Green v. State

Watts, J. “Whether a witness can positively identify the [defendant] at the scene of the crime is often the cardinal facet of a determination of guilt.” Williams v. State, 364 Md. 160, 179 , 771 A.2d 1082, 1093 (2001). In other words, “[identification testimony may be outcome determinative[.]” Id. at 174 , 771 A.2d at 1090 . “[H]ence, any solid preparation of a defense demands this information.” Id. at 174 , 771 A.2d at 1090 . During discovery in a criminal case in a circuit court, Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) requires the State to disclose to the defense, without the necessity of a request, “[a]ll relevant material or information regarding ... pretrial identification of the defendant by a State’s witness[.]” Here, we are asked to decide whether Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) requires the State to disclose to a defendant’s counsel information regarding a State’s witness’s pretrial identification of a co-defendant. If not, we must decide whether Maryland Rule 4—263(d)(7)(B) required the State to make such a disclosure under the circumstances of this case, in which the State’s undisputed theory was that only the defendant and co-defendant were with the person who was killed when he was fatally shot, and a State’s witness identified the co-defendant as not being the shooter.

At trial, the State, Respondent, offered evidence of the following theory of the case. John W. Green, III (“Green”), Petitioner, was friends with Jonathan Copeland (“Copeland”), a drug dealer. One of Copeland’s customers was Jeffrey Myers (“Myers”), the person who was killed. One day, Myers burglarized Copeland’s residence and stole cash and drugs.

Later that day, Copeland and Green went to Myers’s residence and confronted him about the burglary. The next day, Copeland obtained a handgun. The following day, Copeland and Green returned to Myers’s residence and confronted him about the burglary again. During the confrontation, Myers was fatally shot.

Copeland, Myers, and Green were the only people who were present at the time of the shooting. According to the State, Green was the shooter. Green was the only defendant when the case proceeded to trial. Copeland had been charged with the same offenses with respect to Myers.

Copeland, however, pled guilty to first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. The State’s sole eyewitness to the shooting was Doris Carter (“Carter”). Carter saw two men with Myers at the scene of the shooting. Carter was unable to see the shooter’s face because he was wearing a hoodie.

Carter, however, saw the face of the person who was not the shooter. At trial in the Circuit Court for Cecil County (“the circuit court”), during Carter’s direct-examination, the prosecutor proffered that Carter would identify Copeland as the person who was not the shooter. Green’s counsel objected on the ground that the State had not disclosed Carter’s identification of Copeland during discovery. The circuit court permitted Carter to identify Copeland.

Copeland was briefly brought into the courtroom, and Carter identified him as the person who did not do the shooting. Before us, Green contends that the circuit court erred in permitting Carter to identify Copeland for two alternative reasons. First, Green argues that Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) requires the State, as a matter of course, to disclose a pretrial identification of a co-defendant during discovery. Second, Green asserts that Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) required such a disclosure in this case because a pretrial identification of Copeland as the person who was not the shooter essentially constituted a pretrial identification of Green as the shooter.

In Part I, we hold that, as a general matter, Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B), by its plain language and history, does not require disclosure of pretrial identifications of co-defendants. In Part II, we conclude that a pretrial identification of a co-defendant is “relevant ... information regarding ... pretrial identification of the defendant” under Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) where the pretrial identification of the co-defendant is the equivalent of a pretrial identification of the defendant as the person responsible for the crime. Here, Carter’s pretrial identification of Copeland as the person who was not the shooter was the equivalent of a pretrial identification of Green as the shooter because the State’s theory of the case was, and the State’s evidence showed, that Green, Copeland, and Myers, the person who was killed, were the only people at the scene of the shooting, and Myers was shot by one of the other two men. Thus, the State was obligated to disclose during discovery Carter’s pretrial identification of Copeland as the person who was not the shooter.

BACKGROUND Charges, Writ of Habeas Corpus, and State’s Opening Statement On November 13, 2013, Green was indicted for first-degree murder, second-degree murder, conspiracy with Copeland to commit first-degree murder, use of a firearm in the commission of a felony or crime of violence, possession of a firearm after conviction of a disqualifying crime, and wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun. On November 18, 2014, prior to trial, the State filed a Request for Writ in the circuit court, asking that “a writ be issued to” Copeland. (Emphasis omitted). The Request for Writ did not state its purpose.

On November 28, 2014, the circuit court issued to Copeland a Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum/Prosequendum for each day from December 9 through December 12, 2014, and each day from December 15 through December 19, 2014. On December 8, 2014, trial began. After a jury was selected, but before opening statements, the prosecutor informed the circuit court that the State intended to call Carter as a witness. The prosecutor advised that he wanted Copeland to appear in the courtroom during Carter’s testimony so that she could identify him.

Green’s counsel stated: “I very well might object to that. This is the first time [that] I’ve heard that this is going to happen.” During the State’s opening statement, the prosecutor addressed Carter’s identification of Copeland as follows: You’re going to hear a witness who drove by the shooting and saw a very distinct hat and then saw the shooting actually take place in her side-view mirror. [[Image here]] [Y]ou have one eyewitness putting two people, one which will be very clearly identified as [ ] Copeland and one that loosely identifies as [ ] Green, at the scene of the shooting, and that the trigger man is the one loosely identified by size, shape[,] and stature as [ ] Green, and you connect all the other things that you hear—I’m not going to lay out every piece you’re going to hear. Carter’s Testimony At trial, as a witness for the State, Carter testified that, on October 23, 2013, she was driving north on Principio Road in Cecil County. Carter saw two parked vehicles facing each other.

One vehicle was a truck, and the other was a dark Ford Mustang. Two men were nearby. One man was standing off to the side of the road. That man was shorter and stouter than the other one, and was wearing a hoodie.

The other man was standing near the Mustang’s driver’s seat, with one foot in the Mustang and the other foot on the ground. That man was tall and thin, and was wearing a black hat with what appeared to be white snowflakes. During Carter’s testimony, the State showed her a hat. Carter identified the hat as the one that she had seen on the tall, thin man.

The circuit court admitted the hat into evidence. Carter testified that she heard a gunshot. She looked into her driver’s side-view mirror and saw the shorter, stouter man shoot into the truck three times. Carter could not see the face of the shorter, stouter man—ie., the shooter—because his hood was up.

Carter, however, got a look at the face of the tall, thin man—ie., the person who was not the shooter—and drove away. Afterward, Carter decided to return to the scene of the shooting so that she could find out the address. Within two or three minutes, Carter drove back to the scene. On her way, she did not see the Mustang.

By the time that Carter returned to the scene, the Mustang was gone. One or two days after the shooting, Carter provided a statement to detectives in her home. Within a week, detectives interviewed Carter at a police station. On direct-examination, the following exchange occurred with regard to Carter’s ability to identify the two men: [PROSECUTOR: W]hen you first met with detectives, do you remember what you told them in terms of whether you got a good look at faces or not? [CARTER:] You know, at first I didn’t want to get anything wrong.

I just wanted to say exactly what I knew that I saw. And as those memories started coming back, it was after I talked to them. [PROSECUTOR:] So when you first met the detectives what did you say in terms of— [CARTER:] I think I told them that I couldn’t—I could tell you how—like one was tall and thin and the other one was short and stout, and that the one was wearing a hat. Then I think I might have said that one was a white male, but I’m not even sure. [PROSECUTOR:] All right. As time has gone by though, as you sit—again, as you sit here right now, do you have an image of what the taller skinnier one, as you described him, next to the driver’s door looked like? [CARTER:] Yes. [PROSECUTOR:] And if he was presented to you do you believe that you could identify him? [CARTER:] I think so.

