Green v. North Arundel Hospital Ass'n

SALMON, Judge. Darwin Green (Darwin), a disabled minor child, through his parents and next Mends, Teresa Johnson and Charles Johnson (appellants), instituted a medical malpractice action against North Arundel Hospital Association, Inc. (NAH); Richard T. Fields, M.D.; Stewart P. Axelbaum, M.D.; and Harshad R. Mody, M.D. (appellees). 1 Appellants claimed that appellees breached the applicable standard of care by failing to diagnose an alleged shunt malfunction in Darwin on August 18, 1988, and that a proper diagnosis would have prevented the child’s subsequent injuries that have left him in a chronic vegetative state. Appellants filed their original complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City and named only NAH and Dr. Fields as defendants.

Dr. Fields resides and carries on business solely ³⁹⁹ in Anne Arundel County; NAH conducts business solely in Anne Arundel County. On March 20, 1992, Baltimore City Circuit Court Judge Richard T. Rombro ruled that appellants had filed their suit in the wrong venue and transferred the action to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. The Anne Arundel County Circuit Court set a trial date for June 1994. On May 17, 1994, appellants moved to stay the Anne Arundel County proceedings because they wanted to add two new defendants to the case — Drs.

Mody and Axelb-aum. As required by title 3, subtitle 2A, of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code (1998 Repl. Vol & Supp.1998), appellants initially filed their claims against Drs. Mody and Axelbaum in the Health Claims Arbitration Office on May 20, 1994. 2 After the parties agreed to waive arbitration in December 1995, the arbitration panel chairman signed a transfer order on February 20, 1996, allowing appellants to proceed with their case against Drs.

Mody and Axelbaum in circuit court. Rather than moving to lift the stay in the Anne Arundel County action by adding Drs. Mody and Axelbaum to that pending case, appellants filed a new complaint in Baltimore City Circuit Court. Appellants’ basis for filing in Baltimore City was that Dr. Mody regularly conducted business and maintained his medical office there.

In the Baltimore City complaint, appellants not only named Drs. Mody and Axelb-aum as defendants, but they also set forth claims against NAH and Dr. Fields — the same claims already pending in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. On June 3, 1996, Baltimore City Circuit Court Judge David B. Mitchell granted appellees’ motion to dismiss and imposed sanctions against ⁴⁰⁰ appellants. 3 Meanwhile, on February 22,1996, appellants made a motion in the Anne Arundel County Circuit Court to transfer that pending action back to Baltimore City. On August 2, 1996, Circuit Court Judge Lawrence H. Rushworth held a hearing on the motion.

At the time of that hearing, neither Dr. Mody nor Dr. Axelbaum had been added to the Anne Arundel County action. Judge Rushworth denied the motion to transfer at the conclusion of the August 2 nd hearing. On August 9, 1996, appellants amended their original complaint by naming Drs. Mody and Axelbaum as defendants in the Anne Arundel County action.

Dr. Mody was served with process on August 19, 1996. The record is unclear as to when Dr. Axelbaum was served with process, but he filed an answer to the amended complaint on September 17, 1996; Dr. Mody filed his answer two days later. At no time after August 9, 1996, did appellants renew their motion to transfer the case back to Baltimore City. On October 30, 1996, Judge Rushworth bifurcated the case on the issues of liability and damages.

Subsequently, the trial judge held a hearing on appellees’ motion in limine to exclude Darwin from the courtroom during the liability portion of the trial. After hearing arguments and watching a videotape of a day in Darwin’s life, 4 Judge Rushworth granted the motion, finding that Darwin did not have the ability to communicate with his attorneys, nurses, or parents; that he would be unable to provide any assistance to his attorneys in preparing his case; that he would be unable to understand or comprehend the proceedings; and that his presence served no purpose other than to prejudice the jurors against the defendants. ⁴⁰¹ Trial commenced on October 7, 1997. At the conclusion of plaintiffs’ case, on October 17,1997, Judge Rushworth granted NAH’s and Mody’s motions for judgment. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Drs.

