Green v. Garrett

Marbury, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This second appeal is taken by the appellants in the case heard as No. 58 of this Term, decided on January 13, 1949 and reported by the same title in 192 Md. 52 , 63 A. 2d 326 . The purpose of the second appeal is to have this court determine whether the decree passed by the Chancellor, following our decision in the first appeal, is in accordance with our opinion in that appeal. The appellants contend it is not, in two respects, the first having to do with lights and the second with parking facilities.

It is not necessary to repeat the facts stated in the first opinion. It will be sufficient for an understanding of what we are about to determine, to say that this is an action brought by citizens and taxpayers of Baltimore .against the Department of Recreation and Parks of Baltimore City and the Baltimore Baseball and Exhibition Company to prevent the use of the Baltimore Stadium for the playing of professional baseball, and to enjoin the respondents from certain parking and lighting operations there. We held that the stadium could be used for professional baseball, but placed restrictions on the method of lighting and on the use of the unpaved parking lots. The Chancellor attempted to embody these restrictions in his decree, and the question before us is whether he did so correctly.

As to the lights, we found that those on the top of the stadium were tilted in such a manner as to shine ²⁶³ directly across the stadium into the windows of nearby residents. We also stated that for the playing of night baseball it was necessary to illuminate the playing field. We did not require the light thus produced to be confined to the field alone, but said that in order to provide proper light for the games, it was not necessary to project blinding lights into peoples’ homes. We did not, of course, intend to prohibit the lighting of the area, adjacent to the stadium, used for parking, or the lighting of the entrances.

Such lighting would be an obvious precaution against accidents, and a necessity for proper policing. Nor did we suggest that the lights on the top of the Stadium should be so adjusted as to confine their illumination to the field. It is doubtful whether this could be so completely confined, but, in any event, that was not what we decided. What we were concerned with was to prevent these lights (or other lights, if there were any) from shining directly into adjacent residences.

We used the word “blinding”, because that was a description of these lights given by one of the witnesses, but we did not intend that word to be taken as narrowly as the appellants contend it may be construed. Their objection to the decree, in this respect, is that the Chancellor used that word to describe the only kind of lights which the respondents were enjoined from projecting into the windows of their homes and into nearby residences. We do not think the Chancellor intended to restrict his prohibition so literally. The claim made by appellants is that lights may shine directly into their homes, and cause the annoyance complained of in the bill of complaint, without being actually “blinding”, and