While Carter was still on the stand, at a bench conference, the prosecutor stated: [T]his was the reason for the writ for [] Copeland— noting, of course, that [Green] is not charged merely with first[-]degree murder[ ], he is also charged with conspiracy to commit fírst[-]degree murder. He’s charged specifically conspiracy with [ ] Copeland. It is the [S]tate’s proffer to the court that we believe that [ ] Carter, upon seeing [ ] Copeland, will be able to positively identify him. * * Hi We intend to have [ ] Carter specifically .,. identify [ ] Copeland either by face, and say, yes, that’s him, or that looks like him or whatever she says, then ask her about the physique, whether that’s consistent with the first or the second person or anything to that effect. (Emphasis added) (paragraph break omitted).

Green’s counsel objected, stating: “[N]owhere in any discovery has anyone told me that a witness is going to identify a co~ defendant^]” Green’s counsel stated: “[Without giving notice, [Carter]’s going to identify [Copeland.] ... [S]urprise, surprise, she’s identifying the co-defendant.” Green’s counsel contended that the State had been obligated to disclose during discovery that a witness had been expected to identify Copeland. In response, the prosecutor stated, among other things: “[Civilian witnesses[,] every day[,] get on the stand and say things ... for the first time. They say things different and supplemental, additional to what they said during the interview process[.]” The prosecutor did not, however, contend that he had just learned that Carter could identify Copeland, or that he was surprised to discover that Carter could identify Copeland. The prosecutor stated that Green’s counsel’s claim of surprise that the body [of Copeland] would be produced here for purposes of the identification ... just can’t be accurate ....

There is no surprise. This is not a surprise witness. [Green’s counsel] knew that there were plenty of people that could identify [Copeland]; and[,] really[,] the only claim of surprise is, is that [Carter] is going to be able to identify [Copeland]. (Paragraph break omitted). The prosecutor neither disputed that there had been a pretrial identification of Copeland by Carter, nor denied that Copeland had informed law enforcement officers pretrial of her ability to identify Copeland as the person who was not the shooter.

Instead, the prosecutor contended that Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) obligated the State to disclose during discovery pretrial identifications of a defendant, not a co-defendant. The prosecutor stated that Green’s counsel would be able to elicit on cross-examination that, at one point, Carter “went so far as to say that she couldn’t identify anybody.” Without expressly determining whether there had been a discovery violation, the circuit court stated that it would allow Carter to identify Copeland. Copeland was brought in the courtroom, briefly stood there, and was excused. Carter identified Copeland as the tall, thin man who had been wearing a hat and standing near the Mustang’s driver’s side.

In other words, Carter identified Copeland as the person who did not perform the shooting. On cross-examination, the following exchanges occurred with regard to the statement that Carter had provided to detectives in her home one or two days after the shooting: [GREEN’S COUNSEL:] Do you remember what you told [the detectives] the first time? [CARTER:] Pretty much what I said here except for I’m sure—like I said, it’s been a year, and after that[,] I just didn’t contact them to tell them anything else. * ⅝ ⅜ [GREEN’S COUNSEL:] Is it fair to say [that] the detectives asked you if you could identify [the shooter]? [CARTER:] I’m sure [that] they did. That was—believe me, I was so nervous after all this. I was traumatized.

I have to say [that] I was traumatized because I didn’t sleep. I just kept thinking about it over and over again. I couldn’t believe that I saw what I saw. [GREEN’S COUNSEL:] But two days later[,] they asked if you could identify either of these people. [CARTER:] Yeah. I’m sure they asked me if I knew what they were wearing, and I said the hat and the height and as much of a description— [GREEN’S COUNSEL:] Did you give them an idea—two days after the interview you said short and stocky; or did you give an idea of height or just a general description? [CARTER:] Just that, short and stocky.

On cross-examination, the following exchanges occurred regarding the detectives’ interview of Carter at the police station within a week after she provided the statement to detectives in her home: [GREEN’S COUNSEL:] Is it fair to say [that,] in that interview[,] you told the detectives that you didn’t really get a very good look at these people as you drove by because you were worried about their vehicle in the road? [CARTER:] Right. * ⅜ * [GREEN’S COUNSEL:] And they asked you once again for descriptions of these people beyond what you’ve testified to, and you were unable, even a week after this happened, to give any further description, is that fair? [CARTER:] That’s fair. [GREEN’S COUNSEL:] Have you seen a tape of your interview? [CARTER:] Yes. [GREEN’S COUNSEL:] So me asking you that, you’ve seen it? [CARTER:] I’ve seen it. [GREEN’S COUNSEL:] You know what’s on there. [CARTER:] Right. I do know what’s on there. It’s just that memories start coming back after I talked to them, and I didn’t talk to them until now. I’m just telling you what I saw that day and what I remember [that] I saw that day.

The following exchange occurred pertaining to Carter’s ability to identify Copeland: [GREEN’S COUNSEL: Y]ou just identified the person who came in. Have you ever been shown a photo of him before? [CARTER:] Just[,] I identified him through just like his eyes and the hat, and not because of, you know, what he was wearing today or anything like that. I remember [that] he looked at me and I looked at him as I was going by because he was right there. [GREEN’S COUNSEL:] Have you seen his picture in the newspaper or anywhere since this happened? [CARTER:] Yes, yes, in the Cecil Daily. [GREEN’S COUNSEL:] Oh. [CARTER:] But I knew [that] when saw [sic] that, that was the person driving the car—or standing outside that driver’s door. The other person I’d saw in the paper also, and I didn’t know them at all. [GREEN’S COUNSEL:] When you—since—when was the first time that you realized, seeing a picture, that you knew who that person was? [CARTER:] When I saw it probably in the paper.

I said, oh, wow, that’s the guy [who] was wearing the hat, that’s the guy [who] was standing outside the door. [GREEN’S COUNSEL:] So like a year ago? [CARTER:] Yes, probably a little—no, I don’t know if it was a year ago because it wasn’t in the paper—I’m not sure. I’m not sure when they put it in the paper. [GREEN’S COUNSEL:] But sometime after this case and people were charged— [CARTER:] Yes. [GREEN’S COUNSEL:] (Continuing)—you saw a picture of [ ] Copeland, and you— [CARTER:] And I knew that— [GREEN’S COUNSEL:] And you knew [that] it was him? [CARTER:] But I didn’t plan on like being here today. I didn’t want to be here today. [GREEN’S COUNSEL:] Did you ever call anyone, inform anyone that — [CARTER:] No. [GREEN’S COUNSEL:] Okay. When did you eventually tell any of the detectives that you knew who [ ] Copeland was? [CARTER:] When I went over—over everything again with them, what I saw—everything that I saw that day.

Testimony of Other State’s Witnesses Including Carter, the State called thirty witnesses. For brevity’s sake, we will refrain from discussing the testimony of all of the State’s witnesses and summarize the testimony of those witnesses who provided relevant information concerning Myers, Copeland, and Green, and evidence of the crime. Randy Smith (“Smith”) testified that, in October 2013, Copeland was renting a house from him. On October 21, 2013, Copeland told Smith that Myers had broken into his house and stolen cash.

According to Smith, Copeland seemed “very upset.” David Gordon (“Gordon”) testified that, on October 21, 2013, he was spending time with Copeland. Copeland got a telephone call about an alarm in his residence going off. Gordon and Copeland went to Copeland’s residence, and Copeland went inside. Afterward, Copeland came back outside looking mad, and said that “stuff’ had been stolen.

Gordon and Copeland went to Myers’s residence, and went inside. Copeland told Myers that cash and drugs were missing. Gordon and Copeland left Myers’s residence, then picked up Green. Gordon, Copeland, and Green went to Myers’s residence.

Either Copeland or Green told Myers: “[J]ust give it back.” Copeland also talked to Myers’s father, Howard Steve Myers. Eventually, Gordon, Copeland, and Green left Myers’s residence. Dawn Watson (“Watson”), Myers’s girlfriend, testified that, in October 2013, she lived with Myers in his parents’ basement. At the time, Myers was using heroin.

According to Watson, Copeland was Myers’s heroin dealer. Watson testified that, on October 21, 2013, she and Myers were at home. Suddenly, the back door opened, and Copeland and another man appeared. Copeland told Myers that someone had broken into his residence.