Fields and Axelbaum on October 21, 1997, having concluded that neither doctor “departed from accepted standards of care in the treatment of Darwin Green.” Appellants filed this timely appeal and present four questions for our review: 1. Did ... the Circuit Court for Baltimore City err as a matter of law in transferring [appellants’ action to Anne Arundel County ... ? 2. Did ... the Circuit [C]ourt for Anne Arundel County err in denying [appellants’ motion to transfer [their] action back to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City once Dr. Mody was added to the action? 3. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in barring the [p]laintiff, Darwin Green[,] from attending his own trial as a result of his physical and mental disability, in that such exclusion violated the Americans With Disabilities Act, as well as fundamental notions of equal access to justice? 4.

Did the trial eourt err in allowing [appellees to present a theory of their case that is against Maryland case law as stated in Mehlman v. Powell? We answer all of the questions in the negative and affirm. FACTS Darwin Green was bom on February 12, 1977, with a medical condition called hydrocephalus. Hydrocephalus causes increased pressure on the brain due to an excessive accumulation of fluid.

When Darwin was nine days old, doctors placed a shunt in the right ventricle of his brain that drained the extra fluid to another part of his body in order to prevent the build-up of intracranial pressure. In 1981, when he was approximately four-and-a-half years old, Darwin complained of headaches and vomiting. Doctors determined that Darwin’s shunt was not functioning properly ⁴⁰² and performed surgery to correct the problem. For the next several years, Darwin experienced no problems with his shunt.

On the morning of August 17, 1988, Darwin was with his father when he began complaining that he had a headache. Darwin’s father gave him Tylenol and later testified that it was not unusual for Darwin to have headaches and that Tylenol normally cured the problem. On this day, however, the Tylenol did not work, and Darwin continued to complain of a headache. Later that day, Darwin felt nauseous, began vomiting, and refused to eat.

His father continued to give him Tylenol, but Darwin’s condition did not improve. The next morning, August 18, 1988, Darwin was still complaining that he had a headache. In addition, Darwin appeared drowsy and was still refusing to eat. Darwin’s father gave him another dose of Tylenol but this again failed to relieve the child’s symptoms.

At this point, Darwin’s father became very concerned and decided to take his son to the emergency room at nearby North Arundel Hospital, located in Anne Arundel County. Darwin and his father arrived at the hospital at 11:05 a.m. Dr. Fields, the on-call physician in the emergency room, examined Darwin at 1:00 p.m. At that time, Darwin was complaining of a severe headache.

Dr. Fields ordered several laboratory tests, including an emergency CT scan. Darwin was also given Vicodin, a prescription pain killer. Darwin’s CT scan was reviewed by Dr. Axelbaum, a radiologist at NAH. Dr. Axelbaum noted the presence of shunts in Darwin’s brain as well as a number of other abnormalities, but he interpreted these results as all old changes.

Dr. David Buchholz, appellants’ medical expert, later opined at trial that Dr. Axelbaum breached the standard of care when he reported that the changes were all old while failing to report to Dr. Fields that there "was a possibility that the results could represent new change or a blocked shunt. Dr. Fields contacted Dr. Mody, the neurologist on-call at the hospital. Dr. Mody advised that Darwin could be released once his headache was relieved. It is unclear when Dr. ⁴⁰³ Axelbaum placed his written findings in Darwin’s emergency room (“ER”) chart.

Dr. Buchholz later testified that if Dr. Axelbaum’s findings were not in the ER chart when Dr. Fields spoke with Dr. Mody, then neither Dr. Fields nor Dr. Mody breached the standard of care. If Dr. Axelbaum’s findings were in the chart and Dr. Fields read it to Dr. Mody, then Dr. Fields also complied with the standard of care, according to Dr. Buchholz. Dr. Buchholz said, however, that if Dr. Axelb-aum’s notations were on the chart and Dr. Fields failed to read them to Dr. Mody in their entirety, then Dr. Fields would have breached the standard of care. Dr. Buchholz could not say which of these three scenarios actually occurred.

