology Services Agreement, JHTSI will receive a fixed annual fee as well as variable payments tied to growth in the SBBT Program.

The Program Agreement specifically states that respondent “(i) is the franchisor of the Jackson Hewitt Tax Service® tax preparation system to independently owned and operated franchisees ... and (ii) through Tax Service of America, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary, owns and operates Jackson Hewitt Tax Service locations.” It also provides: 6. [Respondent’s] Obligations and Procedures. [Respondent] agrees, in connection with the operation of the [RAL] Program, to: (i) conduct such advertising; (ii) prepare forms and other written materials; (iii) cause its offices to be equipped with computer equipment and hardware; (iv) maintain personnel; (v) train such personnel and EROs[ 6 ] with respect to the Program Protocols; and (vi) take such other actions, in each case as reasonably necessary to advertise and accommodate the facilitation of Financial Products to Applicants at its expense, as well as the following specific duties: 6.2 Application Process. [Respondent] shall require participating EROs to require that each Applicant (i) complete and sign an application in a form developed by SBBT and reviewed by [respondent] prior to each Tax Season ... which application may also include a loan agreement ... and a disclosure statement meeting the requirements of the federal Truth-in-Lending Act.... The Information Form indicates that Gomez had requested a RAL, lists $2,323.00 as her anticipated federal refund and $1950.97 as the “estimated amount of [her] RAL disbursement (this amount is net [of] all fees to be deducted from the loan and does not include any state refund amount ...),” and ¹³⁶ states that she owes $284.00 “to [her] Jackson Hewitt Tax Service office” for tax preparation services. The Application and Agreement explains that a “RAL is a loan from SBBT in the amount of all or part of your refund. Your refund is used to pay back the loan.” To accomplish that, the borrowers authorize SBBT to receive your income tax refund(s) on your behalf and to make disbursements from your refund(s) as authorized by this Agreement.

You authorize SBBT to establish a temporary deposit account (the “Account”) in your name for the purpose of receiving a direct deposit of your refund.... If and when SBBT receives your income tax refunds, you authorize SBBT to deduct from your Account an SBBT tax refund handling fee and any other amounts, fees and charges authorized by this Agreement. ... The Application and Agreement also states that “SBBT will pay compensation to [respondent] and an affiliate[ 7 ] ... in consideration of rights granted by [respondent] to SBBT and the performance of services by [respondent] on behalf of SBBT.” 8 The Disclosure Form reflects an “Annual Percentage Rate” of 85.089%, which is “[t]he cost of ... credit as a yearly rate.” It also lists $2,323.00 as the “Total Loan Amount,” which includes: • $1,950.97 as the “[a]mount paid directly to you;” • $284.00 as the “[t]ax preparation fees paid to” respondent; • $29.95 as the “SBBT tax refund account handling fee;” and • $58.08 as the “total prepaid finance charge (SBBT bank fee).” ¹³⁷ Asserting that respondent is a “credit services business” under the CSBA 9 , the complaint reasons that Gomez “indirectly ” paid respondent for arranging 10 the RAL, because the RAL “included in its principal amount” the $284.00 tax preparation fee, which the complaint describes as “the cost of obtaining this extension of credit[.]” 11 The complaint also reasons that respondent “received money from ... SBBT in connection with the extension of credit to” Gomez, 12 and alleges violations of the CSBA, Md.Code Ann., Com.

Law (“CL”), § 14-1901 et seq. and the Maryland Consumer Protec ¹³⁸ tion Act (“the CPA”), id. § 13-301 et seq. 13 More specifically, the complaint states that respondent failed: (1) “to obtain a license from the Commissioner ... as is required by” § 14-1902 of the CSBA; (2) “to obtain a surety bond as required by” § 14-1908; and (3) “to provide [Gomez] with the documents and disclosures required by” §§ 14-1904 to -1906, “including but not limited to the buyer’s rights and other disclosures” and “detachable copies of a notice of cancellation and a contract with the necessary inclusions.” Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. It acknowledges that, “[i]n exchange for being permitted to offer its products in [respondent’s] offices, in 2006 ... [SBBT] agreed to pay [respondent] a fixed fee,” but asserts that Gomez made a payment for the RAL only to SBBT and “did not pay anything of value to [respondent] in exchange for receiving credit services.” Because respondent did not receive direct payment from Gomez for credit services, respondent asserts that she “failed to state a claim under the CSBA as a ‘consumer’ who purchased services from a ‘credit services business.’ ” Respondent adds that Gomez’s “interpretation of the CSBA would lead to absurd results in applying the statute to tremendous numbers of retailers throughout Maryland who have never registered under the CSBA.” On June 18, 2009, the Circuit Court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss, and on June 23, 2009, the court filed a Memorandum Opinion and Order. The court determined that the definitions “credit services business” in § 14-1901(e) and “consumer” in § 14-1901(c) of the CSBA were ambiguous “because the language can be read in a number of different ways.” Turning to the legislative history, the court concluded that the General Assembly enacted the CSBA to regulate credit repair agencies, and not RAL facilitators: ¹³⁹ It is manifest that the reason why the General Assembly passed the CSBA was to protect unsuspecting Marylanders from credit repair agencies who offered to “fix” their credit rating, or to obtain loans for the credit impaired customer, in exchange for a fee. The CSBA simply was neither intended nor designed to cover firms engaged in the business of selling goods or services to their customers, when such goods or services are not aimed at improving one’s credit rating.

