Greenfeld v. Hook

Offutt, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This case grows out of a collision between two automobiles in the intersection of Lafayette Avenue and Eutaw Place in Baltimore City at about nine o’clock in the evening of June 8th, 1988. One machine, driven by Mrs. Mabel Hook, who was returning to her home in Ellicott City from a visit to her daughter, a patient in the Women’s Hospital in Baltimore, was proceeding west on Lafayette Avenue, the other, driven by Dr. Wil ¹¹⁹ liam Greenfeld, was proceeding south on Eutaw Place, when the collision occurred. Eutaw Place, running north and south, at that intersection is a dual highway, with northbound and southbound driveways separated by a grass plot seventy-four and one-half feet wide.

The northbound driveway is twenty-seven feet wide. The driveway of Lafayette Avenue at the intersection is thirty-nine feet wide. Eutaw Place at that point and at that time was a boulevard or “stop” street, traffic on and across it was affected by the provisions of Code (Supp. 1935), art. 56, sec. 209, and its character was indicated by “stop signs” placed at the entrance of the intersection. There is a slight down grade on Eutaw Place from Lafayette Avenue to Mosher Street, the first intersecting street to the north, and the view between those points is unobstructed.

Mrs. Hook, who lived in Ellicott City, was not familiar with that part of Baltimore, and Mr. Charles B. Spicer, a friend whom she met at the hospital, offered to drive ahead of her and guide her across the city. She accepted the offer and followed his car until he reached Eutaw Place. He and she both knew that that was a boulevard or “stop” street, so when he reached the east curb of the northbound driveway of Eutaw Place he stopped, and Mrs. Hook who was immediately behind him also stopped. After ascertaining that the way was clear, Spicer drove across to the east curb of the southbound driveway, and stopped again, and then crossed that driveway.

When he left the east curb of the northbound driveway, Mrs. Hook drove into the space he had occupied and stopped again, and then, seeing no northbound traffic, crossed that driveway and stopped behind Spicer at the grass plot. When Spicer drove on across the southbound lane she moved into the space his car had occupied and stopped again at the east curb of the southbound way. She testified that she then looked to her right and, seeing no southbound traffic approaching, she entered the southbound way and was crossing it when her car was struck by the Greenfeld car. As a result of the collision ¹²⁰ Mrs. Hook suffered severe and painful injuries, and subsequently brought this action to recover compensation therefor.

The case was tried before the court and a jury, the trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and from that judgment this appeal was taken. At the close of the whole case the court granted two prayers for the plaintiff, three for the defendant, refused defendant’s A and B and first and fourth prayers, and overruled his special exceptions to the plaintiff’s first prayer. Those rulings are the subject of the only exception argued in this court. The defendant’s A and B prayers deny a recovery, the A prayer on the ground that the uncontradicted evidence showed that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence directly contributing to the happening of the accident, his B prayer on the ground that there was in the case no evidence legally sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover.

Plaintiff’s first prayer, which was granted, and defendant’s first prayer, which was refused, invoke a construction of that part of Code, art. 56, sec. 209, which deals with arterial highways. The contention of the plaintiff, appellee, here, as embodied in her first prayer and approved by the court, is that “persons -travelling upon a boulevard or through street do not have an absolute right of way but that it is the duty of such persons when operating their vehicles upon through or boulevard streets to keep the same under reasonable control and to have the speed of the automobile so reduced in' approaching street crossings as to have the same under reasonable control.” Defendant’s theory, set forth in his first prayer, is that “under the law of the State of Maryland, the operator of a vehicle entering a highway, designated as a boulevard, shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching on such highway, except where traffic at such intersections is controlled by traffic signals or officers.” His fourth prayer would have denied a recovery “if the plaintiff contributed in any manner to the happening of the accident.” Since it made no reference to the facts and circumstances of the collision, ¹²¹ and required no finding of negligence, it was consistent with the theory that, in a collision between a traveller on a boulevard and one crossing the same, the person crossing is under all circumstances, and because of his mere presence, guilty of negligence. Obviously that could not be true and, without further consideration of it, it may be said that that prayer was properly refused. Consideration of the demurrer prayers involves an examination of all the evidence to discover whether, conceding the truth of so much of it as supports the plaintiff’s case, together with all reasonable and legitimate inferences deducible therefrom, it is consistent with a right in the plaintiff to recover compensation from the defendant for the injuries she suffered as a result of the collision.

There was in the case evidence tending to prove the facts stated above, and also other facts which may be thus summarized: When Mrs. Hook drove across the northbound driveway and stopped behind Spicer’s car, she was far enough from the grass plot to permit a taxicab to drive to her right and between her and the curb of the grass plot. When Mr. Spicer moved on, she said: “I pulled up to the curb — east curb of the grass plot. I pulled into the same position that he had occupied and stopped again.” She then said: “At that point, did you look to your right? A. I did.

