Gregory W. Dallas, P.C. v. Environmental Health Associates, Ltd.

ROBERT M. BELL, Judge. Gregory W. Dallas, P.C. and Gregory W. Dallas, its president, appellants, appeal from the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County striking its jury trial demand and remanding the action, filed against them in the District Court of Maryland for Baltimore County, by Envi ³⁵³ ronmental Health Associates, Ltd., appellee, to that court for trial. 1 They present two issues for our resolution: 1. Does the separate writing requirement of Rule 3-325, Maryland Rules, allow a jury to be stricken and a case returned to District Court when the pleading filed was recognized by all parties as a Jury Demand and no party can show prejudice? 2. Does a plaintiff waive his objection to a Jury Demand in a District Court action where he fails to file a timely motion to Strike in the Circuit Court following the transfer?

Together, these issues challenge the propriety of the trial court’s ruling on a motion, captioned in the District Court, filed in the circuit court more than thirty days after the latter court had notified the parties that the case had been docketed in the circuit court. For the reasons that follow, we will reverse. The facts underlying appellee’s action against appellants are not germane to this appeal. Suffice it to say that on August 24, 1987 appellee filed suit in the District Court seeking $5727.25, plus interest, in fees from appellants for work, services, and labor performed at appellants’ request.

In response, on November 9, 1987, appellants filed a Notice Of Intention To Defend With Motion To Dismiss And Alternative Jury Demand. The demand for jury trial was included within, and was not a separate paper from, the notice. Having received appellants’ pleading, appellee filed, on November 16, 1987, Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Jury Trial Demand and Response to Motion to Dismiss. Notwithstanding that appellee requested a hearing, the District Court, without conducting one, by notice to the parties dated November 20, 1987, informed the parties that the case was being transferred to the circuit court for a jury trial ³⁵⁴ and, thereafter, the case was so transferred. 2 With the exception of a copy of the motion to strike the jury trial demand it filed in the District Court, which appellee filed in the circuit court on January 5, 1988, appellee did not file any pleadings in the circuit court.

Appellants did not file any pleadings in the circuit court either; when they were made aware that the court intended to hear appellee’s motion to strike and the motion to dismiss which they had filed in the District Court, 3 appellants filed Defendant’s Memorandum in Response to Motion to Strike Jury Trial Demand and Response to Motion to Dismiss. After a hearing, the court denied appellant’s Motion to Dismiss, granted appellee’s Motion to Strike Jury Demand, and remanded the case to the district court for trial. We begin our discussion with the recognition that, pursuant to Maryland Courts and Jud.Proc.Code Ann. § 4-402(e) 4 , concerning exceptions to the subject matter jurisdiction of the District Court in civil cases, a jury trial demand by a party entitled to a jury trial “... divests the District Court of jurisdiction as a matter of law and immedi ³⁵⁵ ately vests jurisdiction in the circuit court.” Vogel v. Grant, 300 Md. 690, 696 , 481 A.2d 186 (1984). Indeed, “it is the demand for a jury trial, in and of itself, which acts to divest the District Court of jurisdiction and simultaneously to confer jurisdiction upon the circuit court.” (Emphasis in original) Ruddy v. First National Bank, 48 Md.App. 681, 684 , 429 A.2d 550 , aff'd, 291 Md. 275 , 434 A.2d 581 (1981).

Vogel, supra. Of some significance to the question of when a jury trial demand divests the District Court of jurisdiction are the procedural requirements, prescribed in the Maryland Rules of Procedure, for the election of a jury trial. As relates to this case, they can be found in Maryland Rule 3-325. At all times relevant to this appeal, Maryland Rule 3-325, 5 pertaining to the election of a jury trial in actions filed in the District Court, provided, in pertinent part: (a) Demand—time for filing.— if!

Sjt í}{ S}¡ ífc (2) By Defendant.—A defendant ... may elect a trial by jury in any action triable of right by a jury by filing a separate written demand therefor within ten days after the time for filing a notice of intention to defend. (b) Waiver.—The failure of a party to file the demand as provided in section (a) of this Rule constitutes a waiver of trial by jury of the action for all purposes, including trial on appeal. Sj! Sj! ¡-t SK A (c) Transmittal of Record to Circuit Court.—When a timely demand for jury trial is filed, the clerk shall transmit the record to the circuit court.

