Gonzalez v. State

Antonio E. Gonzalez v. State of Maryland, No. 23, September Term, 2023 IMPEACHMENT – IMMIGRATION STATUS – U VISA APPLICATION – MARYLAND RULE 5-616(a)(4) – SUFFICIENT FACTUAL FOUNDATION – PROBATIVE VALUE VERSUS DANGER OF UNDUE PREJUDICE OR CONFUSION – HARMLESS ERROR – Supreme Court of Maryland held that trial court erred in determining that defendant failed to establish sufficient factual foundation for cross-examination of witness, who was victim of alleged assault, about witness’s U visa application, which is application for visa by victims of certain crimes who have suffered mental or physical abuse and who are helpful to law enforcement or government officials in investigation or prosecution of criminal activity. Supreme Court concluded that defense counsel established sufficient factual foundation for impeachment of witness about U visa application under Maryland Rule 5-616(a)(4), where counsel demonstrated that U visa application based on witness being victim of crime that defendant was on trial for had been submitted on witness’s behalf and member of State’s Attorney’s Office had signed certification necessary for U visa. Supreme Court determined that issue of whether probative value of inquiry into, i.e., cross- examination concerning, witness’s potential bias, prejudice, interest in outcome of proceeding, or motive to testify falsely was substantially outweighed by danger of undue prejudice or confusion was not implicitly or explicitly decided by trial court and was not one of questions presented in petition for writ of certiorari. Supreme Court concluded that, because any error in precluding cross-examination concerning U visa application was harmless, it was not necessary to deviate from general practice of refraining from addressing issue not decided by the trial court or raised in petition for writ of certiorari.

Supreme Court concluded that trial court’s error was harmless beyond reasonable doubt as defendant testified to committing acts that formed basis of offenses for which he was convicted, witness’s testimony was consistent with another witness’s testimony who was not applicant for U visa, witness’s testimony was consistent with initial description of incident, and other evidence corroborated that both witnesses had been assaulted by defendant. Circuit Court for Montgomery County Case No. 138036C Argued: March 5, 2024 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND No. 23 September Term, 2023 ______________________________________ ANTONIO E. GONZALEZ v. STATE OF MARYLAND ______________________________________ Fader, C.J. Watts *Hotten Booth Biran Gould Eaves, JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Watts, J. Gould, J., dissents. ______________________________________ Filed: May 29, 2024 *Hotten, J., now a Senior Justice, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of this Court. After being recalled pursuant to Md. Const., Art. IV, § 3A, Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. she also participated in the decision and adoption 2025.02.25 of this opinion. 13:20:18 -05'00' Gregory Hilton, Clerk Impeachment of a witness involves the practice of questioning the witness to discredit or undermine the credibility of the witness’s testimony. Demonstrating that a witness is biased or may have an interest in the outcome of a proceeding, and, therefore, a motive to testify falsely, is a common technique used by trial attorneys to attempt to discredit a witness.

Maryland Rule 5-616(a)(4) provides that a witness’s credibility may be attacked through questions asked of the witness that are directed at “[p]roving that the witness is biased, prejudiced, interested in the outcome of the proceeding, or has a motive to testify falsely[.]” Cross-examination under Maryland Rule 5-616(a)(4) “should be prohibited only if (1) there is no factual foundation for such an inquiry in the presence of the jury, or (2) the probative value of such an inquiry is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice or confusion.” Manchame-Guerra v. State, 457 Md. 300, 312 , 178 A.3d 1, 8 (2018) (quoting Calloway v. State, 414 Md. 616, 638 , 996 A.2d 869, 881 (2010)) (emphasis omitted). The main question presented in this case is whether a trial court erred in precluding counsel for Antonio E. Gonzalez, Petitioner, from cross-examining a witness, who was the victim of an alleged assault, about the witness’s application for a U visa because the trial court found that defense counsel had failed to establish an adequate foundation for such inquiry. A U visa, which we describe in greater detail below, is a visa for noncitizens who are the victim of certain qualifying crimes and are helpful to law enforcement or government officials in the investigation or prosecution of criminal activity. See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Victims of Criminal Activity: U Nonimmigrant Status (Apr. 2, 2024), available at https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/victims-of- criminal-activity-u-nonimmigrant-status [https://perma.cc/77SH-6AJE].

A U visa application is signed under penalty of perjury and submitted to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), an agency of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. See USCIS Form I-918, Petition for U Nonimmigrant Status at 1, 8, available at https:// www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/forms/i-918.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8AJ- XDZJ]. The application must contain a certification from an official confirming an applicant’s helpfulness in the investigation or prosecution of criminal activity. See USCIS Form I-918, Supplement B, U Nonimmigrant Status Certification at 3-4, available at https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/forms/i-918supb.pdf [https://perma.cc/ Q76T-YF7L].

For a U visa to be approved, USCIS must determine, among other things, that the applicant “has been helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful” to officials investigating or prosecuting criminal activity. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(15)(U)(i)(III); 8 C.F.R. § 214.14 (a)(12), (b)(3), (c)(2)(ii). In answering the main question in this case, we must address three specific issues, which are: (1) where a party seeks under Maryland Rule 5-616(a)(4) to cross-examine a witness about a U visa application, what must the party demonstrate to establish a sufficient factual foundation; (2) whether, under the circumstances of this case, defense counsel established a sufficient foundation for cross-examination of the witness in question about the submission of a U visa application; and (3) if the trial court erred in precluding cross- examination, whether the error was harmless. According to testimony at trial, on the evening of March 13, 2020, Mr. Gonzalez -2- assaulted his then-wife M. and their then-12-year-old son F. 1 in their home. When Mr. Gonzalez’s counsel attempted to cross-examine M. about her application for a U visa, the State, Respondent, objected.

During voir dire, outside of the presence of the jury, M. acknowledged that she had an immigration attorney assisting her with a U visa application. When asked whether she understood that she needed to be helpful to the prosecutor to obtain a U visa, M. responded in the affirmative and stated that she would do what her immigration attorney told her to do. In response to other questions about the U visa application, M. stated that she did not understand what Mr. Gonzalez’s counsel was saying or what he wanted her to say and that Mr. Gonzalez’s counsel could contact her immigration attorney if he wanted more information. M. denied knowing that she would be unable to obtain a U visa if she did not cooperate with the State.

