Greer Lines Co. v. Roberts

Prescott, ’ J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal is by four defendants below in a negligence case brought by the appellee, James W. Roberts, as plaintiff. The case was tried before a judge and jury in Baltimore County, and resulted in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $67,500. From the judgment entered on this verdict, all of the defendants have appealed.

The four defendants were John Howard Jarvis, William C. Greer (Greer), The Greer Lines Company, and The Greer Transportation Company (companies). Jarvis was sued for his alleged negligence and negligence imputable to him, while an employee or servant of the other defendants, who were sued as the employers or masters of Jarvis. The appellee, Roberts, received serious and permanent injuries to his left leg on June 23, 1955, when he was pinned between the front of a Ford truck and a guard railing on the parking lot of the Bel Air Diner near Bel Air, Maryland. The Ford truck involved in the accident was owned by the appellant, Greer.

He used this truck on his farm, and also leased it to the appellant companies for several hours each ⁷⁵ .morning to “pick up” milk from various farms. When utilized by the companies, it was a feeder-truck, i. e., it and other feeder-trucks gathered the milk from the farms and brought it to the parking lot, where it was placed in larger trucks for transportation to Washington and Baltimore. When the daily “feeder run,” as it was called, was completed, the truck remained on the parking lot or was used by Greer on his farm. Greer was employed as manager by both companies, and received a weekly salary from each.

He took orders from his father, who was the president of both companies. In addition to his salaries from the companies, he received from them approximately $200, per month, as a rental fee for his Ford truck. Jarvis was employed by both companies to drive their trucks and do minor repair work on the equipment used by them, the repair work being a material factor in his employment by them. His work week consisted of reporting every morning at about 6:00 a.m. and driving a prescribed “feeder” route.

When this work was completed at about 8:30 a.m., he would drive, on alternate days, a tractor-trailer loaded with milk from Bel Air to Washington. He would then return with the empty trailer to Bel Air, usually completing his day around 5:00 p.m. On the days that he did not drive to Washington, he was supposed to do mechanical work for the companies if they desired, and, if they had no mechanical work for him, then he could do work for Greer or any other person. Jarvis testified he was guaranteed a certain minimum wage by the companies whether he drove the milk truck or did nothing but mechanical work for them.

For driving the milk truck he received either $55.00 or $67.00 per week, depending upon the number of trips made to Washington; and, for his mechanical work, he received $1.75 per hour, whether the work was performed for the companies, Greer or anyone else. He also testified that he had done mechanical work on Greer’s station wagon or Ford truck, charged the time to the companies, and been paid by them. There were also charge tickets for work done on the Ford truck by Jarvis in the companies’ records summoned by the appellee. ⁷⁶ The Ford truck, from time to time, needed parts for repairs. When this occurred, the evidence is conflicting as to-whether Greer, individually, paid for the same or the companies.

There was evidence from which the jury could have-concluded that these parts were sometimes paid for by Greer and sometimes by the companies. The parts needed on the day the appellee was ' injured were charged to one of the companies. The companies had the same directors, president, management, and leased a part of the parking lot for their business. Greer testified there was no essential difference between them, except one hauled milk to Washington, and the other to Baltimore.

He, as manager, handled the operations of both, and gave orders to all employees of both, except when his. father, the president of each, was present. The companies, used the same equipment and interchanged it frequently. It was Greer’s responsibility to make all decisions with regard to the equipment and runs, and it was his duty to see that the drivers were present, to switch drivers when necessary, and to see that the trucks were maintained. There was evidence to the effect that Jarvis had authority to obtain, when necessary, others to assist in his repair work for the companies, and, on occasions, they had paid for this-help.

