Gregg Neck Yacht Club, Inc. v. County Commissioners

HOLLANDER, Judge. This case involves a dispute concerning ownership of real property, structural improvements, and riparian rights. We must decide, inter alia, whether a deed executed in 1950 conveyed an easement to Kent County or, instead, a fee simple interest that included riparian rights and now encompasses a pier constructed some forty years ago by Gregg Neck Yacht Club, Inc. (“GNYC”), appellant. The pier, situated on the Sassafras River, is at the heart of this dispute.

This litigation was spawned by Kent County’s decision on October 12, 1999, to claim ownership of the pier. That action led GNYC to file suit in the Circuit Court for Kent County on October 25, 1999, against the County Commissioners of Kent County (the “County”) and the Kent County Department of Public Works (the “Department”), appellees. In its declaratory judgment action, amended on December 1, 1999, GNYC asked the court to determine “the intent of the 1950 grant to the County and the property rights arising therefrom.” 1 GNYC also asked the court to declare that appellees were estopped from asserting any rights to the pier or riparian rights. Alternatively, GNYC sought a declaration of ownership by adverse possession.

On April 12, 2000, the circuit court convened an evidentiary hearing, at which numerous witnesses testified and many exhibits were introduced. The hearing proceeded in phases, with the court resolving various issues, seriatim. Ultimately, the court found that the 1950 Deed conveyed a fee simple interest in the disputed land to the County, which necessarily included riparian rights. The court also determined that the County was not estopped from asserting its interests.

As a result, the court concluded that the pier built by GNYC ⁷⁴¹ belongs to the County. This appeal followed, in which appellant presents two questions for our review: I. Did the trial court err when it determined that the 1950 deed conveyed to the County a fee simple estate rather than an easement?

II

Did the trial court err in failing to determine that appellees either acquiesced to the ownership of appellant, or should be equitably estopped from asserting an interest in the subject pier as against appellant? For the reasons that follow, we shall reverse. FACTUAL SUMMARY On July 6,1950, J. Early Wood and his wife, Mary, executed a conveyance to the County of a 40 foot wide “right of way or strip of land,” recorded in the land records, “to be used in the extension, construction, improvement and maintenance of [a] County road.” The 1950 Deed did not mention riparian rights, nor did it use the words “in fee simple.” The Deed stated, in part: WHEREAS the State Roads Commission of Maryland proposes to extend and improve the County road leading from Route 290 (Galena to Sassafras) into Gregg Neck Subdivision in Kent County, and whereas the extension and improvement of said County road will be a material benefit to the adjoining landowners and useful to the general public. NOW, THEREFORE, THIS DEED WITNESSETH that in consideration of the premises, we do hereby give and grant unto the County Commissioners of Kent County to be used in the extension, construction, improvement and maintenance of the aforesaid County road, a right of way or strip of land forty (40) feet in width and more particularly described as follows: BEGINNING at the end of the County Road running from the State Road (leading from Galena to the head of Sassafras and known as Route 290) into Gregg Neck and approximately one-half mile distant from said State Road through the property of J. Early Wood and wife and run ⁷⁴² ning from said point, a right of way 40 feet in width the following courses and distances over other lands of the said J. Early Wood and wife into said Gregg Neck ... * * * AND we further grant to the said County Commissioners of Kent County, or their agents, the right to construct, use and maintain such pipes, culverts and drainage structures as they may desire to construct for the purpose of draining said road, together with the right to create and maintain our land adjacent thereto such slopes as are necessary to support and maintain the aforesaid right of way, and/or adjacent land, at the grades of said road as now proposed.

According to appellant, “[t]he course and distance measurements set forth in the grant are unreliable.” Appellant explains: “If the measurements in the [1950] deed are followed, the right-of-way extends into the Sassafras River [Mill Creek], The actual roadway, known as Mill Road, follows a course that puts its terminus near Mill Creek. This is the location of the pier in question and has served as a County landing.” The public has consistently used the landing, which the County maintains. In contrast, GNYC built, used, and maintained the pier. In 1959, nine years after the conveyance by Wood, GNYC was incorporated by residents of the Gregg Neck Park development.