During voir dire, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County admitted into evidence a letter from M.’s immigration attorney to the Montgomery County State’s Attorney’s Office dated April 23, 2021, in which M.’s attorney advised that M. was pursuing a U visa and that, to qualify, M. needed “a certification from a law enforcement agency corroborating that she was the victim of a crime and that she was helpful to law enforcement in the investigation or prosecution of the crime.” The circuit court also admitted a form titled “Supplement B, U Nonimmigrant Status Certification,” USCIS Form I-918, which showed that, on August 4, 2021, the Chief of the Special Victims Division of 1 To protect their identities, as the parties and the Appellate Court of Maryland did, and in accordance with Maryland Rule 8-125(b)(1), we refer to Mr. Gonzalez’s former wife as “M.” and their son as “F.” -3- the Montgomery County State’s Attorney’s Office signed it, certifying that M. was being helpful in the investigation and prosecution of criminal activity and was “currently cooperating” with the Office. 2 The circuit court ruled that it would not permit cross-examination of M. concerning “her immigration status” because Mr. Gonzalez’s counsel had not established a “proper foundation[.]” The jury found Mr. Gonzalez guilty of two counts of second-degree assault of M. and one count of second-degree assault of F. In a split decision, the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the convictions. See Antonio E. Gonzalez v. State, No. 1075, Sept. Term, 2022, 2023 WL 5030170 , at ¹⁴ (Md. App. Ct. Aug. 8, 2023). The Appellate Court reached two conclusions. First, the Appellate Court upheld the circuit court’s determination that there was an insufficient factual foundation for cross-examination of M. about her immigration status and U visa application.

See id. at ⁶ ; id. at ¹⁸ (Friedman, J., concurring). And second, the Appellate Court held that, even if the circuit court had abused its discretion in prohibiting the questioning, any error was harmless. See id. at ⁹ ; id. at ¹⁸ (Eyler, J., concurring). In this Court, Mr. Gonzalez contends that his counsel established a sufficient factual foundation to cross-examine M. about her U visa application by proffering evidence of circumstances that demonstrated that M. had a motive to lie or embellish her testimony, 2 Supplement B, U Nonimmigrant Status Certification, USCIS Form I-918 is a form that contains, among other things, a section titled “Certification” in which an official signs and, thereby, certifies a U visa applicant’s helpfulness in the investigation and prosecution of criminal activity.

USCIS Form I-918, Supplement B, U Nonimmigrant Status Certification at 3-4. We will, at times, refer to the form as the “supplement” or the “certification.” -4- which, according to Mr. Gonzalez, satisfied our holding in Kazadi v. State, 467 Md. 1, 52 , 223 A.3d 554, 585 (2020). Mr. Gonzalez asserts that, because the Office of the State’s Attorney for Montgomery County provided M. with the certification necessary for a U visa application, there was a reasonable basis to believe that M. may have been tailoring her testimony to assist the State, and that the circuit court’s preclusion of cross-examination about M.’s U visa application was not harmless error. The State responds that Mr. Gonzalez failed to establish “‘additional circumstances—such as evidence of a quid pro quo[3] arrangement or allegations of leniency in an immigration case’—that g[a]ve rise to a motive to testify falsely or bias” on M.’s part, as required by Kazadi, id. at 52 , 223 A.3d at 585 , and, therefore, failed to proffer a sufficient factual foundation to cross-examine M. about her U visa application.

According to the State, Mr. Gonzalez’s counsel failed to establish that M.’s initial allegation of assault was motivated by the expectation of receipt of a U visa, that M. had an agreement with the State, that she expected to receive a benefit in exchange for her testimony, or that M. understood that her application for a U visa could be affected if she did not cooperate with the State. The State also asserts that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We hold that the circuit court erred in precluding Mr. Gonzalez’s counsel from cross-examining M. about her U visa application. We conclude that, given the nature of 3 Black’s Law Dictionary states that “quid pro quo” is Latin for “something for something” and defines the phrase as “[a]n action or thing that is exchanged for another action or thing of more or less equal value[.]” Quid Pro Quo, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). -5- the requirement that, for a U visa to be approved, an applicant must be helpful in the investigation or prosecution of criminal activity and provide a certification from a law enforcement or government official to that effect, a sufficient factual foundation for impeachment of a witness concerning a U visa application is established under Maryland Rule 5-616(a)(4) where there has been a showing that a U visa application, based on the witness being a victim of a crime that the defendant is charged with, has been submitted to the government for approval.

Additionally, evidence that the required certification has been provided on the witness’s behalf by the prosecutor’s office or law enforcement official responsible for investigating or prosecuting the defendant’s case is sufficient to establish the required factual foundation regardless of whether the application has been submitted by the witness. These circumstances are not intended to be exhaustive or all inclusive of the circumstances that may warrant cross-examination of a witness about a U visa application under Maryland Rule 5-616(a)(4). As with all determinations with respect to cross-examination under Maryland Rule 5-616(a)(4), a trial court must on a case-by-case basis determine whether there are circumstances that constitute an adequate factual foundation for cross-examination and, if so, whether the probative value of the cross- examination is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice. Our holding concerning the factual foundation necessary for impeachment under Maryland Rule 5-616(a)(4) stems directly from Calloway, 414 Md. at 637 , 996 A.2d at 880 , in which we concluded that issues as to a witness’s credibility concerning an expected benefit should be decided by the jury and not the trial court, and Manchame-Guerra, 457 Md. at 318 , 178 A.3d at 11 , in which we explained that the requisite factual foundation -6- must “be viewed from the perspective of the witness” and whether the witness could expect or hope for a benefit in exchange for testimony.

(Citations omitted). Our conclusion is also consistent with our holding in Kazadi, 467 Md. at 52-53 , 223 A.3d at 585 , in which we concluded that, absent additional circumstances—such as allegations of quid pro quo or leniency in an immigration case giving rise to a motive to testify falsely or bias—a State’s witness’s status as an undocumented immigrant, or the existence of a deportation order to which the witness may be subject . . . does not show that the witness “has a motive to testify falsely[.]” (Quoting Md. R. 5-616(a)(4)). In this case, we conclude that Mr. Gonzalez’s counsel established a sufficient factual foundation for impeachment of M. under Maryland Rule 5-616(a)(4), as his counsel demonstrated that a U visa application had been submitted on M.’s behalf on the ground that she was the victim of an assault allegedly committed by Mr. Gonzalez, that M. acknowledged that such an application had been submitted, and that M. knew that to obtain a U visa she was expected to help government and law enforcement officials in the investigation or prosecution of Mr. Gonzalez’s case. Equally important, Mr. Gonzalez’s counsel demonstrated that a member of the State’s Attorney’s Office, which was responsible for prosecuting Mr. Gonzalez, had signed the requisite certification on M.’s behalf, already bestowing a benefit by certifying that M. had been or would be helpful in the prosecution of Mr. Gonzalez.

