Grandison v. State

COUCH, Judge. The appellant, Anthony Grandison, Sr., was charged in Baltimore County with conspiracy to murder Scott and Cheryl Piechowicz, first degree murder of Scott Piechowicz and Susan Kennedy, and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. Grandison challenges the verdict of guilt and the subsequent death sentence imposed by a jury in the Circuit Court for Somerset County where he was tried on his request for removal. He raises a host ⁶⁹⁷ of grounds for reversal.

As we conclude that none of these grounds involves reversible error, we shall affirm. With respect to the underlying facts giving rise to the charges against Grandison, we recently recited them in Evans v. State, 304 Md. 487, 494-95 , 499 A.2d 1261, 1264-65 (1985), and therefore shall borrow from that recitation as follows: “According to the State’s evidence, the defendant Evans and Anthony Grandison entered into an agreement whereby Evans would kill David Scott Piechowicz and his wife, Cheryl, because the couple were scheduled to testify against Grandison in a narcotics case pending in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. Evans was to receive $9,000.00 from Grandison for performing the murders. David Scott Piechowicz and Cheryl Piechowicz were employed at the Warren House Motel in Baltimore County.

On April 28, 1983, Susan Kennedy, the sister of Cheryl Piechowicz, was working in place of Cheryl at the Warren House Motel. The evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, on April 28th, Evans went to the motel and, not knowing the Piechowiczs, shot David Scott Piechowicz and Susan Kennedy with a MAC-11 machine pistol. Nineteen bullets were fired at the victims, who died from the multiple gunshot wounds. A two count indictment was filed against Evans and Grandison in the United States District Court.

They were charged with violating the Piechowiczs’ civil rights by interfering with their right to be witnesses in a judicial proceeding, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241 , and with witness tampering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512 . Subsequently the present case began with a four count indictment in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, charging Evans and Grandison each with two counts of first degree murder, one count of conspiracy to commit murder, and use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or crime of violence. Upon the defendants’ re ⁶⁹⁸ quests for removal, Grandison’s trial was transferred to the Circuit Court for Somerset County and Evans’s trial was transferred to the Circuit Court for Worcester County.” Prior to the trial in the instant case, Grandison and Evans were convicted on the federal charges and sentenced to life plus ten years imprisonment. They then filed pretrial motions to dismiss the charges in their respective state cases on double jeopardy grounds.

The motions were denied by the trial judges, and this Court affirmed. Evans and Grandison v. State, 301 Md. 45 , 481 A.2d 1135 (1984), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 105 S.Ct. 1411 , 84 L.Ed.2d 795 (1985). Thereafter, the trial proceeded in Somerset County and Grandison was found guilty of all charges. Subsequently, a sentencing proceeding was held pursuant to Maryland Code, Art. 27, § 413, wherein the jury imposed death penalties for the two murder convictions.

The trial judge also sentenced Grandison to life imprisonment for the conspiracy conviction and twenty years for the handgun violation consecutive to the life sentence. These sentences were imposed to run consecutively to the life plus ten years sentence previously imposed in the federal case. We shall now address Grandison’s arguments in turn as raised. I Failure to Inquire into Mental Capacity of State Witness Sparrow Grandison complains that his constitutional right of witness confrontation and cross-examination was impaired by the trial court’s refusal to permit appropriate steps to be taken to determine the mental capacity and veracity of State’s witness Charlene Sparrow.

Vernon Evans raised the same issue in his trial in the Circuit Court for Worcester County. In Evans v. State, 304 Md. 487, 508 , 499 A.2d 1261, 1272 (1985) we stated in pertinent part: ⁶⁹⁹ “In determining whether a request for a mental examination should be granted, however, a trial judge should carefully balance the demonstrated necessity for a compelled examination against the existence of important countervailing considerations. In affirming the denial of a motion for a psychiatric examination of a government witness, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in United States v. Benn, 476 F.2d 1127, 1131 (D.C.Cir.1972), listed some of the factors to be considered: ‘[A] psychiatric examination may seriously impinge on a witness’ right to privacy; the trauma that attends the role of complainant ... is sharply increased by the indignity of a psychiatric examination; the examination itself could serve as a tool of harassment; and the impact of all these considerations may well deter the victim of ... a crime from lodging any complaint at all. Since there is no exact measure for weighing these kinds of dangers against the need for an examination, the decision must be entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial judge in light of the particular facts.’ Accord, United States v. Butler, 481 F.2d 531 (D.C.Cir. 1973).

See Rasnick v. State, 7 Md.App. 564, 571-572 , 256 A.2d 543 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 835 , 91 S.Ct. 70 , 27 L.Ed.2d 67 (1970).” What we stated in Evans is applicable here and is dispositive of the issue. Hence, the trial court did not commit reversible error. II Venue Grandison next argues that the indictments handed down in Baltimore County are void since venue for the crimes charged did not lie in Baltimore County. Grandison was indicted on June 30, 1983 in Baltimore County; he was ultimately tried and convicted in Somerset County pursuant to his suggestion for removal under for ⁷⁰⁰ mer Maryland Rule 744. 1 The appellant argues that since the acts committed constituting the crimes of accessory before the fact to murder, conspiracy, and unlawful use of a handgun in commission of a crime of violence indisputably occurred in Baltimore City, he was wrongfully indicted and prosecuted in Baltimore County.

Prior to trial, Grandison moved to dismiss the conspiracy count (Count III) of the indictment on the ground that the Grand Jury for Baltimore County lacked jurisdiction. At the February 27, 1984 hearing, he amended his motion to dismiss to allege improper venue. Judge Simpkins denied the motion, relying on Lievers v. State, 3 Md.App. 597 , 241 A.2d 147 (1968) and Greenwald v. State, 221 Md. 245 , 157 A.2d 119 , appeal dismissed, 363 U.S. 721 , 80 S.Ct. 1599 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1521 (1960). We hold that Judge Simpkins committed no error in denying Grandison’s motion to dismiss.

(A) This Court has held that if conspirators enter into an illegal agreement in one county and go into another county to execute or carry out their illegal plans and there commit an overt act in furtherance of their agreement, each of the conspirators may be tried in either county; evidence of an express renewal of their agreement need not be established to prosecute the conspirators in the county where the overt act was committed. Greenwald, 221 Md. at 254 , 157 A.2d at 124 , quoting from People v. Mather (N.Y.), 4 Wendall 229, 259, 21 Amer. Dec. 122, 147. ⁷⁰¹ The underlying rationale for this principle lies in what has been termed the “continuing nature of conspiracy;” that is, “The law considers that wherever [the conspirators] act, there they renew, or, ... continue their agreement, and this agreement is renewed or continued as to all whenever any of them does an act in furtherance of their common design.” Greenwald, 221 Md. at 254 , 157 A.2d at 124 . In Lievers , the Court of Special Appeals recognized the rule that a conspiracy may be prosecuted “where the illegal agreement arose, or where [the] overt act in furtherance of the agreement occurred.... ” 3 Md.App. at 605 , 241 A.2d at 152 .

Chief Judge Murphy, in writing for the Court of Special Appeals in Boddie v. State, 6 Md.App. 523 , 252 A.2d 290 (1969), applied the holding of Lievers . In Boddie , the appellants were in the State of Maryland when the overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy to rob occurred. However, the illegal agreement in that case seemingly took place outside of the territorial limits of the state. Nonetheless, the court held if the evidence could sustain a finding that a conspiracy existed, the conspirators could be punished in Maryland.