That same year, GNYC applied to the Army Corps of Engineers for permission to construct the pier in issue, located at what is now the end of Mill Road. By permit dated March 29, 1959, the Army Corps of Engineers authorized construction of a pier to extend fifty feet channelward of the mean high water line in the Sassafras River (Mill Creek), at a point on the south shore at Gregg Neck Park. The survey plats of the Gregg Neck Park subdivision show Sassafras Avenue, sometimes referred to as Mill Road, extending to the water’s edge. Mill Road and Oxford Road are the only two roads in Gregg Neck Park that run to the water.

The pier was constructed in late 1959 or early 1960. Michael Scott, a registered property line surveyor, performed a ⁷⁴³ survey at the request of the County, and testified that “[t]he pier is located within ... the 40 foot right-of-way. At the end of that road.” Additionally, Scott prepared a plat that shows a pier extending about 70 feet into the creek, in the shape of an “L”; the “L” measures 69.93 feet. According to appellees, “There was no authority granted for the construction of the ‘L’ and the dock exceeded the authority granted by the Army Corps of Engineers.” Nevertheless, Elizabeth Smith, who was treasurer of GNYC from 1971 to 1988, and a resident of Gregg Neck Park for 31 years, testified that the County knew of the construction of the pier by GNYC.

She said: “I don’t know if they were asked about it or not, but they certainly knew it was going up because I would call at different times—I asked about it.” During her testimony, the parties stipulated that GNYC has consistently paid corporate taxes. It also incurred expenses regularly to maintain the pier, dating to 1971, in the total sum of $10,039.74. Daniel Fleming, President of GNYC, testified about a letter dated June 29,1961, from Wood, the grantor, to Clyde Wilgus, the first president of GNYC and founder of the Gregg Neck Park Civic Association, Inc. (“Association”). He stated, in relevant part: I must call your attention to the fact that your organization is using all the facilities of the beaches and anchorages of Gregg Neck Park without assuming the ownership of the roads leading to them.

I am anxious to divest myself of this responsibility without further delay. Will you please advise me promptly what the intentions of the Gregg Neck Yacht Club, Inc. are with regard to taking over the roads. One year later, on July 10, 1962, Wood and his wife conveyed to the Association, in fee simple, some 17.5 acres, which expressly included riparian rights but excluded the conveyance to the County pursuant to the 1950 Deed. The 1962 Deed stated, in part: ⁷⁴⁴ All of the right, title, interest and estate of the said Grantors in and to all that right of way 50 feet wide and that easement area throughout the development known as Gregg Neck Park....

Containing 11% acres, more or less. Being all of the right of way and easement areas as shown on the revised plat of the development known as Gregg Neck Park, recorded among the Land Records for Kent County. SAYING AND EXCEPTING therefrom the 40-foot wide road within this area which by deed dated the 6th day of July, 1950, and recorded among the Land Records for Kent County ... was granted and conveyed unto the County Commissioners of Kent County. TOGETHER with the plaza areas, approaches to navigable waters at the road ends, and the beach area and riparian rights connected therewith.

BEING a part of the same real estate which by deed dated the 9th day of November, 1946, and recorded among the Land Records for Kent County aforesaid in Liber R.A.S. No. 41, folio 394, was granted and conveyed unto the said J. Early Wood and Mary E. Wood, his wife, by Sara C. Plummer et al. (Emphasis added). At the hearing, the parties introduced minutes of various meetings held over the years by the County Commissioners, at which the pier was discussed. According to the Minutes of March 2, 1971, the County discussed ownership of both the landing and the pier on that date. As a result, the County wrote to Wilgus, as President of GNYC, and requested a copy of GNYC’s application to the Army Corps of Engineers and the permit issued to GNYC.

The Minutes of the County Commissioners of March 23, 1971, reveal that the Association asked the County to close “about 200' to the end of the road.” The County took the matter “under advisement,” however, “until the matter could be cleared up concerning permit and ownership of the pier at the end of the [C]ounty road.” ⁷⁴⁵ The Minutes of the County Commissioners dated September 11, 1973, reflect that the issue of ownership of the road and the pier was considered by the County on that date. Three people appeared before the County Commissioners with regard to the 1950 conveyance: State Senator Elroy Boyer; Phillip Skipp, the attorney for Wood who had prepared the 1950 Deed; and a person identified as Mrs. Levis. Boyer asked the County to sign a quit claim deed so that the Association could “control the area from the end of the road to the waters [sic] edge.” Significantly, Skipp advised the Commissioners that “it was not the intent of Mr. Wood to convey this area to the County....” The County never signed a quit claim deed, however. According to the Minutes of the County Commissioners dated May 21, 1974, the Association and various residents of the area appeared in reference to a petition “to close the area at the end of Gregg Neck Road.” Skipp advised that, with respect to the 1950 Deed, “it was Mr. Wood’s intention to deed only the land for the road and not the riparian right at the end of the road.” Shortly thereafter, on September 13, 1974, Wood’s widow executed a Confirmatory Deed, which was almost identical to the 1962 Deed.