Q. What did you see? A. Nothing coming in my direction. I could see up Eutaw Place about half a block. I do not know whether it was Mosher Street.

The way was clear and I proceeded across Eutaw Place. A taxicab passed me on my right, and immediately after the cab passed I was hit. I don’t know what kind of a taxicab it was. The taxicab was going quite fast.

Q. How about your speed? A. I was in low gear. Q. How far out from the curb where you had stopped, had you proceeded when you were hit? A. I would say halfway across.” On cross-examination she further testified: “Q. Explain to his Honor and the gentlemen of the jury, that ¹²² if the cab shot by as you just started across, why the cab was not involved in that accident, if you know?

A. Well, the cab was going much faster than I was, and he just missed it. Q. The cab was going much faster than you were, and he just missed it? A. Yes, sir. Q. Missed what?

A. Missed the accident — the crash. Q. How do you know that? You never did see the other car —Dr. Greenfeld’s car? A. I saw it when it hit me.

Yes. Q. When it hit you? A. Yes, sir. Q. Tell us how long did you see it?

How far away was it? Just at the moment of the crash? A. At the moment of the crash. Q. Where were you looking then?

A. After I had pulled up to the curb, I saw that the way was clear. I was looking ahead of me. Q. Then how did you happen to see his car, if you never looked to the right again ? . A. I saw it when it was right on' me.

Q. You saw the lights, didn’t you? A. No. Q. What did you see? Were the lights of his car burning, or were they out? A. I couldn’t see the lights. * * * Q. Now, Mrs. Hook, you say that you could only see half a block away.

What was to prevent you from seeing further, if anything? A. Well, there is quite a bit of — quite a few bushes in that area. Q. Well, now, isn’t it a fact that when you started— the front of your car was up to the curb? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Then you looked ahead? A. Yes, sir. Q. And you never looked to your right again, did you, until the crash occurred; isn’t that correct? When your car arrived at the second lane of traffic — the southbound lane — you said you stopped.

That is when you looked to your right and could see half a block away. That’s true, isn’t it? A. Yes, sir. Q. And nothing was coming?

A. Yes, sir. Q. Then you put your car in gear and started out? A. Yes, sir. Q. And looked ahead?

A. Yes, sir. Q. And you never looked to your right again, did you? A. No.” Spicer testified that when he reached the southbound lane he stopped and looked to his right, that there was nothing moving as far as he could see, that: “You have got a little obstruction there, due to some bushes, but you can get a pretty clear view down grade, going to ¹²³ wards McMechen, you can practically cover that square, and the only thing of any importance in that block, other than a few parking lights on, was a car parked around three or four houses north of Lafayette Avenue, and on the west side of Eutaw Place. That had headlights burning.

That car was not in motion. It was not close in to the curb. It was possibly half a car in to the curb, but it was not in motion.” Just before he reached the west curb line of Eutaw Place, a taxicab passed him on his right, and when he was about “fifteen, eighteen, or twenty feet past Eutaw Place,” he heard the crash of the collision. He stopped and went back and found Mrs. Hook’s car overturned at the southwest corner.

He “looked in the street for skid marks and the only skid marks were like burnt rubber, where it had been swung across the street. Leading from the impact to where Mrs. Hook’s — stopped, the burnt marks were just like if you apply your brakes and keep skidding, you would burn rubber. They were sideways — diagonally. They appear for eighteen or twenty-five feet.” In crossing the southbound driveway Mrs. Hook was travelling at not more than five miles an hour, the taxicab which passed her was going perhaps twenty miles an hour, Greenfeld was travelling at about twenty-five miles an hour when he applied his brakes just before the collision, and Spicer was travelling at about from three to five miles an hour when the taxicab passed him.

Greenfeld testified that as he approached Lafayette Avenue he could see the intersection from about half a block away, but that he did not see Spicer’s car, the taxicab, or Mrs. Hook’s automobile, that he looked ahead and to his right, but that he did not see Mrs. Hook’s car until it was about sixteen feet away. He said that when the collision occurred half of his car was in Lafayette Avenue, and that after the collision he “backed it up a little.” Spicer said that, when the two cars stopped after the collision, Greenfeld’s car was “to the right of the center” and about half a car length beyond that curb, although he did not say which curb. Officer ¹²⁴ Edward Champness, of the “crash squad” of the traffic division of the Baltimore City Police, arrived shortly after the crash, and at that time found Mrs. Hook’s car facing north at the southeast end of the grass plot and Dr. Greenfeld’s car at the northwest intersection facing south. Other witnesses had said that Dr. Greenfeld’s car had been moved, but Champness said he “understood” that it had not been moved before he reached the scene.

