Greenbriar Condominium v. Brooks

⁶⁸⁷ CATHELL, J. This case addresses the foreclosure of liens upon a condominium unit precipitated by more than fifty unpaid condominium assessment installments. 1 In this case, involving an appeal of the second sale at foreclosure, each of which was set aside by the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, we must determine not only the point at which an objector to a foreclosure sale based upon the lien arising from a default in the payment of a condominium fee or assessment must formally make known his objections to the court and to the creditor(s), but also the effect, if any, of a creditor’s statement of debt on the debtor’s exercise of his right of redemption. Following the second foreclosure sale which occurred on January 15, 1999, Clifford A. Brooks (“Mr. Brooks”), respondent, filed exceptions to the sale and its audit in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. Greenbriar Condominium, Phase I, Council of Unit Owners, Inc. (“Council”), petitioner as well as the hen holder and successful foreclosure bidder, sought to enforce the sale so as to collect on the condominium assessment indebtedness based upon numerous defaults in the payment of installments owed by respondent. After the Circuit Court invalidated the sale, petitioner appealed to the Court of Special Appeals which affirmed the lower court’s invalidation of the foreclosure sale, but vacated the Circuit Court’s award of attorney’s fees to respondent, an attorney appearing on his own behalf.

The parties filed cross-petitions for writ of certiorari, and we granted Council’s petition, but denied Mr. Brooks’ petition, 2 on January 12, 2005. Greenbriar Condominium, Phase I Council of Unit Owners, Inc. v. Brooks, 384 Md. 581 , 865 A.2d 589 (2005). ⁶⁸⁸ For purposes of clarity, we have restructured the questions presented for our review: 1. When a debtor makes a tender which the creditor rejects as insufficient, does a creditor’s counter with a statement of debt in excess of the debtor’s tender prejudice the debtor or constitute a denial of the debt- or’s right to redeem his property so as to permit a mortgage foreclosure sale to be set aside? 2. May a mortgage foreclosure sale be set aside because of the lien holder’s submission of an incorrect statement of the debt owed even though it is uncontroverted that a default had resulted in a hen in some amount? 3.

At what point must the debtor formally file his objections to the holding of a foreclosure sale? We hold that prior to the sale, the debtor may seek to enjoin the foreclosure sale from proceeding by filing a motion to enjoin as provided in Maryland Rule 14-209. Should a sale occur, however, the debtor’s later filing of exceptions to the sale may challenge only procedural irregularities at the sale or the debtor may challenge the statement of indebtedness by filing exceptions to the auditor’s statement of account. 3 I. Facts It is of no surprise that the series of liens and foreclosure actions in this case that has endured some ten years, has also generated a voluminous record and an extensive set of facts. We begin with the relevant background in respect to the ownership interest of respondent, Clifford A. Brooks, who in June 1975 purchased for his residential use a condominium 4 in ⁶⁸⁹ the 253-unit, four phase, Greenbriar Condominium Development and specifically, in Greenbriar Condominium — Phase I located at 7722 Hanover Parkway, Greenbelt, Maryland.

As a Greenbriar Condominium — Phase I owner, Mr. Brooks was designated as a member of the “Council of Owners” and, along with all other present and future owners, mortgagees, lessees and occupants, was subject to the by-laws as well as to the provisions of the relevant Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions of both the Greenbriar Condominium Association (“GCA”) and the Greenbriar Condominium, Phase I. 5 The condominium’s developer recorded an original Condominium Declaration in November 1974, which was subsequently amended in December 1974. The by-laws were originally recorded in November 1974 and, since that time, have been periodically modified or amended as provided therein. The Phase I by-laws and the declarations are administered by that phase’s Board of Directors, Greenbriar Condominium, Phase I Council of Unit Owners, Inc., 6 and the condominium is managed by its agent, Condominium Venture, Inc., with offices at 7600 Hanover Parkway, Greenbelt, Maryland. Found within the declarations and by-laws are provisions bestowing authority to levy upon each condominium unit owner an annual assessment payable in monthly installments.

In June 1991, Council’s Board of Directors adopted a “Policy Resolution” which delineated the procedure for collection of delinquent assessments, stated that a reminder notice which ⁶⁹⁰ included notice of acceleration of the assessments would be mailed on the seventh day of the month and specified that a $15.00 late fee would be imposed on fees not received by the fifteenth day of each month. The Resolution further indicated that a notice of intent to file a lien would be sent to the homeowner if the fee remained unpaid as of the twenty-second day of the month, and a lien would be filed thirty days after service on the owner of the intent to file the lien had been completed. 7 The monthly assessments appear to have been $254 during the years of 1991 through 1993; the assessment amount was reduced to $239 monthly in 1994 and was further reduced to $229 monthly in 1995 and to $227 for each month of 1996. Apparently, according to amended by-law Article VII, Assessments, Section 3, Acceleration, 8 the assessments may be accelerated as follows: • “Section 3. Acceleration.

If a unit owner shall be in default in payment of an installment of an assessment, including, but not limited to, the monthly installments based on the annual budget, the Board of Directors may accelerate the remaining installments upon ten (10) days’ written notice to such unit owner, whereupon the entire unpaid balance of such installments shall become due upon the date stated in such notice.” ⁶⁹¹ At least since the late 1980s, Mr. Brooks demonstrated habitual delinquency in making timely payment of each monthly assessment and, in most cases, he was charged a $15.00 late fee for each late payment. In March 1989 Council recorded among the Land Records for Prince George’s County, a Statement of Lien against Mr. Brooks claiming a lien of $3,054.00 in unpaid monthly installments of the annual condominium assessment for the period from December 1, 1988 to December 31, 1989, a period of eleven months of separate installment delinquencies. Upon Mr. Brooks’ payment, Council released this lien in February 1990. Similarly, in September of 1992, Council recorded a lien in the amount of $1,524.00 in unpaid assessments and fees for the period from July 1, 1992 through December 31, 1992, a period of six months of delinquencies.

Following Mr. Brooks’ payment, Council recorded a “Release and Satisfaction of Statement of Lien” on July 8,1994. Once again, on April 22, 1994, Council filed a Statement of Condominium Lien among the Land Records of Prince George’s County claiming a lien “amount of $2,929.80 for the period from Dec. 1, 1993 to December 31, 1994 [a period of eleven months of delinquencies] plus late fees, interest, collection costs, and attorney’s fees” (alteration added). With the April 22, 1994, lien still unsatisfied as of July 1994, Council’s Board of Directors resolved at a July 12, 1994, meeting, to institute foreclosure proceedings upon the lien it had filed in April 1994. Accordingly, on July 20, 1994, Council filed in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, a “Line to Docket Foreclosure Action.” The accompanying Statement of Indebtedness, tallied as of June 30, 1994, indicated the following debt amount: “Actual and accelerated condominium assessment through 12/31/94_$2,929.80 Late fees through 6/30/94 105.00 Collection costs 155.00 Legal-private process service 20.00 ⁶⁹² Lien charges 41.20 Title search 65.00 Attorney’s fees 75.00 TOTAL $3,391.00” Council properly noticed Mr. Brooks of its intention to foreclose the condominium hen.