Nor was it intended to cover the extension of credit by a third-party, not privy to the primary transaction, which is ancillary to the customer’s purchase of the goods or services provided by the merchant.... [Gomez] is [sic] this case neither had a contract with [respondent] in return for credit services nor a contract for the extension of credit. The documents appended to her complaint make it clear that her contract in this regard was with SBBT and that the fee she paid for the extension of credit was paid by her to SBBT. The only fee [Gomez] was obligated to pay to [respondent] was the $284.00 she agreed to pay for the preparation of her income tax returns. Accordingly, the Circuit Court dismissed the CSBA claim for failure to state a claim, and dismissed the CPA claim because it was “dependant upon a cognizable [CSBA] claim.” Gomez noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.

That court affirmed the Circuit Court, reasoning that [t]he plain meaning of the [CSBA] ... supports [respondent’s] position and we think the legislative history undergirding the enactment of CSBA and subsequent amendments indicates that the General Assembly did not contemplate the statute’s application to businesses such as [RAL facilitators]. Gomez v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 198 Md.App. 87, 94 , 16 A.3d 261, 265 (2011). The intermediate appellate court held, based on the analysis of an analogous credit services statute in Midstate Siding & Window Co. v. Rogers, 204 Ill.2d 314 , 273 Ill.Dec. 816 , 789 N.E.2d 1248 , (2003), that ¹⁴⁰ the words “in return” suggest that the business to which the [CSBA] applies will receive payment from the consumer for credit services, here, the extension of credit. Like Midstate, respondent “sells a service — income tax preparation — and that is the only service that [Gomez] paid [respondent] to perform.” Gomez, 198 Md.App. at 110-11 , 16 A.3d at 275 (emphasis added).

The Court of Special Appeals’s examination of the legislative history of the CSBA revealed that “all indications [are] that the General Assembly understood its original 1987 enactment of the CSBA to be for the purpose of regulating credit repair agencies who take fees from consumers to improve or extend credit, or to give advice or assistance in such matters.” Id. at 113 , 16 A.3d at 277 (emphasis added). As to the 2001 and 2002 amendments to the CSBA, the legislative history indicated that those amendments were “primarily aimed at ‘payday loans,’ ” from which the court concluded that neither “the amendments [n]or the legislative history indicate that the General Assembly ever contemplated regulating a business engaged in income tax return preparation that acts as a facilitator to permit a customer to pay a third party for a RAL.” Id. at 116-17 , 16 A.3d at 277-78 . As to two Advisory Notices, dated January 24, 2005 and May 15, 2008, issued by the Commissioner and interpreting the CSBA to apply to RAL facilitators, the Court of Special Appeals determined that, under the standard for judicial deference to agency interpretations established in Marriott Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Motor Vehicle Administration, 346 Md. 437 , 697 A.2d 455 (1997), [t]he Advisory Notices ... fail to disclose the methods that the Commissioner employed in interpreting the CSBA to apply to tax preparers involved with RALs. It is [also] undisputed that this interpretation was not reached through any kind of adversarial process.

Moreover, the interpretation, in our view, contradicts the plain language of the ¹⁴¹ statute. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in failing to accord great deference to the Commissioner’s interpretation. Gomez, 198 Md.App. at 120-21 , 16 A.3d at 281 . The court was not persuaded by an opinion of the Office of the Attorney General, 79 Md. Op.

Att’y Gen. 98 (1994), which it described as “addressing a substantially different set of facts” from those in the instant case, in which “application of the CSBA was not the focus.... ” Gomez, 198 Md.App. at 119 n. 6, 16 A.3d at 280 n. 6. Finally, “[i]n light of the uncertainty as to whether tax preparers involved in RALs were intended to be covered by § 14-1901 of the CSBA,” the court said, “we find consonant with our determination, the fact that the legislature deemed it propitious to enact C.L. § 14-3806(b),” id. at 122 n. 8, 16 A.3d at 282 n. 8, part of new subtitle 38 in Section 14 of the Commercial Law Article (the “2010 RAL legislation”), which was “specifically aimed at regulating tax preparers involved in facilitating RALs.” Id. at 121 , 16 A.3d at 281 . According to the court, this “clarif[ying]” legislation, enacted by 2010 Md. Laws, ch. 730, “directly addresses both direct and indirect payments to the tax preparer” by prohibiting tax preparers from charging fees to their clients who obtain RALs that exceed fees charged to clients who do not obtain RALs. Id. at 122 n. 8, 16 A.3d at 282 n. 8.

