Grandison v. State

ADKINS, J. In his sixth journey to the Court of Appeals, Anthony Grandison, a prisoner on death row for his role in a pair of 1983 murders, presents various requests for relief. 1 His previous appeals have resulted in one order denying an appeal and four published opinions, the latest in 2005. 2 Since this ³⁹ Court last ruled on Grandison’s case, he has made numerous motions to keep the case active in the Maryland courts, and he has fired several lawyers during the pendency of those motions. The Circuit Court for Somerset County (“Circuit Court”) evaluated his motions: (1) to reopen postconviction proceedings; (2) to correct an illegal sentence; (3) for a new resentencing hearing or, alternatively, to file a belated appeal; and (4) for a new trial. After consideration, the Circuit Court dismissed the motions and denied Grandison relief. Meanwhile, the Circuit Court granted his motion to fire two appointed attorneys from the Office of the Public Defender, and he proceeded pro se for part of the aforementioned collateral proceedings. 3 Now, Grandison argues that he had a right to counsel for those proceedings, and has requested that he be appointed counsel by the Office of the Public Defender, so that he may go back and litigate the denied collateral claims with the benefit of counsel.

Grandison also appealed the denial of the motions, on the merits, to the Court of Special Appeals, which transferred the case to this Court on December 15, 2010. 4 Grandison presents nine questions for our review: 1. Was Appellant deprived of his right to counsel, in a capital case, after he filed various motions seeking a new trial, a reopened post conviction, or a new sentencing? 2. Where Appellant was entitled to a hearing on the question of whether the State engaged in racial discrimination in exercising peremptory strikes, and where his appellate counsel failed to make that argument, did the court below ⁴⁰ err in failing to rule on whether his post conviction should be opened for consideration of those issues? 3. Should the rule of evidence announced in Crawford v. Washington be applied retroactively in Maryland? 4.

From the pre-marking of two mitigating circumstances on the sentencing form, could the jurors have inferred a finding by the Court that only two mitigating circumstances existed or merited serious consideration? 5. Should Appellant have either a new resentencing or a belated appeal, where a letter that was not admitted into evidence was sent to the jury and characterized by the State as a critical piece of evidence? 6. At Appellant’s 1984 trial, was the jury instruction on reasonable doubt plain error? 7. Do the constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws preclude the retroactive application to Appellant of any new execution regulations? 8.

Was it an abuse of discretion to deny the motion for new trial? 9. Was the death sentence illegal, where the aggravating circumstance occurred after the murders had already been committed? The State has moved to dismiss Questions Two, Three, Four, and Six. For reasons explained below, we shall deny the State’s motion to dismiss these four questions.

We shall also hold that Grandison did not have a right to counsel during the collateral proceedings. We shall affirm the denial and dismissal of Grandison’s motions by the Circuit Court. Facts and Legal Proceedings Grandison’s case was most recently before this Court in Grandison V. 5 By way of introduction, in that case we described much of the early procedural history of this matter: ⁴¹ The appellant, Anthony Grandison, was convicted of hiring Vernon Evans, Jr. to murder David Scott Piechowicz and Cheryl Piechowicz on April 28, 1983 at the Warren House Motel located in Baltimore County, Maryland; however, because Ms. Piechowicz was ill, her sister, Susan Kennedy, who was filling in for her, was murdered in her stead. Grandison was convicted of first degree murder of both victims and was sentenced to death.

This Court has, in four previous opinions, rejected Grandison’s various challenges to his trial, convictions, and sentences. Grandison V, 390 Md. at 416, 889 A.2d at 368. This Court also summarized some of the previous opinions, which we present here once again: On November 1, 1990, Grandison filed a petition, pursuant to Md.Code (1957, 1987 ReplVol., 1990 Cum.Supp.), Art. 27, § 645A, in the Circuit Court for Somerset County seeking post conviction relief. On July 31, 1992, the circuit court granted such relief, ordering a new capital sentencing proceeding on Grandison’s convictions of first degree murder.