The record indicates that Mr. Brooks did not file a response or a petition to enjoin in response to the notice of foreclosure. However, presumably having received payment, the Council recorded a release of this lien on June 8, 1995. Council thereafter sent to Mr. Brooks another “Notice of Intent to File a Lien” dated January 5, 1995, stating an amount due of $1,577.50, and another notice dated February 23, 1995, stating an amount due of $1,841.50 plus an unspecified amount of attorney’s fees. 9 Council subsequently recorded another lien on March 29, 1995, in the amount of $2,748.00 for the period from January 1, 1995 through December 31, 1995, a period of twelve months of delinquencies, and also filed on that same date an Amended Statement of Indebtedness reflecting additional unpaid assessments and fees calculated through March 10, 1995, as follows: “Actual condominium assessment through 12/31/94 $ 906.00 Actual and accelerated assessments (1/95-12/95 at $229/month) 2,748.00 Late fees 9/94-3/95 at $15.00/month 105.00 Collection costs 105.00 Legal-private process service 110.00 Lien charges (1995) 34.00 Attorney’s fees 237.50 TOTAL $4,245.50’ ⁶⁹³ On April 4, 1995, Council’s attorney, Frank J. Emig, and his law partner, Leo Wm. Dunn, Jr., were appointed trustees to conduct a foreclosure sale and they scheduled the foreclosure sale for June 7,1995.

By letter dated April 25,1995, Council’s attorney notified Mr. Brooks of the impending foreclosure sale and advised him that if he paid (no amount was specified) by May 5, 1995, the matter could be resolved without proceeding to the public foreclosure sale. On May 15, 1995, Mr. Brooks hand delivered to the office of Council’s attorney a check in the amount of $3,122.50. His accompanying letter stated: “Transmitted herewith is Riggs Bank cashier’s check in the amount of Three Thousand One Hundred twenty-two and 50/100 Dollars ($3,122.50) covering all charges claimed to be due, excepting only putative accelerated 1995 assessments. This amount is paid under protest and solely to stop foreclosure proceedings.

I continue to dispute the validity and accuracy of the unspecified collection charges added to my account, and again request strict proof and itemization of all such charges or the crediting of my account for all such charges.” [Emphasis added.] That same day, Council accepted Mr. Brooks’ check and prorogued the foreclosure sale, but declined to dismiss the case, stating that “if we do not receive each additional monthly installment when it is due on the first of the month, I [Council’s attorney] will immediately schedule the property for sale and you will be responsible for all legal costs incurred in this process.” [Alteration added.] On December 5, 1995, Council’s attorney advised Mr. Brooks that Council intended to reinstitute the foreclosure proceedings due to Mr. Brooks’ failure to pay his October, November, and December 1995 condominium assessments. Council sent Mr. Brooks a “Notice of Intent to File a Lien” dated January 4, 1996, stating a debt of $1,069.00, which included the unpaid assessments, late fees and collection costs. 10 On February 14, 1996, Council recorded another ⁶⁹⁴ “Statement of Lien” for $2,724.00, covering the subsequent period from January 1, 1996 to December 1, 1996, another twelve months of separate installment delinquencies. The next day, Council’s Board of Directors again resolved to pursue anew the foreclosure proceedings, and on March 8, 1996, Council renewed its previously filed “Line Docket Foreclosure Action,” and included an amended statement which detailed Mr. Brooks’ indebtedness as of February 20, 1996, as follows: “Actual condominium assessment through 12/31/95 at $22[9]/month 11 $ 687.00 Actual and accelerated assessments (1/96-12/96 at $227/month) 2,724.00 Late fees 10/95-2/96 at $15/month 75.00 Collection costs 105.00 Legal-private process service 120.00 Lien charges (1996) 34.00 TOTAL $ 3,745.00" [Alteration added.] [Footnote added.] Council’s attorney was again designated as trustee for the purpose of holding the sale and the duly noticed and published (first) foreclosure sale of Mr. Brooks’ condominium unit took place on Friday, May 10, 1996, at 9:30 a.m. at the Prince George’s County courthouse. Mr. Brooks was not present for the sale and the record is unclear as to whether he had specific notice of the scheduled sale.

Council, the sole bidder at the foreclosure sale, purchased the property for $2,500.00, subject to a prior deed of trust of approximately $16,698.26. There is some suggestion in the record that the fair market value of the condominium at the time of the sale was approximately $66,000. On July 3, 1996, Mr. Brooks, pro se, filed ⁶⁹⁵ exceptions to the sale alleging, inter alia, that the acceleration of his monthly installments was invalid and that “[t]he sales price at foreclosure was so grossly inadequate as to shock the conscience and/or to raise a presumption of fraud or irregularity.” He also explained his personal declining financial situation 12 and alleged several irregularities in the sale including: “[F]ailure of notice with respect to the 1994, 1995 and 1996 lien accelerations, failure of due authorization by [petitioner’s] Board of Directors with respect to the 1994, 1995 and 1996 accelerations, failure to provide requested documents and vital information to which [respondent] as Unit Owner was entitled, unlawful usurpation of the Board’s authority by the Management Agent and/or abdication of same by the Board, the imposition of excessive and/or unlawful assessments and other charges underlying this foreclosure sale.... ” [Alterations added.] Mr. Brooks requested that the Circuit Court, inter alia, set aside the foreclosure sale and that Council pay Mr. Brooks’ attorney’s fees. Council filed an opposition to Mr. Brooks’ exceptions delineating the various liens that it had recorded.

Following an August 16, 1996, hearing, which was continued on October 18, 1996, Mr. Brooks, a licensed Maryland attorney, argued the illegality of the accelerated assessments and urged that the price obtained at the sale was clearly inadequate, to which the Circuit Court replied that it did not find ⁶⁹⁶ the price shocking given potential bidders’ disinclination to become embroiled in the disputes with condominium boards that typically accompany a condominium foreclosure. Mr. Brooks did not introduce any evidence of the value of the condominium unit at trial. The Circuit Court overruled the exceptions and ratified the foreclosure sale by order dated October 23, 1996. Mr. Brooks thereafter noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.

No audit of the foreclosure sale took place pending that appeal. On October 31, 1996, Council filed a Motion for Judgment of Possession, and a Show Cause hearing was scheduled for March 7, 1997. Mr. Brooks countered with opposition to Council’s motion as well as his own motion seeking to stay, without bond, the judgment of ratification pending the outcome of his appeal to the intermediate appellate court. In the time leading to the Show Cause hearing, Mr. Brooks continued to occupy the property, but had not paid the holder of the first deed of trust since June 1996, and had not paid the condominium assessments since October 1995.