Its purpose was to correct the “vagueness” regarding the 1962 Deed, and to confirm the conveyance to the Association, including “approaches to navigable waters at the road ends, and the beach and riparian rights,” exclusive of the right-of-way previously given to the County. It also provided that the conveyance to the Association was “in fee simple.” The Minutes of the Kent County Department of Public Works, dated November 5, 1985, indicate that Carter Stanton, the Department’s Director, determined that “the pier existed before this area was established as a County landing in the 1950’s.” Although the County had a right-of-way to build the road, “the private pier owned by the Gregg Neck Boat Club is directly in front of the right-of-way.” Thus, “[t]he Board requested that the Public Landings and Facilities Board make ⁷⁴⁶ recommendation [sic] for an amiable resolution for both owners of the pier and the general public wishing to use the County Ramp.” 2 Stanton advised the Board on November 3, 1985, that he “had no further recommendations to submit for resolving the problem with the County landing and the privately owned pier” in Gregg Neck Park. On December 3, 1985, Stanton again reiterated that the Board had no recommendations to submit for resolving the problem with “the County landing and the privately owned pier.” The Board’s Minutes of April 8, 1996, indicate that Stanton appeared in response to a concern about the pier. At that time, he “advised that this pier is not on County property.” As a result, the Board advised “that the County does not have anything to do with this issue.” The Board’s Minutes of May 13, 1996, indicate that the Commissioners “advised [Stanton] to write a letter to Mr. McCollum informing him that the County has nothing to do with the Gregg Neck [c]ommunity slips.” Accordingly, by letter dated April 9, 1996, Stanton wrote to William McCollum and said, in part: Several weeks ago, I spoke to you on the telephone and explained the County’s position on the pier near Gregg Neck public landing.

In answer to your letter, I do not know who owns the pier or slips next to Gregg Neck public landing, only that the County does not. Not being familiar with the Community Association bylaws or the “Yacht Club” Bylaws, I do not know who controls the slips. I am also not aware of the rights property owners have to slips, this would be included in the deed or contract of sale ... ⁷⁴⁷ I do not intend to seem short, however the County has never been involved with the pier next to Gregg Neck Public Landing. (Emphasis added.) Stanton’s testimony at the hearing was consistent with the information recounted from the various minutes.

He opined that the pier belonged to GNYC. The following testimony is relevant: [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: ... [Y]ou are aware there’s a pier out at Gregg Neck Landing, correct? [STANTON]: Yes, sir. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: What is your understanding as to who owns that pier? [STANTON]: It was always my understanding from the time I was employed with the County that it was not owned by the County. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: Who told you that? [STANTON]: ... I guess the County Commissioners, originally, or the Director of Parks and Recreation at the time. I’m not sure who told me. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: You don’t know specifically what Commissioners told you that? [STANTON]: No ... [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: And did you ever discuss the issue with the members of the Gregg Neck Yacht Club? [STANTON]: The issue of that pier has come—people have called me—I have seen people when I was up there and have spoken to them.

I don’t know whether they are members of the Yacht Club or not. I assume they are from Gregg Neck or that area. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: What did you tell them if they asked you about the pier? [STANTON]: I have always said that it wasn’t the County’s pier, that we had the ramp and that was the extent of it as far as I knew—the right of way and the ramp. ⁷⁴⁸ [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: ... [D]id you ever tell anybody that the Gregg Neck Yacht Club, or Boat Club owned the pier? [STANTON]: I—yes, I may have. * * * [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: And so that anyone that asked you told them—if someone from the public asked generally you would have told them it was not the County’s property? [STANTON]: That is correct. The pier. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: So back in 1985, at least, and maybe before that, you and the Public Landings were aware that—or were of the opinion and probably told people that Gregg Neck Boat Club, that I referred to as Gregg Neck Yacht Club owned that pier? [STANTON]: Yes sir. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: Is that correct? Did you ever hear the Commissioners remark in open session that the pier was privately owned? [STANTON]: I—maybe not privately owned, but that it wasn’t theirs—I mean it wasn’t the County’s. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: So in open session you recall hearing the Commissioners state that the pier was not the County’s? [STANTON]: Yes.

