Grant v. State

⁵⁴⁹ BISHOP, Judge. After a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County appellant Ronald Grant was convicted of robbery with a dangerous and deadly weapon, assault with intent to rob, use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence and theft. The theft conviction was merged with the robbery conviction, and appellant was sentenced to three concurrent terms of nine years. Appellant raises three issues: I. Was the accomplice’s testimony sufficiently corroborated by evidence of an extrajudicial identification?

II

Was the evidence sufficient to support appellant’s convictions for robbery with a dangerous and deadly weapon, assault with intent to rob, and a handgun violation?

III

May an accused be convicted of unlawfully wearing a handgun when the uncontradicted testimony showed that the accused possessed only a BB gun? At approximately 6:30 p.m. on February 28, 1984, two men entered a Baskins Robbins ice cream store and demanded and obtained money from employees Susan Bowersox and a co-worker. One of the men, later identified as appellant, lifted his shirt to reveal what Bowersox said was the “wooden handle to a hand pistol” but she did not know what kind. The night of the robbery, Bowersox assisted police in creating a composite drawing of one of the men.

Approximately one and a half months later, at the request of the police, she reviewed a photograph array and identified a photograph of the appellant as one of the men who robbed her. In connection with the identification, she gave a summary statement in which she stated she was “sixty percent sure” that the individual in the photograph was the same person who, during the robbery, displayed the handle of the gun. Bowersox testified why she said she was “sixty percent sure”: ⁵⁵⁰ Why I chose sixty percent? I chose sixty percent because I don’t want to be a witness in front of a Court.

To my belief, that is the guy that robbed me and, yes, I am more sure than sixty percent. No, I don’t want to be doing this and that’s why I put sixty percent. Antonio Grant, a State’s witness who had pled guilty to participation in the robbery, made an in-court identification of appellant. He also testified that the handle displayed by appellant and seen by Bowersox was the butt of a BB gun.

The State produced several other witnesses including an individual who drove the getaway car, several police investigators, and the policeman who assisted Bowersox in the preparation of the composite drawing. Over objection, the State was permitted to recall Bowersox to the stand in order to have the composite drawing admitted into evidence. Thereafter, appellant was permitted to recall State’s witness Officer Zelenka who testified that, during the robbery investigation, he had made a notation that the composite drawing looked like Leroy Johnson, the driver of the getaway car. Appellant did not testify.

We will supply additional facts as they pertain to our discussions of the issues. I. Corroboration Appellant argues that the only corroboration of accomplice Grant’s testimony was the “sixty percent sure” extrajudicial identification of appellant by Bowersox and that this is not sufficient corroboration. A person may not be convicted of a crime on the basis of the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Turner v. State, 294 Md. 640, 641-42 , 452 A.2d 416, 417 (1982).

See also Brown v. State, 281 Md. 241 , 378 A.2d 1104 (1977) (rejecting contention that the rule should be ⁵⁵¹ abandoned). The Court set out the reasons for the rule in Turner v. State, 294 Md. at 642 , 452 A.2d at 417 : Our cases have expressed two reasons for the necessity of this rule: (1) the witness offering the testimony is admittedly contaminated with guilt, see, Watson v. State, supra, 208 Md. [210] at 217, 117 A.2d 549 [(1955)], and (2) the possibility of an ulterior motive on the part of the accomplice who seeks to curry favor with both the prosecutor and the police in the hope of obtaining a lesser sentence or a reduced charge. See, Luery v. State, supra, 116 Md. [284] at 293, 81 A. 681 [(1911)]. In Brown, 281 Md. at 244 , 378 A.2d at 1107 , Chief Judge Murphy wrote for the Court: Not much in the way of evidence corroroborative of the accomplice’s testimony has been required by our cases.

We have, however, consistently held the view that while the corroborative evidence need not be sufficient in itself to convict, it must relate to material facts tending either (1) to identify the accused with the perpetrators of the crime or (2) to show the participation of the accused in the crime itself. See Wright v. State, 219 Md. 643 , 150 A.2d 733 (1959). If with some degree of cogency the corroborative evidence tends to establish either of these matters, the trier of fact may credit the accomplice’s testimony even with respect to matters as to which no corroboration was adduced. McDowell v. State, 231 Md. 205 , 189 A.2d 611 (1963).

That corroboration need not extend to every detail and indeed may even be circumstantial is also settled by our cases. Moreover, in Turner, 294 Md. at 642 , 452 A.2d at 417 , the Court stated that while “the rule requiring corroboration presumes that the accomplice’s testimony, by itself, is untrustworthy[,] ... as a safeguard against depriving the fact finder of evidence from a source intimately connected with the crime, we have said that only slight corroboration is required.” (emphasis supplied). The Turner Court then went on to quote the above from Brown . ⁵⁵² Appellant attempts to convince us that Brown’s “some degree of cogency” and Turner’s “slight corroboration” tests translate into a “clear and convincing” standard for the evidence necessary to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice. At least 14 times since Brown in 1977, appellate courts of this State have applied the foregoing standards and not a “clear and convincing” standard in weighing the sufficiency of evidence corroborative of accomplice testimony. 1 ⁵⁵³ Appellant’s “cogency” argument, based on a dictionary definition of the word as the quality of being “forceful and to the point, as a reason or agreement; compelling; convincing,” completely overlooks the context in which the word is used in Brown .

First, “not much in the way of evidence” is required; second, the evidence must “tend to establish” certain material facts with “some degree of cogency” which Turner interprets to require only “slight corroboration.” Brown, 281 Md. at 244 , 378 A.2d at 1107 ; Turner, 294 Md. at 642 , 452 A.2d at 417 . We, therefore, find that the test for weighing the sufficiency of evidence to corroborate accomplice testimony is the “some degree of cogency” standard set forth in Brown and construed by Turner to require only “slight” corroboration. 294 Md. at 642-43 , 452 A.2d at 417 . We hold that the Bowersox identification was more than sufficient to meet this test for the corroboration of an accomplice’s testimony.

II

Sufficiency Appellant argues that assuming, arguendo, that the corroborative evidence was sufficient to substantiate the accomplice testimony, the evidence as a whole was insufficient to form the basis for a conviction. In Colvin v. State, 299 Md. 88, 109-10 , 472 A.2d 953, 964 , cert. denied, — U.S.-, 105 S.Ct. 226 , 83 L.Ed.2d 155 (1984) the Court observed: When this Court is required to review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, we follow the standard enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Tichnell v. ⁵⁵⁴ State, 287 Md. 695 , 415 A.2d 830 (1980). The critical inquiry on review is to “determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 443 U.S. at 318 , 99 S.Ct. at 2788 , 61 L.Ed.2d at 573 .

However, the Court is not required to “ ‘ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citations omitted]. Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 443 U.S. at 318-19 , 99 S.Ct. at 2789 , 61 L.Ed.2d at 573 (emphasis in original). Based on our review of the record, in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we