At the Show Cause hearing, the Circuit Court ordered the payment within one week of a supersedeas bond in the amount of $12,500.00 in order to stay execution of the sale’s ratification. On March 14, 1997, as ordered, Mr. Brooks paid into the registry of the Circuit Court a supersedeas bond in the amount of $12,500.00. In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals vacated the Circuit Court’s ratification of the sale and by mandate issued February 18, 1998, remanded the matter, stating that further evidence was needed to determine if the difference between the foreclosure sale price and the appraised value less the mortgage “shocks the conscience.” 13 Furthermore, the intermediate appellate court both declined to address the legality of the acceleration of the condominium assessments, noting that the trial court had not addressed the ⁶⁹⁷ issue, and did not reach the issue of validity of the liens filed by Council because Mr. Brooks had not contested, either prior to the liens’ filings and/or prior to the foreclosure sale, the propriety of the liens. Accordingly, the issues on remand were limited to “the appraised value of the condominium unit, the mortgage remaining on [respondent’s] unit, the sale price, and any deficiency [respondent] is willing to forego.” Clifford A. Brooks v. Greenbriar Condominium, Phase I, Council of Unit Owners, Inc., No. 87-1997, slip op. at 18 (Md.App. December 17, 1997) (alterations added).

A petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals ultimately was denied on May 18, 1998. Greenbriar Condominium, Phase I, Council of Unit Owners, Inc., v. Brooks, 349 Md. 496 , 709 A.2d 140 (1998). On the same date as the mandate issued by the Court of Special Appeals, Mr. Brooks filed an emergency motion to have released to him the funds in the Circuit Court’s registry. His motion stated, “Time is of the essence, because a superior lien holder has scheduled the subject property for foreclosure on February 26, 1998, and the released funds will be required to forestall said prospective foreclosure.” Mr. Brooks did not name the priority lien holder, but the Court presumes that it was the holder of the first deed of trust, which at that time, apparently, was in arrears.

Council opposed this motion and sought to collect the monthly condominium assessments from November 1, 1996 through June 1, 1998, that Mr. Brooks had failed to pay following the ratification of the foreclosure sale. The motion’s hearing was adjourned pending the scheduled August 28, 1998, hearing on the matters remanded by the Court of Special Appeals. At the hearing, at which the parties offered testimony, including that of Mr. Brooks, as to the value of the condominium unit, on September 3, 1998, the Circuit Court accepted an appraiser’s figure of $67,000 as the condominium unit’s value as of the May 1996 foreclosure sale. Thereafter, Council filed with the auditor, Andrew W. Dyer, a “Suggested Final Accounting” which appeared’ as follows: ⁶⁹⁸ “Sale Price less:_$ 2,500.00 Balance due under Amended Statement of Indebtedness as of 2/20/96 (filed on March 8, 1996) 3,745.00 Interest at 1-1/2% [i.e., 18% per annum] per month on assessments of $687.00 for 1995 lien and $2,724.00 for 1996 lien from 2/20/96-8/20/98 (30 months)._1,534.95 Late charges, 3/96-12/96 at $15.00 per month_150.00 Management agent — preparation for and appearance at Exceptions hearing_____412.50 Attorneys’ fees and foreclosure costs incurred in enforcing 1995 and 1996 condominium liens---[Publication costs of $272.00 and $45.00, auctioneer fee of $75.00, and title search of $65.00---- 19,464.75 Auditor’s fee._250.00 _DEFICIENCY $23,057.20’ [Alteration added.] The auditor filed an audit statement allowing a total of $22,208.21 (comprised of the $2,500 sale price plus a $19,708.21 deficiency) which the Circuit Court ratified on September 21, 1998.

That same day, Mr. Brooks filed exceptions to the audit, including among the exceptions his request that the attorney’s fees and costs related to defending the sale or subsequently alienating the unit as well as the post-foreclosure sale late fees be excluded from the accounting. He further sought to have his percentage interest in the condominium’s common elements included as a set-off or a deduction. The Circuit Court declined to order the auditor to modify his account. Nevertheless, on October 1, 1998, Mr. Brooks supplemented his exceptions to the auditor’s account and filed a “Suggested Account” as follows: “Proceeds of Sale $ 2,500.00 TO: Assessment Debt $ 3,411.00 Adjustment of Taxes prepaid 9/25/95 & 3/19/96 for 5/10/96 to 6/30/96 ( 169.40) * Adjustment of Taxes paid by [Mr. Brooks] since the date of sale ( 3,473.76) * Adjustment — Late Pee overcharge (5/95) ( 15.00) ⁶⁹⁹ Paid to Superior Lienholder since date of sale (16,580.81) * Interest from 3/7/97 to 7/31/98 on $12,500.00 Cash Bond ( 3,143.84) SURPLUS TO [Mr. Brooks] (22,471.81) * TOTAL (19,971.81) (19,971.81) A hearing on the exceptions to the auditor’s report took place on November 4,1998, at which the Circuit Court ordered the auditor to restate his account as if no exceptions had been taken subsequent to the sale and stated that it would examine the revised figures to determine if they shocked the court’s conscience.

The auditor’s amended account, which was ratified on November 23, 1998, called for a total of $5,445.89, comprised of the $2,500 in sale proceeds plus a deficiency of $2,773.17. On the same day as the hearing, Mr. Brooks filed a motion to recover expenses and attorney’s fees in the amount of $49,127.29, for the period of June 11, 1998 through October 23, 1998, which were incurred in making proof of the fair market value of his condominium. Council opposed this motion alleging that Mr. Brooks need only have hired an appraiser to establish the condominium’s value and stating that the motion “is a bogus and transparent attempt to wrongfully extract compensation for which he is not entitled.” At the December 8, 1998 hearing on the exceptions, the Circuit Court found its “conscience to be shocked” by the sales price and set aside the May 10, 1996, foreclosure sale, but directed that the “mortgagee [sic] is free to readvertise and [resell]” the property (alterations added). Two days later, on December 10th, Mr. Brooks hand-delivered a check for $3,411.00 14 to the office of Council’s attorney, stating in his accompanying letter that ⁷⁰⁰ the check was “in full payment of the underlying 1995-1996 liens.” Council returned the check the next day, December 11th, stating that the amount tendered was “insufficient to fully pay the 1995-1996 liens.” A second foreclosure on the condominium unit was scheduled for January 15, 1999 at 9:30 a.m. at the Prince George’s County Courthouse.