At 2:45 p.m., Darwin’s headache was gone, and he was able to tolerate fluids. Dr. Fields consulted with Dr. Lee, Darwin’s primary care pediatrician, who informed Dr. Fields that he would see Darwin in his office for a follow-up the next day. Dr. Fields’s final diagnosis was a “vascular headache.” He released Darwin from the hospital at 3:05 p.m. with instructions to follow up with Dr. Lee the next day. Darwin then left the hospital and went to his father’s home, located in Anne Arundel County.

After his release from NAH, Darwin continued to complain of a headache at his father’s home. That evening, his father gave him another Vicodin as prescribed by Dr. Fields. The next morning, August 19, 1988, Darwin was still complaining of a headache. His father took Darwin to Dr. Lee’s office in Anne Arundel County for his follow-up appointment.

Dr. Lee examined Darwin and noted that he had a headache, appeared drowsy, and had a staggering gait. Dr. Lee contacted Darwin’s neurosurgeon, who referred Darwin to the University of Maryland Hospital, located in Baltimore City. Dr. Buchholz was later to testify that Darwin’s condition at Dr. Lee’s office was “worse” than it was the day before at NAH and that the worsening of his condition was related to increasing intracranial pressure caused by his still undiagnosed shunt malfunction. ⁴⁰⁴ Darwin and his father arrived at the University Hospital at 3:55 p.m. on August 19, 1988. The University Hospital ER records note that Darwin was weak, drowsy, and lethargic; that he walked well the day before but “today can hardly walk by himself’; and that his headache was “worse today.” Darwin’s shunt was tapped 5 in the emergency room and a CT scan was performed.

The shunt tap revealed that Darwin had increased intracranial pressure. From this information, emergency room doctors correctly diagnosed Darwin as having a probable shunt malfunction, and at 11:05 p.m., Darwin was admitted to the neurosurgery service of the University Hospital. Corrective surgery was not performed immediately, however, and the next day, August 20,1988, Darwin experienced a cardiac arrest as a result of his shunt blockage. Doctors were able to revive and stabilize him, but the cardiac arrest caused extensive and irreversible damage to Darwin’s brain.

This damage has left Darwin in a permanent vegetative state. Dr. Buchholz’s expert opinion was that, given Darwin’s medical history and the symptoms that he was exhibiting at NAH, the doctors should have performed a shunt tap on Darwin on August 18, 1988. According to Dr. Buchholz, if a shunt tap had been performed at NAH, it would have revealed that Darwin had increased intracranial pressure at that time. This information would have led the doctors to the proper diagnosis that Darwin’s symptoms were caused by shunt malfunction.

Dr. Buchholz opined that once a correct diagnosis had been made, if Darwin had been properly managed from that point on and received a shunt revision, 6 then his subsequent cardiac arrest on August 20,1988, could have been avoided. In addition, Dr. Buchholz testified that, between the time of Darwin’s discharge from NAH and his arrival at the University of Maryland Hospital in Baltimore City, Darwin had in ⁴⁰⁵ creased symptoms from his intracranial pressure, but his injuries were not irreversible at that point. According to Dr. Buchholz, if a shunt revision had been done at University Hospital on August 19, 1988, or during the morning of August 20, 1988, Darwin would have avoided his cardiac arrest and would not have suffered any permanent injury. Dr. Buchholz admitted, however, that if Darwin had been referred to the University of Maryland Hospital by NAH on August 18, 1988, there was no evidence that his course of treatment at the University of Maryland Hospital would have been any different, other than that his treatment would have started twenty-four hours earlier. 7 ANALYSIS Issue 1 A. “Where the Came of Action Arose” In December 1991, appellants filed their initial complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against NAH and Dr. Fields.

