Graczyk v. State

Hornby, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. In a six-count indictment, Paul Graczyk (the defendant) was charged, in the second count, with breaking into a storehouse with intent to steal, and, in the sixth count, was charged with breaking into a storeroom and stealing goods and money to the value of five dollars and upwards. ³⁰¹ When the case came on for trial the defendant changed the general plea of “not guilty” he had entered on his arraignment and plead “guilty” to the charge (in the sixth count) that he broke into the storeroom, i.e., the tavern of Edward Zielski, and stole therefrom whiskey and other goods and money of the total value of $40.97. The State accepted the plea. Eollowing a colloquy at the bench between the judge and counsel, the trial court, after receiving the testimony of one of the arresting officers and the record of prior convictions, inquired whether the defendant understood the nature of the offense to which he had entered a plea of guilty, and, having been assured by the defendant himself that he did, he was sentenced to ten years in the Penitentiary.

The defendant, although he had preserved no points to be reviewed, entered an appeal to this Court. Appellate counsel (who had not been trial counsel), at the suggestion of the defendant, set forth in the brief the questions he understood the defendant wished to raise on appeal, though he had no illusions about their lack of merit under a valid plea of guilty. Among them are contentions that the defendant was not confronted with the witnesses against him; that the State did not prove the corpus delicti; that the State did not show the commission of a crime; that it was improper for the State to introduce and the trial court to receive and consider the prior criminal record of the defendant before the end of the State’s case; and that the court failed to enter a formal verdict of guilty before it imposed sentence. None of these contentions was raised below, and none of them, if properly raised, would have any substance after a valid plea of guilty.

There were also contentions to the effect that the State reneged on its agreement to accept a plea of guilty to the second count and that the trial court interfered by suggesting that the plea of guilty should be to the sixth count instead of the second. These contentions, though not specific, at least indicate that the defendant was not happy with respect to the sentence the court had imposed on him. But the defendant did not then complain that the sentence was more than he had expected under the agreement. Nor did he thereafter move to set aside or otherwise correct the sentence he contends was erroneously imposed. ³⁰² After the briefs had been filed, and two days before the case was to have been argued in this Court, the defendant filed a motion pro se to stay the argument pending the appointment of other counsel “to properly and fully prepare a brief and argument” for him.

Counsel for the State as well as the defendant had submitted on the briefs, and we deferred determination of the case and requested the defendant to submit a statement of the points he claimed his counsel failed to raise and a statement of the matters he claimed were omitted from the record. In his “answer” to the request that he be more specific, the defendant states in substance that after pleading not guilty at the arraignment, he requested trial counsel to inform the State he would plead guilty to the second count (which through experience he knew carried a penalty of not more than 18 months); that the State agreed it would accept the plea; that when the State was reminded of the agreement at the trial, the prosecuting attorneys