By letter dated December 21, 1998, Mr. Brooks acknowledged Council’s rejection of his check for $3,411.00, and requested to be advised in writing of the specific charges and their basis in excess of the $3,411.00, that Council claimed were due on the liens. On December 29, 1998, Council filed a “Supplemental Statement of Indebtedness as of December 20, 1998” as follows: “Amount stated on Amended Statement of Indebtedness (as of 2/20/96) filed in these proceedings $ 3,745.00 Late fees 3/96-12/96 at $15/month_150.00 Interest on 1995 lien of $687.00 at 1-1/2% per month from 1/1/96 to 12/20/98 based upon By-Laws and statute_367.37 Interest on 1996 lien of $2,724.00 at 1-1/2% per month from 1/1/97 to 12/20/98 based upon By-Laws and statute_967.02 Court costs_90.00 Auditor’s fee_250.00 Advertising costs_317.00 Bond premium_75.00 Title examination_65.00 Auctioneer’s fee_;_75.00 Attorneys’ fees re lien foreclosure_1,050.00 Attorneys’ fees/costs re Exceptions and possession _ 5,566.80 Attorneys’ fees/costs re Appeal and remand proceedings in Circuit Court_18,396.45 _TOTAL $31,114.64” Upon receipt of Council’s Supplemental Statement of Indebtedness, which included notice of the scheduled January 15, 1999, foreclosure sale, Mr. Brooks was advised of the specific debt claimed by Council. Mr. Brooks made no court filings in this case between January 1, 1999,' and January 15, 1999. The (second) foreclo ⁷⁰¹ sure sale took place on Friday, January 15, 1999, at 9:30 a.m., the scheduled time for the sale.

Once again, Council was the sole and successful bidder, having bid the sum of $21,600.00, subject to a prior Deed of Trust in the approximate amount of $13,092.77. Shortly after the sale was held, Mr. Brooks filed an “Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and for Preliminary Injunction,” attempting to enjoin the already-held sale. 15 Mr. Brooks filed another post-sale “Emergency Motion for Appropriate Relief’ on Monday, January 19, 1999, in which he sought to stay further proceedings in respect to the January 15th foreclosure sale. He explained in this motion that he had intended to reach the courthouse at 8:45 a.m. on January 15th in order to enjoin the sale. He stated: “On Thursday, January 14, 1999, Mr. Brooks [ 16 ] made arrangements with the Court to hear at 8:45 a.m. on Friday, January 15, 1999, his motion to restrain and enjoin [Council’s] proposed 9:30 a.m. sale of even date.

On the afternoon of January 14, 1999, Mr. Brooks advised Mr. Emig that said hearing had been set.[ 17 ] However, as a result of the ice storm which occurred on January 14th and 15th (resulting in power outages and school closings both days), Mr. Brooks suffered electrical power ‘brown outs’ that caused the loss of both the proposed orders and extensive corrections to said motion which had been entered into Mr. Brooks’ word processor. Because of the time required to re-enter into the word processor said orders and corrections and to safely ⁷⁰² reach the courthouse under the perilous weather related driving conditions, Mr. Brooks was unable to reach the courthouse until 9:45 a.m. In route to the courthouse, however, Mr. Brooks telephoned Judge Hotten’s secretary and advised her of his situation and asked for additional time to get to the courthouse. She advised Mr. Brooks that Mr. Emig had been in chambers but had left saying that he had to file a bond.[ 18 ] After briefly putting Mr. Brooks on hold, Judge Hotten’s secretary advised Mr. Brooks that Judge Hotten had directed her to go downstairs to instruct Trustee Emig not to conduct the sale and to return to chambers until Mr. Brooks’ said motion could be heard upon his arrival.

Upon Mr. Brooks’ arrival at Judge Hotten’s chambers, Judge Hotten’s secretary advised Mr. Brooks that when she arrived downstairs to the front of the courthouse at 9:32 a.m., a ‘white haired’ man told her that the sale had taken place at 9:31 a.m. Upon his arrival, Mr. Brooks saw Mr. Emig with several other people leaving the courthouse parking lot.” [Alterations added.] [Footnotes added.] Council filed an opposition to Mr. Brooks’ emergency motions asserting that the request for injunctive relief was moot, the sale was properly held and Mr. Brooks would be occasioned no harm by the filing of the trustee’s Report of Sale, Affidavit of Purchaser and other post-sale documents. At a hearing on the emergency motions on January 28, 1999, the Circuit Court ordered both parties to submit a suggested statement of account, and instructed that once submitted, the auditor would state the account and the parties may take exceptions therefrom. The Council filed its “Suggested Final Accounting” on March 5, 1999, as follows: “1.

Sale Price-$21,600 2. Debt and Expenses: ⁷⁰³ a. Amount due [Council] as of 5/10/96 .... $ 5,445.00 b. Late charges on 1996 lien at $15 per month from 6/96-12/96 (7 months) 105.00 c.

Interest on 1995 lien of $687 from 1/1/96-3/1/99 391.59 d. Interest on 1996 lien of $2,724 from 2/20/96-2/20/99 1,470.96 e. Attorneys fees 12/17/98-2/24/99 .... [Frank Emig] 1,925.00 f. Enquirer Gazette____ 340.17 g.

Enquirer Gazette — notice 60.00 h. Atlantic Bonding Company .... 128.00 i. Auctioneer (Wm.Smart)____ 100.00 j. Trustee commission — Frank Emig 1,230.00 k.