Relying upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 , 108 S.Ct. 1860 , 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988), the circuit court granted the requested relief on the grounds that the sentencing form and related jury instructions employed at Grandison’s first sentencing proceeding offended the dictates of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution that the death penalty not be imposed where there are mitigating factors which may call for a less severe penalty. The circuit court also decided that Grandison was entitled to retroactive application of the Mills decision. The State applied to this Court for leave to appeal from the circuit court’s grant of post conviction relief as to the death sentences, and Grandison filed a cross-application seeking review of the circuit court’s denial of collateral relief on the underlying convictions. We denied both applications.

Grandison v. State, ⁴² Misc. No. 29, Sept. Term 1992 (order filed October 28, 1992). The Supreme Court denied a petition and cross-petition for writ of certiorari on March 22, 1993. Maryland v. Grandison, 507 U.S. 985 , 113 S.Ct. 1581 , 123 L.Ed.2d 149 (1993); Grandison v. Maryland, 507 U.S. 985 , 113 S.Ct. 1581 , 123 L.Ed.2d 149 (1993).

In 1993, Grandison filed a number of motions in the circuit court to bar his re-sentencing on double jeopardy grounds. The circuit court denied these motions and Grandison’s subsequent request for a stay of the re-sentencing proceeding pending an appeal of the circuit court’s ruling on his motions. Grandison then applied to the Court of Special Appeals for a stay of the re-sentencing. On May 11, 1994, the matter was transferred to this Court.

We issued an order denying the requested stay. Grandison v. State, Misc. No. 20, Sept. Term, 1994 (order filed May 12, 1994). Grandison’s re-sentencing proceeding began on May 24, 1994 and lasted eight days.

The prosecution presented the same evidence that it had introduced at Grandison’s guilt/innocence trial including testimony from Cheryl Piechowicz, Charlene Sparrow, James Savage, and Calvin Harper, which was essentially identical to their testimony in the 1984 trial. The State also introduced testimony from Janet Moore for the first time during the re-sentencing proceeding. Moore’s testimony corroborated the statements made by Sparrow regarding the events of the two days immediately prior to the murders. She also stated that she heard Grandison tell Kelly to take Evans to the Warren House and show him “who the white couple was.” At the conclusion of Grandison’s capital re-sentencing proceeding, on June 3, 1994, a Somerset County jury imposed two death sentences.

This Court affirmed the death sentences in [Grandison III]. Id. at 420-21, 889 A.2d at 370-71. Grandison then filed a petition for posteonviction relief in the Circuit Court, which eventually denied relief. This Court denied Grandison’s application for leave to appeal and his ⁴³ motion to reconsider denial of his application for leave to appeal.

See Grandison IV, 351 Md. at 732, 720 A.2d at 322. Grandison also petitioned for federal habeas relief, which was denied. See generally Grandison v. Corcoran, 78 F.Supp.2d 499 (D.Md.2000), appeal dismissed at 225 F.3d 654 (4th Cir.2000), ce rt. denied 532 U.S. 996 , 121 S.Ct. 1658 , 149 L.Ed.2d 640 (2001). Beginning in 1999, Grandison filed several motions in Circuit Court, including a motion for a new trial, motion to correct an illegal sentence, and a pro se motion to reopen postconvietion proceedings.

See Grandison V, 390 Md. at 421, 889 A.2d at 371. The Circuit Court held evidentiary hearings and then denied Grandison’s motions in their entirety. See id. at 422, 426-27, 889 A.2d at 372, 374. This Court affirmed those denials.

Id. at 448, 889 A.2d at 387. Continued Motions After we decided Grandison V, Grandison’s pursuit of further relief continued unabated. He first filed a motion on February 3, 2006, to reopen his postconviction proceedings, in which he argued that: (1) several items in the State’s evidence were deficient under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004); (2) the trial court had erroneously pre-marked mitigating factors on a jury sentencing form; and (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Grandison concomitantly filed a Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence, in which he made the same arguments about evidence under Crawford , the jury sentencing form, and ineffective assistance of counsel.

Shortly thereafter, he filed an “Addendum to Motion to Reopen Post-Conviction Proceedings and Request for Hearing and Discovery.” In this addendum, he alleged statewide racial bias and discriminatory prosecution with respect to the death penalty. The State answered all three motions. Next, Grandison filed a Second Addendum to his motion to reopen the postconviction proceedings; an Addendum to his motion to correct the illegal sentence; and a supplement to his ⁴⁴ previously filed claim about racial bias. This was only the beginning.

