Goodsell v. Lawson

Bartol, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The facts of this case are fully stated, and the several questions involved are discussed with much ability and clearness in the opinion of the Circuit Court, sent up with the record, and as we concur in the conclusions therein expressed, it will not be necessary for us to enter into any extended or elaborate discussion of the same questions. These, as succinctly stated by the Circuit Court, are: “1st. What are the rights of the complainants in the premises in question?” ³⁷⁰ “ 2d.

How far is the defendant estopped by his contract of May 24th, 1867, and his acts in pursuance thereof, from controverting the complainants’ title?” ££3rd. Has the Court jurisdiction in the premises?” 1. Upon the question of jurisdiction, which is first discussed in the opinion of the Circuit Court, we entirely agree with the views therein expressed, and for the reasons therein so well stated. The principle that “ when a subject-matter of controversy is already in possession of a Court of competent jurisdiction, its action will not he interfered with by any other Court of concurrent jurisdiction” has no application to the present case.

The Commissioner of the Land Office, although declared by the Code, (Art. 54, sec. 1,) to he a ££ Court of Record,” and though he is clothed with certain functions and powers in their nature judicial; yet as was said in Smith’s Lessee vs. Devecmon, 30 Md., 473, that officer does not form any part of the judiciary under the Constitution.” In that case it was decided, that his powers and duties are subject to he changed or modified by the Legislature. In like manner the proceedings before him may he reviewed or controlled by the judicial tribunals of the State. West vs. Jarrett, 1 H. & J., 538 . In our judgment the pendency of proceedings before the Commissioner, with a view to obtaining a patent, whether upon a caveat or otherwise, does not oust the jurisdiction of chancery over the same subject-matter.

It is true that in ordinary cases, the Courts will not interfere by injunction or otherwise with proceedings pending before the Commissioner, but will leave parties to their usual remedies by appeal from his decision, and by resort to the legal tribunals after a patent may he issued. But we think in this case, the appellees were entitled to relief by injunction. From the nature of the rights claimed by them, the situation of the parties, and the condition of the property in question, it is very elear that no adequate ³⁷¹ remedy could be afforded to the appellees by proceedings at law. We concur, therefore, in the opinion of the Circuit Court, that the objections to the jurisdiction made by the appellant are not well taken. 2nd.

In our opinion the doctrine of estoppel applies to the appellant with great force. Nothing is better settled than that every tenant is absolutely estopped and precluded from disputing the title of his landlord, under whom he holds. Here the relation of landlord and tenant exists between the parties. Anderson vs. Critcher, 11 G. & J., 450 .

The appellant is actually in possession of the premises under and by virtue of his contract of May 24th, 1867. Under that contract he has gone on to reclaim the property in question from the water in front of the appellees’ land, and by their license and permission has made improvements ; and now to allow him to repudiate his contract, and to appropriate to himself that which he has agreed shall belong to others, would be a fraud which a Court of Equity could not sanction. 3rd. But the rights of the appellees do not rest alone upon this ground. By the Code Art. 54, see. 38, there is secured to them as riparian proprietors, the exclusive right of making improvements into the waters in front of their lands, and such improvements when made belong to them as incident to their estate.

This is a valuable right which other persons cannot lawfully destroy or interfere with. Where such rights existed under the Acts of 1745 and 1784, it has been held that no patent ought to be issued for the land covered by water, in front of the property of the riparian proprietor, so as to interfere with its prospective enjoyment by him ; and this was decided