Great Coastal Express, Inc. Ex Rel. Great American Ins. v. Fidelity & Guaranty Fire Corp.

¹¹⁴ Markell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. These are suits between two common carriers by motor vehicle, and their insurers, for loss of property by fire on January 19, 1942. Great Coastal Express (plaintiff, appellant) was the initial carrier, Lambert’s Transfer (defendant, appellee) • the connecting carrier. The question is, whether at the time of the fire the goods had been delivered by Coastal to Lambert’s and had come into Lambert’s possession.

Coastal operated between Richmond, Virginia, and Baltimore, with Washington as an intermediate stop. Lambert’s Baltimore terminal was the middle portion of a one-story frame warehouse at 1145 South Howard street. Lambert’s portion was separated by partition walls from the other two portions. There was no platform outside the warehouse; the “warehouse” itself was an enclosed covered platform.

A corner of Lambert’s space, about 12 feet square, had been partitioned off as an office. A front door from Lambert’s space opened on West Street on the south, and a corresponding door on a lot on the north. Coastal, in the course of its business, customarily accepted shipments to points served by Lambert’s and delivered such shipments to Lambert’s as a connecting carrier, to be delivered by it to the consignees, especially consignees in Baltimore and Washington. Lambert’s would also pick up freight from shippers and at its terminal deliver to Coastal.

Local shippers in Baltimore also would deliver freight to Lambert’s warehouse to be carried elsewhere by Coastal; Lambert’s had no part in hauling or delivering such freight. For these purposes Coastal “leased dock space” in Lambert’s warehouse and paid Lambert’s $25 per month “as compensation for dock space and one helper to load shipments from Lambert’s dock or to unload shipments left with Lambert’s.” Lambert’s received specified “pick-up and delivery charges” for shipments to Baltimore or Washington. Coastal’s “leased” space was not designated by markings, barriers or anything of that kind. Space ¹¹⁵ near the front of the warehouse, and also near the inner door to the office, was generally used for Coastal.

Coastal had a telephone in its own name in Lambert’s office; the telephone was answered by Lambert’s manager or somebody else in the office. All freight left at the warehouse by Coastal was to be delivered by Lambert’s. Freight delivered by local shippers at the warehouse, to be carried elsewhere by Coastal, would bear Coastal’s name and be placed in Coastal’s space until Coastal’s truck would pick it up. Except while one of Coastal’s trucks was delivering or receiving shipments, Coastal had no employers at Lambert’s warehouse.

Lambert’s regular office hours were from about 8.30 in the morning until 9 at night. During these hours it had its manager and a girl in the office and one, and sometimes two, helpers or “platform men.” After office hours they had only a watchman, who was on duty from 6 in the evening until 7 in the morning. During office hours, when freight was brought by Coastal to the warehouse for delivery by Lambert’s to the consignees, Coastal’s drivers would have waybills in Coastal’s name and a manifest listing the shipments they had for Lambert’s which would refer to the freight bill number and would include the number of pieces of cartons on the shipment and the weight. After the shipments were checked, to see that they were all in good shape and in order, Lambert’s would receipt the manifest, the freight would be deposited in Lambert’s warehouse, and Lambert’s would make delivery.

The drivers and Lambert’s helper in the warehouse would unload the freight from the truck. If one of Coastal’s trucks arrived after office hours, the watchman would open the doors for Coastal’s driver and allow him to unload his freight. The driver would unload the freight in the warehouse and leave his manifest and other papers at the office, so that they could be checked the following morning. Lambert’s manager, when he came in, checked the freight against the manifest.

The receipted manifests were usually mailed to Coastal at ¹¹⁶ Richmond or sent down by Coastal’s next driver, whichever was convenient. Lambert’s made delivery on Coastal’s waybills and in Coastal’s name. The waybills were receipted by the consignees and sent by Lambert’s to Coastal at regular intervals with its settlement or statement of account. On January 18, 1942, five shipments, consigned to Baltimore, Washington and other points served by Lambert’s, under uniform straight bills of lading, were transported (four in one truck, one in another) by Coastal from Richmond to Baltimore, and in the late evening of January 18th or early morning of January 19th were placed by Coastal’s drivers “inside the door” of Lambert’s warehouse “for delivery by Lambert’s to the respective consignees, the freight bills and manifests accompanying said shipments being left in Lambert’s office.” While these shipments were in the warehouse, they were dedestroyed by fire in the early morning of Jahuary 19th.