The record also reflects, inter alia, the following activity by Grandison: • Four motions filed March 1, 2007:(1) An ex parte motion to withdraw counsel of record; (2) a motion for a new resentencing hearing or, alternatively, to file a belated appeal; (3) a motion for a new trial; and (4) a motion to correct an illegal sentence. • Another motion to correct an illegal sentence, filed March 16, 2007. • A combined motion for a new trial and motion to reopen postconviction proceedings, filed August 9, 2007. • A motion, filed October 24, 2007, claiming that the State’s failure to answer old motions required the court to grant them. • A motion for an evidentiary hearing on previous motions, filed May 27, 2008. Resolving all the unsettled issues before it, the Circuit Court distilled everything raised in the pending motions and related hearings 6 into four avenues of relief sought by Grandison. In a memorandum opinion on September 1, 2010, the court denied relief. First, the Circuit Court addressed Grandison’s motion to reopen postconviction proceedings.

The court analyzed this motion on five points: Grandison contends the Court incorrectly admitted into evidence: 1. Reports of [his] behavior within the institution, 2. Victim impact statements, 3. The doctor’s statement concerning Helen Kondilidis’s grave health, and erred when it: ⁴⁵ 4.

Pre-marked the mitigators in Grandison’s favor on the sentencing form, and, 5. Failed to prevent the systematic exclusion of African-American jurors. After analyzing all five issues, the Circuit Court denied Grandison’s motion to reopen postconviction proceedings across the board. Each of these five issues is now before us: Issues 1-3 are now presented as Question Three; Issue 4 is now presented in Question Four; and Issue 5 is presented in Question Two.

Second, the Circuit Court addressed Grandison’s motion to correct an illegal sentence. Grandison made two arguments in support of this motion: (1) that the death sentence was illegal because the aggravating circumstances leading to Grandison’s death sentence happened after the murders had already been committed; and (2) that the death penalty has been illegal in Maryland since 2006. The Circuit Court addressed the merits of these arguments and denied Grandison’s motion to correct an illegal sentence. Issue 1 is now presented to this Court as Question Nine, and Issue 2 is now presented to us, in moderately different form, as part of Question Seven.

Third, the Circuit Court addressed Grandison’s motion for a new resentencing hearing. Grandison offered three arguments in support of this motion: (1) he was entitled to litigate the admissibility of State’s Exhibit 21; (2) the trial court’s reasonable doubt instruction during his 1984 trial was improper; and (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The Circuit Court addressed the merits of these arguments and denied his motion. Issue 1 is now presented to this Court as Question Five; Issue 2 is presented as Question Six; and Issue 3 is not before us.

Lastly, the Circuit Court addressed Grandison’s motion for a new trial. The court summarized Grandison’s argument in support of this motion: 1. The State used perjured testimony of Cheryl Piechowicz and James Savage, ⁴⁶ 2. The State knowingly suppressed exculpatory evidence that showed Etta Horne, Charlene Sparrow, and Helen Kondilidis committed perjury, and 3.

The mental [disorder] of Helen Kondilidis at the time of the 1984 trial [was undisclosed]. Again, the court addressed the merits of each of these arguments and denied the motion. These three arguments are now before us, presented as Question Eight. The Circuit Court concluded: “Accordingly, after full and fair consideration of the arguments of the parties, this Court finds that, for the reasons mentioned, it is ORDERED that, any and all relief requested by Movant Anthony Grandison is hereby DENIED and DISMISSED.” Grandison’s Counsel From his 1984 trial through 2007, Grandison changed attorneys multiple times, largely at his own initiative.

During this period, he was represented by more than a dozen attorneys. In February 2007, his counsel of record were Gary E. Proctor and Michael E. Lawlor, each appointed by the Public Defender. In a letter to the Circuit Court on or about February 28, 2007, Grandison filed an ex parte motion to withdraw counsel of record. Grandison then wrote a letter to the Circuit Court on April 18, 2007, expressing his continued desire to proceed without appointed counsel.