(Emphasis added). Donald Replogle, a former resident of Gregg Neck and former president of GNYC, testified that he acquired his residential property in 1958, and had a slip at the pier. He stated: “Well it was always my understanding that the Gregg Neck Yacht Club owned the pier.” Further, he claimed that appellant maintained the pier at its expense. He recalled that, on behalf of GNYC, he had once asked the County to erect a security light at the end of Mill Road, near the landing and the pier, but was informed by Stanton that the County ⁷⁴⁹ denied the request because the light “would only benefit the members of the private pier.” (Emphasis added).

Replogle also testified that at various times he and Stanton discussed the public landing and the pier, and that on every occasion Stanton indicated that the pier was private property. Linda Watson purchased a home in Gregg Neck Park and joined GNYC in 1986. It was her understanding that the pier was privately owned, with signs to that effect posted on the pier. Watson testified that in 1988 or 1989, she and other members of GNYC attended a meeting of the County Commissioners in order to discuss the possibility of expanding GNYC’s pier.

During that meeting, Stanton represented that the pier belonged to GNYC. Christine Gillan, who also had a slip at the pier, testified that the contract of sale for the purchase of her home provided for the sale of the house “[tjogether with all rights or license the sellers have to their boat slip to the property.” According to Gillan, the original owner of her home stated that “the slip goes with the house-that’s the way it is and that’s the way it’s been for 40 years.” Gillan estimated that she paid an additional $13,000 for her home because of the boat slip at the private pier. Further, she testified that she relied on information from the County to the effect that the pier does not belong to the County. In the first of several oral rulings, the court found the 1950 Deed ambiguous with respect to the nature of the conveyance.

The court recognized that the term “right-of-way” could either create an easement or a fee simple interest. The court also said: “I’m not exactly sure what [Wood’s] intent was. He conveyed fee simple to the County, made no mention of riparian rights.” Therefore, the court recognized that it had “to determine [Mr. Wood’s] intent in 1950 ...,” because the 1950 Deed “doesn’t say whether [the conveyance of the 40 foot wide right-of-way] is fee simple----” In resolving the ambiguity, the court considered it significant that Wood wanted “to get rid of the roads. He wants to get rid of the maintenance of the roads.... ” ⁷⁵⁰ In its construction of the 1950 Deed, the court also relied on the 1961 and 1974 deeds, which conveyed to the Association, in fee simple, some 17.5 acres, exclusive of the 40 foot right-of-way that Wood conveyed to the County in 1950.

Looking at all three deeds together, the court concluded that it was “even more clear” that the 1950 Deed conveyed a fee simple interest to the County, with riparian rights, although there was “neither reservation of, nor an express grant of riparian rights.” Further, the court said: I’m not concerned about the term “right of way.” I’m concerned with fee simple or easement, as to the degree of ownership. And [Wood] doesn’t say it, and that subsequent deed, though, in 1962, whether he meant to or not, and maybe he didn’t read it well, when he drafted it, the way it’s written—it’s clear from that and that’s all we have to go on. Because he isn’t here for testimony, but it’s clear that he conveyed ... the whole roadway.... My inclination is, from my understanding of property law, that once you grant, and it’s in fee simple, you get the whole bundle of sticks that go with it.

The whole bundle of property rights, as I say, that go along with it. Two days later, after additional testimony that we previously summarized, the court resolved the remaining issues, stating: I have already found that the pier touches on property which had previously been granted to the County.... * * * [T]here is nothing to indicate that the County Commissioners were aware of the construction of the pier until after it had been constructed. And, quite simply, for the next thirty-five to forty years, there was a situation where the County considered it a public landing, the ramp, the access from the road to the water to be public with a private pier leading therefrom. And it was somewhat acknowledged but, quite simply, it doesn’t appear anyone knew quite what to do with it.

It was somewhat benign and didn’t cause anyone any trouble. ⁷⁵¹ Over several sets of County Commissioners, this continued on. Now, as you go through several sets of commissioners, one thing is that the failure to act, realistically, by one set of commissioners on an issue does not bind future commissioners from taking action. Now that the Court has determined that the property, the land belongs to the County, the pier in question and the slips extend from County property, the question is what should be the resolution. I find that estoppel and waiver does not apply to the County Government in this situation....

