Green v. State

Liss, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Patricia Green, appellant, was convicted in a non-jury trial before Judge Shirley B. Jones in the Criminal Court of Baltimore, of possession of heroin in a sufficient quantity to indicate an intention to distribute. Sentence was imposed and it was from that judgment that this appeal was noted. The sole question raised by appellant is whether the trial court erred in overruling appellant’s motion to suppress and exclude the evidence seized in the course of the execution of a search and seizure warrant obtained by the police from a Maryland District Court judge, which authorized the search of a premises described in the warrant as “1519 Presser Court second floor apartment located in a brick project-type building.” The affidavit in support of the application for the search and seizure warrant and the warrant itself were offered into evidence during the suppression hearing as Defense Motion Exhibit 1.

The affidavit stated that in mid-March 1976, the investigating officer, one Officer Parker, spoke with a confidential and reliable informant, 1 who advised him that a female known to him as “Treecy,” whom he described as being 25 to 27 years of age, five feet one inch to five feet five inches in height, weighing 120 to 125 pounds, with brown skin and short hair, was selling heroin on a large-scale basis from “her second floor apartment at 1519 Presser Court.” The informant further stated that persons who wished to purchase heroin would go to 1519 Presser Court, knock on the door “leading to the second floor apartment” and enter. The affidavit further recited that shortly after midnight on ⁶⁵ March 23, 1976 the officer and his informant drove to the Presser Court neighborhood where the informant pointed to the door marked 1519 Presser Court and said that “that door leads to ‘Treecy’s’ apartment.” Officer Parker then drove the informant from the neighborhood and returned to 1519 Presser Court for further surveillance of the apartment. The affidavit states that in the course of the ensuing hour and one-half the officer observed four young black males enter the door pointed out as the entrance to “Treecy’s” apartment. Each of the four males remained for approximately three minutes and then exited and left the area.

The affidavit also reveals that on the following day the officer ascertained that the telephone number assigned to 1519 Presser Court was in the name of Patricia Green. A check of the Central Records Division of the Baltimore Police Department revealed that Patricia Green resided at 1519 Presser Court and that she had been involved in three prior narcotics charges. The officer also stated that the nickname “Treecy” is associated with the name of Patricia. Pursuant to the application the District Court judge issued a warrant describing the premises to be searched as “1519 Presser Court, second floor apartment located in a brick project-type building.” Armed with the warrant, the officer went to the address given, opened the front door marked 1519 Presser Court and looked for stairs leading to the second floor apartment.

He found no stairs. After verifying that the address was in fact 1519 Presser Court, he entered the first floor apartment located at that address, where he found Patricia Green. At trial it was determined that the building here involved has three apartments, with entrance gained through three different numbered entrances. The entrance designated 1519 Presser Court led to the first floor apartment; the entrance designated 1517 Presser Court (ten feet from 1519) led to the second floor apartment; and the entrance designated 1515 Presser Court led to the third floor apartment.

A search of the apartment revealed quantities of heroin of varying strengths, ranging from 22.5% to 5.4%; the higher strength compound indicating a strong possibility that the heroin could be adulterated to yield a greater ⁶⁶ quantity, the lower strength representing the average mixture available in ordinary street sales. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution proscribes the issuance of general warrants and requires that “no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched.” A similar prohibition is contained in Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Maryland Code (1957, 1976 Cum. Supp.) Art. 27, § 551 contains the procedure for the issuance of a search and seizure warrant.

It is to be noted that appellant raises no issue as to the warrant signed by the magistrate being a general warrant, nor does she contend that there was an insufficient showing of probable cause, nor that the warrant lacked particularity in describing the place to be searched. To the contrary, she urges that the premises to be searched were particularly described as “1519 Presser Court second floor apartment located in a brick project-type building” and that the search by the officer of her first floor apartment at 1519 Presser Court was an unreasonable violation of her right to be secure from unlawful searches and seizures. The historical background of the law governing the issuance of search and seizure warrants was discussed by this Court in two recent cases, Hignut v. State, 17 Md. App. 399 , 303 A. 2d 173 (1973) and Harris and Schmitt v. State, 17 Md. App. 484 , 302 A. 2d 655 (1973). We noted in Hignut, supra, “that the notion of a ‘general warrant’ did not contemplate every minor imprecision in draftsmanship giving rise to some arguable ambiguity or fleeting confusion.” Id. at 417 , 303 A. 2d at 182 .

Andresen v. State, 24 Md. App. 128 , 331 A. 2d 78 (1975), aff'd, 427 U. S. 463 , 96 S. Ct. 2737 , 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976). Steele v. United States, No. 1, 267 U. S. 498 , 45 S. Ct. 414 , 69 L. Ed. 757 (1925), decided by the Supreme Court in the unlamented days of Prohibition, stated the standards to be applied in determining whether a warrant sufficiently described the place to be searched. In that case, prohibition ⁶⁷ agents obtained a warrant to search a building used as a garage where they had probable cause to believe that illicit whiskey was stored. The description of the premises to be searched given in the warrant was that of a garage located in a building at 611 W. 46th St. In executing the warrant the agents discovered that the building had three street entrances and two house numbers and further that there was an elevator which gave access to three additional floors in the building.

The agents searched the entire building and discovered illicit whiskey on the premises. Chief Justice Taft, speaking for a unanimous Court, reasoned that the search warrant fully complied with the statutory and constitutional requirements. He stated the test to be that “It is enough if the description is such that the officer with a search warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended.” Id. at 503 , 45 S. Ct. at 416 , 69 L. Ed. at 760 . United States v. Prout, 526 F. 2d 380 (5th Cir. 1976) is a case factually similar to the case sub judice.

There the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to possess and