Boddie, 6 Md.App. at 529 , 252 A.2d at 293 . This rule is in accord with, and indeed follows from, decisions rendered by the Supreme Court. In Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 , 32 S.Ct. 793 , 56 L.Ed. 1114 (1912), the Court was considering whether venue in a conspiracy case under § 5440 Rev. Stat. (1901) properly lies in the state or district where the conspiracy was entered into or any state or district where an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was performed. In its analysis, the Court stated “that a conspiracy is not necessarily the conception and purpose of the moment, but may be continuing.” Id. at 363, 32 S.Ct. at 800 , 56 L.Ed. at 1124 .

Moreover, wherever the conspirators act there they “renew, or perhaps, to speak more properly, they continue, their agreement, and this agreement is renewed or continued as to all whenever any one of them does an act in furtherance of their common design.” Id. at 365 , 32 S.Ct. at 801 , 56 L.Ed. at 1125 (quoting ⁷⁰² Robinson v. United States, 172 Fed. 105 (8th Cir.1909)); accord United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608 , 31 S.Ct. 124, 126 , 54 L.Ed. 1168 (U.S.N.Y. 1910); see United States v. Mayo, 721 F.2d 1084, 1090 (7th Cir.1983); see generally 1 F. Wharton, Criminal Law § 14 (14th ed. 1978). We note that, though the Court in Hyde was analyzing a statute which required allegation and proof of an overt act, it still accepted the characterization of a conspiracy as “continuing” and “ongoing.” See Mayo, 721 F.2d at 1090 . Such a characterization convinces us that the rule expressed in lAevers and applied in Boddie is sound. Accordingly, appellant’s argument must fail.

Since the murders occurred in Baltimore County and were a contemplated result of an ongoing, continuing scheme of which appellant was co-author, venue for the conspiracy count was proper in Baltimore County. (B) Grandison next attempts to specifically challenge venue for the murder and handgun counts as being improperly set in Baltimore County. He argues that since he was indicted and prosecuted outside the county in which the acts he committed occurred, Baltimore City, the indictment charging him as an accessory before the fact to murder and of a handgun violation should have been dismissed. The short answer to appellant’s contention is that venue for the murder and handgun counts was never challenged in the trial court. 2 Thus, this argument was waived.

Md. Rule 885; 3 McBurney v. State, 280 Md. 21, 32-33 , 371 A.2d 129, 135-36 (1977). ⁷⁰³ However, considering the nature of the proceedings before us, we entertain appellant’s argument but are compelled to summarily dismiss it as being without merit. It is a generally recognized principle that where the existence of a conspiracy is established, the law imposes upon a conspirator full responsibility for the logical and natural consequences of acts committed by his fellow conspirators if such acts are done in pursuance of the common design or purpose of the conspiracy. See U.S. v. Wenzel, 311 F.2d 164 (4th Cir.1962); Urciolo v. State, 272 Md. 607, 631 , 325 A.2d 878, 892 (1974) (embezzlement). Accord Commonwealth v. Thomas, 410 Pa. 160 , 189 A.2d 255, 258 , cert. denied, 375 U.S. 856 , 84 S.Ct. 118 , 11 L.Ed.2d 83 (1963).

Such responsibility attaches even though the conspirator was not physically present when the acts were committed by his fellow conspirators and would extend even to a homicide which is a contingency of a natural execution of the conspiracy, even though such homicide is not specifically contemplated by the parties. See Urciolo, 272 Md. at 631 , 325 A.2d at 892 ; accord Thomas, 189 A.2d at 258 . See generally 1 F. Wharton, supra; 21 Am.Jur.2d §§ 386-87 (1965). This rule rests on the underlying principle that one who encourages, aids, abets, or assists the active perpetrator in the commission of the offense, is a guilty participant, and in the eye of the law is equally culpable with the one who does the act.

See, e.g., Urciolo, 272 Md. 607 , 325 A.2d ⁷⁰⁴ 878; accord Bloomer v. State, 48 Md. 521 (1878); see Ex Parte Williams, 383 So.2d 564, 565 (Ala.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995 , 101 S.Ct. 534 , 66 L.Ed.2d 293 (1980). And this criminal accountability extends to the proximate, natural and logical consequences of the conspiracy. Williams, 383 So.2d at 565 . It follows that the law looks upon such a conspirator as an actual participant in the contemplated offense.

In short, the act of the co-conspirators in the case at bar was the act of Grandison. The determination of venue in the instant case must rely upon this theory of vicarious criminal responsibility which arises out of the existence of the conspiracy. The conspiracy in which Grandison took part had as its goal and sole objective the homicides of two victims. As a co-conspirator, Grandison became criminally responsible for the acts of his fellow conspirators; acts which were committed in Baltimore County.

Since the record reveals that in this conspiracy Grandison played a principal role, he is subject to venue at the situs of the crime. Accordingly, in our view, had the issue been properly raised, it would be without merit. Ill Separate Trials as to Counts Grandison also asserts that the charges of conspiracy and handgun violation were improperly tried in Somerset County in conjunction with the murder charges. Appellant was charged in a four count indictment with the murders of Scott Piechowicz and Susan Kennedy, conspiracy to murder Scott and Cheryl Piechowicz, and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence.

He sought removal of the case for trial without reference to counts. Subsequently, he moved to separate the trial of the conspiracy count from the trial of all other counts. Appellant argued that he intended to take the witness stand in his own defense with respect to the conspiracy charge but wished to remain silent with respect to the murder charges. ⁷⁰⁵ After the proceedings were removed to Somerset County, the motion for separate trials was denied. We perceive no error in the denial of appellant's motion.

It is uncontroverted that the decision as to whether to grant a severance lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Stevenson v. State, 43 Md.App. 120, 130 , 403 A.2d 812, 818 (1979), aff'd, 287 Md. 504 , 413 A.2d 1340 (1980); State v. Jones, 284 Md. 232, 238 , 395 A.2d 1182, 1185 (1979). The trial court, in exercising its discretion, is required to balance the likely prejudice to the accused against the possible effects on economy and efficiency in judicial administration. McKnight v. State, 280 Md. 604, 609-10 , 375 A.2d 551, 555 (1977).

Moreover, we note that in considering a charge of conspiracy, the overt acts of the conspirators in the commission of the crime are clearly relevant and material to the proof of the conspiracy. See Jones v. State, 8 Md.App. 370, 379-80 , 259 A.2d 807, 813 (1969); Hill v. State, 231 Md. 458, 461 , 190 A.2d 795, 796 (1963). It follows that in the case at bar, evidence of the homicides and surrounding circumstances is relevant and material to the conspiracy which in the first instance contemplated and directed their commission. The homicides at issue here are clearly related to the conspiracy. 4 Additionally, absent authority to the contrary, it would be “foolhardy and purposeless to require as of right two trials — one for a crime committed and one for conspiracy to commit the same crime.” Green v. State, 25 Md. App. 679, 686 , 337 A.2d 729, 733 (1975).

At trial, appellant offered no authority or compelling justification for a finding that a severance was warranted. Only the following took place at the February 27, 1984 hearing, in pertinent part: ⁷⁰⁶ “THE COURT: Three. Motion for Separate Trials under Counts 1, 2 and 4. I guess what you’re saying, you’re asking that Counts 1, 2 and 4 be tried and that Count 3 be tried separately.

Counts 1 and 2 are murder, first degree murder, and 4 is a handgun violation, and 3 is conspiracy. What you’re saying is that the charges be severed and that we have two separate trials. All right. I’m ready to hear from you on that.

You want to be heard on that, sir? MR. GRANDISON: Yes, sir. Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, sir. MR. GRANDISON: The position on this motion is that counts should be severed because I intend to take the stand as to Count 3, but not as to Counts 1 and 2, which the State is seeking the death penalty. My position is that if cases are tried jointly, if I take the stand, then I would be subject to being cross-examined as to any prior conviction that I may have.