I can not find that anyone acted to their detriment on any actions taken by the Commissioners, or by the County. So, consequently, I have a private structure built on County property. That can not continue. Therefore, I find that the pier in question is the property of the Kent County Commissioners.

It would be under the direction of the Public Landings Commission.... To that extent, the pier ... is public.... Therefore, the court ruled that “[t]he pier, including the slips constructed by Gregg Neck Yacht Club, Inc. is the property of the County Commissioners of Kent County, Maryland.” Nevertheless, the court ordered appellees to lease the slips to the members of GNYC who were occupying them. We shall include additional facts in our discussion.

DISCUSSION I. When, as here, an action is tried without a jury, we review the case on both the law and the evidence. We will not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous. Rule 8-181; see Gwynn v. Oursler, 122 Md.App. 493, 502, 712 A.2d 1072 , cert. denied, 351 Md. 662 , 719 A.2d 1262 (1998); see also Murphy v. 24th Street Cadillac Corp., 353 Md. 480, 497 , 727 A.2d 915 (1999); Inner ⁷⁵² bichler v. Innerbichler, 132 Md.App. 207, 229 , 752 A.2d 291 , cert. denied, 361 Md. 232 , 760 A.2d 1107 (2000). The clearly erroneous standard requires an appellate court to “ ‘consider the evidence produced at trial in a light most favorable to the prevailing party.’ ” Murphy, 353 Md. at 497 , 727 A.2d 915 (citation omitted).

A trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous when they are not supported by substantial evidence. Id. The clearly erroneous standard only applies to the lower court’s findings of fact, however. B & P Enter. v. Overland Equip.

Co., 133 Md.App. 583, 602 , 758 A.2d 1026 (2000); Nationwide Ins. Cos. v. Rhodes, 127 Md.App. 231, 235 , 732 A.2d 388 (1999); Piper v. Layman, 125 Md.App. 745, 754 , 726 A.2d 887 (1999). When we consider conclusions of law, our review is more expansive. Narayen v. Bailey, 130 Md.App. 458, 461-62 , 747 A.2d 195 (2000).

We do not accord any deference to “[p]ure conclusions of law.” Oliver v. Hays, 121 Md.App. 292, 306 , 708 A.2d 1140 (1998); see B & P Enter., 133 Md.App. at 602 , 758 A.2d 1026 ; Porter v. Schaffer, 126 Md.App. 237, 259 , 728 A.2d 755 , cert. denied, 355 Md. 613 , 735 A.2d 1107 (1999). Instead, we must determine whether the trial court was legally correct. Andy’s Ice Cream, Inc. v. City of Salisbury, 125 Md.App. 125, 137 , 724 A.2d 717 , cert. denied, 353 Md. 473 , 727 A.2d 382 (1999).

II

The parties dispute whether, in 1950, Wood conveyed an easement or a fee simple interest to the County in the 40 foot right-of-way, and whether the conveyance included riparian rights. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in concluding that Wood conveyed a fee simple interest to the County in the 40 foot right-of-way, which included riparian rights and now extends to the pier. Moreover, even if the grant, on its face, conveyed a fee simple interest and riparian rights, appellant asserts that the court erred by failing to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel to bar the County’s claim to the pier. ⁷⁵³ Appellant concedes that, generally, “a fee simple conveyance contains, among other things, a conveyance of riparian rights.” But, GNYC argues that the conveyance of the right-of-way in the 1950 Deed amounted to an easement, and thus did not include riparian rights. Appellees counter that the 1950 Deed conveyed the land in fee simple, and therefore the County obtained riparian rights.

Moreover, appellees argue that the County “was clearly acting in its governmental capacity in maintaining the premises and constructing a boat ramp thereon. The doctrine of estoppel or acquiescence does not work against a municipality.” In appellees’ view, it is of no moment that, for some 40 years, the County “elected to ignore” appellant’s claim to the pier. We begin our analysis with an overview of several legal concepts that are important to an understanding of this case and our resolution of it. An easement is “a non[-]possessory interest in the real property of another.” Boucher v. Boyer, 301 Md. 679, 688 , 484 A.2d 630 (1984); see Kirby v. Hook, 347 Md. 380, 392 , 701 A.2d 397 (1997).