Defendants immediately challenged venue. At a March 20, 1992, hearing, Judge Rombro found that both NAH and Dr. Fields were residents of Anne Arundel County, that they both maintained offices and engaged in business solely in Anne Arundel County, and that appellants’ cause of action arose in Anne Arundel County. Based on these findings, he ruled that Baltimore City was an improper venue for the suit and transferred the case to Anne Arundel County. On appeal, appellants claim that Judge Rombro erred in this ruling. ⁴⁰⁶ Section 6-201 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code (1998 Repl.Vol.) (hereinafter “CJ”) provides, in pertinent part: (a) Civil Actions. — Subject to the provisions of §§ 6-202 and 6-203 and unless otherwise provided by law, a civil action shall be brought in a county where the defendant resides, carries on a regular business, is employed, or habitually engages in a vocation____ (b) Multiple Defendants. — If there is more than one defendant, and there is no single venue applicable to all defendants, under subsection (a), all may be sued in a county in which any one of them could be sued, or in the county where the cause of action arose.

CJ § 6-202 reads, so far as here material: In addition to the venue provided in § 6-201 or § 6-203, the following actions may be brought in the indicated county: * * * (8) Tort action based on negligence — Where the cauce of action arose; (Emphasis added.) All parties agree with Judge Rombro’s finding that, at the time the complaint was filed in Baltimore City, both NAH and Dr. Fields were Anne Arundel County residents who maintained their offices and conducted their business solely in that County. As such, neither party disputes that Anne Arundel County was the only proper venue under C J § 6-201 because it provided “a single venue applicable to all defendants.” Nevertheless, appellants note that CJ § 6-202(8) provides an alternative venue in negligence actions, allowing plaintiffs to bring suit in the county where the cause of action arose. See Wilde v. Swanson, 314 Md. 80, 92 , 548 A.2d 837 (1988) (holding that when multiple venues are proper under both CJ § 6-201 and CJ § 6-202, the plaintiff can choose to proceed under either section — “Neither section enjoys a priority over the other”). Appellants maintain that, under CJ § 6-202(8), ⁴⁰⁷ venue was proper in Baltimore City because their cause of action arose there.

Whether the court was right in transferring the case to Anne Arundel County depends, in part, upon the meaning of the phrase “where the cause of action arose.” Maryland appellate courts have not had occasion to interpret this phrase in the context of our venue statutes, but prior decisions have interpreted similar language contained in section 11 — 108(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code (1998 RepLVol.) (hereinafter CJ § 11 — 108(b)). Section ll-108(b) states: Limitation on amount of damages established. — (1) In any action for damages for personal injury in which the cause of action arises on or after July 1, 1986, an award for noneco-nomic damages may not exceed $850,000. (Emphasis added.) In Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107 , 604 A.2d 47 (1992), the Court of Appeals held that, with respect to CJ § ll-108(b), a cause of action “arises” when facts exist to support each element of the cause of action. See id. at 121, 604 A.2d 47 (citing Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 87 Md.App. 699, 724-25 , 591 A.2d 544 (1991)).

The Court explained: We agree with the Court of Special Appeals’ conclusion that a cause of action in negligence ... arises “when facts exist to support each element.” In a negligence claim, the fact of injury would seemingly be the last element to come into existence. The breach, duty, and causation elements naturally precede the fact of injury. Id. (citation omitted); see Owens Corning v. Bauman, 125 Md.App. 454, 480 , 726 A.2d 745 (1999) (“Each of the elements of a claim must be met before a cause of action arises — ”); Ford Motor Co. v. Wood, 119 Md.App. 1, 45 , 703 A.2d 1315 , cert. denied, 349 Md. 494 , 709 A.2d 139 (1998) (“[A] cause of action for negligence ... arises when the injury first occurs.”); Anchor Packing Co. v. Grimshaw, 115 Md.App. 134, 153 , 692 A.2d 5 (1997), vacated in part sub nom.