Under these circumstances, Mr. Gonzalez’s counsel established an adequate factual foundation to ask questions pursuant to Maryland Rule 5- 616(a)(4) aimed at uncovering whether M. had an interest in the outcome of the proceeding, or a motive to testify falsely or to embellish her testimony, either to obtain the benefit of a -7- U visa or retain the prosecutor’s certification for the visa, and the circuit court erred in precluding cross-examination on the ground that this requirement had not been satisfied. For the reasons discussed below, however, we hold that the error was harmless. As such, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court. BACKGROUND Trial In the circuit court, the State charged Mr. Gonzalez with five offenses: one count of first-degree assault of his then-wife M., one count of second-degree physical child abuse of their son F., two counts of second-degree assault of M., and one count of second-degree assault of F. From June 14 to 17, 2022, the circuit court conducted a jury trial.

At trial, as a witness for the State, through an interpreter, M. testified as follows. In 2020, M., Mr. Gonzalez, her former husband, their three children, and a tenant to whom they were renting lived together in a three-bedroom single-family house. The three children are two sons, F. and A., and one daughter, N., who, at the time of trial, were 14, 12, and 3 years old, respectively. On March 13, 2020, M. came home from work at approximately 6:00 p.m. and saw Mr. Gonzalez walking down the street with a bag of beer.

Once in the house, Mr. Gonzalez came into the kitchen and M. told him: “[Y]ou’re drinking again[.]” Mr. Gonzalez responded that she should not be concerned because it was his money and none of her business. Mr. Gonzalez had left bottles of beer in the laundry room. M. took the bottles of beer to the kitchen and poured all of them out in the sink. Mr. Gonzalez came into the kitchen and said: “Son of a b[****].

Why did you pour this beer? . . . [A]re you going to -8- give that me that money back or are you going to give me the beer?” Mr. Gonzalez told M.: “[Y]ou give it to me or you’ll see what’s going to happen to you[.]” Mr. Gonzalez pushed M. in her chest area up against the wall. After he pushed M., Mr. Gonzalez left the kitchen and went to the living room. M. stayed in the kitchen for a few minutes before going to her bedroom. Mr. Gonzalez and F. came into the bedroom.

While the three were in the bedroom, Mr. Gonzalez told F.: “I am your father. I’ll do whatever I want with you. Not you do whatever you want with me. . . . The whole time [you] ha[ve] been meddling and intervening and today you’re going to see what’s going to happen [to] you.” F. “put his father up on the bed . . . [a]nd told him to calm down.” Mr. Gonzalez got up, grabbed F. by the part of his shirt near the neck, pushed him, threw him onto the bed, got on top of him, grabbed his neck with both hands, and said to F.: “[O]f all your days[,] today came. . . .

You are going to see what is going to happen to you with your mom.” M. tried to pull Mr. Gonzalez off of F. and as soon as F. had “a little space, he got up.” M. told F. to go to his room, and F. left the bedroom. Mr. Gonzalez also left the bedroom, but M. remained. At some point, without M. hearing him, Mr. Gonzalez came back into the bedroom, came behind her and put his arm around her neck, putting her in a chokehold. For a moment, M.’s feet did not stay on the ground because Mr. Gonzalez was holding her up and she could not breathe or talk.

Mr. Gonzalez said “your day has come today[,]” which M. took to mean that “he wanted to kill” her. All three children came into the bedroom and F. tried, unsuccessfully, to take Mr. -9- Gonzalez’s hands off of M.’s neck. M.’s and Mr. Gonzalez’s tenant came into the bedroom and was able to get Mr. Gonzalez’s arms off of M.’s neck and take Mr. Gonzalez to the living room. M. called 911, and police and fire/rescue responded to the home.

Officers asked M. to write down what happened and she did so. An ambulance subsequently transported M. to a hospital for treatment of her injuries. As a witness for the State, F., who was almost 15 years old at the time of trial, testified that, in March 2020, he had “an on-and-off relationship” with his father, Mr. Gonzalez, “where it would be very good when he was sober but it would be like quickly just flipped upside down when he wasn’t[,]” which F. said was when Mr. Gonzalez was drinking. F. testified that, on March 13, 2020, Mr. Gonzalez was drinking and that, as “usual[,]” he grew “more aggressive.” F. testified that, when the beers were poured out, Mr. Gonzalez grabbed him “by the arms” and F. grabbed Mr. Gonzalez’s arms and “push[ed] him off[.]” Mr. Gonzalez left the kitchen.

F. was in his bedroom with his brother when he “heard scuffling” and shouting coming from his parents’ bedroom, so he went to the room and saw M. “being handled by [his] dad.” F. testified that he saw Mr. Gonzalez with his arms around M. F. successfully got Mr. Gonzalez “off” of M. and Mr. Gonzalez “got more aggressive towards” him. F. testified that Mr. Gonzalez grabbed his neck with his hands, which affected his breathing. Mr. Gonzalez’s hands remained around F.’s neck for a “[r]elatively short” period of time before F. was able to get Mr. Gonzalez “off” of him. Mr. Gonzalez left the bedroom.

During his testimony, F. identified State’s Exhibits 3 and 4 as photographs of bruises on his neck on March 13, 2020 that resulted from Mr. Gonzalez’s contact with him. - 10 - The following day, March 14, 2020, F.’s aunt took him to a hospital for medical treatment. F.’s emergency department medical records from Adventist HealthCare Shady Grove Medical Center were admitted into evidence as Defendant’s Exhibit 8. The records indicate that F.’s “Chief Complaint” was that he had suffered “assault by strangulation by father last night.” (Italics omitted). The medical records indicate F. advised that, the night before, his father had been “intoxicated” and used a “stranglehold” on him “with one hand on the right side of his neck[.]” According to the medical records, there were “[m]inor physical findings . . . on his left side of his neck[,]” and “some mild redness where [his] dad[’]s hands” were.