It “can be created expressly or by implication.” Kirby, 347 Md. at 392 , 701 A.2d 397 . An express easement by reservation arises when a property owner conveys part of his property to another, but includes language in the conveyance that creates a right to use some part of the transferred land as a right-of-way. See Greenwalt v. McCardell, 178 Md. 132, 136 , 12 A.2d 522 (1940), overruled on other grounds by Travelers Indem. Co. v. Nationwide Constr.

Corp., 244 Md. 401 , 224 A.2d 285 (1966); Greif v. Teas, 156 Md. 284, 300 , 144 A. 281 (1929). “A private easement implies, as an essential quality thereof, two distinct tenements; namely, the dominant, to which the right belongs, and the servient, upon which the obligation rests.” Maryland & P.R. Co. v. Silver, 110 Md. 510, 516 , 73 A. 297 (1909); see Board of County Comm’rs of Garrett County v. Bell Atlantic-Md., Inc., 346 Md. 160, 175 , 695 A.2d 171 (1997). If land is burdened by an easement, the owner of the servient estate is not divested of ownership of the property. Greenwalt, 178 Md. at 136 , 12 ⁷⁵⁴ A.2d 522. Rather, the easement area remains the property of the owner of the servient estate.

Id. “ A right of way is nothing more than a special and limited right of use; and every other right or benefit derivable from the land, not essentially injurious to, or incompatible with the peculiar use called the right of way, belongs as absolutely and entirely to the holder of the fee simple as if no such right of way existed.’ ” Desch v. Knox, 253 Md. 307, 311, 252 A.2d 815 (1969) (quoting Public Service Comm’n v. Maryland Gas Transmission Corp., 162 Md. 298, 312 , 159 A. 758 (1932)); see Millson v. Laughlin, 217 Md. 576, 585 , 142 A.2d 810 (1958) (“[T]he owner of the servient tenement is entitled to use and enjoy his property to the fullest extent consistent with the reasonably necessary use thereof by his neighbor in accordance with the terms and conditions of the grant.”). As the Court said in Bishields v. Campbell, 200 Md. 622, 624 , 91 A.2d 922 (1952), “a right of way is merely a right of passage and the owner of the land is entitled to use it for any purpose that does not unreasonably interfere with the use of the easement.” In Chevy Chase Land Co. v. United States, 355 Md. 110, 124, 733 A.2d 1055 (answering certified question), aff'd, 230 F.3d 1375 (Fed.Cir.1999), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 121 S.Ct. 380 , 148 L.Ed.2d 293 (2000), the Court recently said: “[I]t has generally been held by courts of this and other states that ‘deeds which in the granting clause convey a “right of way” are held to convey an easement only.’ ” (Citation omitted). The property dispute in Chevy Chase concerned a “right of way” granted by deed in 1911 to a railroad, and later converted to a hiking and biking trail under the federal “Rails to Trails” Act. Id. at 117, 733 A.2d 1055 .

The Court construed the deed granting the conveyance. In the context of that issue, the Court said: The general rule that the terms “right-of-way” and “easement” are synonymous came about because the rule is consistent with the likely intent of the parties to a deed when the term “right-of-way” is used____“The fact that the ⁷⁵⁵ word ‘easement’ was not used to designate the property interest passing is not of particular significance since use of the phrase ‘right-of-way’ is generally understood to mean that only an easement is being granted.” Id. at 126 , 733 A.2d 1055 (citations omitted). The Court recognized that a deed conveying a right-of-way to a railroad could constitute an estate in fee simple. Id. at 128 , 733 A.2d 1055 .

But, it added that “when a deed conveying a right-of-way fails to express a clear intent to convey a different interest in land, a presumption arises that an easement was intended.” Id. Common law dedications are “voluntary offers to dedicate land to public use, and the subsequent acceptance, in an appropriate fashion, by a public entity.” City of Annapolis v. Waterman, 357 Md. 484, 503 , 745 A.2d 1000 (2000). Ordinarily, the fee owner of land conveys an interest in the land “ ‘to the public; usually to the local government having jurisdiction over the land.’ ” Id. at 506 , 745 A.2d 1000 (quoting Urban Planning and Land Development Control Law § 140, at 259 (1975)). The owner retains a fee simple interest in the dedicated parcel, “subject to an easement for the public.” Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Comm’n v. McCaw, 246 Md. 662, 675 , 229 A.2d 584 (1967); see Perellis v. City of Baltimore, 190 Md. 86, 92 , 57 A.2d 341 (1948); Slear v. Jankiewicz, 189 Md. 18, 26 , 54 A.2d 137 (1947) , cert. denied, 333 U.S. 827 , 68 S.Ct. 453 , 92 L.Ed. 1112 (1948) .