Porter Hayden Co. v. Bullinger, 350 Md. 452 , 713 A.2d 962 (1998) (stating that a ⁴⁰⁸ cause of action arises “when all the elements of the claim are satisfied”); DiLeo v. Nugent, 88 Md.App. 59, 77 , 592 A.2d 1126 (1991) (concluding that a medical malpractice cause of action arises “when a negligent act, coupled with the resulting harm, amounts to a legally cognizable wrong”). Although the cases just referenced deal with when a “cause of action arises” in the context of CJ § ll-108(b), we see no reason why the same interpretation of the phrase should not be applied to where a “cause of action arises” under CJ § 6-202(8). See Engel v. Gosper, 71 N.J.Super. 573 , 177 A.2d 595, 598 (N.J.Super. Ct. Law Div.1962) (noting that state statute dictating that a wrongful death cause of action arises when death occurs also makes it “reasonable to conclude that [a wrongful death] cause of action arises where death occurs” (emphasis added)).

We therefore hold that, under CJ § 6-202(8), “where the cause of action arises” is the place where all the elements of the negligence claim (duty, breach, causation, and injury) are satisfied. In negligence cases, because injury is the last element to come into existence, a cause of action in negligence arises where the injury first occurs. Appellees argue that a cause of action in contract or tort arises where the alleged breach occurs. Appellees cite Kane v. Schulmeyer, 349 Md. 424 , 708 A.2d 1038 (1998), in support of this position.

Other than citing to Kane , appellees fail to point to any case that holds that a cause of action arises at the place of the breach. Kane does not hold that a cause of action in contract or tort arises where the breach occurs — the specific holding of Kane is that, in an action involving the breach of an agreement to pay money, a cause of action for breach of contract arises where payment was to be made; if no place of payment is specified in the agreement, then the cause of action arises where the creditor resides or has its place of business. See id. at 438 , 708 A.2d 1038 . At issue in Kane was the breach of an agreement to repay a debt.

In such actions, the breach and damages arising from the breach will always occur in the same place. In other words, as soon as the debtor fails to make payment at the ⁴⁰⁹ proper place, the creditor has incurred damages at that location. The Kane Court did not address the issue of where a cause of action arises when the breach occurs in one county and the injury occurs in another. As such, Kane does not support appellees’ argument that a cause of action arises where the breach occurs. 8 ⁴¹¹ We therefore reject appellees’ interpretation of the language in CJ § 6-202(8) and hold that a cause of action in negligence arises where the injury first occurs.

B. Where Did Darwin First Suffer Injury ? Appellants presently contend that because Darwin suffered his cardiac arrest and brain damage at the University of Maryland Hospital in Baltimore City, the cause of action arose in Baltimore City because this is where he manifested injury proximately caused by NAH’s and Dr. Fields’ alleged breach of the standard of care. On the other hand, appellees maintain that, after his discharge from NAH on August 18, 1988, and due to his undiagnosed shunt malfunction, Darwin incurred pain and suffering injuries in Anne Arundel County, ⁴¹² before he was transported to Baltimore City, and therefore the cause of action arose in Anne Arundel County. In Edmonds v. Cytology Services, 111 Md.App. 233 , 681 A.2d 546 (1996), aff'd sub nom., Rivera v. Edmonds, 347 Md. 208 ; 699 A.2d 1194 (1997), we said: A patient sustains an “injury” ... when, as a result of the tort, he or she first sustains compensable damages that can be proven with reasonable certainty.