At that time both parties had been taken to the hospital. Champness saw Greenfeld there and he signed this statement: “I was bound south on Eutaw Place, going to the Lord Baltimore Hotel. I didn’t see any automobile. The first thing I knew, I struck another car.

I was going about twenty to twenty-five miles an hour. I didn’t even have time to apply my brakes. My 'impression was that the car came from my left.” The same witness proved an excellent diagram of the intersection, and two photographs which showed that the running board and fender back of the right front wheel of the Hook car were damaged, and that the radiator screen and front fenders of the Greenfeld car were crumpled and dented. Before dealing with the rulings on the prayers it is necessary to consider the relative rights of travellers on a highway designated and appropriately marked by the proper authorities as a “boulevard,” “stop street,” or “arterial highway,” and of travellers entering such a highway from intersecting roads and streets, in the light of the statute as construed in two cases recently decided by this court: Carlin v. Worthington, 172 Md. 505 , 192 A. 356 , and Blinder v. Monaghan, 171 Md. 77 , 188 A. 31 .

The statute, Code (Supp. 1935), art. 56, sec. 209, provides : “Except as hereinafter provided, all vehicles shall have the right of way over other vehicles approaching at intersecting public roads from the left, and shall give right of way to those approaching from the right. * * * The State Roads Commission is hereby authorized and directed to designate main traveled or through highways by erecting at the entrances thereto from intersecting ¹²⁵ highways signs notifying drivers of vehicles to come to a full stop before entering or crossing such designated highway, and whenever any such signs have been so erected, it shall be unlawful for the operator of any vehicle to fail to stop in obedience thereto, except when traffic at such marked intersection is controlled by traffic signals or officers. All such signs shall be illuminated at night or so placed as to be illuminated by the headlights of an approaching vehicle or by street lights. The operator of a vehicle entering a highway so designated shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching on such highway, * * * provided, however, that within the limits of Baltimore City, the designation and marking of such main traveled or through highways shall be made by the Police Commissioner of Baltimore City.” That statute imposes, upon one driving an automobile along or on a highway intersecting such a stop street, arterial highway, or boulevard, the duty of coming to a complete stop before entering the favored highway, and of yielding the right of way to all vehicles travelling thereon. The two duties, of stopping and of yielding the right of way, are correlated and co-ordinate.

That of stopping is to give force and practicability to that of yielding the right of way, by requiring the inhibited traveller, before entering the intersection, to stop in order that he may ascertain whether traffic is approaching over and along the favored highway. The rule could have no other rational purpose, for unless the inhibited traveller yields the right of way to traffic on the stop street, the mere act of stopping would be idle, useless, and futile. The obvious and essential purpose of such rules is to accelerate the flow of traffic over through highways by permitting travellers thereon to proceed within lawful speed limits without interruption. That purpose would be completely frustrated if such travellers were required to slow down at every intersecting highway, and the vast sums which have been spent in their construction in an effort to accommodate the great volume of auto ¹²⁶ mobile traffic, which is so indispensable a part of modern life, would be largely wasted.

On the other hand the safety of the travelling public demands that the rules defining the relative rights of travellers on through highways and on highways intersecting them be clear, unmistakeable, and definite. If the duty of stopping and of yielding right of way is positive and inflexible, the inhibited traveller may know that he violates it at his risk, while the traveller on the favored highway may know that he may safely exercise the privilege of uninterrupted travel thereon, which the statute gives. If, however, the relative rights of travellers on the two types of highway are held to depend upon nice calculations of speed, time, and distance, the rule would encourage recklessness and the privilege of uninterrupted travel would mean little more than the privilege of having a jury guess in the event of a collision whose guess was wrong. If the traveller on a stop street were required to slow down and bring his car into control at every intersection there would be no perceptible difference between such a street and any other street on which traffic is controlled by the general rules of the road.

That aspect of the question is emphasized in a very useful annotation to the case of Morris v. Bloomgren, 89 A. L. R. 831, at page 838, where the annotator says : “Although rights of way have been given by statutes and ordinances to certain travellers, as, for example, to those approaching an intersection from the right, these have been construed to give only a relative right, dependent upon the particular circumstances, such as speed, and the distance of the vehicles from the intersection. This has worked out unsatisfactorily in its practical application. The elements of speculation as to speed, distance, etc., have rendered the traveller’s insecurity almost, if not quite, as great as if no regulations existed. What is required is some further assurance that a right of way does in fact exist and will be respected.” The construction of the statute was considered by this court in Blinder v. Monaghan, supra, and Carlin v. ¹²⁷ Worthington, supra, and the contention of appellant apparently rests upon the theory that those cases are in conflict, but they are not.

In Blinder v. Monaghan, the plaintiff was a passenger in a taxicab. The cab westbound on Thirty-second Street approached the