Proctor then wrote to the Circuit Court, saying he had spoken with the head of the Capital Division of the Office of the Public Defender. Proctor stated that, in the event he and Lawlor were discharged as counsel, the Public Defender would not appoint other counsel to represent Grandison. In response to this letter, Grandison wrote to the Circuit Court and said “I do not want either Mr. Proctor or Mr. Lawlar [sic] to act in my behalf in any capacity, and will not accept either under any circumstances as standby counsel.” The Circuit Court held a heading on July 3, 2007, to determine “[1] whether or not the Court will allow ... Grandison to discharge counsel ... [2] whether or not the request to ⁴⁷ discharge counsel is meritorious ... [and] [3] whether or not it’s appropriate to appoint counsel or to request a public defender to proceed further with appointed counsel.” The record reflects the following exchange between the court and Proctor: The Court: What is your position with respect to continuing to represent Mr. Grandison?

Mr. Proctor: If Mr. Grandison — I’ve got enough clients that want my help, without forcing myself on someone who doesn’t. I have no objection to Mr. Grandison’s motion. I don’t think there’s cause. And in good [conscience], I can’t stand in front of this Court and represent that I should have done things that I haven’t.

I think I’ve provided him with effective assistance throughout, but neither do I want to force myself on him, so I have no objection to his motion to fire me, basically. That’s fine. The Court: Would you be prepared to continue if he agreed to allow you to continue? Mr. Proctor: Yes, I would.

The Court: Are you prepared to prosecute the motions? Mr. Proctor: The motions I file, yes, and — of which I think 90 percent will agree with the motions Mr. Grandison wants to file. We’ll just lock heads over a few issues, I’m sure. But, you know, I believe in Mr. Grandison’s right to counsel.

I want him to have his day in court. If he withdraws his motion, I’ll continue to represent him to the best of my ability. Lawlor testified: The truth of the matter is, is that Mr. Grandison’s motions are ridiculous and frivolous and insulting, but it’s his choice. It’s his life.

As Mr. Proctor said, I am not going to beg and plead to work in my office and not spend time with my wife and not work on my other cases to an individual who doesn’t want my representation. I would stay. I will stay. I undertook the representation knowing what it entails.

Grandison spoke as well: ⁴⁸ The Court: What else do you want to say in response to either something that Mr. Proctor said or Mr. Lawlor said? Do you want them to continue to represent you? Mr. Grandison: No, definitely not. The Court: Do you want to discharge them?

Mr. Grandison: Yes, sir. Grandison was also advised that “the public defender may not appoint additional counsel” were he to discharge Proctor and Lawlor. In response, Grandison said, “that’s a bridge I’ll have to cross, you know what I’m saying, when I get there.” The State then said that Grandison had not shown “good cause” to discharge Proctor and Lawlor. The Court made its ruling: I will allow Mr. Grandison to discharge counsel, Mr. Proctor and Mr. [Lawlor].

The Court has fully and fairly considered the arguments and the pleadings and the correspondence. The Court finds that there is no meritorious reason for discharge of counsel, but will allow the same to occur. Grandison appeared again in Circuit Court, this time pro se, on September 5, 2008. At this hearing, Grandison said, “I wish counsel,” but also stated that he had requested counsel from the public defender’s office and had not received a response.

Grandison averred that he was prepared to represent himself on his request for an evidentiary hearing, and the Circuit Court heard his argument. The court denied the motion. When the hearing concluded, the court said: Given the nature of this case I’m willing to give you one more shot at getting counsel. I will tell you I think it’s probably an exercise in futility based on my previous experience in eighteen years with Mr. Grandison, but I’m willing to allow him the opportunity to get counsel and continue this case for a short period of time.

The Circuit Court also requested that Grandison submit a letter within sixty days advising the court about his efforts to secure counsel. ⁴⁹ On or about December 15, 2008, Grandison filed a pro se motion for appointment of counsel. At a hearing on June 30, 2009, Grandison had not secured counsel. At this hearing, the Court also mentioned: [T]he Court received a letter from Nancy Forster who is the Public Defender who indicated to the Court that the Public Defender would not provide counsel .... [quoting from letter:] “I will not authorize the appointment of another attorney from the Office of the Public Defender to represent Mr. Grandison in any further proceeding.” The Circuit Court continued the case for 120 days to afford Grandison the opportunity to find counsel, adding: if representation does not come forward within that ... period and there is not a reasonable request for a continuance from counsel who may enter an appearance for Mr. Grandisonf,] whatever date we decide this case is going to be heard[,] the Court is not going to do anything further with respect to securing counsel. At a fourth hearing on April 26, 2010, the judge and Grandison discussed his various attempts to obtain counsel.