Therefore, the patient could suffer an “injury” as a result of a negligent misdiagnosis, when (1) he or she experiences pain or other manifestation of an injury; (2) the disease advances beyond the point where it was at the time of the misdiagnosis and to a point where (a) it can no longer effectively be treated, (b) it cannot be treated as well or as completely as it could have been at the time of the misdiagnosis, or (c) the treatment would entail expense or detrimental side effects that would not likely have occurred had treatment commenced at the earlier time; or (3) the patient dies. This is not, of course, an exhaustive checklist; the overriding inquiry in all cases must be when the patient first sustained legally compensa-ble damages. In any event, the injury occurs, as we have observed, when legally compensable tort damages first occur, regardless of whether those damages are discoverable or undiscoverable. Id. at 270 , 681 A.2d 546 (citations omitted).

Given this definition of injury, we agree with appellees that Darwin first suffered injury in Anne Arundel County. During discovery, one of the interrogatories propounded to appellants was: Describe in detail the injuries, disabilities, and infirmities which you claim that [Darwin] sustained as a result of the occurrence which is the subject matter of this suit, and when each such injury, disability, or infirmity occurred. Appellants’ answer to this interrogatory was: At the time [Darwin] was in the care of the Defendants at North Arundel Hospital, the child’s intracranial pressure was constantly increasing causing neurological deterioras ⁴¹³ tion moving him inevitably toward and ultimately causing massive brain injuries.... (Emphasis added.) This interrogatory answer shows that appellants claimed that the defendants caused Darwin to suffer injury in the form of “neurological deterioration” and increased intracranial pressure while at NAH, located in Anne Arundel County.

In addition, at trial, appellants’ medical expert, Dr. Buch-holz, testified that if the doctors at NAH had properly diagnosed Darwin as having a shunt malfunction on August 18, 1988, then he would have been referred to the University of Maryland Hospital twenty-four to twenty-five hours earlier for a shunt revision. See supra note 7. Instead, because of this alleged misdiagnosis, Darwin was sent to his home in Anne Arundel County. While at his home, Darwin experienced pain and suffering in the form of headaches and drowsiness caused by his increasing intracranial pressure.

The next day, at Dr. Lee’s office in Anne Arundel County, Darwin continued to complain of a headache and drowsiness, and Dr. Lee also noted that Darwin had a “staggering gait” — a common symptom of increased intracranial pressure. Overall, Darwin’s condition continued to worsen after his release from NAH, and this worsening took place in Anne Arundel County. In short, Darwin experienced pain and suffering injury in Anne Arundel County due to appellees’ alleged negligent failure to diagnose the blocked shunt. Darwin’s pain and suffering could have been limited if he had been referred immediately to the University of Maryland Hospital for a shunt revision.

In this regard, Dr. Buchholz testified on cross-examination as follows: Q Okay. Now, in response to ... whether Darwin Green had sustained injury between the time he was seen at North Arundel Hospital and the time of his [cardiac] arrest, some time around midday on the 20th, you had mentioned ... that [Darwin] had sustained no irreversible injury. But, in fact, you’re willing to go further than that and say that he sustained no injury whatsoever; is that true? ⁴¹⁴ A I mean, if you mean symptoms as being some form of injury, he had some symptoms which had increased. But I think in the sense that we really mean the term some sort of permanent damage, that is true that he had not sustained permanent damage prior to the arrest.

(Emphasis added.) In sum, because appellants’ own evidence showed that Darwin first experienced injury in the form of “neurological deterioration” and pain and suffering in Anne Arundel County, the cause of action arose in that county. Accordingly, Judge Rombro did not err in transferring the case out of Baltimore City. 9 The fact that Darwin experienced more serious injuries later in Baltimore City is of no consequence for venue purposes — the cause of action was complete as soon as Darwin first experienced any injury from the alleged negligent acts of NAH and Dr. Fields. Issue 2 Both sides agree that Dr. Mody carries on his business and maintains an office in Baltimore City. Appellants’ second claim is that Judge Rushworth erred in failing to transfer the case back to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City once Dr. Mody was added to the action.