Copeland and the other man left Myers’s residence. According to Watson, Copeland texted Myers, stating: “If my stuff is not in the back of your truck when I get there[,] somebody is going to get shot.” Approximately half-an-hour after Copeland and the other man left Myers’s residence, Copeland, Green, and the other man came to Myers’s residence in Copeland’s black Mustang. Watson knew Green because Myers had previously introduced him to her. At the time, Green had a full beard.

Myers and his father went outside. Copeland spoke in a loud voice, but Watson could not make out what he was saying. The next day, on October 22, 2013, Green telephoned or texted Myers, warning him that people were looking for him. Myers’s mother, Rebecca Myers, testified that, on October 21, 2013, when she came home from work, she saw Copeland’s black Mustang parked near her residence.

Myers, his father, Copeland, Green, and another man were standing outside. Copeland accused Myers of burglarizing his residence. Myers threw his hands in the air and said: “I wasn’t there. I didn’t do anything.” Myers’s father told Copeland to get off their property.

Copeland, Green, and the other man left in Copeland’s Mustang. Myers’s father testified that, in October 2013, he, Myers’s mother, Myers, and Watson lived on Principio Road in Port Deposit. On October 21, 2013, at approximately 3:15 p.m. or 3:30 p.m., Myers’s father arrived home from work, and entered his residence. Afterward, Myers’s father heard a vehicle approaching.

Myers’s father looked outside and saw Copeland, Green, and another man in Copeland’s black Mustang. At the time, Green had a bushy beard. Myers’s father went outside and asked if he could help the men. The three men asked to talk to Myers.

Myers’s father went inside and told Myers that he had company, and Myers went outside. Myers’s father heard yelling, went outside, and asked the three men what was going on. Copeland said something along the lines of: “[N]one of [your] business[.]” Myers’s father heard Copeland tell Myers that someone had broken into his residence. At approximately 4:30 p.m. or 4:35 p.m., Myers’s mother arrived home.

Two or three times, Myers’s father told the three men to leave, or he would call the police. Eventually, the three men left. Myers’s father testified that, two days later, on October 23, 2013, at approximately 3:15 p.m. or 3:30 p.m., he came home from work. Myers was in the basement.

At approximately 4:30 p.m., Myers’s mother came home from work. Afterward, Myers’s father heard a door slam. Later, Thomas Miller (“Miller”), a neighbor, telephoned Myers’s father and said that something had happened to Myers. Myers’s parents went outside.

Myers’s truck was at the end of the driveway, and Myers’s body was in the driver’s seat. Michael Owens (“Owens”) testified that, in October 2013, Copeland was his heroin dealer. At the time, Owens used one or two “bundles” of heroin each day. In September and October 2013, Owens owned approximately eight guns.

One of Owens’s guns was a 40 caliber Kahr handgun. Sometime before October 21, 2013, Copeland said that he wanted the handgun, and offered to either buy it or trade drugs for it. On October 21, 2013, Copeland told Owens that someone had broken into his residence. Copeland said that he wanted to obtain the handgun for self-defense in case another break-in occurred.

Owens testified that, the next day, on October 22, 2013, Owens went to Copeland’s residence and saw Copeland, Green, and Kenny Howell (“Howell”), Copeland’s cousin. Copeland and Green “seemed to be very good friends.” Owens gave Copeland the handgun, which was loaded with six bullets. In exchange, Copeland gave Owens thirteen bags of heroin. Owens testified that, in March 2014, Detective Chris Lewis contacted him.

Owens gave Detective Lewis two spent shell casings that had been ejected from the handgun when he had fired it twice sometime in 2013. During Owens’s testimony, the circuit court admitted the shell casings into evidence. Jessie Campbell (“Campbell”), a forensic scientist of the Firearms and Tool Marks Unit of the Forensic Sciences Division of the Maryland State Police, was accepted as an expert in firearm and tool mark examination. Campbell compared the shell casings that Owens had given Detective Lewis to four shell casings that had been found at the scene of the shooting.

Campbell concluded that all six shell casings had been fired from the same gun. Richard Bell, Jr. (“Bell”) testified that, on October 23, 2013, he telephoned Copeland to ask to buy marijuana. At approximately 4 p.m., Copeland and Howell, his cousin, came to Bell’s residence in Copeland’s black Mustang. Copeland and Howell stayed at Bell’s residence for approximately ten minutes.

Copeland told Bell that Myers had broken into his residence two days earlier. Copeland “looked pretty mad,” and had something that “looked like a gun.” Jessica Peacock (“Peacock”) testified that, in October 2013, she was dating Green. On October 23, 2013, at approximately 4:30 p.m., Green met Peacock outside the residence of one of her friends. Green told Peacock: “Something bad might happen.” Afterward, Green left.

At approximately 6:00 p.m., Peacock returned to her residence. At approximately 6:30 p.m., Green was dropped off at Peacock’s residence. Green told Peacock that someone had been shot. Green told Peacock that he had been present at the scene of the shooting, but that he did not do it.

Gwen Wisniewski (“Wisniewski”) testified that, on October 23, 2013, she was driving on Principio Road, in the area of its intersection with Biggs Highway. Wisniewski saw a truck parked in a driveway. A black Mustang with two occupants was blocking the driveway. The person in the Mustang’s passenger seat was moving around.

Miller—the neighbor whom Myers’s father had mentioned— testified that he lived on Principio Road, approximately one or two acres away from the Myerses’ residence. On October 23, 2013, at approximately 4:45 p.m., Miller saw a black Mustang blocking Myers’s truck in the driveway. A man with a long, reddish beard was standing near Myers’s truck. A tall man with black hair was walking around the Mustang.

Miller heard loud voices, but could not make out what was being said. Miller went into his garage. One or two minutes later, Miller heard two gunshots. Miller left his garage and saw the Mustang speeding away.

Miller went to Myers’s truck and saw that Myers had been shot. Deputy First Class Ross Griffin of the Cecil County Sheriffs Office testified that he lived approximately a quarter of a mile away from Myers’s residence. On October 23, 2013, while Deputy First Class Griffin was at home, he heard two gunshots. After a pause, he heard two more gunshots.

Approximately one or two minutes later, a black Mustang with two occupants went down Principio Road. The passenger had a larger build than the driver, and was wearing a dark coat or jacket. James Finn (“Finn”), a paramedic with the Cecil County Department of Emergency Services, testified that, on October 23, 2013, at 4:56 p.m., he was dispatched to Principio Road. At 5:02 p.m., he arrived.

There was a truck parked in the driveway. Inside the truck was an unresponsive man with a bullet wound. The man was pronounced dead on the scene. James Locke, M.D.

(“Dr. Locke”), a medical examiner of the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, was accepted as an expert in forensic pathology. Dr. Locke testified that, on October 24, 2013, he autopsied Myers’s body. The cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds. Myers had four gunshot wounds: one to his head, one to the left side of his chest, one to the right side of his chest, and one to his right hand.

Stephanie Peterson (“Peterson”), a crime scene technician of the Cecil County Sheriffs Office, testified that, on October 23, 2013, at approximately 9:20 p.m., she arrived at Principio Road. Peterson recovered one cartridge and four cartridge casings from the scene. Peterson recovered from Myers’s body 132 baggies that contained suspected heroin. In the basement of Myers’s residence, Peterson saw pills, suspected marijuana seeds, suspected drug paraphernalia, and a “Suboxone strip,” which is used to treat drug addiction.

Deputy First Class Jonathan Pruett of the Cecil County Sheriffs Office testified that, on October 23, 2013, he assisted in Copeland’s arrest at an M & T Bank in Colora, Maryland. A person named Eddie Haskins (“Haskins”) was the only person who was with Copeland at the time of his arrest. Deputy First Class Pruett performed a search incident to arrest, and found two bundles, or approximately twenty-six bags, of heroin, as well as a cell phone on Copeland’s person. Detective William Sewell of the Criminal Investigation Division of the Cecil County Sheriffs Office testified that he obtained records for Copeland’s and Green’s cell phones.