As a witness for the State, Detective Renae McEvoy of the Rockville City Police Department testified that, on March 13, 2020, she responded to a domestic violence call involving M. While another officer and emergency medical services staff spoke with M., Detective McEvoy noticed that, when M. “would touch her neck, she would grimace[,]” and that at points she was “also holding her left arm[.]” As a witness for the State, Najla Barton, RN, who worked as a nurse in the Forensic Medical Unit of Adventist HealthCare Shady Grove Medical Center in March 2020, was accepted as an expert in the field of forensic examinations. Nurse Barton testified that, on March 13, 2020, she conducted a forensic examination of M. 4 Nurse Barton testified that, during the exam, M. stated that she was suffering symptoms, including headache, shortness of breath, chest pain and palpitations, sore throat, abdominal pain, extremity pain, neck Nurse Barton’s forensic examination report of M. was admitted into evidence as 4 Defendant’s Exhibit 7. - 11 - pain, and back pain. Nurse Barton testified that M.’s neck had an “area of erythema[,] which means redness not appreciated by the camera[.]” Nurse Barton identified photographs that she took of M. during the forensic examination and the photographs were admitted into evidence as State’s Exhibit 6. Nurse Barton testified: “After I did my exam, I would say that [the examination] was consistent with her disclosure of what occurred[.]” As a witness for the State, Dr. Jessica Volz, 5 the clinical director of the Forensic Medical Unit at Adventist HealthCare Shady Grove Medical Center, was accepted as an expert in the field of strangulation.

Prior to testifying, Dr. Volz reviewed provider and nursing notes, the medical forensic record, photographs, lab and radiology results, and vital signs of M. for March 13-14, 2020. Dr. Volz testified that, in her opinion, M.’s injuries and symptoms were consistent with her report of strangulation. As a witness for the defense, Dr. Wray Anthony Gerard, an emergency room physician at the Lebanon Veteran Affairs Medical Center in Lebanon, Pennsylvania, was accepted as an expert in the field of emergency medicine. Dr. Gerard testified that, based on his review of “the police charges” and the medical records for M. and F., there was “no medical evidence” that M. or F. were strangled.

During Dr. Gerard’s testimony, a Montgomery County Fire and Rescue Service report was admitted into evidence as Defendant’s Exhibit 5. 6 5 Dr. Volz testified that she has “a bachelor’s of science in nursing[,]” a “bachelor of science in behavioral science[,]” and “a doctor of nursing practice . . . with a focus on family nurse practitioner.” 6 A section of Defendant’s Exhibit 5 labeled “Narrative” indicated that M.’s chief complaint was “Neck Pain/Tenderness” and that she advised that she came home and - 12 - On cross-examination, Dr. Gerard acknowledged that M.’s emergency department records from Adventist HealthCare Shady Grove Medical Center indicated that M. reported “her husband came home drinking, assaulted her multiple times by pushing her against the wall, pushing her from behind, and he held her by the neck against the walls strangling her.” Dr. Gerard agreed with the prosecutor that the records indicated that M. stated “that she was strangled by her husband and hit in the head against the wall.” M.’s emergency department records were admitted into evidence as Defendant’s Exhibit 6. On his own behalf, Mr. Gonzalez testified that, on March 13, 2020, he took his sons to school and went back home to make breakfast. Around 1:00 p.m. that day, M.’s sister came to the house with her two daughters, and M. and her sister left while he stayed home watching his daughter and nieces. F. came home around 3:15 p.m. and became “angry or upset” because of a smell in his bedroom.

F. started yelling at Mr. Gonzalez, who “got upset, angry, and [] decided to take [F.’s] PlayStation away from him to punish him.” Around 6:00 p.m., M. came home with her sister, and she, her sister, and her sister’s daughters left after dinner to go to a meeting at a church. Mr. Gonzalez stayed home because he “had hidden some beers” and started drinking. Mr. Gonzalez hid the beers because M. “would get upset” when he drank. M. returned from church around 7:15 or 7:20 p.m.

During the approximately 40 minutes she had been gone, Mr. Gonzalez had “found her husband intoxicated. Husband became aggressive, as he did not want to stop drinking and physically assaulted her and her oldest son. [Patient] was put in a choke hold and her head was banged against the wall.” The report stated that M. had “neck pain, tenderness, and limited range of motion[,]” and that M. rated her “neck pain as a 9, on a scale of 1 to 10.” - 13 - consumed three beers and decided to go for a walk and buy six more. He was going into the house with the beer while M. was parking. M. and the children saw that Mr. Gonzalez had a bag with beers, F. took the bag away, and “[t]hey poured them” out “[i]n the sink.” According to Mr. Gonzalez, he did nothing in response.

Mr. Gonzalez testified that, around fifteen minutes later, when he went back into the kitchen, M. tried to hit him on the face with an open hand. He avoided being hit by grabbing M.’s hands and the two struggled. F. came in and Mr. Gonzalez grabbed F. “almost in the neck area because [he] was pushing [F.] in order . . . to be able to leave.” Mr. Gonzalez testified that he was able to get away from M. and F. and went to his bedroom. When Mr. Gonzalez left the bedroom, he ran into M. in the narrow hallway and she tried to hit him.

Mr. Gonzalez testified that he “pushed” M. when she tried to hit his face “because [he] wanted to get out.” Mr. Gonzalez testified that he sustained marks on his neck as a result of contact between him and M. and F. 7 Mr. Gonzalez denied strangling M. or F. and denied that he intended to hurt them. On cross-examination, Mr. Gonzalez acknowledged that he grabbed F.’s neck with one hand, and that there were two red marks on F.’s neck after he grabbed it. Mr. Gonzalez also confirmed that he pushed M. when he was in the hallway trying to leave the house. When asked how M. got the red marks on her neck that Nurse Barton saw, Mr. Gonzalez responded: “We confronted each other.

We struggled.” 7 Mr. Gonzalez testified that M. scratched his neck while they were in the kitchen and that, when he grabbed F., F. “hit [him] on the neck.” - 14 - Voir Dire Concerning M.’s Immigration Status and U Visa Application Prior to trial, the State disclosed to Mr. Gonzalez a letter dated April 23, 2021 from Manuel Rivera, Esq. to the Montgomery County State’s Attorney’s Office, advising that his office represented M. in immigration matters and was pursuing a U visa for M. The State also disclosed the supplement, i.e., the certification signed by a member of the State’s Attorney’s Office. Information written on the supplement stated that M. and her son, F., had been assaulted and identified Mr. Gonzalez as the person responsible for the criminal activity. In a section of the supplement titled “Part 4. Helpfulness Of The Victim,” the following appeared: 1.

Does the victim possess information concerning the criminal activity listed in Part 3.? [The checkbox for “Yes” was marked.] 2. Has the victim been helpful, is the victim being helpful, or is the victim likely to be helpful in the investigation or prosecution of the criminal activity detailed above? [The checkbox for “Yes” was marked.] 3. Since the initiation of cooperation, has the victim refused or failed to provide assistance reasonably requested in the investigation or prosecution of the criminal activity detailed above? [The checkbox for “No” was marked.] If you answer “Yes” to Item Numbers 1. - 3., provide an explanation in the space below. If you need extra space to complete this section, use the space provided in Part 7.