At any time ³⁵⁶ before the record is transmitted pursuant to this section, the District Court may determine, on its own initiative, or on motion of a party, that the demand for jury trial is not timely filed. It is apparent that subsection (a)(2) sets out the two components of a valid election of jury trial: (1) a separate written demand and (2) a timely demand. A failure to comply with either prong may result in a waiver of the jury trial. See Rule 3-325(b).

Ordinarily, however, it is the circuit court, and not the District Court, that makes that determination. See Vogel v. Grant, 300 Md. 690, 697-98 , 481 A.2d 186 (1984). Subsection (c) provides an exception, ie., in the circumstance where the claimed procedural defect in the jury trial demand is the untimeliness of the demand. By its express terms, if a jury trial demand is timely, the clerk of the District Court shall transmit the record to the circuit court.

Only if that court determines, prior to the transmittal of the record, that the demand is hot timely may it strike the demand; the District Court does not have the authority to strike a demand for jury trial on any other basis. See Vogel, 300 Md. at 699 n. 8, 481 A.2d 186 , in which the Court, commenting on former Maryland District Rule 343e, which contains language virtually identical to the second sentence of Rule 3-325(c), stated: “The language of subsection e was apparently intended to vest authority in the District Court, after a jury trial demand but prior to the physical transmission of the record, to entertain an objection to the jury trial demand on timeliness grounds.” In the instant case, we think it clear that the District Court appropriately forwarded the case to the circuit court upon appellants’ timely jury trial demand. As we have seen, the only basis upon which the court could have stricken the jury trial demand was its untimeliness. Appellee’s motion did not challenge the timeliness of the demand; rather, it challenged only the ability of a defendant to demand a jury trial conditionally or alternatively to other forms of relief, grounds not cognizable by the District Court.

Thus, although there is no explicit ruling in the record denying appellee’s motion, we think that such a ³⁵⁷ ruling is implicit in the court’s transfer of the case pursuant to appellant’s jury trial demand. 6 Our conclusion that the case was properly transferred to the circuit court pursuant to appellant’s timely jury trial demand does not end our inquiry. The next question that is presented is whether appellee’s belief that the jury trial demand was so procedurally defective as to result in appellants’ waiver of a jury trial was properly and timely brought to the attention of the circuit court. This is ordinarily accomplished by filing, in the circuit court, a motion detailing the defect. See Vogel, 300 Md. at 698 , 481 A.2d 186 ; Fallon v. Agency Rent-A-Car, 268 Md. 585, 588 , 303 A.2d 387 (1973).

Only if such a motion has been properly and timely filed in the circuit court do we reach the question of the correctness of the circuit court’s ruling remanding the case. We seek the answer to this question in Maryland Rule 2-326, which, during the relevant time period, 7 provided, in pertinent part: (a) Notice—Upon entry on the docket of an action transferred from the District Court pursuant to a demand for jury trial, the clerk shall send to the parties notice of the date of entry and the assigned docket reference. íji ft # $ # ³⁵⁸ (c) Action Not Within Exclusive Original Jurisdiction of the District Court.—When the action transferred is one over which the District Court does not have exclusive original jurisdiction, a complaint complying with Rules 2-303 through 2-305 shall be filed within 30 days after service of the demand for jury trial filed by the defendant. The complaint shall be served pursuant to Rule 1-321. The defendant shall file an answer or other response within 30 days after service of the complaint.

The action shall thereafter proceed as if originally filed in the circuit court. Perusal of the pertinent sections of the Rule suggests two distinct and separate reference points by which the timeliness of a challenge to a District Court jury trial demand is to be determined. Subsection (a)’s requirement that the clerk of the circuit court notify the parties of the date the transfer was noted on the circuit court’s docket and of the assigned docket reference strongly suggests that it is the date of the docketing by which the timeliness of the challenge is to be judged. On the other hand, subsection (c) suggests that it is the date of service of the demand for jury trial upon the opposing party that governs.

If subsection (c) is read in isolation, one would be led to the conclusion that the party seeking a jury trial would have to file a second jury trial demand after the case has been docketed in the circuit court. Rule 2-325(c), 8 however, specifically and completely negates such a construction. Since a second demand is not required, presumably the date the District Court jury trial demand was served on the opposing party is the applicable date. This date is particularly inappropriate for several reasons: 9 First, it arguably conflicts with sub ³⁵⁹ section (a); second, counting from that date provides precious little certainty in the determination of the timeliness of a challenge, filed in the circuit court, to a jury trial demand made in the