I feel that this might be very prejudicial to me as to those two counts which the State is seeking the death penalty. THE COURT: Are you saying that the reason those counts should be separate is because — did I understand you to say in Counts 1 and 2 you don’t want to take the stand, but on Count 4 you do? MR. GRANDISON: Count 3 is the conspiracy offense.

I intend to take the stand and testify, offer testimony. THE COURT: I see. MR. GRANDISON: But as to Count 1 and 2, I do not wish to testify.

THE COURT: All right. And because of that, you think the cases should be separated, that the counts should be separated. Is that the only reason? MR.

GRANDISON: That’s not the only reason. I have additional reasons in my memorandum. THE COURT: What are they? ⁷⁰⁷ MR. GRANDISON: I’m sorry, Your Honor.

I have no additional reason other than what I stated.” MR. GRANDISON: The conspiracy offense in this case is a distinct offense from the substantive offense which is first degree murder charges. I don’t believe it to be true that evidence that would be admissible in the conspiracy count would be admissible as well in the first degree murder case. I have no authority rightly before me to support that position.

I think this is — the law is clear on that as well as the rules, that evidence may be admissible in a conspiracy, but not be admissible to substantive offense. I think that I am entitled to a separate trial on these two counts, especially in light of the fact that I have presented to the Court that I wish to take the stand as to the conspiracy and not as to the first degree murder counts. This is not no ordinary run-of-the-mill case. The State is seeking the death penalty on first count of the indictment, the first two counts of the indictment.

I think the situation would be different from any other case and I think that I’m entitled to a separate trial on these counts, and I submit.” ****** “MR. GRANDISON: Your Honor, offer one additional thing. To force me into a trial of Count 3 along with the first two counts in the indictment would be a — put me in the position where I would have to offer defense for my alleged co-defendant as well, where I wouldn’t be in that position if I was being tried separate for both counts. But being as the conspiracy count, the State would allege different things as act or allegedly committed by three co-defendants which would force me in a position to have to defend the act allegedly committed by them which I think would be very prejudicial and no way could I ⁷⁰⁸ receive a fair trial being tried in all these counts together.” We are unable to find any authority for the proposition that a trial court is required to grant a motion for separate trials as a matter of right to a criminal defendant upon an allegation by that defendant that he wishes to testify on less than all counts charged against him.

In this case, Grandison has done little more than express a generalized desire to testify as to some counts but not others. He has not indicated what he would or would not have testified to and whether such testimony would have been of any particular importance. We are thus unable to conclude that appellant has demonstrated compelling prejudice resulting from denial of the motion for separate trials when we have been given no indication that testimony to be offered or withheld by appellant had any value. See McKnight, 280 Md. at 609-10 , 375 A.2d 551 .

Therefore, we conclude that Grandison’s bare allegation proffered in support of his motion, with nothing more, under the record before us is no basis for mandating a severance of trial. See, e.g., United States v. Corbin, 734 F.2d 643, 648-49 (11th Cir.1984). It follows, then, that there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying appellant’s motion for separate trials. Considering the allegation that the conspiracy and handgun counts were improperly removed along with the murder counts from Baltimore County in the first instance, we conclude this argument to be without merit.

As Judge Simpkins correctly noted at trial, “You remove the whole case, not parts of it.” More particularly, former Md. Rule 744 5 speaks in terms of transferral of the “case” or “case file.” Further, in Stevenson v. State, 9 Md.App. 152 , 263 A.2d 36 (1970), the Court of Special Appeals held that “[E]ven though [an] indictment contains other counts which charge ⁷⁰⁹ offenses which are not punishable by death, those offenses are carried along with the removal of the offense that is or may be punishable by death, and are also removed for trial.” Id. at 162 , 263 A.2d at 41 . Finally, we note that appellant’s initial motion did not express the intent to remove only the murder counts from Baltimore County. Indeed, appellant’s “Motion and Affidavit for Removal of Trial” filed in this case demanded a removal of appellant’s trial. As we have stated herein, it was proper for appellant’s entire trial, encompassing all counts which were enumerated in the Baltimore County Grand Jury Indictment to be removed pursuant to former Md.Rule 744.

Therefore, in light of the plain language enunciated in former Md.Rule 744 and Stevenson, 9 Md.App. 152 , 263 A.2d 36 , we hold that the trial court did not err in transferring the entire proceeding to Somerset County. IV Insanity Plea We turn now to the issue of whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant appellant’s request to file a plea of insanity. The request was made on April 25, 1984, the day before trial was scheduled to begin. The procedures governing the assertion of the insanity defense at the time of the Grandison trial were dictated by section 12-108 of the 1982 Health — General Article of the Maryland Code and former Maryland Rule 731. 6 The rule and the statute must be read in conjunction.

Their combined provisions require the defense of insanity to be interposed in writing at the time the initial plea is made; the ⁷¹⁰ initial plea must be made within fifteen days after the earlier of the appearance of counsel or the first appearance of the defendant before the court pursuant to former Md. Rule 723. This period is automatically extended if a motion, demand for particulars, or other paper requiring a ruling by the court or compliance by a party before entering a plea is filed. Former Md. Rule 731 b 2. Such a filing delays the deadline for entering a plea until fifteen days after the court has ruled on the motion.

Id. Both the statute and the rule provide for an exception to these time constraints. The court may accept an insanity plea at any time before commencement of the trial upon a showing of “good cause.” Appellant posits two theories under which he contends the trial court should have accepted his insanity plea. First, he asserts that his plea was timely under former Rule 731 b 2, and the court was therefore without discretion to reject it.

In the alternative, appellant argues that he made an adequate showing of “good cause” as required by § 12-108 and former Rule 731 b 2; hence he was entitled to plead insanity prior to the commencement of trial. Appellant’s first argument fails since no “motion, demand for particulars, or other paper ... requiring a ruling by the court or compliance by a party before entering a plea” was ruled upon by the court in the fifteen day period preceding his attempted entry of the insanity plea. 7 Consequently, the automatic extension of former Rule 731 b 2 does not come into play. Since the defendant made his ⁷¹¹ first Rule 723 appearance before the court on July 19, 1983, the fifteen day period during which he had a right to file the insanity plea had expired long before April 25, 1984. Thus, Grandison was entitled to enter a late plea of insanity only upon a showing of “good cause.” Maryland Code (1982), Health — General Article, § 12-108; former Md. Rule 731 b 2.

Although not in the context of the insanity plea, we have previously held that a statutory requirement of “good cause” vests the trial court with wide discretion. See State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422 , 470 A.2d 1269 (1984) (discussing “good cause” in context of postponement of trial date); State v. Jones, 270 Md. 388 , 312 A.2d 281 (1973) (analysis of “good cause” requirement to permit a requested withdrawal of an accused’s jury trial waiver). We now hold that the “good cause” requirements of § 12-108 and former Rule 731 likewise endow the trial court with broad discretion. Thus the trial judge’s determination is entitled to the utmost respect and should not be overturned unless there was a clear abuse of that discretion.

Madore v. Baltimore County, 34 Md.App. 340, 346 , 367 A.2d 54, 58 (1976). Because we feel that Judge Simpkins’ ruling was not the result of an abuse of discretion, we refuse to disturb it. The only evidence proffered by the defense at the hearing to determine whether there was “good cause” warranting the acceptance of a late insanity plea was the appellant’s unsubstantiated allegations that he had been committed to a mental hospital at age nine and that “as late as 1980 — the Court psychiatrist had determined [him] to be functioning on the borderline.” The paucity of proof was a direct result of the appellant’s refusal to submit to a court provided psychiatric examination which ironically had been initiated pursuant to appellant’s April 25, 1984 request that the court “arrange proper psychiatric examination.” At the April 26, 1984 hearing, Judge Simpkins gave a first hand account of the events precipitated by Grandison’s request for a mental evaluation: ⁷¹² “[I]t was filed by the defendant 19 hours before Court was to start. In order to save time and to comply with this, to get him the examination that he requested in the plea and to give him the hearing that he requested, and to give him the findings of the examination, I contacted a psychiatrist who is employed by the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, and asked him if he would arrange for a psychiatric examination.