Additional Information. [The following was typed in:] M[.] is currently cooperating with the State[’s] Attorney’s Office. (Bolding omitted). “Part 6. Certification” showed that the Chief of the Special Victims Division of the Montgomery County State’s Attorney’s Office signed the supplement on - 15 - August 4, 2021, under penalty of perjury, as the “Certifying Official” beneath language stating, among other things: “I further certify that if the victim unreasonably refuses to assist in the investigation or prosecution of the qualifying criminal activity of which he or she is a victim, I will notify USCIS.” (Bolding omitted). At trial, when Mr. Gonzalez’s counsel asked M. about where she was born, the prosecutor objected.

During voir dire, outside of the presence of the jury, M. indicated that she was not born in the United States and that she had an immigration attorney assisting her with an application for a U visa. During the following exchange, Mr. Gonzalez’s counsel asked M. if she understood that she needed to be helpful to the prosecutor to obtain the U visa: [MR. GONZALEZ’S COUNSEL:] Okay. So[,] you are aware that, if you are helpful to the prosecutor, you and your family might be able to obtain a special immigration status and eventually a green card.

Right? [M.:] I’m not doing this by myself. I’m doing what the attorney is telling me to. [MR. GONZALEZ’S COUNSEL:] I understand that. My question is you understand that you need to be helpful to the prosecutor for you to be able to get this U visa immigration status.

Right? [M.:] With the attorney, yes. If the attorney tells me. Yes. Of course.

Yes. [MR. GONZALEZ’S COUNSEL:] And on the flip of that, you also understand that if you don’t -- if you refuse to cooperate with the prosecutor’s office, you will not be able to get a special immigration visa? [M.:] I’m telling you the truth. I don’t know what you’re saying. [MR. GONZALEZ’S COUNSEL:] Okay.

Let me rephrase it then. You also know that if you don’t cooperate with the State’s Attorney’s Office, you will not be able to get -- excuse me. You will not be able to get a green card to stay in the United States? - 16 - [M.:] I’m sorry. I don’t understand.

I don’t understand what you want me to say. [MR. GONZALEZ’S COUNSEL:] I don’t want you to say anything that you don’t know. I’m simply asking if you know that if you don’t cooperate you won’t be able to get your U visa? [M.:] I feel like you are -- well, I don’t know what you want me to answer. [MR. GONZALEZ’S COUNSEL:] Do you know that if you do not cooperate you will not be able to get your U visa? [M.:] I have no idea but if you want more information about that get in contact with my immigration attorney.

Mr. Gonzalez’s counsel asked M.: “You are undocumented. Correct?” M. responded: “Yes. I got here without any then I obtained my work permit.” Mr. Gonzalez’s counsel asked M.: “For you to get a legal status in the United States, you need a U visa. Right?” M. responded: “I don’t know if it is illegal or not. . . .

If the attorney tells me that there will be[—]that I will benefit myself and my children[,] then we can do it.” During a bench conference, the circuit court asked Mr. Gonzalez’s counsel whether M. had “a U visa in the works” as of March 13, 2020. Mr. Gonzalez’s counsel responded that the letter from M.’s immigration attorney was dated April 23, 2021, “a year later[,]” but argued that the question of the timing of the U visa application “goes to weight[.]” When asked about Defendant’s Exhibit 1, the letter to the State’s Attorney’s Office, and whether her immigration attorney had been representing her on or about April 23, 2021, M. responded that her immigration attorney had been in charge of her case since 2013. During the following exchange, Mr. Gonzalez’s counsel asked M. about Defendant’s Exhibit 2, the completed supplement: - 17 - [MR. GONZALEZ’S COUNSEL:] I am showing you what is Defense Exhibit No. 2.

Do you know what this document is? And you can flip through it if you need to? [M.:] Yes. I know that. That is from the immigration. [MR.

GONZALEZ’S COUNSEL:] This is -- is it fair to say that this is a U visa application or certification is it fair to say that this is a U visa certification? [M.:] I imagine so. As I have been telling you, I just do what the attorney tells me to do. [MR. GONZALEZ’S COUNSEL:] And your name is on this document. Right? [M.:] Of course. [MR.

GONZALEZ’S COUNSEL:] And your A number is on this document. Right? [M.:] Well, it’s there. That’s true. I don’t remember it. [MR.

GONZALEZ’S COUNSEL:] Is this a fair and accurate representation of your U visa certification? [M.:] Okay. [MR. GONZALEZ’S COUNSEL:] Is it? If you know? [M.:] I do what the attorney tells me like sign this paper. I signed this paper so I imagine so. [MR.

GONZALEZ’S COUNSEL:] And you filled out this paper? [M.:] Of course. With my attorney. Mr. Gonzalez’s counsel moved to add Defendant’s Exhibits 1 and 2 to the record “for - 18 - appellate purposes[,]” and the circuit court admitted both exhibits. 8 When Mr. Gonzalez’s counsel asked M. whether she got a response from the State’s Attorney’s Office with respect to her application for a U visa, M. responded: “Of course. It has been accepted and approved.” After argument by the parties, the circuit court ruled that it would “not allow any further inquiry into [M.’s] immigration status” because Mr. Gonzalez’s counsel had not shown “that any inquiry regarding her immigration status would be probative of her character trait for truthfulness” and the “proper foundation ha[d] not been laid.” The circuit court determined that there was not a sufficient foundation to establish a quid pro quo relationship and found that M.’s testimony indicated “that she doesn’t understand or doesn’t know if there are any negative consequences for her failure to cooperate[.]” The circuit court stated: The nexus essentially in this case arises from an alleged assault that occurred on March 13 of 2020.

The motivation to lie would have had to have begun at that point in time essentially and I have not seen anything at this point with the evidence which indicates a[] motivation to lie on her part was generated on March 13, 2020 that led to her U visa subsequently in a letter to the State’s Attorney’s Office more than a year later in April 2021. . . . [T]here is [] a big leap in time here . . . there is nothing showing that on March 13 o[r] March 14 that she is filing a U visa automatically saying, you know, let me use this [a]s some kind of way to get a visa so I can stay here which arguably closer in time arguably could be motivation to lie which was begun on March 13, 2020. 8 Although M. testified that she “signed this paper,” referring to the completed U visa certification (Defendant’s Exhibit 2), there is no place for a U visa petitioner to sign the supplement; only the certifying official signs. See USCIS Form I-918, Supplement B, U Nonimmigrant Status Certification at 4. USCIS Form I-918, the U visa application, however, requires the signature of a U visa petitioner under penalty of perjury. See USCIS Form I-918, Petition for U Nonimmigrant Status at 8. - 19 - So, in this case, I think [it] is just a bit too attenuated in time.

