Green v. Sollenberger

BLOOM, Judge. Appellee, Meg Sollenberger, Executive Director of the Child Support Enforcement Administration for the State of Maryland (the State), filed a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court for Carroll County, seeking an annulment of an adoption decree that permitted appellant, Dorothy Mae Green, to adopt the three minor children who had been born to her and her first husband during their marriage. Appellee moved for summary judgment, ánd the circuit court granted her motion, determining that, as a matter of law, the adoption decree was void ab initio. Appellant raises the following issues in this appeal from that judgment: I. Whether Maryland law permits adoption by a natural mother of her own legitimate children, under Maryland’s adoption statute.

II

Whether a decree of adoption may be vacated when more than one year has passed since its entry, absent a showing of fraud, mistake, or irregularity. Statement of Facts Appellant married David Brian Lenick in 1975. Three children were born to them during their marriage: Thomas, born 29 September 1979, and Sara and Andrew (twins), born 29 August 1980. In March 1980, the couple separated, and appellant found it necessary to apply for public assistance under AFDC (Aid for Families with Dependent Children), pursuant to Md.Code (1957, 1991 Repl.Vol.) Art. 88A, § 44A.

On receipt of public assistance, appellant assigned to the State ⁶⁸⁸ of Maryland her right to obtain child support from Mr. Lenick. When appellant obtained a divorce from Mr. Lenick in June 1988, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County awarded custody of all three children to appellant and ordered Mr. Lenick to pay child support. In 1985, appellant married Mark James Green. In May 1990, appellant applied again to the State for AFDC.

On 15 April 1991, she filed a URESA (Maryland Uniform Enforcement of Support Act (Md.Code (1984, 1921 Repl.Vol.) Family Law Article § 10-301 through § 10-340) complaint and affidavit in order to allow the State to collect child support from Mr. Lenick in Pennsylvania. One month later, appellant filed in the Circuit Court for Carroll County a petition for adoption of her three children. Appellant’s second husband, Mr. Green, did not join in the petition for adoption. After the adoption petition was filed, Mr. Lenick signed a “Consent with Waiver” form.

The children, without representation by independent counsel, also executed consent forms. On 3 September 1991, the circuit court entered an adoption decree declaring appellant to be, by adoption, the parent of her natural and legitimate children and changing the last name of the children from Lenick to Green. Since the status of appellant as mother of the three children was precisely the same after the decree as it was before the decree, the only effect of the adoption decree was the severance of the parental relationship, rights, and obligations of Mr. Lenick. Even after the entry of the adoption decree, Mr. Lenick paid child support payments to the State, and the State sent AFDC assistance to appellant.

Almost one year later, after Mr. Lenick had been jailed several times in Pennsylvania pursuant to a URESA action, he filed a petition in a Pennsylvania court, seeking to be released from his obligation to pay support. He argued that the adoption by appellant of their three children relieved him of any parental duties. At the request of the State of Maryland, the Pennsylvania court ⁶⁸⁹ stayed the support order so that a Maryland court could determine whether the adoption decree was valid. On 30 March 1993, appellee instituted the declaratory judgment action that is the subject of this appeal.

Analysis The current adoption statutes are contained in Md.Code (1984 & Repl.Vol.1991), Title 5, Subtitle 3 of the Family Law Article (FL). FL § 5-307 provides that any individual, whether a minor or an adult, may be adopted; FL § 5-309 allows any adult to petition a court to decree an adoption. The question before this Court is whether, despite this broad, all inclusive, language, these statutes permit a natural parent to adopt her own minor children that were born to her and her former husband during their marriage. To answer this question, we must look not only to the language of these statutes, but also to the legislative intention behind them.

As the Court of Appeals stated in Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 387 , 614 A.2d 590 (1992): While the language of the statute is the primary source for determining legislative intention, the plain meaning rule of construction is not absolute; rather, the statute must be construed reasonably with reference to the purpose, aim, or policy of the enacting body.... The Court will look at the larger context, including the legislative