Grandison mentioned he had sent letters to various attorneys suggested by the Circuit Court. Grandison had received a letter from the Death Penalty Representation Project, saying that group would be unable to represent him. The judge also stated that he had reached out to various pro bono practices at firms, without success. The judge indicated he had contacted several law professors in an attempt to procure counsel, also without success.

After some discussion of a recently decided case, Office of the Public Defender v. State, 413 Md. 411 , 993 A.2d 55 (2010) (“OPD ”), the Circuit Court made the following ruling: [T]he Court is not persuaded that [OPD ] requires the Court under the facts of this case to order the Public Defender to provide counsel for you, Mr. Grandison. And given the reasons that Ms. Forster[,] who was then the Public Defender[,] gave for declining to provide representation previously[,] the Court believes that the Rules and the ⁵⁰ case law do not require that counsel be appointed at State expense for these proceedings. And notwithstanding what I just said[,] the Court has ... on several occasions ... continued this case because the Court believes it’s important that Mr. Grandison have representation if representation is available and willing to provide advice and counsel to him. The Court has made efforts beyond what I think is required of the Court in order to find representation for Mr. Grandison unsuccessfully.

At trial twice the Court is aware[,] because I was at one of those trials!,] that. Mr. Grandison!,] because of disagreements with his attorneys!,] discharged them and proceeded pro se. And, accordingly, the Court is going to deny the motion to appoint counsel. Now, what’s interesting in looking back the last few days through these motions!;] most if not all of the motions that were filed!,] even though it’s filed by counsel who may have been representing Mr. Grandison at the time!,] were his product.

The Court is mindful of and respects Mr. Grandisoné ability to understand and argue the issues. And once again the motion for appointment of counsel is denied. Motion to Dismiss The State moved to dismiss Questions Two, Three, Four, and Six in this case on procedural grounds. The State directs us to several statutory provisions and rules to support its dismissal.

First, the State cites Section 7-109(a) of the Criminal Procedure Article, which requires that an appeal of postconviction proceedings begin with an application for leave to appeal. Md.Code (2001, 2008 Repl.Vol.), § 7-109(a) of the Criminal Procedure Article. Although this section provides that “person[s] aggrieved by” a postconviction order “may apply to the Court of Special Appeals for leave to appeal the order,” we have said that Section 2-401 of the Criminal Law Article, “when construed in conjunction with (Section 7-109(a) of the Criminal Procedure Article], provides for direct review by this Court of any proceedings in a case where the death penalty has been imposed.” Johnson v. State, 292 Md. 405, ⁵¹ 435-36 n. 16, 439 A.2d 542 (1982). We also adopted Maryland Rule 8-306, which “applies to ... an application for leave to appeal from a judgment granting or denying relief in a post conviction proceeding brought to review a judgment imposing a sentence of death,” and directs that the application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals be made “by filing the application with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals.” Md. Rule 8-306(a), (e)(1).