As the court saw it, based on the legislative history, it appears that the General Assembly’s decision to create the new provisions was prompted by the Commissioner’s erroneous interpretation of the CSBA [as applying to RAL facilitators] because it enacted provisions that expressly define refund anticipation loans and the roles that facilitators of those loans play, provide for disclosures to the consumer, prohibit specific acts relating to fees and misrepresentations and provide that a violation is an unfair or deceptive trade practice under the [CPA].... While this enactment does not provide the basis for our construction of ¹⁴² the CSBA, we believe it further supports our interpretation of the General Assembly’s intent with regard to the CSBA. Id. at 123-24 , 16 A.3d at 282 . DISCUSSION Standard of Review We review de novo both the grant of a motion to dismiss, Reichs Ford Rd.

Joint Venture v. State Rds. Comm’n of the State Highway Admin., 388 Md. 500, 509 , 880 A.2d 307, 312 (2005), and the interpretation of a statute, Gleneagles, Inc. v. Hanks, 385 Md. 492, 496 , 869 A.2d 852, 854-55 (2005). This Court has said, [Considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a court must assume the truth of, and view in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, all well-pleaded facts and allegations contained in the complaint, as well as all inferences that may reasonably be drawn from them, and order dismissal only if the allegations and permissible inferences, if true, would not afford relief to the plaintiff, i.e., the allegations do not state a cause of action for which relief may be granted. RRC Northeast, LLC v. BAA Md., Inc., 413 Md. 638, 643 , 994 A.2d 430, 433 (2010) (citations omitted).

The grant of a motion to dismiss may be affirmed on “any ground adequately shown by the record, whether or not relied upon by the trial court.” Parks v. Alpharma, Inc., 421 Md. 59 , 65 n. 4, 25 A.3d 200 , 203 n. 4 (2011) (citation omitted). Legal Analysis Petitioners argue that both the “unambiguous” plain language of the CSBA and its legislative history support the application of the CSBA to respondent. They also cite other extrinsic aids, such as the 2010 RAL legislation, to support their argument. ¹⁴³ According to the “well-recognized rules of statutory construction,” Brooks v. Hous. Auth., 411 Md. 603, 621 , 984 A.2d 836, 846-47 (2009), [o]ur primary goal is “ ‘to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by a particular provision!.]’ ” Anderson v. Council of Unit Owners of the Gables on Tuckerman Condo., 404 Md. 560, 571 , 948 A.2d 11, 18 (2008) (quoting Barbre v. Pope, 402 Md. 157, 172 , 935 A.2d 699, 708 (2007)).

We first look at the “normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute,” Anderson, 404 Md. at 571 , 948 A.2d at 18 , and we read it as a whole so that “ ‘no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory!.]’ ” [I]d. (quoting Barbre, 402 Md. at 172 , 935 A.2d at 708 ). “If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statute’s provisions and our analysis ends.” Id. at 572, 948 A.2d at 19 . Section 14-1901 of the CSBA states in pertinent part: (c) Consumer. — “Consumer” means any individual who is solicited to purchase or who purchases for personal, family, or household purposes the services of a credit services business. (e) Credit services business. — (1) “Credit services business” means any person who, with respect to the extension of credit by others, sells, provides, or performs, or represents that such person can or will sell, provide, or perform, any of the following services in return for the payment of money or other valuable consideration: (i) Improving a consumer’s credit record, history, or rating or establishing a new credit file or record; (ii) Obtaining an extension of credit for a consumer; or (iii) Providing advice or assistance to a consumer with regard to either subparagraph (i) or (ii) of this paragraph.

(2) “Credit services business” includes a person who sells or attempts to sell written mateiials containing information ¹⁴⁴ that the person represents will enable a consumer to establish a new credit file or record. (3) “Credit services business” does not include: (i) Any person authorized to make loans or extensions of credit under the laws of this State or the United States who is actively engaged in the business of making loans or other extensions of credit to residents of this State; (ii) Any bank, trust company, savings bank, or savings and loan association whose deposits or accounts are eligible for insurance by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or any credit union organized and chartered under the laws of this State or the United States; (iii) Any nonprofit organization exempt from taxation under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code ( 26 U.S.C. § 501 (c)(3)); (iv) Any person licensed as a real estate broker by this State where the person is acting within the course and scope of that license; (v) Any person licensed as a mortgage lender by this State; (vi) An individual admitted to the Bar of the Court of Appeals of Maryland when the individual renders services within the course and scope of practice by the individual as a lawyer and does not engage in the credit services business on a regular and continuing basis; (vii) Any broker-dealer registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Commodity Futures Trading Commission where the broker-dealer is acting within the course and scope of that regulation; (viii) Any consumer reporting agency as defined in the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act ( 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 -1681t) or in § 14-1201(e) of this title; or (ix) An individual licensed by the Maryland Board of Public Accountancy when the individual renders services within the course and scope of practice by the individual as a certified public accountant and does not engage in the credit services business on a regular and continuing basis. ¹⁴⁵ (f) Extension of credit. — “Extension of credit” means the right to defer payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its payment, offered or granted primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. (g) Person. — “Person” includes an individual, corporation, government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, statutory trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, 2 or more persons having a joint or common interest, and any other legal or commercial entity. (Emphasis added.) A “credit services business” must, inter alia, secure a license from the Commissioner of Financial Regulation, CL § 14-1903(b), 14 provide the consumer with a written information statement, id. § 14-1904 to -1905, include certain provisions in the contract with the consumer, id. § 14-1906, and maintain a surety bond.