I don’t really believe there has been any showing quid pro quo and I don’t believe there is sufficient showing of any motivation to lie which began on March 13, 2020 such that any testimony or questioning regarding her immigration status would not go to her -- address her credibility. Would not address her credibility or her motive to testify falsely or after character for witness[’s] truthfulness. I don’t believe the foundation has been sufficiently laid. Verdict and Sentencing The jury found Mr. Gonzalez guilty of two counts of second-degree assault of M. and one count of second-degree assault of F., but not guilty of first-degree assault of M. and second-degree physical child abuse of F. The circuit court sentenced Mr. Gonzalez to four years’ imprisonment, with all but six months suspended, concurrently, as to Count 3 and 4, both second-degree assaults of M., and four years’ imprisonment, with all but sixty days suspended, as to Count 5, the second-degree assault of F., to be served consecutive to the sentence imposed for Count 4.

The sentence included three years of supervised probation. Mr. Gonzalez noted an appeal. Opinions of the Appellate Court of Maryland On August 8, 2023, the Appellate Court of Maryland, with the Honorable Laura S. Ripken writing for a majority of the panel, affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. See Gonzalez, 2023 WL 5030170 , at ¹⁴.

The Appellate Court “agree[d] with the trial court that there was an insufficient factual foundation upon which to cross-examine M. about her U-Visa application and immigration status in the presence of the jury.” Id. at ⁶ . The Appellate Court explained that whether there are additional circumstances, such as evidence of a quid pro quo relationship between M. and the State, warranting cross- - 20 - examination as to bias depends on “a review of the surrounding facts and circumstances available to the trial court” and concluded that M.’s U visa application “failed to provide aid in assessing M.’s credibility as a witness.” Id. The Appellate Court reasoned that, although the circuit court did not “explicitly” balance the probative value of Mr. Gonzalez’s counsel’s requested line of cross- examination against the danger of undue prejudice, it was “implicit” in the record that the circuit court did so, and that it would assume that the circuit court knew the law and applied it properly. Id. at ⁸ n.16.

On this basis, the Appellate Court concluded that the circuit court had implicitly determined that the probative value of such questioning would have been substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice, and that the court did not abuse its discretion in doing so. Id. at ⁸ . Finally, the Appellate Court held that, even if the circuit court abused its discretion in prohibiting Mr. Gonzalez’s counsel from questioning M. about her immigration status and U visa application, the error was harmless. See id. at ⁹ .

The Appellate Court explained that Mr. Gonzalez himself testified to committing acts constituting second- degree assault. See id. at ¹⁰ . The Appellate Court concluded that M.’s testimony was corroborated by other evidence, such as F.’s testimony, photographs showing marks on F.’s neck, and Nurse Barton’s testimony that she observed redness on M.’s neck. See id.

The Appellate Court pointed out that, during closing argument, Mr. Gonzalez’s counsel argued that M. and F. both consented to contact with Mr. Gonzalez by participating in the incident, but Mr. Gonzalez never testified to being fearful of M. or F. or even that he believed he was involved in a “mutual affray” with them. Id. For these reasons, the - 21 - Appellate Court was “convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that, had the court abused its discretion in barring [Mr.] Gonzalez from raising M.’s U-Visa application and immigration status, the error would not have influenced the jury’s verdict.” Id. The Honorable Deborah S. Eyler and the Honorable Daniel A. Friedman each issued a concurring opinion.

See id. at ¹⁴ (Eyler, J., concurring), ¹⁸ (Friedman, J., concurring). 9 Judge Eyler explained that, in her view, based on the letter from M.’s immigration attorney and the U visa certification signed by a member of the State’s Attorney’s Office, there was an adequate factual foundation under Maryland Rule 5- 616(a)(4) for cross-examination of M. about her immigration status and U visa application, but agreed that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Gonzalez, 2023 WL 5030170 , at ¹⁴-¹⁶ (Eyler, J., concurring). Judge Eyler pointed out that, “to succeed in obtaining and keeping a U-Visa, which would be to M.’s benefit, she would have to cooperate in the prosecution of the case against [Mr. Gonzalez], which only could happen if she testified against him.” Id. at ¹⁶ (Eyler, J., concurring). Judge Eyler explained that M., therefore, “had a motive to testify that [Mr. Gonzalez] committed the acts underlying the criminal charges, even if he did not.” Id.

(Eyler, J., concurring). 10 Judge Eyler, 9 The concurring opinions show that one majority of the panel (Judge Ripken and Judge Friedman) concluded that there was an insufficient factual foundation for cross- examination of M. concerning her U visa application. See Gonzalez, 2023 WL 5030170 , at ⁶; id. at ¹⁸ (Friedman, J., concurring). A different majority of the panel (Judge Ripken and Judge Eyler) concluded that any error by the circuit court in precluding cross- examination of M. was harmless. See id. at ⁹-¹⁰; id. at ¹⁸ (Eyler, J., concurring). 10 Judge Eyler also concluded that the circuit court did not find that the probative value of the cross-examination would have been substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice or confusion and that, if it had, the circuit court would have abused its discretion in doing so.

See Gonzalez, 2023 WL 5030170 , at ¹⁷ (Eyler, J., concurring). - 22 - however, concluded that the circuit court’s error was harmless given that Mr. Gonzalez had acknowledged committing acts that constituted second-degree assaults and that the jury found him not guilty of first-degree assault and second-degree physical child abuse. See Gonzalez, 2023 WL 5030170 , at ¹⁸ (Eyler, J., concurring). Judge Friedman agreed that Mr. Gonzalez’s counsel failed to establish a sufficient factual foundation for cross-examining M. about her U visa application, but pointed out that a different trial judge may have permitted the requested cross-examination and that, in his view, under the applicable standard of review, doing so would not have been an abuse of discretion. See id. at ¹⁸ (Friedman, J., concurring).