Auditor’s fee (estimated) 250.00 TOTAL EXPENSES $11,445.[7]2” [Alteration added.] The Circuit Court signed an order on March 25, 1999, noticing that the foreclosure sale would be ratified on April 26, 1999, and directing that any exceptions be filed by that date. Mr. Brooks filed exceptions on April 26, 1999, asserting as follows: “Said resale should be set aside, because, inter alia: (1) [Council] and Trustee Emig fraudulently deprived [Mr. Brooks] of his right of redemption by demanding excessive and unlawful payments as a condition of redemption; (2) [Council] and Trustee Emig fraudulently deprived [Mr. Brooks] of his right of redemption by failing, prior to initiating foreclosure proceedings, to demand of [Mr. Brooks] a lawful payment necessary for him to exercise his right of redemption; this despite specific request from [Mr. Brooks] for such demand; (3) Trustee Emig breached his fiduciary duty to [Mr. Brooks] and to the Court by his blatant acts of gamesmanship to the consistent detriment of [Mr. Brooks] and short term benefit of [Council] (Trustee Emig’s client at law), and by his conflicting roles and loyalties as both trustee for the protection of all with ⁷⁰⁴ equitable rights (including [Mr. Brooks]) and as counsel to [Council] and to its Managing Agent; (4) the sale was not fairly conducted in that: (a) the advertisement required excessive interest (16%) on sale price in light of current market interest; (b) the resale was premature and based upon unlawful demands; (c) the sale was not well attended; and (d) the sale price was preset by Trustee with an eye toward establishing the minimum amount Trustee believed necessary to avoid the fate of the first sale, and not toward ‘a view to obtain as large a price as might, with due diligence and attention, be fairly and reasonably obtainable under the circumstances’; (5) the sale price at foreclosure is so grossly inadequate as to shock the conscience; (6) the sale price is grossly inadequate and when combined with irregularities in the original sale and in the resale constitutes a constructively fraudulent sale; (7) the resale was premature in that the provisions of Maryland Rule 14-205 were not complied with prior to the resale; (8) the instant resale is precluded by the equitable considerations underlying Maryland Rule 14-205 (to wit: that after hearing the Court ‘fix the amount of the debt’, and ‘provide a reasonable time within which payment may be made’ before resale); (9) the resale was not duly authorized by the Greenbriar Board of Directors; and (10) [Council] lacks clean hands.” [Alterations added.] Mr. Brooks filed an opposition to Council’s suggested accounting on May 12, 1999, and included his own suggested account for the foreclosure resale: “Proceeds of Sale $21,600.00 Adjustment of Taxes (FY '99 1/15/99 to 6/30/99Q ]_$ 487.27 TO: Assessment debt $ 1,388.50 Late Charge (3/96 to 5/10/96 sale)_$ 30.00_ Surplus to [Mr. Brooks]_(20,668.77) TOTAL_$1,418.50 $ 1,418.50" [Footnote omitted.] Mr. Brooks included a notation with his suggested accounting that indicated his belief that: ⁷⁰⁵ “[The Circuit Court’s] requested account is rather to establish the amount properly due for redemption purposes on the 1995-1996 liens at the time of the ineffectual May 10, 1996, sale. Thus, the account proposed hereinabove and the account proposed [by Council], are each premature. [Mr. Brooks] reserves all rights with respect to the final accounting for the January 15, 1999 resale, should such an accounting become necessary as a result of the Court’s subsequent ratification of said resale.” [Alterations added.] Respondent, then, however, went on to provide a second “Suggested Accounting” which, somewhat inexplicably, 19 applied the sale price from the May 1996 foreclosure sale, which had been set aside: “Proceeds of Sale $ 2,500.00 Adjustment of Taxes (FY '96 $1212.38 <&) 52 Days[) ] $ 172.72 TO: Assessment debt $ 1,388.50 Late Charge (3/96 to 5/10/96 sale) $ 30.00 Surplus to [Mr. Brooks] (1,254.22) TOTAL $ 1,418.50 $ 1,418.50” [Footnote omitted.] The auditor filed his report on May 14,1999, as follows: “Proceeds of Sale_21,600.00 Interest_ Adjustment of Taxes_487.27 TO:_ Court Costs 90.00 ⁷⁰⁶ Auditor’s Fee 250.00 Advertising Costs 400.17 Bond Premium 128.00 Examiner’s Fee 65.00 Auctioneer’s Fee 100.00 Trustee’s Commission (Rule) 1,230.00 Attorney’s Fee (Sale) 1,150.00 Attorney’s Fee (Preliminary Injunction) 775.00 Attorney’s Fee (Exceptions) 437.50 Assessment Debt 3,411.00 Interest from 2/20/96 to 1/15/99 * 3.79 Late Charge 30.00 Escrow Deficit/(Credit) (SURPLUS) ** (13,426.81) TOTAL 8,660.46 8,660.46 Both Council and Mr. Brooks filed timely exceptions to the auditor’s report. Following the scheduled May 27, 1999, hearing on the exceptions to the sale, the Circuit Court stated that it would address only “whether or not the [second] sale was conducted properly and a reasonable price paid ...” and ultimately, sustained the exceptions and apparently overturned the foreclosure sale.

The Circuit Court noted that “[t]he [second] sale is based upon the original amount due that gave rise to the [first] sale. We are going back to that point, not what transpired beyond that point (alterations added).” Council argued that the indebtedness was, at a minimum, the figure of $5,445.89 stated in the auditor’s revised report and even if Mr. Brooks believed that the $3,411.00 payment that he had tendered to Council and later deposited in the Circuit Court’s registry was all that was owed once the first foreclosure sale had been set aside, his proper remedy prior to the second foreclosure sale was to file a motion for an injunction. Council’s attorney asserted that “[f]ull payment of the liens is full payment of everything.” Council argued that it was entitled, at a minimum, to collect interest on the assessment debt (i.e., the 1995 and the 1996 liens) at least through the date of the liens’ payment, just as it would be entitled to ⁷⁰⁷ collect interest on the debt up to and including the date of a foreclosure sale. Mr. Brooks maintained that the set aside of the first foreclosure sale restored his right to redeem the property, and his deposit of $3,411.00 into the court’s registry in satisfaction of the condominium assessment debt for 1995 and 1996 was a good faith effort to exercise that right.

He argued that Council aimed to thwart his right of redemption with the December 1998 submission of the Supplemental Statement of Indebtedness in the amount of $31,114.64. The Circuit Court determined that upon receipt of Mr. Brooks’ earlier-calculated $162.89 in interest coupled with delivery to Council of the $3,411.00 already in the Circuit Court’s registry, it would dismiss the foreclosure action. A later colloquy (at a July 6th hearing) summarized the Circuit Court’s conclusion: “MR. EMIG: Well, the problem that I had was the [$]3,411 was what was owed when the lien was filed in '96, and since that time interest accrued on that [ ] assessment for the following year.

THE COURT: Mr. Emig, when you have a lien, you have a lien, and that is the lien that was there. Now, when that was offered and you refused it, and that is the lien that is in the court, then I have a problem. Something else may come later, but that is the lien that is in the court. MR.

EMIG: I understand that. THE COURT: And as I understand it, that was tendered and that was refused.... MR. EMIG: The only thing that was tendered was the lien, but not the accrued, interest on the lien.

THE COURT: You are talking about something later. But the lien, whatever the lien was, as I understand it, that was tendered to you, and you refused, and that is the hen that is in the court. Now, correct me if I am wrong, that is the lien that we were dealing with as of that time it was tendered, a check was offered, and it was refused. ⁷⁰⁸ MR. EMIG: I disagree with the court to this extent, that what ivas tendered in December of '98 was only the basic lien.

It did not include the statutory interest that we were entitled to. THE COURT: It included the lien that was in this court that gave rise to all of this. There may be something that could come later as interest that would be due, but the lien that was on file in the court that he failed to deny, and therefore, it became this, that the lien that I understood at that time to have been offered.... ” [Alterations added.] [Emphasis added.] The Circuit Court then advised that Council was free to file a new lien for other outstanding debt amounts and pursue another foreclosure sale. Mr. Brooks filed a motion for attorney’s fees and costs on June 4, 1999 pursuant to a provision in the November 11, 1974, Declarations. 20 By letter dated June 15, 1999, Council ⁷⁰⁹ rejected Mr. Brooks’ tender of $74.30, 21 which was intended to accompany the $3,411.00 already in the Circuit Court’s registry.