Roberts was employed by the companies in the early morning to assist in their milk hauling operations, for which he received a weekly stipend. When his work for the companies ceased, usually around 9:00 a.m., he was employed by Greer on his farm; for which he received a weekly salary from Greer. Alvin H. Jones, who will be mentioned later, was not employed by the companies, but was employed by Greer to do work upon his farm, on a part-time basis. On the day of the accident, Roberts had completed his day’s work for the companies, and was waiting upon the parking lot, as a result of Greer’s directions, for Greer’s return from Baltimore, when Greer was going to take him to the farm to work.

Jones, who was seventeen years of age and had never obtained an operator’s permit, was also waiting for Greer for the same reason. Before leaving for Balti ⁷⁷ more, Greer requested Jarvis to do some repair work upon the Ford truck. Jarvis began the repair work. He removed the truck from one part of the parking lot to the scene of the accident.

The truck needed a new' fuel pump and distributor points, and the adjustment of the carburetor, which required the hood to be raised. Jarvis had replaced the fuel pump, and, in order to make the adjustment on the carburetor, asked Jones to start the motor. Roberts, in the meantime, had noticed loose nuts on the front of the truck and a wrench. He proceeded to tighten the nuts and had completed doing so very shortly before the motor was started.

Roberts testified he did not hear Jarvis ask Jones to start the motor, and he was unable to see anyone in the seat of the truck because the hood was raised. Jones got into the truck, pushed down on the clutch pedal and started the motor. The motor had run but a few moments, when he released his foot from the clutch pedal preparatory to leaving the driver’s seat. When the pedal was released, the truck lurched forward, pinning Roberts’ leg between the truck and the guard rail.

Jones testified that he did not touch the gear shift at anytime before the truck moved forward. The jury could have concluded that Jarvis had left the gear shift in when he moved the truck to this location. As there are four appellants and their contentions are not the same, we shall consider their respective claims under the headings of “Jarvis,” “The Companies,” and “Greer.” JARVIS Jarvis abandoned his first assignment of error; so we proceed to his only remaining one. He claims the court erred in refusing to direct a verdict in his favor.

He does not contend that Jones was free from negligence, but argues that Jones’ acts and conduct were of his own initiative; that Jones was an intervening human agency between Jarvis and the events that brought on the accident; and, therefore, none of Jarvis’ acts was a proximate cause of the injuries. He further argues that to hold him liable Jones’ acts and conduct must be imputed to him under “some doctrine of law' such as ⁷⁸ master and servant/’ and the principle of respondeat superior has no applicability to him in this case. The rule of respondeat superior arises from the relation of principal and subordinate, and rests upon the powers of control and direction which the superior has over -the subordinate. Hooper v. Brawner, 148 Md. 417, 421 , 129 A. 672 .

It applies when the relation of master and servant, employer and employee, or principal and agent is shown to exist between the wrongdoer and the person sought to be charged for the result of the wrong, at the time and in respect to the very transaction out of which the injury arose. If we lay aside entirely the evidence that the jury was entitled to consider with reference to the individual negligence of Jarvis, there can be no doubt that he was answerable for the acts and conduct of Jones, who was acting under his direct and immediate control and supervision, in starting the motor of the truck. Charles Freeland v. Couplin, 211 Md. 160, 169 , 126 A. 2d 606 . There was no error in the trial court’s refusal to grant his motion for a directed verdict.

THE COMPANIES The companies made two claims: (a) that the appellee was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law; and (b) that Jarvis was not the servant or employee of either of the companies at the time of the accident complained of. (a) This Coúrt has so frequently stated the rule as to what constitutes contributory negligence as a matter of law that it would serve no useful purpose to repeat the same. Eor one of our recent decisions stating the same, see Meldrum v. Kellam Distr. Co., 211 Md. 504, 511 , 128 A. 2d 400 .

In the instant case, the appellee was standing in front of an unoccupied truck that was being worked upon by a mechanic. He had just completed tightening some nuts on the front of the truck. The motor was not running and the hood was up. Roberts testified he did not hear Jarvis ask Jones to start the motor and he could not see inside the cab because of the hood; and that he was standing there and the motor had ⁷⁹ started, and “I imagine