Id. § 14-1908 to -1909. “A credit services business, its employees, and independent contractors[ 15 ] who sell or attempt to sell the services of a credit services business shall not[:]” (1) Receive any money or other valuable consideration from the consumer, unless the credit services business has secured from the Commissioner a license under Title 11, Subtitle 3 of the Financial Institutions Article; (2) Receive any money or other valuable consideration solely for referral of the consumer to a retail seller or to any ¹⁴⁶ other credit grantor who will or may extend credit to the consumer, if the credit extended to the consumer is substantially the same terms as those available to the general public; (3) Make, or assist or advise any consumer to make, any statement or other representation that is false or misleading, or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known to be false or misleading, to a consumer reporting agency, government agency, or person to whom the consumer applies or intends to apply for an extension of credit, regarding a consumer’s creditworthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, or true identity; (4) Make or use any false or misleading representations in the offer or sale of the services of a credit services business; (5) Engage, directly or indirectly, in any act, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deception on any person in connection with the offer or sale of the services of a credit services business; (6) Charge or receive any money or other valuable consideration prior to full and complete performance of the services that the credit services business has agreed to perform for or on behalf of the consumer; (7) Charge or receive any money or other valuable consideration in connection with an extension of credit that, when combined with any interest charged on the extension of credit, would exceed the interest rate permitted for the extension of credit under the applicable title of this article; (8) Create, assist a consumer to create, or provide a consumer with information on how to create, a new consumer report, credit file, or credit record by obtaining and using a different name, address, telephone number, Social Security number, or employer tax identification number; or (9) Assist a consumer to obtain an extension of credit at a rate of interest which, except for federal preemption of State law, would be prohibited under Title 12 of this article. ¹⁴⁷ Id. § 14-1902 (emphasis added). “Any contract for services from a credit services business that does not comply with the applicable provisions” of the CSBA is “void and unenforceable as contrary to the public policy of this Statef.]” Id. § 14-1907(b). While neither expressly disputing nor conceding that its role in a RAL is covered by § 14 — 1901(e)(l)(i—iii), respondent argues that, 16 based on the plain language of the CSBA, it does not qualify as a “credit services business” 17 because it does not, under the language of § 14 — 1901(e)(1), offer its purported credit services “in return for the payment of money or other valuable consideration,” ie., it is not paid directly by the consumer. (Emphasis added.) That it does not is recognized by the statement in Gomez’s complaint that she “indirectly ” paid respondent for arranging the RAL loan. (Emphasis added.) Petitioners disagree that the CSBA requires direct payment, reminding us that “[a] court may neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute; nor may it construe the statute with forced or subtle interpretations that limit or extend its application.” Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 387 , 835 A.2d 1221, 1226 (2003) (citation omitted).

They point out that § 14-1906 states in pertinent part: (a) Requirements. — Every contract between a consumer and a credit sendees business tor the purchase of the services of the credit services business shall be in writing, dated, signed by the consumer, and shall include: ¹⁴⁸ (2) The terras and conditions of payment, including the total of all payments to be made by the consumer, whether to the credit services business or to some other person[.] (Emphasis added.) Petitioners assert that § 14-1906(a)(2) “expressly recognizes that payment may flow from the consumer directly to a third party, as in this case to a bank that has a contractual arrangement with” respondent, and supports “the conclusion that the direct payment from the consumer to the business is not a prerequisite to finding that the business is a credit services business.... ” According to petitioners, “the Court of Special Appeals incorrectly read into the statute” this very prerequisite. In support of its position, respondent refers us to Midstate Siding & Window Co. v. Rogers, 204 Ill.2d 314 , 273 Ill.Dec. 816 , 789 N.E.2d 1248 (2003), while petitioners refer us to Harper v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 227 W.Va. 142 , 706 S.E.2d 63 (2010) and Fugate v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 347 S.W.3d 81 (Mo.App.2011). 18 These cases involve similar credit services statutes from other states and reach different conclusions. In Midstate, Midstate, a home remodeling business, contracted with Mr. and Mrs. Rogers to provide work on their home. Unwilling to proceed with the work “without assis ¹⁴⁹ tance in obtaining an extension of credit,” id. at 322, 273 Ill.Dec. at 822 , 789 N.E.2d at 1254 , Mr. and Mrs. Rogers filled out a credit application, which Midstate forwarded to Bank One, Illinois, N.A., which agreed to provide Mr. and Mrs. Rogers a home equity loan. 19 It was Midstate’s position that it forwarded the credit application gratuitously.