The value of the goods destroyed was $2,863.76. Coastal’s insurer paid that amount to the several shippers. Coastal and Lambert’s are both common carriers, subject to Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act, formerly Motor Carrier Act. 1935, 49 U. S. C. A. Chapter 8, Secs. 301-327, Act August 9,1935, c. 498, Secs. 201-227, 49 Stat. 543 , amended, Act September 18, 1940, c. 722, 54 Stat. 919 . The Carmack Amendment, which makes the initial carrier liable to the owner for loss of property “caused by” a carrier “to which such property may be delivered or over whose line or lines such property may pass,” and entitles the initial carrier to recover from the carrier “on whose line the loss * * * shall have been sustained,” 49 U. S. C. A, Sec. 20 (11) (12), Act June 29, 1906, c. 3591, Sec. 7, 34 Stat. 593 , Act March 14, 1915, Sec. 1, 38 Stat. 1196 , Act August 9, 1916, c. 301, 39 Stat. 441 , is applicable to common carriers by motor vehicle. 49 U. S. C. A. Sec. 319, supra.

Section 215 of the Act, 49, U. S. C. A. Sec. 315, empowers the Interstate Commerce Commission to require common carriers by motor vehicle to file insurance policies, in a sum to be determined by the Commis ¹¹⁷ sion, conditioned upon making compensation for property “coming into the possession of such carrier in connection with its transportation service”; any carrier required to compensate for loss “for which a connecting motor common carrier is legally responsible” shall be subrogated to the rights of the owner under any such insurance. Fidelity & Guaranty Fire Corporation (defendant, appellee) issued to Lambert’s a policy, which at the time of the fire was in force and contained an endorsement “to assure compliance” by Lambert’s with “Section 215 of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935,” with reference to making compensation for property “coming into the possession of such carrier in connection with its transportation service, and with the pertinent rules and regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission.” The policy provides that the insurer “shall not be liable for an amount in excess of $2,000, in respect of any loss of or damage to or aggregate of losses or damages of or to the property hereby insured occurring at any one time and place, nor in any event for an amount in excess of 81,000, in respect of the loss of or damage to such property carried on any one motor vehicle, whether or not such losses or damages occur while such property is on a motor vehicle or otherwise.” There is no contractual limitation (in legal scope or in pecuniary amount) of either Coastal’s or Lambert’s liability as a common carrier. Coastal, for the benefit of its insurer, sued separately Lambert’s and its insurer. Both cases were tried together before the court without a jury.

From judgments for the defendant in each case the plaintiff appeals. Against Lambert’s the plaintiff claims $2,863.76, the full amount of the loss; against the insurer the plaintiff claims $2,000, the limit of the insurer’s liability. The facts, as stated above, are undisputed. The question of law is whether at the time of the fire the goods had been delivered to, and had come into the possession of, Lambert’s. ¹¹⁸ On this question both parties, and also the lower court, regard Pratt v. Grand Trunk Railway Co., 95 U. S. 43 , 24 L. Ed. 336 , as the leading authority; they have minutely discussed the facts of that case.

The Grand Trunk Railway was sued for loss of goods carried over its road from Montreal to Detroit. The goods reached Detroit on October 17, 1865, and on the night of the 18th were destroyed by fire. The Grand Trunk claimed to have delivered the goods to the Michigan Central Railroad, a succeeding carrier, and thus to have discharged itself from liability before the fire. The Grand Trunk had no freight depot at Detroit, except a single section or apartment in the Michigan Central’s depot, which was a large building under one roof, divided into sections without any partition wall between them.

In the center of the building was, a railway track, for cars to be loaded with freight. The only use the Grand