He was kind enough to arrange that examination after he got off work last night. He went to the Wicomico County Detention Center last night at 5:15 to meet with Mr. Grandison. He met with Mr. Grandison____ Mr. Grandison wouldn’t talk with him. ****** Now, that put us in this position. This man wanted then, before we do anything else, before he would be interviewed by the doctor, as he had requested, he refused to talk to the doctor until he had a chance to talk to his standby counsel — not his counsel, because he was representing himself, but to his standby counsel — who was then some 35 miles away in another county, which would have meant we had to get hold of Crawford [standby counsel], get Crawford, find him, get him to the Detention Center in Salisbury, have the conversation, hoping the doctor — who was doing the Court a favor— would agree to stick around, have the examination, type up the findings sometime before 9:30 this morning, and have it all done in time for Court at 9:30, a ridiculous situation.” In our view, the trial court afforded Grandison ample opportunity to adduce evidence of “good cause” for allowance of the late insanity plea.

His failure to do so was the result of his unjustifiable refusal to cooperate with the court appointed psychiatrist. There is no constitutional right to have counsel present at a psychiatric examination to determine sanity. United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104 ⁷¹³ (D.C.Cir.1984); United States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d 43, 48 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855 , 97 S.Ct. 149 , 50 L.Ed.2d 130 (1976); United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54, 67 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Baird, 414 F.2d 700, 711 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1005 , 90 S.Ct. 559 , 24 L.Ed.2d 497 (1970); United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719, 726-27 (4th Cir. 1968). A defendant is, however, entitled to the assistance of counsel in determining whether to submit to a psychiatric examination.

Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 471 , 101 S.Ct. 1866, 1877 , 68 L.Ed.2d 359, 374 (1981). Since Grandison was acting as his own counsel, the only possible complaint he might have is that he was denied assistance of standby counsel in determining whether to undergo mental evaluation. However, the April 25, 1984 “Plea” itself reflects that this was not so. It requests that the court “arrange proper psychiatric examination of Defendant” and is signed by both the defendant and his standby counsel.

Also, at the April 26th hearing, standby counsel, acting at the request of the defendant, stated that prior to the filing of this plea “Mr. Grandison and I had a considerable discussion about the fine distinction between competency to stand trial and insanity at the time the crime was committed.” Thus, it is clear that the decision to undergo psychiatric evaluation was made after consultation with standby counsel. Therefore, there was no excuse for appellant’s subsequent refusal to proceed with the examination. He cannot now complain that he was not given an opportunity to demonstrate “good cause” or that the trial court’s refusal of the insanity plea was in error. The defense did not demonstrate “good cause” for entry of the late plea.

Thus, the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in refusing to accept the insanity plea. V Violation of Former Md.Rule 746 Grandison claims that the charges against him should have been dismissed because he was not tried within 180 ⁷¹⁴ days of his arraignment and there was no postponement for good cause by an administrative judge pursuant to Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol., 1985 Cum.Supp.), Art. 27, § 591 and former Md.Rule 746. 8 The record reveals that Grandison was first arraigned in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County on July 19, 1983; thus the 180 days requirement of Rule 746 started to run making January 15, 1984 the expiration date before which the case was to be tried in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. Trial was initially set for November 11, 1983, but was subsequently postponed until January 3, 1984.

The case was removed from the Circuit Court for Baltimore County to the Circuit Court for Somerset County on December 16, 1983, on Grandisoné motion. The record is silent as to what, if anything, occurred on January 3, 1984. It is clear, however, that on January 20, 1984 the Circuit Court for Somerset County set the trial date for April 26, 1984. Grandison moved to dismiss based on two grounds; first, he argued to the trial judge that once the 180 days had elapsed (January 15, 1984) ⁷¹⁵ the trial court no longer had any jurisdiction.

Secondly, he claimed that the administrative judge did not grant the postponement as required by the rule. Both Art. 27, § 591 and former Rule 746 provide that trial shall be set within 180 days after the earlier of the appearance of counsel or the first appearance of the defendant before the circuit court. The statute and rule also provide that, for good cause shown, the County Administrative Judge may grant a change of a circuit court trial date. In our view the rule is simply inapplicable here where at Grandison’s request the case was removed to the Circuit Court for Somerset County less than a month before the January 3, 1984 trial date set in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.

This is readily understandable since the statute and rule only address the situation where a case is set and ultimately tried in a single circuit court, and not where a trial date has been set in one circuit court but the case has been removed to a different circuit court for trial. Indeed, to conclude that Art. 27, § 591 and former Rule 746 similarly cover removal situations would be to render useless and ineffective the principal requirement contemplated by the statute and rule. Judge Eldridge, speaking for the Court in State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 453 , 470 A.2d 1269 (1984), stated: “The major safeguard contemplated by the statute and rule, for assuring that criminal trials are not needlessly postponed beyond the 180-day period, is the requirement that the administrative judge or his designee, rather than any judge, order the postponement. This is a logical safeguard, as it is the administrative judge who has an overall view of the court’s business, who is responsible ‘for the administration of the court,’ who assigns trial judges, who ‘supervises the assignment of actions for trial,’ who supervises the court personnel involved in the assignment of cases, and who receives reports from such personnel.” (footnotes omitted). ⁷¹⁶ Clearly then former Rule 746 was not designed to cover the removal situation.

In such a situation, the administrative judge of the circuit court from which the case was removed would be unable to fulfill those functions contemplated by the statute and rule. Id. Similarly, to expect and require that the receiving court adhere to the trial schedule set forth in the former circuit court would be to bestow upon the administrative judge of the receiving court an unreasonable burden which oftentimes could result in an impossible task. Understandably, this was recognized by the trial judge in Somerset County who, in denying Grandisoné motion to dismiss, stated in part: “Obviously, when you ask for removal like that, you automatically extend the trial date.

There is no way in this county we could have tried it on the 3rd of January. No. 1, we only had 12 days because of the Christmas holiday and weekends and New Yearé holiday, and we have the problem of cancelling out four or five months of cases that had already been scheduled to be tried. We only have one judge and one courtroom in this county, so it became necessary to continue the trial date at the request of the defendant.” 9 We hold therefore that when a criminal case is removed on a defendanté request, the trial date assigned in the forwarding circuit court pursuant to Art. 27, § 591 and present Rule 4-271 is without effect. We further hold that under such conditions the 180-day period begins to run anew in the receiving circuit court from the time the case is received therein.

A defendant also remains protected by his speedy trial rights under the federal and state constitutions. We also point out that this holding is equally applicable where the State obtains the removal, but with some limitation. If it appears that such removal was for the ⁷¹⁷ purpose of or had the necessary effect of circumventing the requirements of the statute and the rule, the original trial date will hold. See Curley v. State, 299 Md. 449 , 474 A.2d 502 (1984) (charges refiled following nolle prosequi); State v. Glenn, 299 Md. 464 , 474 A.2d 509 (1984); and compare State v. Phillips, 299 Md. 468 , 474 A.2d 512 (1984).