Later, Midstate sued Mr. and Mrs. Rogers for breach of contract when they refused to allow Midstate to perform work on the home. In their answer, Mr. and Mrs. Rogers stated that the contract violated the Illinois Credit Services Act, 815 111. Comp. Stat. Ann. 605/1 el seq., and filed a counterclaim alleging that Midstate had indicated that it “would obtain financing for the Rogers and/or provide advice or assistance to ¹⁵⁰ the Rogers in obtaining an extension of credit.” Midstate, 204 Ill.2d at 317 , 273 Ill.Dec. at 818 , 789 N.E.2d at 1250 .

According to the counterclaim, “Midstate failed to describe the services [it] was to provide in obtaining the extension of credit,” in violation of the Illinois Credit Services Act. Id. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the Illinois Credit Services Act 20 is aimed at credit repair, and “is not intended to regulate retailers primarily engaged in the business of selling goods and services to their customers.” Id. at 324 , 273 Ill.Dec. at 823 , 789 N.E.2d at 1255 . “Looking to the definition of a ‘Buyer’ and the definition of a ‘[c]redit [s]ervices [organization,’ ” id. at 321 , 273 Ill.Dec. at 821 , 789 N.E.2d at 1253 , the court reasoned that [t]he Credit Services Act requires that the credit services organization, in return, for the payment of money or other valuable consideration, agree to provide, or represent that it will provide, credit services to the buyer.... Thus, the Credit Services Act requires payment for credit services, not simply payment for other goods or services.

Id. at 322 , 273 Ill.Dec. at 821 , 789 N.E.2d at 1253-54 (emphasis added). Because “[t]he contract at issue does not provide for payment of money or other valuable consideration in return for credit services provided by Midstate,” the statute did not apply. Id. 21 ¹⁵¹ In Harper v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., Hunter, like Gomez in the instant case, “hired Jackson Hewitt to prepare her federal income tax return ... and in the process, purchased a [RAL].... Hunter claimed that she allowed Jackson Hewitt to forward her application for the RAL, along with her tax return, to [SBBT]....” 227 W.Va. 142, 145 , 706 S.E.2d 63, 66 (2010).

She filed a class action suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, alleging, inter alia, that Jackson Hewitt had violated West Virginia’s credit services statute. 22 The federal court certified four questions to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, including: “Does a tax preparer who receives compensation, either directly from the borrower or in the form of payments from the lending bank, for helping a borrower obtain a refund anticipation loan meet the statutory definition of a credit services organization” under West Virginia’s credit services statute? Id. at 147 , 706 S.E.2d at 68 . 23 Noting that the statute did not expressly require that a consumer must pay the credit services organization “directly,” id. at 150 , 706 S.E.2d at 71 , the court concluded that [wjhether the Legislature intended to require direct payment or not, the plain and broad sweeping language contained in the statute leads us to no other possible conclusion. Accordingly, we find that a tax preparer who receives compensation, either directly from the borrower or in the form of payments from the lending bank, for helping a borrower obtain a RAL meets the statutory definition of a ¹⁵² credit services organization under W. Va.Code § 46A-6C-2(a). Id.

(emphasis added). Nevertheless, the court “encourage[d] the Legislature to amend the provisions of W. Va.Code § 46A-6C-1, et seq., to provide a clarification of the” credit services statute. Id. at 151 n. 12, 706 S.E.2d at 72 n. 12. Petitioners contend that West Virginia’s credit services statute “contains a definition of [‘jcredit services organization[’j that is essentially identical to [‘jcredit services businessf’j under Maryland’s CSBA,” and therefore Harper should be considered persuasive authority.