As the State argues, “Grandison has never filed an [application for leave to appeal] after his motions to reopen post conviction were denied; rather, he filed what was tantamount to a direct appeal, through a pleading captioned: ‘Notice of Appeal’ ” The State’s argument proceeds: [Rule 8-306] provides that Maryland Rule 8-204 “applies to all applications for leave to appeal subject to this Rule[.]” Md. Rule 8-306(e) (2011). Grandison’s “Notice of Appeal” did not provide, in any conceivable way, the content required by Maryland Rule 8-204 for [applications for leave to appeal]: “The application shall contain a concise statement of the reasons why the judgment should be reversed or modified and shall specify the errors allegedly committed by the lower court.” Md. Rule 8-204(b)(3) (2011). Because of this failure to file an application for leave to appeal or provide the content required by the rule, the State urges us to dismiss issues II, III, IV, and VI, as “procedurally defaulted.” Grandison counters that “the Court of Special Appeals, on its own motion, routinely treats an ‘appeal’ filed by an indigent defendant, pro se, as an ‘Application for Leave to Appeal,’ where the latter is the correct pleading, thereby affording the appellant (applicant) an opportunity to provide reasons for granting the application.” Grandison directs our attention to a footnote in State v. Daughtry, 419 Md. 35 , 44 n. 4, 18 A.3d 60 , 65-66 n. 4 (2011), in which this Court mentioned a “Notice of Appeal, which the Court of Special Appeals docketed as an Application for Leave to Appeal.” ⁵² Grandison argues that this Court “explicitly noted [the] routine practice, apparently with approval.” Without question, the Court of Special Appeals has sometimes treated a Notice of Appeal as an Application for Leave to Appeal. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 185 Md.App. 293, 295 , 970 A.2d 332, 333 (2009) (“The appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, which this Court treated as an application for leave to appeal[.]”); Bagley v. Warden, 1 Md.App. 154, 158 , 228 A.2d 491, 492 (1967) (treating the document “designated by applicant as a ‘Notice of Appeal’ ” as an “application for leave to appeal”).

This practice likely prevails in any number of unreported opinions. At least one reported case, however, has required strict compliance with the dictates of Rule 8-204. See, e.g., Britton v. State, 201 Md.App. 589, 595 , 30 A.3d 236, 239 (2011) (“Because appellate review of a guilty plea may only be obtained by an application for leave to appeal and because appellant’s notice of appeal lacked sufficient content to be deemed the substantive equivalent of an application for leave to appeal, this Court dismissed his appeal.”). We view the decision as to whether an appellate court will require strict compliance with the terms of Rules 8-204 or 8-306 to be discretionary.

In this death penalty case, in which the defendant was unrepresented at the time he filed what should have been termed an “application for leave to appeal,” we elect to consider the arguments he raises, notwithstanding this procedural deficiency. Cf. Doering v. Fader, 316 Md. 351, 360 , 558 A.2d 733, 738 (1989) (“The penalty of death ‘is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long[.]’ ” (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 , 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976))). Question One: Right to Counsel Grandison argues that he “was deprived of his right to counsel, in a capital case, after he filed various motions seeking a new trial, a reopened post conviction, [and] a new sentencing.” Grandison draws our attention to State v. Walker, 417 Md. 589 , 11 A.3d 811 (2011), in which we quoted a case that “summarized aptly the right of a defendant in a criminal ⁵³ case to the assistance of counsel,” id. at 596-97 , 11 A.3d at 816 .

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the same right to the assistance of counsel, including the right to the appointment of counsel in the case of the indigent defendant, in state criminal prosecutions!.] Central to the cases dealing with the right to counsel is the recognition that the assistance of a lawyer is essential to assure a fair trial!.] Consequently, because essential fairness is lacking if an accused cannot put his case effectively in court ... and because it is unlikely that an accused will be able to present his case effectively without the assistance of counsel, a conviction cannot be allowed to stand where the accused is not represented at trial by counsel unless it be determined that there was an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused!.] To assure protection of so fundamental a right, courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver ... and do not permit waiver to be presumed from a silent record!.] It must appear affirmatively on the record that the accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. (Citations and quotation marks omitted.) Id. In Walker , however, the defendant represented herself at trial, and we were faced with a direct appeal of her conviction.

Id. at 595-96 , 11 A.3d at 815 . As the State observes, Grandison has not lodged this appeal from his conviction at trial. These proceedings are collateral matters, all filed years after Grandison’s initial trial and sentencing, and indeed, after other collateral proceedings. Different standards apply to these proceedings, and Walker and the principles utilized therein are not applicable here. ⁵⁴ Grandison makes several arguments in support of his claim.