Council filed opposition on June 17, 1999, to Mr. Brooks’ motion for fees and also filed an amended set of exceptions to the auditor’s report as well as a motion to reconsider, seeking review of the Circuit Court’s May 27th statement of its intent to dismiss the foreclosure action. At a July 6, 1999, hearing, the Circuit Court considered Mr. Brooks’ motion for attorney’s fees and Council’s motion for reconsideration. Council argued that Mr. Brooks’ invocation of the Declarations in support of his motion for attorney’s fees was misplaced because the attorney’s fees provision he cited was contained in the Greenbriar Condominium Association’s Declaration, and it was Greenbriar Condominium, Phase I Council of Unit Owners, Inc. which initiated suit against Mr. Brooks. 22 Council further argued that the rate of interest to be applied to outstanding assessments was incorrectly stated at six percent. 23 ⁷¹¹ Mr. Brooks asserted that his deed is subject solely to the GCA Declaration, and moreover, although the GCA does not collect any funds directly, it still receives funds channeled through the Phase I Council of Unit Owners. The funds are collected by the petitioner, Greenbriar Condominium, Phase I Council of Unit Owners, Inc. which, in turn, makes payments to the GCA.

In awarding attorney’s fees to Mr. Brooks, the Circuit Court observed that all four phases of the Greenbriar development pay fees to the GCA and stated that if the Declaration of the GCA: “[Sjays that it grants attorney fees when the other side prevails, and the other side prevails in a suit brought about by the parent organization, which collects for that organization, for those funds, and then you are going to tell me that the other side, for that portion of the funds, can’t elect to have attorney fees granted, somehow or other, that doesn’t make any sense.” [Alteration added.] The Circuit Court denied Council’s motion to reconsider and also denied Mr. Brooks’ motion to award fees in respect to the November 1998 determination of the value of the condominium. The Circuit Court determined that it would sign two orders: one, an order prepared by Mr. Emig, releasing to Council the money in the registry of the court, and the next day, the Circuit Court signed an order directing that the Clerk of the Court make payment from its registry to Council in the ⁷¹² amount of $3,411.00. 24 Mr. Brooks was instructed to submit to the judge a statement of his attorney’s fees. The second order was to be a joint order reflecting the Circuit Court’s July 6th rulings and resulting in dismissal of Council’s complaint. The parties were unable to agree on the language of a joint order, and as a result, each party submitted a proposed order.

The Circuit Court did not sign either order at that time. On July 21, 1999, Council filed a “Motion for Supersedeas Bond and to Stay Further Proceedings.” The motion indicated Council’s intention to appeal both the Circuit Court’s forthcoming dismissal and its award of attorney’s fees and sought to prevent Mr. Brooks from disposing or otherwise encumbering the property in the meantime. Mr. Brooks filed an opposition. By motion dated January 2, 2000, Mr. Brooks sought attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $311,305.64.

Council disputed Mr. Brooks’ claimed fees and, notwithstanding its pending motion for stay, asserted that respondent’s motion was premature until such time as the Circuit Court signed an order affirming its July 6, 1999, dismissal of Council’s complaint and memorializing its award of attorney’s fees. Some two years later, on September 23, 2002, the Circuit Court finally filed an order that read as follow: “For the reasons stated by the Court at the July 6, 1999 hearing in this matter, it is, on this 23 day of September, 2002, by the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Maryland, ⁷¹³ ORDERED, that [Council’s] Complaint in these proceedings is hereby dismissed and the foreclosure sale of January 15, 1999, invalidated; and it is further, ORDERED, that [Council’s] Motion to Reconsider Ruling of May 27, 1999, is hereby denied; and it is further, ORDERED, that [Brooks’] Motion, pursuant to Md. Rule 2-424(e), to recover expenses, including reasonable attorney fees incurred in making proof of matter which [Council] failed to admit (Docket # 98) is hereby denied; and it is further, ORDERED, that [Council] shall pay to [Brooks] reasonable attorney’s fees for his prior appeal to the Court of Special Appeals in these proceedings, such amount to be determined following a hearing on this issue; and it is further, ORDERED, that [Brooks] shall establish his reasonable attorney fees for his involvement in these proceedings after December 17, 1997. The parties shall also establish the percent of the budget of [Council] that is paid to [GCA] for its assessments. [Council] shall be responsible for and pay to [Brooks] this percentage of [Brooks’] attorney’s fees for his involvement in these proceedings after December 17, 1997. The determination of these figures shall be made by the Court following a hearing on this issue; and it is further, ORDERED, that the issue of the amount of attorneys’ fees shall be deferred until the completion of any appeal of this Order; and it is further, ORDERED, that the amount of the supersedeas bond is hereby set at $1,000.00. [Council] shall be given seven (7) days to post such bond and the effect of this Order shall be stayed during this seven (7) day period, and if such bond is timely posted, the stay shall continue in effect thereafter until the appeal is completed.” [Alterations added.] On September 30, 2002, the Circuit Court granted Council’s motion to allow a cash bond in lieu of a supersedeas bond. ⁷¹⁴ Council noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals 25 on October 16, 2002, appealing the Circuit Court’s September 23, 2002, order that invalidated the second foreclosure sale and awarded Mr. Brooks attorney’s fees; Mr. Brooks cross-appealed on October 25, 2002.

Each party presented questions to the intermediate appellate court. Council sought review of the following: “1. Did the circuit court err in setting aside the January 15,1999 foreclosure sale of Brooks’s property? 2. Did the circuit court err in determining that Brooks was entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees?” Mr. Brooks presented three questions which the Court of Special Appeals slightly rephrased: “1.

Did the circuit court err in its assessment of the amount due for 1995 and 1996 liens by failing to take into account all payments made by Brooks? 2. Did the circuit court err in finding that Brooks was not entitled to attorneys’ fees for records and amounts excluded by the court? 3. Did the circuit court err in not granting reasonable attorneys’ fees to Brooks under Maryland Rule 2-424(e)? Brooks also moved to dismiss the case, claiming that the Council’s Notice of Appeal was not timely filed.” Greenbriar Condominium, Phase I, Council of Unit Oirners, Inc. v. Brooks, 159 Md.App. 275, 282 , 859 A.2d 239, 243 (2004).

As to Council’s questions, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court’s invalidation of the January 15, 1999, foreclosure sale, holding: ⁷¹⁵ “The circuit court was not clearly erroneous in its determination that Brooks had attempted a good faith tender when he submitted to Council $8,411 and, when the tender was refused, sought clarification from Council on the amount due. Council’s refusal letter indicated that Council was unwilling to accept any amount less than $31,114.64, which included attorneys’ fees for the prior invalid foreclosure proceeding. This was sufficient to support a finding that tendering the additional $162.89, which Brooks had calculated was due since the last sale, would be a futile gesture.” Id. at 302 , 859 A.2d at 254 . The intermediate appellate court, however, vacated the Circuit Court’s award of attorney’s fees, observing that Mr. Brooks was not actually the “prevailing party,” in that “[i]t was only during the enforcement proceedings that Brooks cured his default and satisfied the lien.” Id. at 316 , 859 A.2d at 263 .