A completed common law dedication “requires an offer and an acceptance.” Washington Land Co. v. Potomac Ridge Development, 137 Md.App. 33, 40 , 767 A.2d 891 (2001); see Town of Glenarden v. Lewis, 261 Md. 1, 3 , 273 A.2d 140 (1971). Acceptance may occur when the “appropriate entity assum[es] control and maintenance of the property offered.” Waterman, 357 Md. at 504 , 745 A.2d 1000 . Once an offer by a grantor is accepted by a competent government authority, “common-law dedication is complete.” Id.; see Mauck v. Bailey, 247 Md. 434, 442-44 , 231 A.2d 685 (1967). The accep ⁷⁵⁶ tance requirement is important because it “ ‘protects] municipalities from having someone impose upon them the responsibility for maintenance or repair of streets or highways.’ ” Waterman, 357 Md. at 505 , 745 A.2d 1000 (citation omitted).

Generally, an acceptance of an offer to dedicate is shown by one of four methods. See Windsor Resort v. Ocean City, 71 Md.App. 476, 486-87 , 526 A.2d 102 , cert. denied, 311 Md. 145 , 532 A.2d 1371 (1987). These are: acceptance of a deed or other record; acts in pais, such as grading, at public expense; long use; or express statutory or other official action. Washington Land Co., 137 Md.App. at 44 , 767 A.2d 891 ; see Farrell v. Phillips, 94 Md.App. 152, 156 , 616 A.2d 437 (1992) (Dedication may be shown “ ‘by deed or other record; by acts in pais, such as opening, grading or keeping the road in repair at the public expenses; or by long continued use[ ] on the part of the public.’ ” (quoting City of Baltimore v. Broumel, 86 Md. 153, 158 , 37 A. 648 (1897))).

In a dispute about whether a dedication has occurred, the court must consider “declarations of the landowner, his intentions as manifested by his acts, and all the other circumstances of the case.” Smith v. Shiebeck, 180 Md. 412, 420 , 24 A.2d 795 (1942). The owner’s intent “to give his lands over to public use” is critical. Washington Land Co., 137 Md.App. at 41 , 767 A.2d 891 ; see Blank v. Park Lane Center, Inc., 209 Md. 568, 574 , 121 A.2d 846 (1956) (“The intention of the owner is the governing test.”). Moreover, the “[ejxpression of that intent must be clear and unequivocal.” Washington Land Co., 137 Md.App. at 41 , 767 A.2d 891 ; see Department of Natural Resources v. Ocean City, 274 Md. 1, 8 , 332 A.2d 630 (1975).

Similarly, “the public must also show its intent to accept clearly and decisively.” Washington Land Co., 137 Md.App. at 41 , 767 A.2d 891 ; see North Beach v. North Chesapeake Beach Land & Improvement Co., 172 Md. 101, 116 , 191 A. 71 (1937). It is noteworthy that “ ‘a conveyance creates a ‘dedication’ only when the conveyance benefits the public at large and not merely a portion of it, such as the property owners ⁷⁵⁷ within a particular subdivision.’ ” Waterman, 357 Md. at 506 , 745 A.2d 1000 (quoting River Birch Assoc. v. City of Raleigh, 326 N.C. 100 , 388 S.E.2d 538, 542 (1990)); see Chapman v. Rogan, 222 Md. 12, 19 , 158 A.2d 626 (1960); Brady v. Farley, 193 Md. 255, 259 , 66 A.2d 474 (1949). In effect, the “ ‘public must be a party to every dedication [because] the essence of a dedication to public uses is that it shall be for the use of the public at large.’ ” Waterman, 357 Md. at 506 , 745 A.2d 1000 (quoting River Birch, 388 S.E.2d at 542 ). Once property has been dedicated, it “cannot later be acquired by adverse possession.” Farrell, 94 Md.App. at 156 , 616 A.2d 437 ; see City of Baltimore v. Chesapeake Marine Ry.