Judge Friedman explained that, in light of the holding that there was no sufficient factual foundation, it was not necessary to reach the question of whether the proposed cross-examination “was more probative than prejudicial” and that he would not have addressed the issue of harmless error because he did not agree that M.’s credibility “was unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered.” Id. (Friedman, J., concurring) (cleaned up). 11 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari On September 19, 2023, Mr. Gonzalez petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which we granted, raising the following three issues: 1. When seeking to cross-examine a witness about their submission of and/or interest in applying for a U-Visa—which is available to people “who have suffered mental or physical abuse and are helpful to law enforcement or government officials in the investigation or prosecution of 11 In addition, the Appellate Court concluded that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in declining to remove a prospective juror or in limiting Mr. Gonzalez’s closing argument. See Gonzalez, 2023 WL 5030170 , at ¹⁰, ¹²; id. at ¹⁴ n.2 (Eyler, J., concurring); id. at ¹⁸ (Friedman, J., concurring).

Neither issue is before this Court. - 23 - criminal activity”—what must trial counsel proffer to satisfy Md. Rule 5- 614(a)(4) and this Court’s holding in Kazadi v. State, 461 Md. 1 (2020)? 2. Did a majority of the Appellate Court err in holding that defense counsel proffered an insufficient basis for cross-examining a witness for the State about her submission of a U-Visa application, even though defense counsel, inter alia, proffered (1) a copy of a letter from the witness’ immigration attorney asking the State’s Attorney’s Office (“SAO”) to provide “certification” that the witness “was the victim of a crime and that she was helpful to law enforcement in the investigation or prosecution of” Petitioner and (2) a copy of the requisite federal form filled out by the SAO indicating that the witness had been “cooperating” with law enforcement regarding Petitioner’s prosecution? 3. Did a majority of the Appellate Court err in holding that any error was harmless even though the relevant witness’ credibility was a central issue in the case and even though Petitioner testified that, during the altercation, he touched the complaining witnesses only to protect himself? See Gonzalez v. State, 486 Md. 216 , 305 A.3d 853 (2023).

DISCUSSION The U Visa “In October 2000, Congress created the U-visa as part of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (‘the Act’), Pub. L. No. 106-386, Div. A, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000), codified at inter alia, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(15)(U).” Calderon-Ramirez v. McCament, 877 F.3d 272, 274 (7th Cir. 2017). The Act created a new visa classification that permits noncitizens “who are victims of serious crimes and who assist law enforcement to apply for and receive a nonimmigrant visa called a U-visa.” Id.

(citation omitted). 12 For a petitioner to qualify for a U visa, the Secretary of Homeland Security must determine 12 A nonimmigrant is a foreign national who enters the United States on a temporary basis for work, study, tourism, or other reasons. See USCIS, Glossary, https://www.uscis. gov/tools/glossary [https://perma.cc/C3GD-AEZA]. - 24 - that: (1) the petitioner “has suffered substantial physical or mental abuse as a result of having been a victim” of qualifying criminal activity; 13 (2) the petitioner “possesses information concerning [the] criminal activity”; (3) the petitioner “has been helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful” to government officials investigating or prosecuting the criminal activity; and (4) the criminal activity at issue violated the laws of the United States or occurred in the United States or the territories and possessions of the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(15)(U)(i)(I-IV). “Department of Homeland Security (DHS) regulations give USCIS sole jurisdiction over U-visa petitions.” J.M.O. v. United States, 3 F.4th 1061, 1062 (8th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). As such, USCIS decides whether to approve or deny a petition. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14 (c)(5). 14 To petition for a U visa, a petitioner submits Form I-918 (Petition for U Nonimmigrant Status) to USCIS, which is a division of DHS.

See USCIS Form I-918, Petition for U Nonimmigrant Status at 1. The form requires petitioners to fill out information about themselves, a spouse, and/or their children and must be signed and dated by the petitioner under penalty of perjury. See id. at 1, 7-8 . 15 13 Qualifying criminal activity includes the commission of or an attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit crimes such as domestic violence, felonious assault, abusive sexual contact, sexual assault, stalking, and others. See 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(U)(iii). 14 “Congress enacted a statutory cap of 10,000 U-visas each fiscal year.” Calderon- Ramirez, 877 F.3d at 274 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1184 (p)(2)(A)).

As a result, “a waiting list exists for petitioners seeking adjudication” and there are “two separate waiting periods and two adjudications for each petitioner—one for placement on the waiting list and one to receive a U-visa.” Id. (citation omitted). 15 Form I-918, Supplement A (Petition for Qualifying Family Member of U-1 Recipient) is a form that a petitioner fills out with information about any qualifying family member included in the petition. See USCIS Form I-918, Supplement A, Petition for - 25 - A petitioner must also submit Supplement B. See USCIS Form I-918, Supplement B, U Nonimmigrant Status Certification at 1. Supplement B includes a certification, “which confirms that the petitioner has been helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful in the investigation or prosecution of the qualifying criminal activity of which he or she is a victim.” 8 C.F.R. § 214.14 (a)(12).

Supplement B must be “signed by a certifying official within the six months immediately preceding the filing of Form I-918.” 8 C.F.R. § 214.14 (c)(2)(i). Under 8 C.F.R. § 214.14 (a)(3)(i) and (ii), the “certifying official” must be “[t]he head of the certifying agency, or any person(s) in a supervisory role who has been specifically designated by the head of the certifying agency to issue U nonimmigrant status certifications on behalf of that agency” or “[a] Federal, State, or local judge.” The “certifying agency” must be “a Federal, State, or local law enforcement agency, prosecutor, judge, or other authority, that has responsibility for the investigation or prosecution of a qualifying crime or criminal activity.” 8 C.F.R. § 214.14 (a)(2). Among the requirements for eligibility to obtain a U visa is that, “since the initiation of cooperation, [the petitioner] has not refused or failed to provide information and assistance reasonably requested.” 8 C.F.R. § 214.14 (b)(3). A certifying official is required to notify USCIS if a petitioner refuses or fails to provide aid when reasonably expected.

See id. It can easily be seen that a U visa provides a noncitizen and the person’s family substantial benefits. If a U visa “petition is approved, a petitioner present in the United Qualifying Family Member of U-1 Recipient at 1, available at https://www.uscis.gov/sites/ default/files/document/forms/i-918supa.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FJ2-C3V9]. - 26 - States receives lawful nonimmigrant status and employment authorization for up to four years.” J.M.O., 3 F.4th at 1062 (citations omitted). There is an opportunity to extend the four-year period upon attestation by the certifying official that the petitioner’s presence in the United States continues to be necessary to assist in the investigation or prosecution of qualifying criminal activity.