Respondent argues, in turn, that Harper was wrongly decided without the benefit of the statute’s legislative history. Respondent also finds support in the Court of Special Appeals’s comment on the Harper court’s encouragement of legislative clarification: [Hjaving rendered a cursory disposition of the issue, obviously concerned that the statute needed clarification — notwithstanding its unequivocal decision, [the court] “encouraged” the West Virginia legislature to provide a clarification of the CSOA to explicate the application, vel non, of the CSOA to entities like Jackson Hewitt. Gomez v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 198 Md.App. 87 , 122 n. 8, 16 A.3d 261 , 282 n. 8 (2011). According to respondent, this statement recognizes the “contradiction” between the Harper court’s holding and its encouragement of legislative clarification, and that “[sjurely, if the West Virginia credit services organization act were unambiguous, there would be no need for the Legislature to clarify it to avoid the absurd results that the West Virginia Supreme Court undoubtedly recognizes.” In Fugate v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., Jackson Hewitt prepared Fugate’s federal income tax return, and, according to the complaint, “obtained an extension of credit for her in the form of a” RAL from SBBT. 347 S.W.3d 81, 83 (Mo.App.2011).

As described by the Court of Appeals of Missouri, Fugate filed her petition for a class action against Jackson Hewitt two years after the RAL transaction. In Count I of her petition, Fugate contended that, because Jackson Hew ¹⁵³ itt obtained an extension of credit for her, Jackson Hewitt was a credit services organization pursuant to [Missouri’s credit services organizations statute].[ 24 ] Fugate alleged that, as a credit services organization, Jackson Hewitt was required to comply with certain statutory requirements but failed to do so. Id. at 83-84 . The court, reversing a lower court’s dismissal of the complaint, explained: The plain and ordinary meaning of “purchase” is “to obtain (as merchandise) by paying money or its equivalent: buy for a price.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 1844 (1993).

This dictionary definition of “purchase” requires that the recipient of goods, or in this case, services, pay money or other consideration for obtaining such services. It also requires that the provider of services receive payment for such services. It does not, however, require a direct payment from the recipient to the provider for the services. Nothing in section 407.635(l)’s definition of a “buyer” requires that the payment from the buyer to the credit services organization be a direct payment.

Similarly, nothing in section 407.637.1’s definition of a “credit services organization” as a person who provides services “in return for the payment of money or other valuable consideration” requires that it be a direct payment. ¹⁵⁴ Jackson Hewitt notes that the dictionary definition of the phrase “in return” is “to give or perform in return: repay” and “to respond in kind.” Although Jackson Hewitt argues that this language contemplates only a direct exchange of payment for services between the buyer and the credit services organization, we do not read it so narrowly. As long as the credit services organization provides services to the buyer, the buyer pays for those services, and the credit services organization receives payment for the services, section 407.637.1 is satisfied. There is nothing explicit or implicit in the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase “in return” that requires a direct payment from the buyer to the credit services organization. Id. at 86 (emphasis added).

We shall assume that respondent “provides] advice or assistance to a consumer with regard to ... [obtaining an extension of credit for a consumer.” CL § 14 — 1901(e)(l)(ii)— (iii). That said, to be subject to the CSBA, that “advice or assistance” must be provided “in return for the payment of money or other valuable consideration[.]” Id. § 14-1901(e) (emphasis added). Merriavu-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 998-99 (10th ed. 2000) defines “return” in part as “in return: in compensation or repayment” and “to give or perform in return: REPAY.” In the context of the CSBA and § 14-190.1(e), “in return” can reasonably be understood to envision an exchange of assistance for payment between the consumer and the provider of that assistance and to mean that any payment to the credit services business for such assistance in obtaining the extension of credit must come directly from the consumer. This understanding of § 14-1901 is consistent with § 14-1902(1), which prohibits a credit services business from “[r]eceiv[ing] any money or other valuable consideration from the consumer; unless the credit services business has secured from the Commissioner a license under Title 11, Subtitle 3 of the Financial Institutions Article[.]” (Emphasis added.) This provision suggests that it is the receipt of payment from the consumer that is necessary for an entity to ¹⁵⁵ qualify as a credit services business. 25 Here, Gomez made no payment to respondent for credit services; whatever respondent received for its involvement in her RAL came from SBBT.

If respondent is not a “credit services business,” then Gomez is not a “consumer” under the CSBA. See CL § 14-1901(c) (“ ‘Consumer’ means any individual who is solicited to purchase or who purchases for personal, family, or household purposes the services of a credit services business.”) (emphasis added). Petitioners argue that, “[h]ad the General Assembly intended to exclude RAL facilitators from coverage under the CSBA, it easily could have done so by including such entities in the nine enumerated exceptions,” set forth in § 14-1901(e)(3), to the definition of “credit services business.” “That the legislature did not indicates its intent that the credit services organization statutes apply to such entities.” Id. at 88. Petitioners observe that tax preparers are not included among the enumerated exemptions, and that some credit services statutes in other states expressly exempt RAL facilitators under certain circumstances.

See, e.g., 24 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 132 (exempting “any person authorized to file electronic income tax returns who does not receive any consideration for refund anticipation loans”). They conclude, referring to this Court’s comment in Ferrero Constr. Co. v. Dennis Rourke Corp., 311 Md. 560, 575 , 536 A.2d 1137, 1144 (1988), that “[w]hen the legislature has expressly enumerated certain exceptions to a principle, courts normally should be reluctant thereafter to create additional exceptions.” They contend that “[s]uch reasoning is in keep ¹⁵⁶ ing with another maxim of statutory construction: expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another).” Leppo v. State Highway Admin., 330 Md. 416, 423 , 624 A.2d 539, 543 (1993).