Co., 233 Md. 559, 572 , 197 A.2d 821 (1964), overruled, in part, on other grounds by Travelers, supra, 244 Md. at 414-16 , 224 A.2d 285 . On the other hand, “Where the public has never accepted the offer of dedication ... the property is subject to adverse possession.” Farrell, 94 Md.App. at 156 , 616 A.2d 437 . The Farrell Court explained, 94 Md.App. at 156 , 616 A.2d 437 : The reason is that the dedication is not complete and the original dedicator or his successors in interest may revoke or modify the offer to dedicate, in whole or in part, until there is an acceptance. Adverse possession of property offered but not accepted for public use forecloses the right, title and interest of the original dedicator with respect to the property offered to the public and revokes the offer to dedicate.

Riparian rights are also pertinent here. “Generally, a riparian landowner is ‘defined as one who owns land bordering upon, bounded by, fronting upon, abutting or adjacent and contiguous to and in contact with a body of water.... ’ ” Kirby v. Hook, supra, 347 Md. at 389 , 701 A.2d 397 (citation omitted); see Kelly v. Nagle, 150 Md. 125, 137 , 132 A. 587 (1926); Gwynn v. Oursler, 122 Md.App. at 497 , 712 A.2d 1072 . Maryland Code (1982, 1996 RepLVol.), § 16-103 of the Environment Article (“E.A.”), provides that a “riparian owner may not be deprived of any right, privilege, or enjoyment of riparian ⁷⁵⁸ ownership....” Further, E.A. § 16-201 provides: “A person who is the owner of land bounding on navigable water is entitled to any natural accretion to the person’s land..-.. After an improvement has been constructed, the improvement is the property of the owner of the land to which the improvement is attached.” Maryland Code (1957,1998 RepLVol.), Art. 25, § 156, states: § 156. Authority to establish.

In all cases where the public convenience requires it, the county commissioners shall have the power to establish a public landing upon any navigable river, canal, bay, sound or other navigable waters. The County established a public landing at the end of Mill Road. Public landings are established for the benefit of the public, so that “the transit of travelers and the use of the landing in any lawful way must be reasonably expeditious and consistent with its successive and reasonable enjoyment in common by all the public, whose convenience and necessity are of paramount consideration.” Maxa v. County Comm’rs, 158 Md. 229, 231 , 148 A. 214 (1930). Moreover, this important public right may be enforced by the State pursuant to Md. Code (1957, 1996 RepLVol.), Art. 27, § 484.

It states, in relevant part: § 484. Damaging or interfering with use of public wharf or landing. Any person, partnership or corporation who shall interfere with the use of a public landing, or do anything to destroy its usefulness to the public, or who shall destroy or damage any wharf or other structure erected on said wharf ... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor upon conviction thereof shall be subject to a fine of not less than $25.00. No evidence was presented, however, that GNYC’s pier interfered with the County’s right to maintain and control the public landing. ⁷⁵⁹ III.

As we previously observed, the 1950 Deed conveyed a “right of way” to the County for the purpose of the “extension, construction, improvement and maintenance of the ... County road,” along with the right to “use and maintain such pipes, culverts and drainage structure” and to “maintain the right of way, and/or adjacent land, at the grades of said road.” The question is whether the right-of-way amounted to an easement or a fee simple interest. Ordinarily, the construction of a deed is a question of law for the court, and is subject to de novo review. Chevy Chase, 355 Md. at 123 , 733 A.2d 1055 ; Auction & Estate Representatives, Inc. v. Ashton, 354 Md. 333, 341 , 731 A.2d 441 (1999); Calomiris v. Woods, 353 Md. 425, 434 , 727 A.2d 358 (1999); see also Adloo v. H.T. Brown Real Estate, Inc., 344 Md. 254, 266 , 686 A.2d 298 (1996).

To ascertain the nature of the property interest conveyed to the County, we must first look to the language of the 1950 Deed. In construing the language of a deed, the basic principles of contract interpretation apply. Chevy Chase, 355 Md. at 123 , 733 A.2d 1055 ; see Brown v. Whitefield, 225 Md. 220, 225 , 169 A.2d 920 (1961); Buckler v. Davis Sand & Gravel Corp., 221 Md. 532, 537 , 158 A.2d 319 (1960). “These principles require consideration of ‘ “the character of the contract, its purpose, and the facts and circumstances of the parties at the time of execution.” ’ ” Chevy Chase, 355 Md. at 123 , 733 A.2d 1055 (citations omitted). In addition, the