Detective Sewell had those records sent to Detective Jordan Swonger of the Prince George’s County Police Department. Detective Swonger was accepted as an expert in the fields of cell phones and cell phone technology. Detective Swonger testified that he had performed an analysis of the records for Copeland’s and Green’s cell phones. Detective Swonger prepared a Cellular Analysis Report for Copeland’s cell phone, and another Cellular Analysis Report for Green’s cell phone.

Detective Swonger also created a map showing the cell towers to which Copeland’s and Green’s cell phones connected between 4:46 p.m. and 5:46 p.m. on October 23, 2013. The circuit court admitted the Cellular Analysis Reports and the maps into evidence. On October 23, 2013, at 4:46 p.m., Copeland’s cell phone connected to a cell tower in the general vicinity of Myers’s residence. At 4:57 p.m., Green’s cell phone connected to a different cell tower in the general vicinity of Myers’s residence.

Copeland’s and Green’s cell phones appeared to move east across Interstate 95, which runs through Cecil County and Delaware. At 5:34 p.m., Green’s cell phone connected to a cell tower in the general vicinity of a Pathmark store in Delaware. At 5:39 p.m., Copeland’s cell phone connected to a different cell tower in the general vicinity of the Pathmark store in Delaware. Detective Matt Blailock of the Criminal Investigation Division of the Cecil County Sheriffs Office testified that he reviewed surveillance videos as part of the homicide investigation.

At the time, Copeland’s Mustang was in the Sheriffs Office’s possession. Detective Blailock was able to identify Copeland’s Mustang in surveillance videos because it had after-market rims or wheels, blinkers on the side-view mirrors, and a stripe on the side. Additionally, stickers and an E-ZPass transmitter tag 1 were attached to Copeland’s Mustang’s windows. According to Detective Blailock, surveillance videos showed that, on October 23, 2013, sometime after 4 p.m., Copeland’s Mustang traveled on Theodore Road, then turned onto Camp Meeting Ground Road.

At 4:55 p.m., Copeland’s Mustang traveled through the parking lot of a Lan-dhope Farms gas station, and left onto Maryland Route 276. At 5:14 p.m., Copeland’s Mustang went east through the toll booth on Interstate 95 that is near the Maryland-Delaware border. Detective Blailock viewed a surveillance video from a camera outside a Pathmark store in Delaware. On October 23, 2013, at 5:46 p.m., Copeland and Green were walking together outside of the store.

Detective Blailock testified that he helped execute a search warrant for Green’s residence. Detective Blailock found a hat on the kitchen countertop. Detective Blailock was shown the hat that had been admitted into evidence—ie., the hat that Carter testified that she had seen the tall, thin man wearing. Detective Blailock identified the hat as the one that he had seized from Green’s residence.

Julie Kempton (“Kempton”), a forensic scientist of the Biology Unit of the Forensic Sciences Division of the Maryland State Police, 2 testified that she had received a hat and oral swabs from Green and Copeland. Kempton found skin cells on the hat. There were two contributors to the DNA in the skin cells—-one major, and one minor. The major contributor’s profile matched Green’s profile.

Kempton excluded Copeland as the minor contributor. Detective Lewis of the Criminal Investigation Division of the Cecil County Sheriffs Office testified that, on October 24 or 25, 2013, he and Detective Sewell interviewed Carter at her residence. On October 25, 2013, Detective Lewis prepared a statement of charges against Green. According to the statement of charges, Carter said that the shooter was a short, stocky person who was wearing a hat with snowflakes.

Detective Lewis testified that, when they were arrested and booked, Green was approximately 5’7” and 190 pounds, and Copeland was approximately 511” and 160 pounds. On October 25, 2013, Detective Lewis interviewed Green. Detective Lewis advised Green of his Miranda rights, 3 which he waived. Green told Detective Lewis that he had never been with Copeland on October 23, 2013.

Green acknowledged, however, that he and Copeland were close. Green also said that he used to have a bushy beard, and that he had shaved on the day of the interview. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and Green’s Testimony At the conclusion of the State’s ease, Green’s counsel made a motion for judgment of acquittal, which the circuit court granted only as to the charge for possession of a firearm after conviction of a disqualifying crime. As the only witness on his own behalf, Green testified that he had known Myers for fifteen years.

According to Green, he and Myers “were all right” and “got high together.” On October 22, 2013, Green telephoned Myers and told him “to watch out, that people were looking for him[.]” Green told Myers that, if he had stolen cash or drugs, he should give them back. Green testified that on October 23, 2013, Copeland telephoned him and said that he was going to pick him up and drive to Myers’s residence. Copeland said that he wanted to talk to Myers about “taking [his] s[***].” Copeland picked up Green in his Mustang. Green acknowledged that, at the time, he was wearing the hat that had been admitted into evidence.

According to Green, Copeland drove to Myers’s driveway and parked in front of his truck. Myers told Copeland and Green to leave, and threatened to call the police. Myers and Copeland started arguing about the “dope” that had gone missing. Myers told Copeland to move his Mustang because Myers’s truck was blocked in.

Green testified that while Myers was in his truck, Copeland pulled out a gun and shot Myers. Green acknowledged that no one else was present at the time. According to Green, Copeland drove his Mustang to Delaware, with Green as a passenger. Eventually, Copeland drove to an open-air drug market, and left his Mustang to buy drugs.

When Copeland left his Mustang, he had his gun, but when he returned, the gun was gone. Copeland drove down Interstate 95. Eventually, due to car trouble, Copeland parked and telephoned Haskins to ask for help. Haskins picked up Copeland and Green.

On cross-examination, Green acknowledged that, when detectives interviewed him, he falsely stated that, on October 23, 2013, he was not at the scene of the shooting. Green admitted that he told detectives that he does not drive. Green also acknowledged that he had a beard at the time of the shooting. State’s Closing Argument During the State’s closing argument, the prosecutor addressed Carter’s identification of Copeland as follows: Passers[ ]by and neighbors saw the two people outside the Mustang.

One taller. One skinnier. I’m sorry. One taller and skinnier and the other was shorter and stockier.

And [] Miller, the neighbor, and [] Cartel', the passer[]by, both said without reservation, no ambiguity, no cross[ Jexamination that got them tongue[-]tied or twisted or slightly confused, no question in their minds that the shorter[,] stocky guy was the one at the side of [Myers]’s truck. [ ] Miller distinctly remembered a bushy beard on the shorter[J stockier man. And [ ] Copeland [was] positively identified by [ ] Carter, you saw him, he stood right here, she sat right there, he left the room, she said [that] that was the guy. Not just the guy. That was the guy standing at the side of the Mustang.

That is one key piece of evidence. So [ ] Copeland was positively identified by [ ] Carter as being the man next to his Mustang at the time of the shooting. He is distinctly—you have seen them both. He is distinctly the taller[,] skinnier guy as compared to [] Green. [] Green himself says [that] he doesn’t drive, yet he wants you to believe that he, not Copeland, was the person at the driver’s side of the door when [ ] Carter drove by.

You know [that] that makes no sense. He was the passenger. He said, “I don’t drive.” You heard that in a statement to the detectives during their interview and you heard that in his testimony here. He doesn’t drive.

But for convenience sake [sic] of this story he concocted, he wants you to believe that roles were reversed, he got out of the car and just meandered over to the driver’s side while [ ] Copeland was the one who went and executed [ ] Myers. Still talking about that puzzle piece about short and stocky, [ ] Carter was quite clear in her memory. First of all, the tall[,] skinny guy was at the side of the Mustang. She said that without reservation.

Secondly, she positively identified him as the guy next to the Mustang when he was in the courtroom[,] and she said that the shorter[,] stocky guy was the one by the side of the truck. This is so important. Think about the time that went by. She drove by, she’s feet away, she sees Copeland standing at the side of the Mustang, and within seconds, not enough time for them to just do a quick role reversal, she hears the bang, she looks in the mirror and she sees the shorter[,] stocky guy.