We are not persuaded that this interpretation of the CSBA creates an “additional exception[ ]” from coverage under the statute for RAL facilitators who are not paid directly by the consumer. Presumably, were they not exempted, any of the entities listed under § 14-1901(e)(3) could be covered by the CSBA if they met the definition of “credit services business” provided by § 14 — 1901(e)(l)(i)—(iii). Rather than specifically “exempting” RAL facilitators from the CSBA, this interpretation would simply mean that tax preparers who do not receive payment directly from the consumer are not a “credit services business.” Nor are we persuaded that the enumerated exceptions necessitate an inclusion of anything not contained on that list. “[N]ot all statutory enumerations are limited by” the canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Potomac Abatement, Inc. v. Sanchez, 424 Md. 701, 712 , 37 A.3d 972, 978 (2012). “[T]his particular canon of construction should be applied with extreme caution, as ‘[it] is not a rule of law, but merely an auxiliary rule of statutory construction applied to assist in determining the intention of the Legislature where such intention is not manifest from the language used.’ ” Breslin v. Powell, 421 Md. 266 , 26 A.3d 878, 895 (2011) (quoting Walzer v. Osborne, 395 Md. 563, 579 , 911 A.2d 427, 436 (2006)).

When engaged in statutory construction and the pursuit of legislative intent, we consider the provision under review “in light of the statutory scheme.” Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 129 , 756 A.2d 987, 995 (2000), in an effort to avoid an illogical result. It appears to us that many provisions of the CSBA do not logically apply to RAL facilitators. 26 ¹⁵⁷ For example, § 14-1902(3) states that a credit services business shall not [m]ake, or assist or advise any consumer to make, any statement or other representation that is false or misleading, or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known to be false or misleading, to a consumer reporting agency, government agency, or person to whom the consumer applies or intends to apply for an extension of credit, regarding a consumer’s creditworthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, or true identity!)] It is unclear how this subsection would readily apply to a RAL facilitator. At the heart of a RAL is a tax refund that is intended to secure the loan. It is illogical to think that the General Assembly was concerned that a tax preparer would falsely generate or represent a tax refund.

Similarly, § 14-1904 requires a credit services business to provide the consumer with a written information statement, which, under § 14-1905(a), must contain: (1) An accurate statement of the consumer’s right to review any file on the consumer maintained by any consumer reporting agency, and the right of the consumer to receive a copy of a consumer report containing all information in that file as provided under the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. § 1681g) and under § 14-1206 of this title; (2) A statement that a copy of the consumer report containing all information in the consumer’s file will be furnished free of charge by the consumer reporting agency if requested by the consumer within 30 days of receiving a notice of a denial of credit as provided under the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. § 1681j) and under § 14-1209 of this title; (3) A statement that a nominal charge not to exceed $5 may be imposed on the consumer by the consumer reporting agency for a copy of the consumer report containing all the information in the consumer’s file, if the consumer has not been denied credit within 30 days from receipt of the consumer’s request; ¹⁵⁸ (4) A complete and accurate statement of the consumer’s right to dispute the completeness or accuracy of any item on the consumer contained in any file that is maintained by any consumer reporting agency, as provided under the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. § 1681i) and under § 14-1208 of this title; (5) A complete and detailed description of the services to be performed by the credit services business for or on behalf of the consumer, and the total amount the consumer will have to pay for the services; and (6) A statement that accurately reported information may not be permanently removed from the file of a consumer reporting agency. With the exception of section (5), such provisions are more clearly applicable to consumers seeking to improve or repair their credit score. As respondent points out, “[t]here is nothing in these provisions that ... contemplates RAL transactions.” Section 14-1906 states: (a) Requirements. — Every contract between a consumer and a credit services business for the purchase of the services of the credit services business shall be in writing, dated, signed by the consumer, and shall include: (3) A complete and detailed description of the services to be performed and the results to be achieved by the credit services business for or on behalf of the consumer, including all guarantees and all promises of full or partial refunds and a list of the adverse information appearing on the consumer’s credit report that the credit services business expects to have modified and the estimated date by which each modification will occur[.] Certainly, respondent has no control over the consumer’s credit report and has not been engaged to modify that report. Finally, when “seeking to ascertain legislative intent, [a court] may consider the consequences resulting from one ¹⁵⁹ meaning rather than another, and adopt that construction which avoids an illogical or unreasonable result, or one which is inconsistent with common sense.” Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Ins.