He directs our attention to Sites v. State, in which this Court held that although a person apprehended for driving while intoxicated has no statutory or Sixth Amendment right “to consult counsel before deciding whether to submit to a chemical sobriety test,” that right is protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Sites v. State, 300 Md. 702, 707, 717 , 481 A.2d 192, 194, 199 (1984). As we explained: The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has long been recognized as a source of a right to counsel independent of the Sixth Amendment where critically important to the fairness of the proceedings. We recognized in Rutherford v. Rutherford, 296 Md. 347, 358 , 464 A.2d 228 (1983) that the constitutional right to counsel is broader than the specific guarantee of the Sixth Amendment and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights in that, under certain circumstances, the requirements of due process include a right to counsel, with appointed counsel for indigents, in civil cases or other proceedings not constituting critical stages of criminal trials.

The concept of a due process right was described as far back as Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 , 58 S.Ct. 149 , 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937) as a guarantee of respect for those personal immunities which are so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. While the exact contours of the due process right are not definable with precision, the right, as restated in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 , 72 S.Ct. 205, 210 , 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952), is one that assures that convictions cannot be brought about in criminal cases by methods which offend a sense of justice. (Citations and quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 716, 481 A.2d at 199 . Grandison argues that it would indeed “offend a sense of justice” for courts to find that he may not have counsel appointed for a motions hearing in a death penalty case, but that he may have counsel appointed before this Court, immediately thereafter, for an appeal from ⁵⁵ rulings made at that hearing.

He also argues that it would also offend a sense of justice “if the right to appointed counsel were more freely extended to one facing probation for drunk driving[ ] than to one facing execution for murder.” Keeping in mind the unique nature of capital cases, we still are not persuaded by Grandison’s argument on this issue. First, the decision by the Public Defender to provide Grandison with representation for this appeal does not mean that he has a constitutional or statutory right to such representation. Second, in Sites , our primary concern was that “convictions cannot be brought about in criminal cases by methods which offend a sense of justice.” Id (emphasis added). Here, Grandison’s conviction and direct appeal thereof have long since passed, and he has been represented by counsel for several postconviction proceedings.

Any argument that Grandison must have counsel for these collateral motions is further muted by the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Pennsylvania v. Finley: We have never held that prisoners have a constitutional right to counsel when mounting collateral attacks upon their convictions, and we decline to so hold today. Our cases establish that the right to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further. Thus, we have rejected suggestions that we establish a right to counsel on discretionary appeals. Postconviction relief is even further removed from the criminal trial than is discretionary direct review.

It is not part of the criminal proceeding itself, and it is in fact considered to be civil in nature. It is a collateral attack that normally occurs only after the defendant has failed to secure relief through direct review of his conviction. States have no obligation to provide this avenue of relief, and when they do, the fundamental fairness mandated by the Due Process Clause does not require that the State supply a lawyer as well. (Citations omitted.) ⁵⁶ Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555-57 , 107 S.Ct. 1990, 1993-94 , 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987).

This Court’s previous interpretations of the Maryland Declaration of Rights paint a similar picture: The Maryland Constitution has not hitherto been interpreted to provide a right to counsel in collateral proceedings challenging a criminal conviction. Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides that “in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right ... to be allowed counsel ...” This Court has held that Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights does not afford any right to counsel which is more expansive than that afforded by the Sixth Amendment. See State v. Campbell, 385 Md. 616 , 626 n. 3, 870 A.2d 217 , 223 n. 3 (2005) (stating that the right to counsel provisions in Article 21 are in [pari materia ] with Sixth Amendment); State v. Tichnell, 306 Md. 428, 440 , 509 A.2d 1179, 1185 (1986) (holding that “[tjhere is no distinction between the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and Art. 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights”). Blake v. State, 395 Md. 213, 235 , 909 A.2d 1020, 1033 (2006).

Grandison asks us to recognize rights that simply do not exist. Grandison’s analogy to the drunken driving cases is also unpersuasive, as he was represented by counsel throughout his criminal trial, direct appeal, resentencing, and first set of postconviction proceedings. Grandison also attempts to use selective citation of rules and statutes to bolster his claim. He first cites Maryland Rule 4-214(b), which provides that “[wjhen counsel is appointed by the Public Defender or by the court, representation extends to all stages in the proceedings, including but not limited to” the post-trial motions and other legal proceedings enumerated in Rule 4-214(b).