Furthermore, the intermediate appellate court questioned a pro-se attorney’s entitlement to “collect attorneys’ fees for work on his own behalf’ and opined that “at the end, Council’s ultimate purpose in the proceeding was accomplished. [Mr.] Brooks won some major battles, but he ultimately lost the war that he occasioned by failing to pay his assessments in a timely fashion.” Id. (alteration added). The intermediate appellate court affirmed the Circuit Court’s judgments as they related to Mr. Brooks’ questions, but, after examining the relevant governing documents and noting the budget allocation of an owner’s assessment payments, ruled that the matter should be remanded for a recalculation of the interest due on the unpaid assessments, ie.} “6% interest should be applied to that portion of the debt attributable to GCA assessments, and 18% interest to the portion attributable to Council assessments.” Id. at 308-09 , 859 A.2d at 258 .

II

Discussion The parties position themselves with two competing, yet nonparallel, theories of the issues before this Court. Council asserts that the Court of Special Appeals erred in affirming the Circuit Court’s setting aside of the foreclosure sale on the ⁷¹⁶ basis of an incorrect statement of the debt. On the other hand, Mr. Brooks contends that the Circuit Court’s setting aside of the January 15, 1999, (second) foreclosure sale occurred because Council, by demanding such a high payoff amount, had effectively denied his right of redemption. A. Condominium Assessments Despite the bevy of governing condominium documents present in this case, it is undisputed that Mr. Brooks, as owner of his condominium unit, was obligated to the payment of an annual assessment made due in monthly installments.

It is equally dear that on fifty or more occasions, spread over five or more years between 1989 and 1996, Mr. Brooks failed to pay such installments when due. Condominium fees are designed to provide the condominium association and governing body with a stream of revenue to pay the expenses of the general common elements. As the Court of Special Appeals observed, “Assessments, however they may be characterized, are the financial life blood of common interest communities such as homeowners and condominium associations. They are the taxes on which those communities run and are essential to their operation.” Greenbriar Condominmm, 159 Md.App. at 316 , 859 A.2d at 262-63 . 1.

The Maryland Condominium Act The Maryland Condominium Act (“Act”), Md.Code (1974, 2003 Repl.Vol., 2004 Supp.), §§ 11-101 et seq. of the Real Property Article, not only provides the legislative framework for establishing a condominium regime, but also the authority by which a condominium development can maintain and sustain its existence through the collection of annual assessments upon the unit owners. Originally enacted by 1963 Md. Laws, Chap. 387, as the “Horizontal Property Act,” Md.Code (1957, 1966 Repl.Vol.), Art. 21 §§ 116-142, 26 this Act established the ⁷¹⁷ scope and duties of condominium development and ownership in Maryland. From the outset, this statute contained provisions allowing for the collection of assessments and the imposition of liens upon failure to pay: “§ 131. Common profits, contributions for payment of common expenses of administration and maintenance.

(a) The common profits of the property shall be distributed among, and the common expenses shall be charged to, the unit owners according to the percentages established by Section 120 [Ownership of condominium units, of common elements] of this subtitle. [The allocation formulae have since been repealed or amended.] (b) All co-owners shall contribute in accordance with the percentages [Again, the allocation formulae have changed.] toward the expenses of administration and of maintenance and repairs of the general common elements, and, in' proper cases, of the limited common elements of the building and toward any other expenses lawfully agreed upon by the council of co-owners. (c) No owner shall be exempt from contributing toward such common expenses by waiver of the use or enjoyment of the common elements, both general and limited, or by the abandonment of the condominium unit belonging to him. (d) The contribution may be determined, levied and assessed as a lien on the beginning of each calendar or fiscal year, and may become and be due and payable in such instalments as the by-laws may provide, and the by-laws may further provide that upon default in the payment of any one or more of such instalments, the balance of said lien may be accelerated at the option of the manager, or board of directors and be declared due and payable in full.” [Alterations added.] When amended in 1972, the Horizontal Property Act was renumbered, but remained a part of the previous Maryland Code. See 1972 Md. Laws, Chap. 349, Title XI — Horizontal Property Act, §§ 11-101, et seq.

The above-quoted section remained largely intact, undergoing only the Act-wide renum ⁷¹⁸ bering, and experiencing a slight alteration in its heading and some minor cosmetic changes: “§ 11-116. Distribution of common profits; contributions toward common expenses. (a) The common profits of the property shall be distributed among, and the common expenses shall be charged to, the unit owners according to the percentages established by 11-105 [Ownership of condominium units; undivided share interest in common elements ] of this title. [The allocation formulae have since been repealed or amended.] (b) All co-owners shall contribute in accordance with the percentages [Again, the allocation formulae have since changed.] toward the expenses of administration and of maintenance and repairs of the general common elements, and, in proper cases, of the limited common elements of the building and toward any other expenses lawfully agreed upon by the council of co-owners. (c) No owner shall be exempt from contributing toward such common expenses by waiver of the use or enjoyment of the common elements, both general and limited, or by the abandonment of the condominium unit belonging to him.

(d) The contribution may pursuant to a provision in the by-laws, be determined, levied and assessed as a lien on the beginning of each calendar or fiscal year, and may become and be due and payable in such installments as the bylaws may provide, and the bylaws may further provide that upon default in the payment of any one or more of such installments, the balance of said lien may be accelerated at the option of the manager, or board of directors and be declared due and payable in full.” [Alterations added.] [Changes emphasized.] The only change affected to this section by 1978 Md. Laws, Chap. 2, § 2, was the addition of a section symbol (i.e., § ) in § 11-116(a). The next year, pursuant to 1974 Md. Laws, Chap. 12, the Maryland Horizontal Property Act was recodified as part of the Annotated Code of Maryland at Md.Code (1974), §§ 11- ⁷¹⁹ 101 et seq. of the Real Property Article. Later that year, 1974 Md. Laws, Chap. 641, resulted in renaming the statute as “The Maryland Condominium Act” (“Act”); the relevant section relating to condominium assessments was moved to § 11-110 and the language providing for the payment of condominium assessments was strengthened. The comments of the Condominium Revision Committee of the Real Property, Planning and Zoning Section of the Maryland State Bar Association reflect the importance of condominium assessments.