Co., 308 Md. 69, 75 , 517 A.2d 730, 732 (1986); see also Briggs v. State, 413 Md. 265, 275 , 992 A.2d 433, 439 (2010). Again, as pointed out by respondent, under petitioners’ interpretation of the CSBA, many “mainstream businesses across Maryland” which “routinely offer assistance to customers with applications for credit offered by third-party banks in exchange for compensation from the banks” may fall under the purview of the CSBA, including “department stores, electronic retailers, big box retailers, bookstores, gas stations!, and] clothing retailers.” In sum, we are persuaded that the most logical reading of the CSBA as a whole is that it was not intended to regulate RAL facilitators who do not receive compensation directly from the consumer. But, even if we assume that petitioners’ interpretation is not unreasonable, a review of the legislative history, along with other extrinsic aids, confirms that view. 27 As this Court recently said in Brooks v. Hous. Auth., 411 Md. 603, 621 , 984 A.2d 836, 847 (2009), [i]f the language [of a statute] can be subject to more than one interpretation, or if the terms are ambiguous when part of a larger statutory scheme, “we endeavor to resolve that ambiguity by looking to the statute’s legislative history, case law, statutory purpose, as well as the structure of the statute.” [Anderson v. Council of Unit Owners of the Gables on Tuckerman Condo., 404 Md. 560, 572 , 948 A.2d 11, 19 (2008) ].

The language should not be interpreted in isolation when the statute is part of a larger statutory scheme. Id. We analyze the statute as a whole considering the “ ‘purpose, aim, or policy of the enacting body.’ ” Id. ¹⁶⁰ (quoting Serio v. Baltimore County, 384 Md. 373, 389 , 863 A.2d 952, 961 (2004)). Moreover, even when we believe that the language of the statute renders legislative intent clear, it is appropriate to examine the legislative history as a confirmatory process.

See Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 131 , 756 A.2d 987, 993 (2000). To support its view that the CSBA does not apply to RAL facilitators, respondent contends that the legislative history surrounding the 1987 legislation enacting the CSBA, H.B. 472, demonstrates that the CSBA intended to regulate “credit repair agencies,” not RAL facilitators. H.B. 472’s “Statement of Purpose” provides: FOR the purpose of providing certain protections to the consumers of credit services business; requiring credit services businesses to provide certain information to customers; establishing certain requirements for contracts between credit services businesses and consumers; requiring a surety bond or trust account in certain circumstances; defining certain terms; providing certain civil and criminal penalties; providing administrative remedies; providing certain limitation periods; making provisions of this Act severable; and generally relating to the regulation of credit services businesses. 1987 Md. Laws, ch. 469. The “Background” section of the House of Delegates Floor Report on H.B. 472 states, Proponents claim that some credit services businesses, or “credit repair agencies ” have engaged in unfair and deceptive practices.

They claim that the agencies frequently cannot deliver the services offered or the services offered are such that they can be performed by the customer with little effort. According to the [C]ommissioner ... there are at least six credit repair agencies operating in this state. The agencies are subject to the [CPA], but are not otherwise regulated. (Emphasis added.) The bill file also includes several letters from supporters of H.B. 472 — including the Office of Consumer Affairs of Mont ¹⁶¹ gomery County, the Consumer Credit Association of Greater Washington, and the consumer reporting agency TRW, Inc.— stating that the bill targeted “credit repair agencies.” And there are, as described by the Court of Special Appeals, “multiple newspaper articles in the bill file decrying the practices of credit repair agencies that improperly lead consumers to believe that they can offer a ‘quick fix’ to credit problems and rehabilitate poor credit records.” Gomez v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 198 Md.App. 87 , 112 n. 4, 16 A.3d 261 , 276 n. 4 (2011).

Petitioners argue, focusing on the disjunctive “or” in the “Summary” section of the House of Delegates Floor Report on H.B. 472, 28 nestled between “obtaining an extension of credit” and “providing advice about either,” that it indicates the General Assembly’s intent to target more than “credit services businesses which accept fees for attempting to improve a consumer’s credit record,” i.e., “credit repair services.” 29 We, however, agree with the Court of Special Appeals that the “documents in the bill file make clear that the General Assembly enacted the CSBA in response to concerns about predatory practices and misleading advertising of ‘credit repair organizations,’ ” id. at 112, 16 A.3d at 276 (emphasis added), and that “the General Assembly understood its original 1987 enactment of the CSBA to be for the purpose of regulating credit repair agencies who take fees from consumers to improve or extend credit, or to give advice or assistance ¹⁶² in such matters.” Id. at 113 , 16 A.3d at 277 (emphasis added). 30 For example, [the “Background” section of the Floor Report] confirms that, in enacting the CSBA, the General Assembly intended to target “credit repair agencies.” In other words, the legislature sought to regulate those in the business of claiming to offer services to improve a consumer’s credit or otherwise extending credit in exchange for a fee paid by consumers. As we see it, this language denotes an intent, on the part of the legislature,