This tall[7]skinny versus short[/]stocky is critical. The timing did not allow the two to change positions as [ ] Carter heard shots fired almost instantly she passed by. So not only did she say without reservation that the shorter[,] stockier guy was the shooter, but given that she is certain that [] Copeland was the person standing at the driver’s side of the Mustang[,] and given the lack of time between passing by and hearing that first shot, those two could not have swapped positions. She said she saw the shorter[,] stockier guy firing the gun. [[Image here]] [ ] Wisniewski and [ ] Carter happened to drive by as this thing was all just going down.

Think about the timeframe here, ladies and gentlemen. Think about this. They have got two guys there. Carter definitively, definitively, she is as neutral as you can get, she’s a passer[ ]by who you could tell, maybe not as much as [ ] Peacock, but you could tell she didn’t want to be here either.

I mean, who would want to be here and testifying in circumstances like this? But she gets on the stand[,] and she says without reservation, that man, [ ] Copeland, was the man standing at the side. This is all important because of the amount of time, the speed by which this happened. * # * Green, by his own admission!,] and as supported by other evidence, was, in fact, at the crime scene. The shooter was the short[,] stocky guy and had a bushy beard. [ ] Green was and is the shorter!,] stockier guy[,] and had, by his own admission[,] and again as supported by the evidence we presented, a bushy beard when [ ] Myers was shot. [ ] Gopeland was positively identified as the man standing on the roadway immediately next to the driver’s door of his own Mustang a mere second or two before the first shots were fired. [ ] Carter was quite clear about this fact, and [ ] Copeland, therefore, was not the shooter.

Verdicts and Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals The jury found Green guilty of first-degree murder, conspiracy with Copeland to commit first-degree murder, use of a firearm in the commission of a felony or crime of violence, and wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun. Green noted an appeal. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the convictions. See Green v. State, 231 Md.App. 53, 56 , 149 A.3d 1159, 1161 (2016).

The Court of Special Appeals held “that the State’s discovery obligations pursuant to [Maryland] Rule 4—263(d)(7)[ (B) ] are limited to that set forth by the plain language of the rule, i.e., information regarding ‘pretrial identification of the defendant by a State’s witness.’ ” Id. at 74 , 149 A.3d at 1171 . In other words, the Court concluded that Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) is unambiguous, and applies only to “disclosure of pretrial identifications of ‘the defendant.’ ” Id. at 72 , 149 A.3d at 1170 . The Court observed that, in contrast to Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B), other provisions of Maryland Rule 4-263(d) expressly use the term “co-defendant.” See id. at 72 , 149 A.3d at 1170 . The Court concluded that Green had supplied “no persuasive authority” indicating that Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) applies to a pretrial “identification of someone other than the defendant” where such a pretrial identification “suggests, in conjunction with other evidence, that the defendant was involved with the crime.” Id. at 73 , 149 A.3d at 1171 .

The Court reasoned that concluding otherwise would make the State’s discovery obligations depend on the defendant’s trial strategy, “which often will be unknown prior to trial.” Id. at 74 , 149 A.3d at 1171 . Applying its holding to the facts of this case, the Court concluded that the State did not violate Maryland Rule 4—263(d)(7)(B) by not disclosing during discovery Carter’s pretrial identification of Copeland. See id. at 74 , 149 A.3d at 1171 . Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Green petitioned for a writ of certiorari, raising the following two issues: 1.

Does Maryland Rule 4—263(d)(7)(B), which requires the State to disclose “[a]ll relevant material or information regarding ... pretrial identification of the defendant by a State’s witness,” require the State to disclose all relevant material or information regarding pretrial identification of a co-defendant by a State’s witness? 2. Where [Green] and another individual, [] Copeland, who pled guilty to first[-]degree murder and conspiracy to commit fírst[-]degree murder in the shooting death of the victim in [Green]’s case, were both present at the scene of the shooting, and the eyewitness identification of Copeland as the [person who was not the shooter] implicated [Green] as the person who shot and killed the victim, did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that information regarding the identification of Copeland did not fall within the scope of “relevant material or information regarding ... pretrial identification of the defendant by a State’s witness,” under [Maryland] Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B)? (Ellipses and first alteration in original). This Court granted the petition.

See Green v. State, 452 Md. 4 , 155 A.3d 891 (2017). DISCUSSION I. Pretrial Identification of Co-Defendants The Parties’ Contentions Green contends that, as a general matter, Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) requires the State to disclose a State’s witness’s pretrial identification of a co-defendant. Green argues that disclosure of a pretrial identification of a co-defendant fulfills the objectives of Maryland Rule 4-263—namely, assisting the defendant in the preparation of a defense and protecting the defendant from unfair surprise. Green asserts that the Court of Special Appeals’s holding resulted in too narrow an interpretation of Maryland Rule 4—263(d)(7)(B), and that the use of the phrase “all relevant material or information” in the subsection warrants a broader interpretation, requiring disclosure of a pretrial identification of a co-defendant.

Green maintains that Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) is analogous to Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(6)(G), which requires the State to disclose a pretrial failure to identify a defendant or a co-defendant. Green acknowledges that, unlike Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(6)(G), Maryland Rule 4—263(d)(7)(B) does not explicitly refer to co-defendants. Green contends, however, that “there is no reasonable explanation as to why the [Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (“the Rules Committee”) ] would recommend[—]and this Court, in its rule-making capacity, would require[—disclosure of information regarding the failure of a witness to identify a co-defendant[,] but not disclosure of information regarding the witness’s identification of a co-defendant.” According to Green, both of these pieces of information are important to preparing a defense, and neither is more burdensome to produce than the other. Green argues that the inclusion of the term “co-defendant” in Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(6)(G) mandates the inclusion of the term “co-defendant” in Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B).

Green asserts that, even if Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(6)(G)’s use of the word “co-defendant” does not establish that Maryland Rule 4—263(d)(7)(B) applies to co-defendants, Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(6)(G)’s use of the word “co-defendant” shows that Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) is ambiguous in its applicability to co-defendants. Green maintains that, if Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) is ambiguous, the Rule’s history is vital to resolving any' question as to its construction. Green points out that Maryland Rule 4-263 was amended in 2008, and contends that the Rules Committee sought to harmonize Maryland Rule 4-263 with the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice: Discovery and Trial by Jury, 3d Ed. (1996) (“the ABA Standards”) as much as possible, and, as such, intended Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) to “cover identifications of the defendant or co-defendant.” (Footnote and ellipsis omitted). Green argues that the lack of inclusion of the term “co-defendant” in Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) is not evidence of a deliberate omission.

The State responds that Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B)’s plain language limits the State’s discovery obligations to pretrial identifications of the defendant, not a co-defendant. The State points out that Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) explicitly refers to “the defendant,” not “a defendant,” meaning that Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) may not be construed to include any defendant—ie., a co-defendant or a defendant. In other words, the State contends that the Rules Committee specifically chose language limiting Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) to disclosure of the pretrial identification of the defendant. The State argues that, because the Rules Committee chose to include the phrase “or a co-defendant” in other provisions of Maryland Rule 4-263, but deliberately omitted the phrase from Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B), it must be presumed that the omission is intentional.

The State acknowledges that the purposes of Maryland Rule 4-263 include assisting the defendant in the preparation of a defense and protecting the defendant from unfair surprise, but the State asserts that not all alleged surprises are covered by Maryland Rule 4-263. The State points out that another purpose of the discovery rules is the provision of clear notice as to what is required to be disclosed. The State maintains that interpreting Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B)— which refers to the disclosure of a pretrial identification of “the defendant”—to include a requirement to disclose the pretrial identification of a co-defendant would not provide adequate notice of the State’s disclosure obligations. The State contends that Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B)’s history does not show that the Rules Committee intended for the phrase “the defendant” to include co-defendants and/or co-conspirators.

