Gover v. Barnes

Eccleston, J., delivered the opinion of this court. This appeal is taken from the Superior Court of Baltimore City in tire case of an attachment on warrant issued at the instance of Gerard Gover and others, trading as Josiah Lee & Co., against John H. Barnes, as an absconding debtor. * The defendant filed a petition, under oath, alleging that at the time of issuing die attachment, he had never run away and lied from justice, and removed from his place of abode to defraud his creditors; alleging, also, that when the affidavit was made for the attachment, and when the attachment issued, he was in the city of Baltimore, and attending to his lawful business in the most public mariner, and in the most public places, was seen by and conversed with many citizens -of Baltimore, had, during business hours, passed several times into the banking-house of the plaintiffs, and the office of the sheriff of Baltimore city. Which petition prays that the attachment may be quashed. Afterwards the counsel for the defendant filed a motion to quash the attachment, assigning reasons why the motion should be granted.

Again, by leave of the court, the counsel for the defendant filed additional reasons in support of the motion. The first, as well as the additional reasons, allege that, at ⁵⁷⁸ the time- of issuing the attachment, the defendant was not an? absconding debtor. The counsel for the plaintiffs resisted the motion to qu ash, upon the following grounds: “1st. Because said defendant has not appeared in the said action against him. “2nd.

Because the matters of fact averred in said reasons, and said additional reasons, are proper for trial and decision by a jury, upon issues properly joined between the parties, and ought not to be tried by the court here, when the matters of fact so averred are not admitted, but, as in this case, are denied to be true.” Whereupon the court decided that the reasons in support of the motion to quash, appeared to be sufficient in law to bar the issuing of the attachment. After which, at the request of the plaintiffs’ counsel, the judge signed