See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14 (g)(2)(ii). Once a petitioner who has been granted U nonimmigrant status has continuously been physically present in the United States for at least three years following receipt of a U visa, the petitioner is eligible to apply for lawful permanent residency. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (m)(1)(A). In other words, the Secretary of Homeland Security has the authority to convert a petitioner’s status from lawful U nonimmigrant to lawful permanent resident.

See J.M.O., 3 F.4th at 1062 . And, even petitioners who apply for a U visa and are placed on the waiting list receive a benefit because USCIS “will grant eligible petitioners and qualifying family members on the waiting list deferred action [as to removal] and work authorization while they wait for final adjudication.” Calderon-Ramirez, 877 F.3d at 274 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 214.14 (d)(2)). All of these benefits may be revoked if an applicant fails to assist law enforcement in the investigation and prosecution of criminal activity. USCIS may revoke an approved petition after giving notice of intent to revoke if “[t]he certifying official withdraws the U nonimmigrant status certification [i.e., Supplement B] or disavows the contents in writing[.]” 8 C.F.R. § 214.14 (h)(2)(i)(A).

Maryland Rule 5-616(a)(4) and Relevant Case Law “An appellate court reviews without deference a trial court’s restriction of cross- examination where that restriction is based on the trial court’s understanding of the legal - 27 - rules that may limit particular questions or areas of inquiry.” Kazadi, 467 Md. at 49 , 223 A.3d at 582-83 (cleaned up). “An appellate court reviews de novo a trial court’s determination as to whether evidence is relevant.” Portillo Funes v. State, 469 Md. 438, 478 , 230 A.3d 121, 144 (2020) (citation omitted). Maryland Rule 5-616(a) addresses impeachment by inquiry of a witness and provides, in relevant part: “The credibility of a witness may be attacked through questions asked of the witness, including questions that are directed at: . . . (4) Proving that the witness is biased, prejudiced, interested in the outcome of the proceeding, or has a motive to testify falsely[.]” On more than one occasion, we have held that, when the trier of fact is a jury, questions permitted by Rule 5-616(a)(4) should be prohibited only if (1) there is no factual foundation for such an inquiry in the presence of the jury, or (2) the probative value of such an inquiry is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice or confusion. Manchame-Guerra, 457 Md. at 312 , 178 A.3d at 8 (cleaned up).

A sufficient factual foundation may be established through circumstantial or direct evidence and issues concerning a witness’s credibility as to an expectation of a benefit are for the trier of fact to determine. Our holdings in Calloway, Manchame-Guerra, and Martinez v. State, 416 Md. 418 , 7 A.3d 56 (2010) demonstrate these points. In Calloway, 414 Md. at 619, 639 , 996 A.2d at 870, 881-82 , a case in which the defendant’s former cellmate called the Montgomery County State’s Attorney’s Office and offered to testify about inculpatory statements the defendant allegedly made to him, we held that “there was a solid factual foundation for an inquiry into [the witness’s] self interest, and the circumstantial evidence of [the witness’s] self interest was not outweighed—substantially - 28 - or otherwise—by the danger of confusion and/or unfair prejudice to the State.” (Emphasis omitted). At the time that the witness offered to provide information, he was awaiting trial on charges of second-degree assault and reckless endangerment, facing a violation of probation as a result of a guilty plea he entered in another matter, and had been unable to post bail.

See id. at 619 , 996 A.2d at 870 . In between the call to the State’s Attorney’s Office and the defendant’s trial, the witness was released from custody, the State nolle prossed the pending charges, and no violation of probation charges were filed against the witness. See id. at 637 , 996 A.2d at 880 . The State filed a motion in limine to prohibit defense counsel from cross-examining the witness about whether he had volunteered to testify in the hope of receiving a benefit from the State.

See id. at 619 , 996 A.2d at 870 . At a hearing on the motion, the witness acknowledged that he had pending charges and was incarcerated when he called the prosecutor, but testified that he did not expect to receive any benefit from the State by talking about the defendant. See id. at 624-25 , 996 A.2d at 873 . The trial court granted the State’s motion in limine, finding the witness to be credible.

See id. at 631 , 996 A.2d at 877 . We held that the trial court committed reversible error. See id. at 620 , 996 A.2d at 870-71 . We concluded that issues concerning the witness’s credibility, i.e., whether the witness made the call to the State’s Attorney’s Office “in the hope of being released from detention, and whether he was testifying at trial in the hope of avoiding a violation of probation charge, should have been decided by the jury rather than by the [trial c]ourt.” Id. at 637 , 996 A.2d at 880 .

We stressed that the issue was whether the witness “had a hope - 29 - that he would benefit from volunteering to testify against [the defendant.]” Id. at 637 , 996 A.2d at 880-81 . We explained that it was “of no consequence” that the State had not entered into an agreement with the witness in exchange for testimony or that the witness’s testimony before the jury would be consistent with his testimony at the hearing. Id. at 637 , 996 A.2d at 881 . Quoting the Appellate Court in Leeks v. State, 110 Md. App. 543, 557 , 678 A.2d 80, 87 (1996), we stated that [t]he issue of bias is often generated by circumstantial evidence, and does not disappear merely because the witness denies any reason to be biased.

If such circumstantial evidence exists, the trier of fact is entitled to observe the witness’s demeanor as he or she responds to questions permitted by Rule 5- 616(a)(4). Calloway, 414 Md. at 638 , 996 A.2d at 881 (emphasis omitted). Because we could not determine that the trial court’s error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we concluded that the defendant was entitled to a new trial at which the issue of the witness’s motive to testify falsely would be decided by the jury. See id. at 639 , 996 A.2d at 882 . 16 Shortly after Calloway, in Martinez, 416 Md. at 420 , 7 A.3d at 57 , a case involving charges of murder and attempted murder, we held that the trial court erred in precluding 16 In Calloway, 414 Md. at 638 , 996 A.2d at 881 , we also held that, to the extent our analysis was inconsistent with that of Ebb v. State, 341 Md. 578 , 671 A.2d 974 (1996) and Watkins v. State, 328 Md. 95 , 613 A.2d 379 (1992), those cases were overruled.

In Watkins, 328 Md. at 103 , 613 A.2d at 382-83 , we held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding cross-examination of State’s witnesses concerning whether they were on probation where the trial court determined that the evidence had limited probative value that “was outweighed by other appropriate considerations.” In Ebb, 341 Md. at 590 , 671 A.2d at 980 , we held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding cross- examination of State’s witnesses concerning whether they had charges pending against them at the time of their testimony where the witnesses denied expecting to receive leniency. After Calloway, these holdings