The State points out that ABA Standard 11-2.1 requires disclosure of “[a]ny material, documents, or information relating to lineups, showups, and picture or voice identifications in relation to the case.” The State notes that, in proposing amendments to Maryland Rule 4-263, the Rules Committee considered the ABA Standards, but failed to include the broad language requiring disclosure of any pretrial identifications in relation to the case. The State argues that, instead, the Rules Committee decided to narrow the State’s disclosure requirement to “[a]ll relevant material or information regarding ... pretrial identification of the defendant by a State’s witness!.]” The State asserts that the Rules Committee was free to require the disclosure of a pretrial failure to identify a co-defendant in Maryland Rule 4—263(d)(6)(G) and not require the disclosure of a pretrial identification of a co-defendant in Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B). The State contends that Maryland case law does not support the position that the pretrial identification of a co-defendant is required to be disclosed under Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B). The State points out that the cases relied on by Green involve pretrial identifications and non-identifications of “the defendant,” not a co-defendant.

The State asserts that, even if Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) can be construed to apply to a co-defendant, it is unclear in this case that Copeland was a co-defendant because he and Green were not charged in the same charging document, did not appear at the same hearings, and were not tried together. Standard of Review Where, as here, a trial court does not expressly determine that a discovery violation occurred, an appellate court reviews the issue without deference. See Williams, 364 Md. at 169 , 771 A.2d at 1087 (“Where the trial [court] made no specific finding as a matter of law that the State violated the discovery rule, we exercise independent de novo review to determine whether a discovery violation occurred.” (Citations omitted)). In Fuster v. State, 437 Md. 653, 664-65 , 89 A.3d 1114, 1120 (2014), this Court discussed the standard for interpreting a Maryland Rule: A court interprets a Maryland Rule by using the same canons of construction that the court uses to interpret a statute.

First, the court considers the Rule’s plain language in light of: (1) the scheme to which the Rule belongs; (2) the purpose, aim, or policy of this Court in adopting the Rule; and (3) the presumption that this Court intends the Rules and this Court’s precedent to operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law. If the Rule’s plain language is unambiguous and clearly consistent with the Rule’s apparent purpose, the court applies the Rule’s plain language. Generally, if the Rule’s plain language is ambiguous or not clearly consistent with the Rule’s apparent purpose, the court searches for rulemaking intent in other indicia, including the history of the Rule or other relevant sources intrinsic and extrinsic to the rulemaking process, in light of: (1) the structure of the Rule; (2) how the Rule relates to other laws; (3) the Rule’s general purpose; and (4) the relative rationality and legal effect of various competing constructions. (Brackets, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted).

Where a Rule’s language is clear, a court “neither add[s] nor delete[s] language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the Rule.” Williams v. State, 435 Md. 474, 490 , 79 A.3d 931, 940 (2013) (brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted), “Unambiguous language will be given its usual, ordinary meaning unless doing so creates an absurd result.” Hurst v. State, 400 Md. 397, 417 , 929 A.2d 157, 168 (2007) (citation omitted). Maryland Rule 4-263 Maryland Rule 4-263 states in relevant part: (a) Applicability. This Rule governs discovery and inspection in a circuit court. Committee note.—This Rule also governs discovery in actions transferred from District Court to circuit court upon a jury trial demand made in accordance with Rule 4-301(b)(1)(A).

See Rule 4-301(c). (b) Definitions. In this Rule, the following definitions apply: (1) Defense. “Defense” means an attorney for the defendant or a defendant who is acting without an attorney. (2) Defense Witness. “Defense witness” means a witness whom the defense intends to call at a hearing or at trial.

(3) Oral Statement. “Oral statement” of a person means the substance of a statement of any kind by that person, whether or not reflected in an existing writing or recording. (4) Provide. Unless otherwise agreed by the parties or required by Rule or order of court, “provide” information or material means (A) to send or deliver it by mail, e-mail, facsimile transmission, or hand-delivery, or (B) to make the information or material available at a specified location for purposes of inspection if sending or delivering it would be impracticable because of the nature of the information or material. (5) State’s Witness. “State’s witness” means a witness whom the State’s Attorney intends to call at a hearing or at trial.

Cross references.—For the definition of “State’s Attorney,” see Rule 4-102(Z). (6) Written Statement. “Written statement” of a person: (A) includes a statement in writing that is made, signed, or adopted by that person; (B) includes the substance of a statement of any kind made by that person that is embodied or summarized in a writing or recording, whether or not signed or adopted by the person; (C) includes a statement contained in a police or investigative report; but (D) does not include attorney work product. (c) Obligations of the Parties. (1) Due Diligence.

The State’s Attorney and defense shall exercise due diligence to identify all of the material and information that must be disclosed under this Rule. (2)Scope of Obligations. The obligations of the State’s Attorney and the defense extend to material and information that must be disclosed under this Rule and that are in the possession or control of the attorney, members of the attorney’s staff, or any other person who either reports regularly to the attorney’s office or has reported to the attorney’s office in regard to the particular case. Cross references.—For the obligations of the State’s Attorney, see State v. Williams, 392 Md. 194 , 896 A.2d 973 (2006).

(d) Disclosure by the State’s Attorney. Without the necessity of a request, the State’s Attorney shall provide to the defense: (1) Statements. All written and all oral statements of the defendant and of any co-defendant that relate to the offense charged and all material and information, including documents and recordings, that relate to the acquisition of such statements; (2) Criminal Record. Prior criminal convictions, pending charges, and probationary status of the defendant and of any co-defendant; (3) State’s Witnesses.

As to each State’s witness the State’s Attorney intends to call to prove the State’s case in chief or to rebut alibi testimony: (A) the name of the witness; (B) except as provided under Code, Criminal Procedure Article, § 11-205 or Rule 16-910(b), the address and, if known to the State’s Attorney, the telephone number of the witness; and (C) all written statements of the witness that relate to the offense charged; (4) Prior Conduct. All evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts committed by the defendant that the State’s Attorney intends to offer at a hearing or at trial pursuant to Rule 5^04(b); (5) Exculpatory Information. All material or information in any form, whether or not admissible, that tends to exculpate the defendant or negate or mitigate the defendant’s guilt or punishment as to the offense charged; (6) Impeachment Information. All material or information in any form, whether or not admissible, that tends to impeach a State’s witness, including: (A) evidence of prior conduct to show the character of the witness for untruthfulness pursuant to Rule 5—608(b); (B) a relationship between the State’s Attorney and the witness, including the nature and circumstances of any agreement, understanding, or representation that may constitute an inducement for the cooperation or testimony of the witness; (C) prior criminal convictions, pending charges, or probationary status that may be used to impeach the witness, but the State’s Attorney is not required to investigate the criminal record of the witness unless the State’s Attorney knows or has reason to believe that the witness has a criminal record; (D) an oral statement of the witness, not otherwise memorialized, that is materially inconsistent with another statement made by the witness or with a statement made by another witness; (E) a medical or psychiatric condition or addiction of the witness that may impair the witness’s ability to testify truthfully or accurately, but the State’s Attorney is not required to inquire into a witness’s medical, psychiatric, or addiction history or status unless the State’s Attorney has information that reasonably would lead to a belief that an inquiry would result in discovering a condition that may impair the witness’s ability to testify truthfully or accurately; (F) the fact that the witness has taken but did not pass a polygraph examination; and (G) the failure of the witness to identify the defendant or a co-defendant; Cross references.—See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995); Giglio v. U.S., 405 U.S. 150 , 92 S.Ct. 763 , 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972); U.S. v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976); Thomas v. State, 372 Md. 342 , 812 A.2d 1050 (2002); Goldsmith v. State, 337 Md. 112 , 651 A.2d 866 (1995); and Lyba v. State, 321 Md. 564 , 583 A.2d 1033 (1991).

