Grabner v. Battle

Finan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This case is before us on appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. The plaintiff-appellant contends that the trial judge erred in not granting her motion for a new trial on the grounds that the jury had ignored the court’s instructions regarding damages for personal injuries. On December 17, 1965, appellant while driving her automobile was involved in a collision with a truck driven by an employee of appellee, Edward Battle.

On April 30, 1968, appellant filed suit for personal injuries and pain and suffering, alleging that the accident had occurred through the negligence of appellee’s employee. At the trial, testimony was introduced to show the appellant had struck her nose on the steering wheel and had been removed to a hospital in an ambulance. There was medical testimony to show that because of the injury, appellant was required to undergo a complete nasal reconstruction and a submucous resection. Other evidence revealed that appellant had suffered a similar injury on October 6, 1968, which necessitated a similar operation.

The trial judge instructed the jury that they were to only award damages for injuries and pain and suffering caused by the first accident. The jury returned a verdict in appellant’s favor for $70.00. The appellant felt this sum was inadequate and filed the motion for a new trial on February 19, 1969. The ⁵¹⁶ lower court denied the motion after a full hearing with this comment :■ “The above entitled case came on for hearing on March 17, 1969, on the Plaintiff’s Motion for New Trial filed February 19, 1969.

Counsel for the respective parties were present and arguments of counsel were heard. The main basis alleged in support of the Motion for New Trial is that the damages awarded the Plaintiff, Hedwig M. Grabner, individually, under the first count of the Declaration were grossly inadequate. The Court is of the opinion . that a determination as to the award of damages in the personal injury case is within the province of the Jury to decide as a matter of fact. The Jury is the sole Judge of the facts in such a case, and the Court cannot substitute its judgment for the finding of the Jury of the facts.” From this decision this appeal followed.

The appellant’s argument advances on two fronts both of which involve count one of the declaration covering personal injuries and property damage. First, she contends that the jury ignored the court’s instruction concerning the assessment of damages for pain and suffering and injuries sustained by her and considered only the element of property damage. Second, appellant contends that on the motion for a new trial, the lower court did not review the verdict of the jury and, furthermore, that the court was of the opinion that it did not have the authority to do so. We find no substance to either of these contentions.

First, it is a gratuitous assumption on the part of the appellant to baldly assert that the jury did not consider the question of damages arising from personal injuries ■and pain and suffering. This assumption is undoubtedly predicated on the fact that the verdict of the jury .amounted to $70.00, the stipulated amount of property damage. However, there is nothing in the record which ⁵¹⁷ would confirm that the jury did not consider the question of personal injury and pain and suffering. They might well have directed their attention to the elements of personal injury and pain and suffering and found them inconsequential.

The jury was expressly instructed not to consider the effects of the second accident sustained by the appellant; however, one must note that there was a second accident which involved similar injuries to her person and which occurred between the time of the first accident on which suit was brought and the time of the trial. It is to be noted that the jury apparently experienced no difficulty in following the court’s instructions regarding count numbers two and three as they rendered a verdict on count two for $793.20 covering the medical bills, and a verdict in the amount of $250.00 on count three for loss of consortium. The court could hardly speculate that the jury chose to ignore its instructions regarding count one, especially in view of the following query which the jury