Appellants argue that the addition of Dr. Mody to the case made venue proper in Baltimore City under the multiple defendant provision of CJ § 6-201(b). Appellants’ argument is without merit because, at the time that Judge Rushworth denied appellants’ motion to transfer the case back to Baltimore City, Dr. Mody had not been named as a defendant in the case. The court denied appellants’ motion to transfer on August 2, 1996. Appellants did ⁴¹⁵ not amend their complaint to add Dr. Mody to this case until August 9, 1996.

Thereafter, appellants never renewed their motion to transfer. Because Dr. Mody was not a defendant in the case at the time Judge Rushworth decided the motion, there was no basis for him to grant the transfer. As such, there was no error. Issue 3 Appellants next contend that the trial court erred as a matter of law in excluding Darwin from the courtroom during the liability phase of the trial because such exclusion was: (A) a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994) (hereinafter “ADA”); (B) a violation of federal and state due process; and (C) a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments’ implicit right guaranteeing the public access to trials.

A. Americans With Disability Act Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (1994), deals with discrimination against disabled persons by public entities. 10 Section 12132 states: Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity. Federal regulations implementing the requirements of the ADA state: A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, ⁴¹⁶ unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (b)(7) (1999); see Weinreich v. Los Angeles County Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, —U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 423 , 139 L.Ed.2d 324 (1997).

Once a qualified individual with a disability 11 requests a reasonable modification, and the public entity denies the request, Title II sets forth various procedural mechanisms 12 by which that individual can seek injunctive relief to force the public entity to make the reasonable modifications to allow the disabled individual access to the services, programs, or activities of the public entity. 13 In short, the ADA allows for action only against the public entity for prospective injunctive relief — there is nothing in the ADA that provides a basis for reversing the judgment of a lower court in a civil dispute between private parties. Therefore, assuming, arguendo, that Judge Rushworth’s ruling constituted a violation of the ADA, this would only give Darwin a separate cause of ⁴¹⁷ action for injunctive relief against the trial judge in his official capacity as a judicial officer of the State 14 — it would not constitute reversible error in the case sub judice. Thus, whether Judge Rushworth’s exclusion of Darwin from trial violates the ADA is irrelevant to the outcome of this case. B. Due Process Appellants also argue that the exclusion of Darwin from the liability phase of the trial violated his due process rights under the United States and Maryland Constitutions.

For reasons set forth below, we disagree. A party does not have an absolute right to attend trial. See Helminski v. Ayerst Lab., 766 F.2d 208 (6th Cir.1985); Marks v. Mobil Oil Corp., 562 F.Supp. 759, 768 (E.D.Pa.1983), aff'd, 727 F.2d 1100 (3rd Cir.1984); Cary v. Oneok, Inc., 940 P.2d 201, 204 (Okla.1997). Although there is no Maryland case law specifying the circumstances under which the exclusion of a party from trial offends due process, many courts faced with this issue have adopted the reasoning used by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Helminski.

See, e.g., Hines v. Wilkinson, 163 F.R.D. 262, 265-68 (S.D.Ohio 1995); Province v. Center for Women’s Health & Family Birth, 20 Cal.App.4th 1673 , 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 667, 675 (1993) (noting that Helminski “surveyed, considered, and discussed the rules which had been applied to a broad range of cases” dealing with the exclusion of parties from trial); Cary, 940 P.2d at 205 ; Bremner v. Charles, 312 Or. 274 , 821 P.2d 1080, 1085 (1991), modified by, 313 Or. 339 , 832 P.2d 454 (1992). In Helminski, the plaintiffs alleged that the minor plaintiffs mother’s exposure during pregnancy to a surgical anesthetic ⁴¹⁸ manufactured by the defendant caused injury to the minor’s nervous system when he was a fetus. See 766 F.2d at 210. The defendants moved to exclude the minor from trial, arguing that his appearance before the jury would be prejudicial to their case.

See id. at 213. At the time of trial, the minor required twenty-four hour a day care, did not speak, was not toilet