(7) Searches, Seizures, Surveillance, and Pretrial Identification. All relevant material or information regarding: (A) specific searches and seizures, eavesdropping, and electronic surveillance including wiretaps; and (B) pretrial identification of the defendant by a State’s witness; (8) Reports or Statements of Experts. As to each expert consulted by the State’s Attorney in connection with the action: (A) the expert’s name and address, the subject matter of the consultation, the substance of the expert’s findings and opinions, and a summary of the grounds for each opinion; (B) the opportunity to inspect and copy all written reports or statements made in connection with the action by the expert, including the results of any physical or mental examination, scientific test, experiment, or comparison; and (C) the substance of any oral report and conclusion by the expert; (9) Evidence for Use at Trial. The opportunity to inspect, copy, and photograph all documents, computer-generated evidence as defined in Rule 2-504.3(a), recordings, photographs, or other tangible things that the State’s Attorney intends to use at a hearing or at trial; and (10) Property of the Defendant.

The opportunity to inspect, copy, and photograph all items obtained from or belonging to the defendant, whether or not the State’s Attorney intends to use the item at a hearing or at trial. [[Image here]] (g) Matters Not Discoverable. (1) By Any Party. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Rule, neither the State’s Attorney nor the defense is required to disclose (A) the mental impressions, trial strategy, personal beliefs, or other privileged attorney work product or (B) any other material or information if the court finds that its disclosure is not constitutionally required and would entail a substantial risk of harm to any person that outweighs the interest in disclosure. (2) By the Defense.

The State’s Attorney is not required to disclose the identity of a confidential informant unless the State’s Attorney intends to call the informant as a State’s witness or unless the failure to disclose the informant’s identity would infringe a constitutional right of the defendant. [[Image here]] (j) Continuing Duty to Disclose. Each party is under a continuing obligation to produce discoverable material and information to the other side. A party who has responded to a request or order for discovery and who obtains further material information shall supplement the response promptly. [[Image here]] (n) Sanctions. If at any time during the proceedings the court finds that a party has failed to comply with this Rule or an order issued pursuant to this Rule, the court may order that party to permit the discovery of the matters not previously disclosed, strike the testimony to which the undisclosed matter relates, grant a reasonable continuance, prohibit the party from introducing in evidence the matter not disclosed, grant a mistrial, or enter any other order appropriate under the circumstances.

The failure of a party to comply with a discovery obligation in this Rule does not automatically disqualify a witness from testifying. If a motion is filed to disqualify the witness’s testimony, disqualification is within the discretion of the court. (Emphasis added). Collins v. State In Collins v. State, 373 Md. 130, 146, 133-34 , 816 A.2d 919, 928, 921 (2003), this Court held that the State violated what is now Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) 4 by failing to disclose during discovery that a State’s witness had failed to identify the defendant pretrial.

When this Court decided Collins, Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(6)(G) had not yet been adopted, and no provision of Maryland Rule 4-263 expressly required disclosure of a pretrial failure to identify a defendant or a co-defendant. In Collins, 373 Md. at 132 , 816 A.2d at 920 , the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and related handgun offenses. On the night of the shooting, a witness told a Baltimore City detective that he had not seen anything because he had been too far away. See id. at 133 , 816 A.2d at 921 .

The detective included this information in a report. See id. at 133 , 816 A.2d at 921 . Subsequently, however, before trial, the witness identified the defendant as the shooter in a photographic array and gave a contemporaneous audiotaped statement. See id. at 133-34 , 816 A.2d at 921 .

Initially, during discovery, the State disclosed the witness’s pretrial photographic array identification of the defendant, but did not disclose the pretrial failure to identify the defendant the night of the shooting, or the audiotaped statement identifying the defendant. See id. at 134 , 816 A.2d at 921 . Later, the State provided to the defense the audiotaped statement, but still did not disclose the pretrial failure to identify the defendant. See id. at 134 , 816 A.2d at 921 .

At trial, the State initially encountered difficulties in securing the witness’s appearance. See id. at 134 , 816 A.2d at 921 . By the time that law enforcement officers located the -witness, the trial’s evidentiary phase had concluded. See id. at 134-35 , 816 A.2d at 921 .

The State moved to reopen its case so that the witness could testify. See id. at 135 , 816 A.2d at 921 . The defendant’s counsel opposed the motion to reopen on the ground that there was no necessity for reopening, as the State had simply failed to summons the witness before trial. See id. at 135 , 816 A.2d at 921-22 .

The defendant’s counsel also advised that he had just learned about the witness’s pretrial failure to identify the defendant. See id. at 135 , 816 A.2d at 922 . The prosecutor responded that the omission of the witness’s pretrial failure to identify the defendant was inadvertent. See id. at 135 , 816 A.2d at 922 .

The trial court granted the motion to reopen. See id. at 135 , 816 A.2d at 922 . The defendant’s counsel moved for a continuance over the weekend to prepare for the witness’s testimony, and the trial court denied the motion to continue. See id. at 143 , 816 A.2d at 926-27 .

While testifying, the witness identified the defendant as the shooter. See id. at 139 , 816 A.2d at 924 . The defendant was convicted. See id. at 132 , 816 A.2d at 920 .

The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, and this Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. See id. at 132, 149 , 816 A.2d at 920, 930 . In discussing the underlying policies of Maryland Rule 4-263, this Court stated: Inherent benefits of discovery include providing adequate information to both parties to facilitate informed pleas, ensuring thorough and effective cross-examination, and expediting the trial process by diminishing the need for continuances to deal with unfamiliar information presented at trial. Specific to the mandatory disclosure provisions of [Maryland] Rule 4-263( [d]), the major objectives are to assist defendants in preparing their defense and to protect them from unfair surprise.

The duty to disclose pre[ ]trial identifications, then, is properly determined by interpreting the plain meaning of [Maryland] Rule [4-263] with proper deference to these policies. Id. at 146-47 , 816 A.2d at 928 (quoting Williams, 364 Md. at 172 , 771 A.2d at 1089 ). This Court concluded that the State violated Maryland Rule 4—263(d)(7)(B) “[i]n light of the plain meaning and policies of the Rule[.]” Collins, 373 Md. at 147 , 816 A.2d at 928 . More specifically, this Court held that the witness’s pretrial failure to identify the defendant fell “within the scope of ‘relevant material or information regarding pretrial identification of the defendant by a witness for the State.’ ” See id. at 146 , 816 A.2d at 928 (quoting Md. R. 4—263(d)(7)(B)) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).

This Court concluded that the witness’s pretrial photographic array identification of the defendant made “the initial statement given on the night of the crime relevant to the veracity of the subsequent identifieation[,]” and that “the prior statement, [then] a prior inconsistent statement, became subject to the requirements of’ Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B). Id. at 146 n.9, 816 A.2d at 928 n.9. This Court held that the State’s violation of Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) was prejudicial, and thus was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 148 , 816 A.2d at 929 .

This Court observed that a witness’s ability to identify a defendant “at the scene of the crime is often the cardinal facet of a determination of guilt.” Id. at 148 , 816 A.2d at 929 (citation omitted). This Court explained: “It is not for us to determine what, if any, response the defense could have prepared had it known of the prior inconsistent statement. It is enough to find that the defense was denied an adequate opportunity to do so, to its prejudice.” Id. at 148 , 816 A.2d at 929 . This Court determined that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for a continuance, which would have given the defendant’s counsel “an opportunity to review the circumstances surrounding the undisclosed prior inconsistent statement^]” Id. at 149 , 816 A.2d at 930 .

In other words, a continuance “would have been appropriate to allow defense counsel adequate time to ‘regroup,’ investigate, and prepare as full a defense as possible.” Id. at 143 , 816 A.2d at 927 . Analysis Here, we conclude that, as a general matter, Maryland Rule 4—263(d)(7)(B) does not, by its plain language and history, require the State to disclose during discovery a State’s witness’s pretrial identification of a co-defendant. As an initial matter, we address the State’s contention that, even if Maryland Rule 4—263(d)(7)(B) can be construed to apply to co-defendants, Maryland Rule 4—263(d)(7)(B) does not apply in this case because it is not clear that Copeland and Green were co-defendants. Despite the State’s contention in its brief, the record is replete with references by the prosecutor identifying Copeland as a co-defendant in the circuit court.

