Green v. State

ALPERT, Judge. Appellant, Robert Lee Green, was convicted by a Kent County jury of first degree rape and subsequently was sentenced to life imprisonment. He has noted a timely appeal and argues that: The trial court erred in denying the appellant’s pre-trial motion to suppress the May 13, 1991, taped statement of the appellant because the trial [court] failed to consider that a statement by a criminal suspect can be constitutionally inadmissible as being involuntary because of coercive conduct by non-state actors. Facts and Proceedings Appellant filed a motion to suppress a tape of a confession which he gave to the local police on May 13, 1991.

A hearing on the motion was held on September 4, 1991, before Circuit Court Judge J. Frederick Price. The basis of appellant’s motion was that he involuntarily provided the confession as a result of a death threat he received. The trial court denied appellant’s motion, and appellant was subsequently convicted of first degree rape and sentenced to life imprisonment. ⁵⁷⁴ At the evidentiary hearing appellant testified that, at around midnight on May 10, 1991, a tall, well-built unidentified male came to appellant’s home and threatened to kill him if appellant would not implicate himself in a rape for which appellant was being investigated. The next day, appellant went to the police department and reported the incident.

He appeared “somewhat nervous [and] edgy,” and stated that the unidentified male left in a car that resembled a state police car. Appellant left after reporting the incident and did not make any inculpatory statements. But then, on May 13, 1991, appellant returned to the police department and expressed a willingness to discuss the rape in greater detail. After he was advised of his Miranda rights, appellant agreed to allow the police to tape his confession.

At the suppression hearing, appellant contended that his confession was involuntary because it was induced by the threats he received. He testified that he thought the unidentified male who threatened him was an undercover police officer, but appellant was unable to provide evidence supporting his allegation. The trial court denied appellant’s motion and stated: The Court, quite simply, finds that that statement of allegation of a threat by a phantom witness, not being one who is even alleged to be a police officer, to be incredible. And therefore, the Court finds that that statement was made knowingly and voluntarily by the Defendant, under] no force or duress[, nor were] favors invoked [, nor] promises made [to the defendant].

Normally, this sort of determination of credibility by the hearing judge would bring our discussion to an abrupt halt. 1 Appellant, however, raises a haunting vision of factual ambiguity in the hearing judge’s decision. If it were clear that the judge found, as a matter of fact, that appellant had ⁵⁷⁵ not been threatened at all then indeed, pursuant to Md. Rule 8-131(c), we need pursue this no further. If, on the other hand, the judge ruled as he did because appellant could not identify the alleged coercer 2 , then we must address appellant’s federal constitutional argument, to wit: Whether the admission into evidence of a confession by a criminal suspect, which was motivated by the coercive conduct of a non-state actor is violative of the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution? Appellant submits that the admission of his confession violates the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment.

More specifically, appellant argues that the trial court erred in ruling “that in order for an involuntary coerced statement by a criminal suspect to be suppressed as unconstitutionally involuntary, the cause ... of the coercion must be state actors, i.e. police officers.” Appellant asserts that the trial judge “did not even consider [the federal constitutional] aspect of this Motion to Suppress, merely because appellant did not identify the unknown black male as a police officer.” Appellant contends that the state action requirement is not the requirement of a police role in obtaining the statement; but rather, appellant contends that the requirement is a connection between the harm suffered by the appellant and the State of Maryland. Discussion “A defendant in a criminal case is deprived of due process of law if his conviction is founded, in whole or in part, upon an involuntary confession, without regard for the truth or falsity of the confession____” State v. Brown, 324 Md. 532, 540 , 597 A.2d 978 (1991) (quoting Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-77 , 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1780 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964)). In determining whether a confession is voluntary under the fourteenth amendment, this court will ⁵⁷⁶ accept the trial judge’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. See Hoey v. State 311 Md. 473, 484 , 536 A.2d 622 (1988).

And, based on the findings in the entire record, this court will make an independent, reflective constitutional judgement. See Lancaster v. State, 86 Md.App. 74, 95 , 585 A.2d 274 , cert. granted, 322 Md. 644 , 589 A.2d 73 (1991). To support a claim of a due process violation, a defendant must show some form of “state action.” Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165 , 107 S.Ct. 515, 521 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). As this court explained in Reynolds v. State, 88 Md.App. 197, 204 , 594 A.2d 609 (1991), aff'd, 327 Md. 494 , 610 A.2d 782 (1992), “[t]here is no constitutional right not to give an involuntary confession; there is only a constitutional right not to be compelled to do so by government.” (Emphasis in original.) Appellant submits