Accordingly, we find no merit to Grandison’s contentions on this issue. VI Violation of Interstate Agreement on Detainers It is next contended that because he was not tried within 120 days of being returned to Maryland, the State violated Maryland Code, Art. 27, § 616E, and thus the indictment against him must be dismissed. Grandison argues that he was brought to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County several times for matters in connection with this case. It appears that at these times he was in federal custody in New York, and upon completion of the hearings on motions and other matters, he was returned to New York by the federal authorities.

As this motion was heard by the court on argument without any testimony being taken, the record is not entirely clear. Nevertheless, we glean that whenever it was necessary to have Grandison in attendance at court for matters connected to this case a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum was obtained and served. Thereupon federal marshals escorted Grandison to court and stayed with him until the court business was completed. Grandison was then escorted back to New York by the federal marshal, where he was being held in a pre-trial detention facility.

It also appears that during this period Grandison was not serving a period of incarceration, only pre-trial detention. The trial judge concluded that he was not satisfied that Grandison was “serving a sentence in the Federal Court,” that no detainer was filed, and that Grandison never left the custody of the federal marshal. Article 27, ⁷¹⁸ § 616E(a) 10 contains certain triggering events which, as argued by the State, were not met here. First, there needs to be a detainer which was lodged against Grandison.

While the record is less than clear as to what was filed, the trial judge found that it fell short of being a detainer. Second, there is doubt that the requirement in § 616E(a) that Grandison was serving a term of incarceration was met; the trial judge did not think so. Finally, § 616E(a) requires that custody be obtained by the State; it was not here, as noted by the trial judge. We do not believe the trial judge erred; he heard the argument and saw what was presented to him.

We find no merit to this contention. VII Denial of Request for Further Removal Because of what he perceived as extensive publicity surrounding his case, Grandison requested an additional removal; lacking this, he wanted a continuance; and in the absence of either, he moved to have the jury sequestered. He also sought the impaneling of a new group of jurors. The trial judge denied all of these requests.

Grandison now complains that he was denied a fair trial. We disagree. In Evans v. State, 304 Md. 487 , 499 A.2d 1261 (1985), we had occasion to address this identical issue when Evans raised it ⁷¹⁹ in the Circuit Court for Worcester County where he was being tried. The reasons cited by Evans are the same, basically, as those cited by Grandison.

What Judge Eldridge wrote for the Court there is equally applicable to Grandison’s argument here and is dispositive of his contention. Judge Eldridge stated in part: “We hold that the record supports the decision of the trial judge to deny the request for further removal. We have consistently taken the position that this question is one which rests within the trial court’s discretion, reviewable on appeal only to determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 511-12 , 499 A.2d at 1273-74 (citations omitted). Accordingly, we herein conclude that the denial of the request for further removal did not amount to an abuse of discretion under Maryland law.

The same can be said of the trial court’s denial of a continuance. It is beyond dispute that the determination of whether to grant a continuance lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Id. at 514 , 499 A.2d at 1275 . Here, we find no evidence of abuse of that discretion.

Similarly, the determination to have the jury sequestered throughout the trial is discretionary. Former Md. Rule 751 e (now Md.Rule 4 — 311(c)); Maryland Code (1974, 1984 Repl.Vol.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, § 8-304; see Evans, 304 Md. 487 , 499 A.2d 1261 (1985). Here, too, Grandison has failed to provide us with any indication that there was an abuse of discretion. There is no proof of juror prejudice.

To the contrary, the jurors received daily admonitions against exposure to publicity. Finally, Grandison’s contention that a new jury should have been impanelled due to alleged discussions connecting him to the Mafia is completely without merit and foundation in the record. Any possibility of prejudice resulting from those rumors was adequately cured by the trial court’s individual questioning of the prospective jurors. ⁷²⁰ Consequently, there was no abuse of the trial court’s discretion here. VIII Individual Voir Dire In assessing appellant’s contention that the trial judge’s voir dire examination of the jury en masse was inadequate to protect him from the probability that his defense would be prejudiced due to publicity surrounding the Evans verdict, we begin with the recognized principle that “in the absence of a statute or court rule to the contrary, as long as the selection procedure [of a jury] results in a fair and impartial jury, the method and manner of conducting a voir dire rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Evans v. State, 304 Md. 487, 514 , 499 A.2d 1261, 1275 (1985) (quoting Colvin v. State, 299 Md. 88, 102 , 472 A.2d 953, 960 , cert. denied, — U.S.-, 105 S.Ct. 226 , 83 L.Ed.2d 155 (1984)).

At issue here is whether the trial judge abused his discretion as appellant contends in failing to grant appellant’s request to individually voir dire members of the jury panel as to potential prejudice resulting from the guilty verdict rendered in the Evans trial, which was held in nearby Worcester County. Appellant has offered no authority, nor has our research uncovered any, mandating that a trial court conduct individual voir dire of each member of the jury after trial has commenced in a capital case where there is an allegation of jury prejudice resulting from publicity of a related, yet separate, trial. 11 ⁷²¹ Nonetheless, several related principles of law exist which in our analysis force, us to conclude that appellant’s argument must fail. To support his contention, appellant relies in part on Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627 (9th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1022 , 91 S.Ct. 585 , 27 L.Ed.2d 633 (1971), for the proposition that in some instances where a significant potential for prejudice has been found, individual voir dire of the jurors is required. We decline to analyze the merits of such a contention as we find the case sub judice factually distinguishable to Silverthorne .

In Silverthorne the appellant argued that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to ascertain during voir dire and at certain specific points in the trial whether, in light of the massive news media publicity which antedated and which was contemporaneous with the trial, the jurors bore any prejudice toward appellant. 400 F.2d at 630 . In analyzing the particular situation, the United States Court of Appeals noted that during the trial some jurors, while sitting in the jury room, read the newspaper accounts of appellant’s trial; indeed, one particular juror maintained a comprehensive collection of newspaper articles pertaining to appellant’s trial. Id. at 641 . Though these facts were brought to the attention of the trial judge during the trial, he nonetheless failed to inquire as to the possible influence of the articles or further attempt to remedy the situation.

In holding that the trial court erred, the Circuit Court of Appeals stated, “[W]e have no recourse, in light of this incident, but to ... attribute little if any weight to the court’s repetitive admonitions that the jurors should read or hear nothing about the case.” Id. at 641 . Relying in part on Coppedge v. United States, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 275 , 272 F.2d 504, 508 (1959), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 855 , 82 S.Ct. 92 , 7 L.Ed.2d 52 (1961), the court noted, “It is ... the affirmative duty of the trial court to take positive action to ascertain the existence of improper influences on the jurors’ ⁷²² deliberative qualifications and to take whatever steps are necessary to diminish or eradicate such improprieties.” Silverthorne, 400 F.2d at 643 . We find the significant fact existing in Silverthorne , knowledge on the part of the trial court of blatant violations by members of the jury of the trial court’s admonitions, not to be present in the case at bar. Further, in the case at bar, there is no evidence on record of massive publicity surrounding appellant’s trial but only allegations of the existence of publicity surrounding the related but separate Evans trial.

In Coppedge , the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the conviction of a criminal defendant on the basis that the trial court failed to ascertain the possible effect of trial publicity on members of the jury. Particularly, the trial court was found to have allowed the jury to twice separate overnight without admonishing the jurors against reading newspaper articles about the pending trial. Further, the trial court failed to inquire into the potential prejudice harbored by those jurors the trial court knew had read newspaper accounts of the proceedings. This was held to constitute error on the part of the trial court.

In the case sub judice, the trial court specifically admonished the jurors not to expose themselves to media publicity; further, there is no evidence in the record that suggests the trial court had knowledge that any member or members of the jury had violated its admonition. See also Adjmi v. United States, 346 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1965). Turning- to the instant appeal, it must be borne in mind that the record suggests the trial judge was extremely sensitive to and concerned with the potential problems raised by media publicity and was quite aware of the necessity of specifically calling to the attention of the jurors the importance of avoiding it. On the evening of May 2, 1984, the trial judge warned the newly selected jurors: ⁷²³ “Now, the admonishment I am going to give you now will be true throughout these proceedings.