At a bench conference, the prosecutor stated: “[T]he [S]tate intends to produce the body of [] Copeland to at least one witness[.] ... [Identification of a co-defendant[,] when charged as co[-]conspirators[,] is almost as important as identification of the defendant^]” Later at the bench conference, the prosecutor stated: “[T]his is [a] co-defendant, not the defendant himself.” Still later at the bench conference, the prosecutor stated: “The co-defendant, [ ] Copeland, was interviewed by other people.” Shortly afterward, the prosecutor stated that Green and his counsel “knew that ... the co-defendant existed.” Later, the prosecutor stated: “[W]e had a collateral thought about the co-defendant being brought in, as you said, in prison garb[.]” Shortly before Copeland was brought into the courtroom, the prosecutor stated: “We’re going to ask [Carter] another question before we bring in the body of the co-defendant[.]” And, during the State’s closing argument, the prosecutor stated: To call each other, [ ] Green and [ ] Copeland had to use outside sources to connect them together. You heard testimony about the system at the detention center. They are on separate tiers. Co-defendants, people who are charged as co-defendants in a crime, are put in separate places, and one of the reasons is so that they can’t talk, can’t contrive, can’t discuss the cases.

The record demonstrates that, in the circuit court, the State took a different position with respect to Copeland’s status as a co-defendant. No Maryland Rule or statute defines the term “co-defendant.” Black’s Law Dictionary provides the following definition of the term “co-defendant”: “One of two or more defendants sued in the same litigation or charged with the same crime.” Codefendant, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Neither this Court nor the Court of Special Appeals has had the occasion to expressly define the term “co-defendant.” Both this Court and the Court of Special Appeals, however, have treated the term “co-defendant” in a manner that indicates that Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of the term “co-defendant” is accurate—ie., that a co-defendant is an individual who is charged with the same crime as the defendant. In Veney v. State, 251 Md. 159, 164 , 246 A.2d 608, 612 (1968), this Court stated: “The motion for discovery and inspection filed by the appellant asked for copies of all written statements of three co-defendants who were charged with the same crimes with which appellant was charged.” (Emphasis added).

In Boone v. State, 3 Md.App. 11, 31 , 237 A.2d 787, 800 , cert. denied, 393 U.S. 872 , 89 S.Ct. 161 , 21 L.Ed.2d 141 (1968), the Court of Special Appeals stated: “The fact of the conviction or acquittal of one person charged with a crime is neither relevant nor material to the issue of the guilt or innocence of another person charged with the same crime as a co-perpetrator. Contrary to the position taken by the appellant, we feel that the admission of evidence of the conviction of a co-defendant at a prior trial would be prejudicial error.” (Emphasis added). 5 And, in Boyd v. State, 321 Md. 69, 72 , 581 A.2d 1, 2 (1990), this Court repeatedly referred to defendants who were charged with the same crime as co-defendants, even though they were charged separately and tried separately. Similarly, in Hickman v. State, 242 Md. 91, 91 , 218 A.2d 21, 22 (1966), this Court stated that the defendant “was tried ... with two separately indicted co-defendants[J” And, in State v. Johnson, 367 Md. 418 , 421 & n.2, 788 A.2d 628 , 630 & n.2 (2002), without expressly referring to co-defendants, this Court stated that four co-conspirators were tried jointly, even though one of them “was indicted separately.” This Court has never determined, or, indeed, even indicated, that a co-defendant must be charged in the same charging document as the defendant. To the contrary, Maryland Rule 4-253(a) expressly permits two defendants who have been charged separately to be tried together.

See Md. R. 4-253(a) (“On motion of a party, the court may order a joint trial for two or more defendants charged in separate charging documents if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses.”). In other words, Maryland Rule 4-253(a) explicitly allows two separately-charged individuals to be tried together as co-defendants. The State mistakenly relies on State v. Stojetz, 84 Ohio St.3d 452 , 705 N.E.2d 329, 338 (1999) for the proposition that, to be a co-defendant, an individual must have been charged in the same charging document as the defendant. In Stojetz, id., the Supreme Court of Ohio reasoned that co-conspirators were not co-defendants because the defendant “was the only person charged in the indictment[.]” In Stojetz, id., the Court quoted State v. Wickline, 50 Ohio St.3d 114 , 552 N.E.2d 913 , 918 (1990), in which, in turn, the Court quoted the following definition of “co-defendant” in Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979): “More than one defendant being sued in the same litigation; or, more than one person charged in same complaint or indictment with same crime.” (Emphasis added).

This definition of the term “co-defendant” in the Fifth Edition of Black’s Law Dictionary from 1979 is now approximately thirty-eight years old. In the meantime, there have been five newer editions of Black’s Law Dictionary. The most recent edition—namely, the Tenth Edition, published in 2014—has a different definition of the term “co-defendant” than the one that the Supreme Court of Ohio employed in Wickline and Stojetz. In contrast to the Fifth Edition, the Tenth Edition does not include in its definition of the term “co-defendant” the requirement that the individual was charged “in the same complaint or indictment.” Instead, the Tenth Edition simply defines the term “co-defendant” as “[o]ne of two or more defendants ... charged with the same crime.” Codefendant, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).

The Tenth Edition’s definition of the term “co-defendant” is consistent with Maryland case law, which indicates that a co-defendant is an individual who is charged with the same crime as the defendant. To the extent that an older edition of Black’s Law Dictionary, or Ohio case law, endorses a definition of the term “co-defendant” that requires the co-defendant to be charged in the same charging document as the defendant, such a definition is inconsistent with the way in which this Court and the Court of Special Appeals have employed the term “co-defendant.” In this case, it is undisputed that Copeland pled guilty to first-degree murder of Myers and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder of Myers—ie., that he was charged with, and convicted of, the same crimes with which Green was charged. We have no difficulty in concluding that Green and Copeland were co-defendants. As to the plain language of Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) and whether, as a general matter, it requires disclosure of the pretrial identification of a co-defendant, Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) provides: “Without the necessity of a request, the State’s Attorney shall provide to the defense ... [a]ll relevant material or information regarding ... pretrial identification of the defendant by a State’s witness[.]” The word “co-defendant” is conspicuously absent from Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B).

One of the cardinal tenets of rule interpretation is that, where the language of the Rule is plain, we “neither add nor delete language” to reach a result not set forth in the clear language of the Rule. Williams, 435 Md. at 490 , 79 A.3d at 940 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The language of Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) is plain and unambiguous— Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) applies only to pretrial identifications of “the defendant,” and not to pretrial identifications of a co-defendant. Significantly, where Maryland Rule 4-263(d) applies to co-defendants, the language of the Rule says as much; the word “co-defendant” is found in three of Maryland Rule 4-263(d)’s other provisions.

First, Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(1) requires the State to disclose “[a]ll written and all oral statements of the defendant and of any co-defendant that relate to the offense charged and all material and information ... that relate to the acquisition of such statements[.]” Second, Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(2) requires the State to disclose “[pjrior criminal convictions, pending charges, and probationary status of the defendant and of any co-defendant[.]” And third, Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(6)(G) requires the State to disclose “[a]ll material or information in any form, whether or not admissible, that tends to impeach a State’s witness, including ... the failure of the witness to identify the defendant or a co-defendant[.]” Each party contends that Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(6)(G) supports its position. Green asserts that, by requiring the State to disclose a pretrial failure to identify a co-defendant, Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(6)(G) implies that the State must also routinely disclose a pretrial identification of a co-defendant. By contrast, the State argues that, by referring to co-defendants, Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(6)(G)—as well as Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(l) and (d)(2)—establish that the lack of a reference to co-defendants in Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) was intentional. In our view, the State has the better part of the argument.

Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(6)(G), (d)(1), and (d)(2) demonstrate that,