The final sentence of Rule 4-214(b), however, conspicuously absent from his brief, provides: “The representation of appointed counsel does not extend to the filing of subsequent discretionary proceedings including ⁵⁷ petition for writ of certiorari, petition to expunge records, and petition for post conviction relief.” The statutory framework offers no help to Grandison either. First, the Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act exempts such motions from the right to counsel. It provides: (a) In general. — Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, “a person is entitled to assistance of counsel [in a postconviction proceeding.] (b) Exceptions.- — If a person seeks to reopen a postconviction proceeding under § 7-104 of this subtitle, the court shall determine whether assistance from counsel ... should be granted. Maryland Code (2001, 2008 Repl.Vol.), § 7-108(a)-(b)(l) of the Criminal Law Article.

Thus, the Act grants the right to counsel in postconviction proceedings, except that in a request to reopen, the court shall determine whether assistance from counsel should be given. This is exactly what the Circuit Court did in this case. The passages from the Circuit Court proceedings that we quoted earlier demonstrate that the Circuit Court considered whether the law required the appointment of counsel, and decided there was no such requirement. We affirm that decision.

As the State argues, the statute that empowers and defines the rights and obligations of the Office of the Public Defender “does not contemplate the extension of counsel to collateral attacks so far removed from a defendant’s conviction, direct appeal, or state post conviction proceeding such as the challenges Grandison brings here.” Grandison merely asserts that because this is a capital case, the Circuit Court abused its discretion, under section 7-108, by having him proceed pro se. If anything, the Circuit Court went to considerable length to attempt to secure counsel for Grandison, even though it was under no obligation to do so. As the State correctly points out, the Circuit Court’s failure to secure counsel for Grandison on these motions does not “render the lower court’s efforts erroneous or an abuse of discretion.” The Circuit Court’s effort to help Grandison find counsel for these collateral proceedings did not spawn an ⁵⁸ affirmative right for Grandison to have counsel. Grandison’s previous treatment and dismissal of various counsel appointed for him likely plagued his and the Circuit Court’s efforts to secure counsel for him at the hearing in this case.

That is Grandison’s own doing, and he must suffer the consequences. Grandison also seeks support from our decision in OPD. We summarized the question presented in that case and answered it: In the present case, we must determine whether a Maryland trial court possesses the authority, statutory or otherwise, to appoint an attorney from a local Office of the State Public Defender (“OPD”) to represent a criminal defendant who qualifies for public representation based on indigency, as defined by the Maryland Code, upon the court’s finding that the local OPD denied previously and erroneously representation to the defendant. For reasons we shall explain, we answer that question in the affirmative.

OPD, 413 Md. at 415 , 993 A.2d at 57 . We explained: OPD contends that the Circuit Court’s actions in this regard exceeded its authority, and that, although a circuit court may appoint counsel for an indigent defendant who has been denied representation by the local OPD, the circuit court may not appoint an attorney from the local OPD once the local OPD declines representation of the defendant. For reasons we shall explain, we disagree and hold that, upon finding that the local OPD denied erroneously representation to an indigent defendant, a circuit court may appoint any attorney, including an attorney from the local OPD, to represent a defendant. OPD, 413 Md. at 428-29 , 993 A.2d at 66 .

In OPD, defendant Jason Flynn Stinnett was erroneously denied representation on the grounds that he did not meet the indigency standards utilized by the Public Defender, and as a consequence, entered a guilty plea and received a three-year suspended sentence and two years’ probation. Id. at 421-22, 426-27 , 993 A.2d at 61, 64-65 . We held that: ⁵⁹ where the local OPD declines representation to a defendant erroneously, because of the local OPD’s failure to consider properly the statutorily-mandated criteria for determining indigency, and where a court finds, upon its subsequent mandatory independent review, that the individual qualifies for representation, the trial court, in carrying out its role as “ultimate protector” of the Constitutional right to counsel, may appoint an attorney from the local OPD to represent the indigent individual unless an actual and unwaived or unwaivable conflict of interest would result thereby. Id. at 434 , 993 A.2d at 69 .

It is manifestly clear that OPD does not apply to Grandison in this proceeding. Grandison is well past the trial phase, and there was no previous or erroneous denial of representation by the Office of the Public Defender. There was no finding by that office that Grandison did not qualify for representation because he failed the indigency test. Grandison was also not