Please don’t discuss this matter with anyone at all. Don’t discuss it amongst yourselves, and don’t discuss it with your friends or your neighbors or your wives or husbands, as the case may be, or your children, or with the press. As I said a couple times before, I know when you are playing an important part in a proceeding like this, it is difficult sometimes to avoid reading a newspaper account of it or watching a television account of it or something like that. I know it is hard not to do that.

But I am going to ask you, you are going to have to refrain from doing it in this case if you are going to be fair to both parties. You are under oath to be fair to both parties. Don’t watch any television account or listen to any radio account of these proceedings until this case is terminated. Don’t read anything in the newspaper about it, please, until this case is terminated.” The next morning the trial judge reiterated the admonition.

He again reminded the jurors during the course of the trial. Additionally, on the morning of May 9, the morning after co-conspirator Evans was convicted in Worcester County, upon request of the appellant-Grandison, the trial judge posed the following question to the jury en masse: “Have any of you heard anything about the outcome of a case that was concluded in Worcester County last night? If you have, please stand.” There was no response by any member of the jury. Based on our review of the record, we are not persuaded that the trial judge erred in questioning the jury en masse as to the alleged publicity surrounding the Evans trial. 12 Appellate courts should be slow to impute to juries ⁷²⁴ a disregard of their duties and to trial courts a want of diligence or perspicacity in appraising the jury’s conduct.

Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474 , 53 S.Ct. 252 , 77 L.Ed. 439 (1933). It is mere speculation, unsupported by the record, to conclude that there were jurors who became overwhelmingly influenced by publicity surrounding a different trial and yet did not choose to acknowledge these feelings before their fellow jurors. Manifestly, Grandison has not demonstrated that he has been afforded anything less than a fair and impartial jury. Under the circumstances presented by the instant case, we are not persuaded that the trial judge erred in conducting the requested voir dire concerning publicity surrounding the Evans conviction en masse.

IX Exclusion for Cause of Jury Panel Members Who Expressed General Objections to the Death Penalty Grandison next contends that of the twenty six prospective jurors who expressed some hesitation about imposing the death penalty, all but three were excused for cause. He argues that it is clear that the court improperly struck these jurors because their beliefs were not such as to prevent them from rendering an impartial verdict. The State, on the other hand, contends there was no error by the trial judge. We have carefully reviewed the record and agree with the State’s position.

The Court has recently been confronted with two death penalty cases in which the same basic argument was made as is now presented by Grandison; in both cases we rejected that argument and do so here. See Foster v. State, 304 Md. 439 , 499 A.2d 1236 (1985) and Evans v. State, 304 Md. 487 , 499 A.2d 1261 (1985). The only variation in Grandisoné argument stems from Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 844 , 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), wherein the Supreme Court modified the standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of ⁷²⁵ his or her views on capital punishment. 13 The Court stated, “That standard is whether the juror’s views would ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’ ” Id., — U.S. at-, 105 S.Ct. at 852, 83 L.Ed.2d at 851 -52 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 , 100 S.Ct. 2521 , 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980)). After reviewing the record we are satisfied that where the trial judge excused a prospective juror for cause he followed the standard set out in Witt .

In reaching this conclusion we recognize that deference must be given to the trial judge’s decision to exclude. In Witt , in pertinent part, the Supreme Court stated: “We note that, in addition to dispensing with Wither-spoon’s reference to ‘automatic’ decisionmaking, this standard likewise does not require that a juror’s bias be proved with ‘unmistakable clarity.’ This is because determinations of juror bias cannot be reduced to question-and-answer sessions which obtain results in the manner of a catechism. What common sense should have realized experience has proved: many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been made ‘unmistakably clear’; these veniremen may not know how they will react when faced with imposing the death sentence, or may be unable to articulate, or may wish to hide their true feelings. Despite this lack of clarity in the printed record, however, there will be situations where the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law.

For reasons that will be developed more fully infra, this is why deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror.” — U.S. at -, 105 S.Ct. at 852-53, 83 L.Ed.2d at 852-53 (footnote omitted). ⁷²⁶ In our view, Judge Simpkins was painstakingly thorough in the questioning of prospective jurors, particularly those who obviously had problems with the death penalty in general. Furthermore, the trial judge afforded Grandison, his standby attorney, and the State’s attorney ample opportunity to question the prospective jurors. In short, we are satisfied that the entire procedure was carefully executed in an effort to obtain a fair and impartial jury both as to the defendant and to the State. X Failure to Strike for Cause Jurors Who Indicated, Potential Inability to be Impartial Grandison also argues that the trial judge erred in refusing to strike for cause six prospective jurors whose ability to be impartial was “drawn into serious question” because of their aversion to drugs and drug trafficking.

A defendant is, of course, entitled to a fair and impartial jury. What Grandison overlooks, however, is the fact that all six of the prospective jurors he claims should have been struck were rehabilitated through additional questioning. For example, Mrs. Creasy, who admitted she had heard the case was a drug-related case also stated several times she thought she could base her decision on the evidence she heard in the courtroom and the law involved. Mrs. Dorsey disliked drugs; she was asked the following question by Grandison’s standby counsel: “MR.

CRAWFORD: Could I ask you one more question? I am sorry. Getting back to this drug business, if something came out in trial to indicate that there were drugs involved, and although this man is not on trial for any drug involvement, if it should develop during the course of the trial that there may have been some drug involvement, although he is not on trial for that, would that have any — make any difference to you as to how you arrived at a verdict regarding what he is on trial for? ⁷²⁷ MRS. DORSEY: No, if it wasn’t pertinent to the case.

Like I said, I just don’t like drugs. I had an experience in drugs with my son, and he is well, thank God. I just don’t like drugs.” Thus it is clear that Mrs. Dorsey was stating, in effect, that the drug factor would make no difference in how she arrived at a verdict if the case did not involve drug charges. Mrs. Hankins also stated that she would try her very best to make a decision based on the evidence and the law.

Mrs. Somers stated she would not make a decision on the fact of drugs alone and that her decision would be based on the evidence and the law. Finally, both Mr. Brimer and Mr. Serman testified that while drugs might influence them, they would follow the court’s instructions to base their decisions on the evidence and the law. Thus while unremarkably all expressed an aversion to drugs, all stated they would make a decision based on the evidence and the law. In our view Grandison was entitled to no more.

XI Death Qualified Jury Grandison next contends that he was entitled to be tried by a jury from which opponents to the death penalty were not excluded. We recently had occasion to address this contention in Foster v. State, 304 Md. 439 , 499 A.2d 1236 (1985). For the reasons set forth in Part IB of the Foster opinion, 304 Md. at 453, 499 A.2d at 1243, we again reject this contention. XII Evidence Here, certain evidence is argued to have been erroneously admitted at trial.

That evidence consists of, namely: (a) testimony of Cheryl Piechowicz concerning her husband and sister; (b) photographs of the victims taken before the incident occurred; (c) photographs taken at the autopsy of each victim; (d) testimony of Cheryl concerning her conver ⁷²⁸ sation with Janet Moore; (e) a MAC-11 pistol; and (f) an enlargement of Grandison’s March 14 letter to Moore. (a) During the guilt or innocence phase of the trial, Cheryl Piechowicz testified, inter alia, to certain facts about her sister and husband. 14 Objection to this testimony on the grounds of relevancy was overruled. We perceive no error on the part of the trial judge in so ruling. In Johnson v. State, 292 Md. 405, 430 , 439 A.2d 542, 556 (1982), holding that the trial judge did not err in permitting testimony that the victim had a very sick daughter, we stated: “Assuming, solely arguendo, that this testimony was superfluous to the prosecution’s case, a reversal of the underlying convictions is not justified if the evidentiary violation constitutes harmless error.