In respect to the alterations from-the then-denominated Horizontal Property Act, the Committee stated: “The new Title 11, however, goes well beyond the 1972 version to treat, or to substantially enlarge upon the earlier treatment of ... the establishment and enforcement of the lien for common expense assessments.... “The current Maryland [Horizontal Property Act] recognizes that the continuing viability of a condominium depends upon each unit owner contributing his fair share to the payment of common expenses; it provides a hen on the unit to enable the council of co-owners to collect assessments for such expenses.” [Alteration added.] The renumbered § 11-110 stated: “§ 11-110. Common expenses and common profits. (a) Ah common profits of the condominium shall be disbursed to the unit owners, be credited to their ássessments for common expenses in proportion to their percentage interests in common profits and common expenses, or be used for any other purpose as the council of unit owners decides. (b) Funds for the payment of current common expenses and for the creation of reserves for the payment of future common expenses shall be obtained by assessments against the unit owners in proportion to their percentage interests in common expenses and common profits. ⁷²⁰ (c) A unit owner shall be liable for all assessments, or installments thereof, coming due while he is the owner of a unit.

In a voluntary grant the grantee shall be jointly and severally liable with the grantor for all unpaid assessments against the grantor for his share of the common expenses up to the time of the voluntary grant for which a statement of condominium lien is recorded, without prejudice to the rights of the grantee to recover from the grantor the amounts paid by the grantee for such assessments. Liability for assessments may not be avoided by waiver of the use or enjoyment of any common element or by abandonment of the unit for which the assessments are made. (d) All assessments, until paid, together with interest on them and actual costs of collection, constitute a lien on the units on which 'they are assessed, if a statement of lien is recorded within two years after the date the assessment becomes due. The lien shall be effective against a unit from and after the time a statement of condominium lien is recorded among the land records of the county where the unit is located, stating the description of the unit, the name of the record owner, the amount due and the period for which the assessment was due.

The clerk shall index the statement of condominium lien under the name of the record owner in the grantor index and in the block index if one is maintained by the clerk. The statement of condominium lien shall be signed and verified by an officer or agent of the council of unit owners as specified in the by-laws and then may be recorded. On full payment of the assessment for which the lien is claimed the unit owner shall be entitled to a recordable satisfaction of the lien. (e) Any assessment, or installment thereof, not paid when due shall bear interest, at the option of the council of unit owners, from the date when due until paid at the rate provided in the by-laws, not exceeding 8 percent per annum, and if no rate is provided, then at 8 percent per annum.

(f) The hen may be enforced and foreclosed by the council of unit owners, or any other person specified in the by-laws, in the same manner, and subject to the same requirements, ⁷²¹ as the foreclosure of mortgages or deeds of trust on real property in the state containing a power of sale, or an assent to a decree. Suit for any deficiency following foreclosure may be maintained in the same proceeding and suit to recover a money judgment for unpaid assessments may be maintained without waiving the lien securing the same. No action may be brought to foreclose the lien unless brought within three years following the recordation of the statement of condominium lien. No action may be brought to foreclose the lien except after ten days’ written notice to unit onmer given by registered mail — return receipt requested, to the address of the unit oumer shown on the books of the council of unit owners. ...” [Emphasis in original.] In 1981 Md. Laws, Chap. 246,- the purpose statement accompanying this amended legislation stated, in relevant part: “FOR the purpose of specifying certain rights, duties, responsibilities and liabilities of lenders, unit owners, developers, and other persons and organizations having interests in condominiums; specifying powers and responsibilities of a condominium council of unit owners, and condominium board of directors; specifying certain conditions of sale of certain condominium units; specifying rights and duties of buyers and sellers of condominium units.... ” The assessment payment language of § 11-110(d) and (e) was altered.

These changes follow: “§ 11-110. Common expenses and common profits. (a) All common profits of-the condominium shall be disbursed to the unit owners, be credited to their assessments for common expenses in proportion to their percentage interests in common profits and common expenses, or be used for any other purpose as the council of unit owners decides. (b) Funds for the payment of current common expenses and for the creation of reserves for the payment of future common expenses shall be obtained by assessments against ⁷²² the unit owners in proportion to their percentage interests in common expenses and common profits.

(c) A unit owner shall be liable for all assessments, or installments thereof, coming due while he is the owner of a unit. In a voluntary grant the grantee shall be jointly and severally liable with the grantor for all unpaid assessments against the grantor for his share of the common expenses up to the time of the voluntary grant for which a statement of condominium lien is recorded, without prejudice to the rights of the grantee to recover from the grantor the amounts paid by the grantee for such assessments. Liability for assessments may not be avoided by waiver of the use or enjoyment of any common element or by abandonment of the unit for which the assessments are made. (d) All ANY assessments, until paid, together with interest, LATE CHARGES, IF ANY, on them and actual costs of collection, AND REASONABLE ATTORNEY’S FEES, constitutes a lien on the units on which IT IS they are assessed, if a statement of lien is recorded within tw© 2 years after the date the assessment becomes due.

THE RECORDATION OF A GRANT OF A UNIT FOR VALUE EXTINGUISHES THE RIGHT OF THE COUNCIL OF UNIT OWNERS THEREAFTER TO FILE A STATEMENT OF CONDOMINIUM LIEN FOR ASSESSMENTS, OR INSTALLMENTS THEREOF, DUE PRIOR TO THE RECORDATION OF THE GRANT. The lien shall be effective against a unit from and after the time a statement of condominium lien is recorded among the land records of the county where the unit is located, stating the description of the unit, the name of the record owner, the amount due and the period for which the assessment was due. The clerk shall index the statement of condominium lien under the name of the record owner in the grantor index and in the block index if one is maintained by the clerk. The statement of condominium lien shall be signed and verified by an officer or agent of the council of unit owners as specified in the bylaws and then may be recorded.

On full payment of the assessment AND OTHER PERMIT ⁷²³ TED AMOUNTS for which the lien is claimed the unit owner shall be entitled to a recordable satisfaction of the lien IN ANY FORM USED FOR THE RELEASE OF MORTGAGES IN THE COUNTY IN WHICH THE CONDOMINIUM IS LOCATED. FEES, CHARGES, LATE CHARGES, FINES, AND INTEREST ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO §§ 11-110(F) AND 11-112 [ie„ Eminent domain] ARE ENFORCEABLE AS ASSESSMENTS UNDER THIS SECTION. (e) Any assessment, or installment thereof, not paid when due shall bear interest, at the option of the council of unit owners, from the date when due until paid at the rate provided in the bylaws, not exceeding 8 18 percent per annum, and if no rate is provided, then at 8 18 percent per annum. THE BYLAWS ALSO MAY PROVIDE FOR A LATE CHARGE OF two dollars $15 OR ONE twentieth TENTH OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF ANY DELINQUENT ASSESSMENT OR INSTALLMENT, WHICHEVER IS GREATER, PROVIDED THE CHARGE MAY NOT BE IMPOSED MORE THAN ONCE FOR THE SAME DELINQUENT PAYMENT AND MAY ONLY BE IMPOSED IF THE DELINQUENCY HAS CONTINUED FOR AT LEAST 15 CALENDAR DAYS.

(f) The lien may be enforced and foreclosed by the council of unit owners, or any other person specified in the bylaws, in the same manner, and subject to the same requirements, as