The standard for determining harmless error, as thoughtfully laid out by Judge O’Donnell for this Court in Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659 , 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976), is whether ‘a reviewing court, upon its own independent review of the record, is able to declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict____’ Upon such a review of the trial record in this case we have no difficulty in declaring beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdicts were not influenced by the testimony concerning the daughter’s health. The record is glutted with overwhelming evidence in support of the jury’s guilt determinations____ A reversal on this basis is thus not warranted.” We find these principles applicable here and dispositive of this contention. ⁷²⁹ (b) & (c) During Cheryl’s testimony, two color photographs were introduced; one, a high school portrait of Susan Kennedy (State’s Exhibit # 1), the other, the Piechowiczes at the beach (State’s Exhibit # 2). 15 Whether a photograph is of practical value in a case and admissible at trial is a matter best left to the sound discretion of the trial judge. Johnson v. State, 303 Md. 487, 502 , 495 A.2d 1, 8 , cert. denied, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 868 , 88 L.Ed.2d 907 (1985). Ordinarily a court’s determination as to the admissibility at trial of photographs will not be disturbed unless plainly arbitrary.

See Bowers v. State, 298 Md. 115, 135-36 , 468 A.2d 101, 111-12 (1983). Considering first the photographs identified as State’s Exhibits 1 and 2, we perceive no arbitrariness on the part of the trial court in ruling those exhibits admissible. The photograph of Kennedy was relevant to illustrate the similarity the victim bore to her sister, Cheryl Piechowicz. As to the family photograph of the Piechowiczes, we fail to see any prejudicial error in admitting it, particularly in light of the overwhelming evidence against the accused.

Two black and white photographs, one of each victim, marked State’s Exhibits 23 and 24, are also contested as erroneously admitted. The photographs were taken in connection with the medical examiner’s autopsy report on each victim. We conclude it was not error to admit these photographs. Not only is the admissibility of such evidence clearly within the trial court’s sound discretion, Johnson, 303 Md. at 503 , 495 A.2d at 9 , 16 but we have had occasion to ⁷³⁰ recognize as proper the exercise of such discretion in receiving into evidence at trial photographs depicting the condition of the victim and location of injuries upon the deceased, Clarke v. State, 238 Md. 11, 21-22 , 207 A.2d 456, 461-62 (1965) and the wounds of the victim, Madison v. State, 200 Md. 1, 7-8 , 87 A.2d 593, 595 (1952).

Nor are the particular photographs inflammatory to the jury solely on the basis that they do not represent any issue in controversy. Further, since the photographs are mere graphic representations of undisputed facts already in evidence, their introduction could not be held to have injured the accused. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 182 Md. 176, 187 , 32 A.2d 863, 867 (1943). (d) Cheryl Piechowicz testified over objection that she conversed with co-conspirator Moore at the federal courthouse on March 14, 1983, while appellant’s federal drug trial was there pending.

An objection to the substance of the conversation was sustained on grounds of hearsay. However, Cheryl was permitted to testify that a conversation had taken place and that Moore had “scared her.” Also, Cheryl successfully identified a photograph of Moore. Although not clear from his brief, appellant’s argument seems to be that the admission of Cheryl’s testimony concerning her conversation with Moore was erroneous since it had no relevance to the proceedings. We disagree.

As a preliminary matter, we note that appellant’s contention that Cheryl’s admitted testimony was irrelevant ⁷³¹ was not preserved for appeal, and is therefore waived. Where specific grounds are delineated for an objection, the one objecting will be held to those grounds and will ordinarily be deemed to have waived grounds not specified. Thomas v. State, 301 Md. 294, 328 , 483 A.2d 6, 23 (1984). Since Grandison specifically objected to the testimony on hearsay grounds at trial, our review is limited to that issue.

Despite the fact that the trial judge sustained Grandisoné hearsay objection, the court maintained discretion to allow introduction of evidence as to the existence of the Moore conversation and its effect on Cheryl. A trial judge has broad discretion to determine whether evidence will be sufficiently helpful to the jury to justify an excursion into the subject. Stebbing v. State, 299 Md. 331, 350 , 473 A.2d 903, 912 , cert. denied, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 276 , 83 L.Ed.2d 212 (1984). Here, Moore was alleged to be part of the conspiracy; Cherylé testimony was relevant to illustrate that Moore acted in a manner supportive of Grandison at the time of the federal hearings to frighten a crucial identification witness.

(e) The trial court similarly did not err in admitting Stateé Exhibit 14, a MAC-11 pistol, into evidence. Testimony adduced at trial revealed that Stateé Exhibit 14 looked like the weapon that changed hands between Kelly and Evans and was seen by Charlene Sparrow. Additionally, a weapons expert concluded at trial that the pistol he identified as a MAC-11 was the only type of firearm that could have discharged the bullets and ejected the particular cartridges found at the scene. Finally, the jury was told that the actual weapon that fired the fatal shots had never been found.

In light of this testimony, we perceive no error in the admission of Stateé Exhibit 14. We were presented with this precise issue in Evans v. State. Our discussion there is dispositive of Grandisoné present argument. Citing C. ⁷³² McCormick, Evidence § 213 (3d ed. 1984), at 670, we held that the trial judge did not commit an abuse of discretion in admitting into evidence a MAC-11 machine pistol as a weapon representative of that allegedly used in the slaying.

Evans, 304 Md. at 520-21 , 499 A.2d at 1278 . In the case sub judice, not only was the proffered exhibit relevant and material, it was clearly an important part of the State’s case in its attempt to link the weapon offered to Evans on the day prior to the murders to the weapon used to commit the murders. Thus, we conclude the trial judge did not err in admitting State’s Exhibit 14 as there was ample evidence of similarity between it and the weapon used. (f) Finally, appellant argues that an enlarged facsimile (State’s Exhibit 45) of an original letter (State’s Exhibit 44) written by appellant to Moore, dated March 14, 1983, had the prejudicial effect of overemphasizing a single piece of evidence over all others.

We cannot agree. The enlargement of the letter was identified and received into evidence during direct examination of Mr. Senter, a document examiner for the F.B.I. Though unclear from the record, appellant seemed to object to the display of the enlargement since it was shown to the jury prior to its admission into evidence. Whether the display overemphasized that piece of evidence was not questioned by appellant at trial. See Thomas, 301 Md. 294 , 483 A.2d 6 .

Nevertheless, we find no error on the part of the trial court in allowing State’s Exhibit 45 to be admitted; nor do we feel the appellant was prejudiced by the display of that exhibit prior to its formal admission into evidence. First, the original letter was already in evidence; its admissibility was not challenged on appeal. Second, testimony revealed that the enlargement was an exact, although enlarged, copy of the original. Finally, the enlargement was employed to demonstrate to the jury the basis for witness Senter’s conclusion that the original letter was indeed authored, drafted, and signed by Grandison. ⁷³³ In analyzing such evidence, it is the statement itself which has substantive legal significance.

The means by which the statement is recreated as evidence before the jury is of secondary import, provided that its authenticity is reasonably assured. Colbert v. State, 37 Md.App. 383, 387 , 377 A.2d 585, 588 (1977). Accordingly, we hold there was no error in the display or the admission of State’s Exhibit 45. XIII Admission of Hearsay Evidence Under The Co-conspirator Exception Grandison next argues that the trial judge erred in allowing the admission of hearsay evidence under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule.

This is so, he argues, because the State had not proven the existence of a conspiracy by independent proof showing his participation therein. Furthermore, he argues that several of the statements related to matters not within the scope of the conspiracy and several statements were made by someone not alleged to be part of a conspiracy. After reviewing the record we perceive no merit to Grandison’s contentions. Grandison concedes that out of court declarations of one conspirator made during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy are admissible against a co-conspirator as an exception to the hearsay rule.

See Greenwald v. State, 221 Md. 245 , 157 A.2d 119 , appeal dismissed, 363 U.S. 721 , 80 S.Ct. 1599 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1521 (1960). What Grandison seems to argue is that before this hearsay exception is available, there must be a prima facie showing of the existence of a conspiracy and his participation therein. To the contrary, it is not necessary that a conspiracy be conclusively established before the declarations are admissible. Flexibility in the order of proof is allowed.

Greenwald, 221 Md. at 257 , 157 A.2d at 126 ; see Hill v. State, 231 Md. 458, 461 , 190 A.2d 795, 796 , cert. denied, 375 U.S. 861 , 84 S.Ct. 127 , 11 L.Ed.2d 87 (1963); Mason, Taylor ⁷³⁴ and Taylor v. State, 18 Md.App. 130, 137 , 305 A.2d 492, 497 (1973). In the instant case, we have reviewed the record and are persuaded that there was ample evidence presented, independent of the challenged hearsay statements, of the existence of a conspiracy to justify the trial court’s application of this hearsay exception. For example, Grandison’s letter of March 14 to Janet Moore telling her to take “Short” (Evans) to see Rodney (Kelly) to take care of something to do with his upcoming trial; the evidence of Evans’ and Moore’s visit thereafter with Grandison in the City Jail; and Theresa Purdie’s testimony that Evans, Moore, and Kelly all spoke to Grandison over her phone about protective glass at a motel. In addition, Calvin Harper testified that Kelly took a gun to show to Evans and the next day Kelly left with the gun and returned without it.

There was also testimony to the effect that Kelly got $500.00 from a Michael Queen, which apparently was used to obtain the gun. It is settled that not much in the way of independent evidence is needed to show the existence of a conspiracy and an accused’s involvement therein. See Brown v. State, 281 Md. 241 , 378 A.2d 1104 (1977). In our view the independent evidence in this case was sufficient.

Finally, Grandison contends that there was one instance of double hearsay which did not fall within the co-conspirator exception and that another statement could not be said to be in furtherance of the conspiracy. Furthermore, he complains that one statement that Grandison told Purdie— she should deny knowing Charlene Sparrow — was made after the conspiracy had ended. We find no merit in these contentions. XIV Reference to Federal Case Appellant also objected to the introduction of evidence relating to a federal charge against him pending at ⁷³⁵ the time of commission of the homicides in the case sub judice.

The admissibility of this evidence forms the basis for Grandison’s next argument. The State maintains that evidence of appellant’s pending federal charge was relevant to show his motive for arranging the murders and thus admissible. We agree. The record reveals that at no time during the proceedings below did the State reveal or attempt to reveal the nature of the pending federal charge against the appellant, its result, or details related to it.

The references made to the federal charge only stated that there existed a federal charge against Grandison for which the prosecution had to prove he occupied a particular room at the Warren House Motor Hotel in November of 1982. It is elementary that evidence of a defendant’s prior criminal acts may not be introduced to prove that he is guilty of the offense for which he is on trial. Straughn v. State, 297 Md. 329, 333 , 465 A.2d 1166, 1169 (1983). We applied this rule, commonly referred to as the “other crimes rule,” in Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 669 , 350 A.2d 680, 684 (1976) , where we said: “[EJvidence which in any manner shows or tends to show that the accused has committed another crime wholly independent of that for which he is on trial, even though it be a crime of the same type, is irrelevant and inadmissible.” (Citations omitted).

However, the exceptions to this rule are equally well-recognized and virtually as prominent as the rule itself. McKnight v. State, 280 Md. 604, 613 , 375 A.2d 551, 556 (1977). 17 See C. McCormick, Evidence § 190 (3d ed.1984). ⁷³⁶ The admissibility of the challenged evidence must be determined through recognition of this rule and, more particularly, application of its exceptions. We conclude that the scintilla of evidence admitted relating to appellant’s federal charge was relevant to establish appellant’s motive for arranging the murders. Thus, the evidence does not fall prey to the rule of exclusion enunciated above.

As our cases make clear, that rule will act as a bar to other crimes evidence unless the evidence is “substantially relevant for some other purpose than to show a probability that [the accused] committed the crime on trial because he is a man of criminal character.” Ross, 276 Md. at 669 , 350 A.2d at 684 (quoting McCormick, supra) (emphasis supplied). Thus, the trial court did not err. See Straughn, 297 Md. at 333-34 , 465 A.2d at 1169 (trial court has broad discretion in admitting other crimes evidence); McCormick, supra. Evidence of the existence of appellant’s pending federal charge was relevant to illustrate his motive for arranging the murders; it demonstrated a logical connection between the crucial defense witnesses, the Piechowiczes, and the subsequent homicides.

Further, the fact that the State proffered no evidence other than the existence of the pending federal charge renders any potential prejudice to Grandison minimal in light of its probative value. 297 Md. at 333-34 , 465 A.2d at 1169 . XV Erroneous Admission of Hearsay Evidence Resulting in Prejudice During the State’s case-in-chief, one James Savage, the prosecutor in the federal drug trial against Grandison, was permitted to testify that Scott Piechowicz had provided the federal authorities certain evidence against Grandison. The tenor of this evidence was to show that despite the fact that Piechowicz could not make a positive identification of Grandison, he could help establish that Grandison had occu ⁷³⁷ pied a room at the Warren Motel at a time critical to the federal prosecution. Piechowicz had related to Savage that he had seen a ticket on an individual’s belt indicating that the individual had been to the Sugar Ray Leonard benefit.

Apparently, this ticket was found in the room occupied by Grandison. We find no error in the trial court’s refusal to preclude Savage, testifying as a State witness, from relating this evidence. Grandison complained at the instant trial that his right of confrontation was violated and the evidence was hearsay. This argument is meritless.

Hearsay was not involved as these extrajudicial statements were not being offered for their truth. Lunsford v. Bd. of Education of Prince George’s County, 280 Md. 665 , 374 A.2d 1162 (1977); McCall’s Ferry Co. v. Price, 108 Md. 96 , 69 A. 832 (1908); Sun Cab Co. v. Walston, 15 Md.App. 113 , 289 A.2d 804 (1972) , aff'd on other grounds, 267 Md. 559 , 298 A.2d 391 (1973) . Through Savage, the State sought to establish a motive for the murder of Scott Piechowicz. Thus, the veracity of Piechowicz’s statements to Savage was of no import.

The mere fact that they were made supplied a motive for the Piechowicz killing. At the instant trial, Savage was under oath and available for cross-examination as to whether Piechowicz actually made the statements. Hence, his testimony was admissible. A second ground for complaint arose when the State, in cross-examining Detective Duckworth, elicited certain alleged hearsay not within any of the recognized exceptions to the rule.

Duckworth, an investigating officer in the murder case, had been called by the defense to show that Scott Piechowicz had been summoned to testify in an unrelated case. Through this testimony the defense hoped to show that someone else besides Grandison had a motive to murder Scott Piechowicz. Grandison elicited this testimony from Duckworth on direct examination without objection by the State. ⁷³⁸ On cross-examination the State sought to establish the nature of the dispute precipitating the second summons. Without objection, Detective Duckworth testified that his investigation of the summons had revealed that