Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Alderson

Morton, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal by Greyhound Lines, Inc., from the refusal of the trial judge to grant its motion for a judgment n.o.v. after a jury in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County (Couch, Jr., J., presiding) rendered a verdict in favor of Ruby Alderson and her husband who had sued to recover damages for personal injuries. The case arose out of an accident involving a Greyhound Lines bus which resulted in the death of five passengers and serious bodily injuries to many other passengers. A number of suits for damages were brought against Greyhound Lines, Inc., Gerald T. Koehler, the driver of a pick-up truck, and against Ronald Williamson, the driver of a passenger car.

It was stipulated by counsel for all parties, with the approval of the court, that the present case would serve as the vehicle to determine the liability, if any, of the respective defendants. All litigants agreed to abide by the jury’s ²⁷⁹ determination of this issue and if liability were established against any or all of the defendants, the issue of damages to be recovered by the various plaintiffs would be tried in separate actions later. After a four-day trial and before submitting the case to the jury, the trial judge granted defendant Williamson’s motion for a directed verdict and, pursuant to Maryland Rule 563, reserved ruling on the motions of Greyhound Lines, Inc., and Gerald T. Koehler for directed verdicts. The jury returned a verdict against Greyhound and Koehler on the issue of their liability to the plaintiffs for injuries received in the accident.

The trial judge thereafter denied the motions for judgment n.o.v. filed by Greyhound and this appeal by Greyhound Lines, Inc., followed. 1 Williamson is not involved in the appeal and Koehler appears as an appellee. Greyhound poses the following questions: “1. Whether there was sufficient evidence of negligence on the part of the Appellant’s driver to submit the case to the jury. 2. Whether the Lower Court erred in denying Appellant’s Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. 3.

Whether the Lower Court erred in admitting into evidence portions of the letter from the Appellant to its driver regarding his failure to comply with driving practices of the Appellant.” The record indicates that about 6 p.m. on May 4, 1972, a Greyhound Lines bus was being operated by a company ²⁸⁰ employee, Robert Newton, on a daily commuter run between Washington, D. C., and Waldorf, Charles County, Maryland. The bus was traveling south on Maryland Rt. 5, a dual highway separated by a grass median strip. As the bus approached the intersection of Rt. 5 and Beach Drive, in the general area of Marlow Heights, Prince George’s County, the driver moved the bus from the slow lane to the fast lane. A passenger car heading east on Beach Drive and driven by Ronald Williamson was stopped, facing a stop sign, awaiting entrance to Rt. 5.

Facing Williamson across the southbound lanes of Rt. 5 was a pick-up truck in the median strip crossover, heading west, preparatory to entering Rt. 5, driven by Koehler. James F. Donnellan, a passenger on the bus, testified that the highway was very wet and as the bus approached the intersection of Rt. 5 and Beach Drive, it was on a substantial downgrade. He stated that the bus was in the slow lane coming down the hill at about 50 miles per hour and then changed to the fast lane. According to this witness, as the bus approached the intersection, he observed a pick-up truck 40 or 50 yards away in a stationary position in the median crossover.

He stated that as the bus was changing from the slow to the fast lane, he observed the pick-up truck start up and enter the fast lane of the highway and attempt to accelerate while remaining in the fast lane. As the bus got to the intersection, the driver applied the brakes and the rear end of the bus began to slide sideways and spin out of control. It then caromed off into a ditch and overturned. The witness recalled that sometime prior to the accident the driver had applied the brakes of the bus after passing the intersection of Southern Avenue and the bus “skidded over and hit the curb right there.” The driver of the bus testified that as he was half way down the hill approaching the intersection at a speed of 30 miles per hour, he observed the Williamson car on Beach Drive partially on the shoulder of the highway.

Because he feared the driver might proceed on to the shoulder and head south in front of him on Rt. 5, he decided to change lanes. ²⁸¹ After the bus was substantially in the fast lane, the pick-up truck pulled out of the median crossing and headed south in the fast lane of Rt. 5. At that point, according to the bus driver, the truck was two bus lengths ahead of the bus and this was the first time he had observed the truck. He then applied his brakes and pulled back into the right lane to avoid hitting the truck and ended up turning over into a ditch. Gerald T. Koehler, the driver of the truck, testified that he was driving a 1968 Chevrolet pick-up truck and just prior to the accident was stopped at the stop sign controlling traffic on Beach Drive, facing west, preparing to enter the southbound lane of Rt. 5.

As he looked north, he saw what he believed could have been a bus approximately 200 yards away in the right, or slow, lane. He then drove the truck into the fast lane and proceeded south in that lane at approximately 20 or 30 miles per hour. According to him, he accelerated his truck as fast as possible and purposely stayed in the fast lane to avoid being hit by the bus, which he apparently assumed would stay in the right lane. Ronald Williamson testified that he was seated in his passenger car, facing east, on Beach Drive awaiting entrance to Rt. 5 when he observed the bus, traveling south on Rt. 5 at a speed of 40 to 45 miles per hour, move from the right-hand lane to the left-hand lane and at the same time he observed the truck pull into the left-hand lane of Rt. 5.

It was his opinion that had the bus not applied the brakes and endeavored to swing back to the right-hand lane, the bus would have collided with the truck. A number of other passengers testified at the trial below, but a summary of their testimony is not necessary to this opinion. An expert testified that he examined the tires of the bus shortly after the accident and found their condition to be “almost new, if not new.” There was offered into evidence, over appellant’s objection, a letter from Greyhound Lines, Inc., to the driver of the bus, which read in part: ²⁸² “On the above date while operating schedule and at location noted you became involved in a serious accident wherein your bus ran off road and turned over resulting in five fatalities and serious injuries to passengers and causing severe damage to bus. Investigation of this accident has revealed that you failed to exercise required defensive and professional driving practices required of a Greyhound driver.” The trial judge admitted into evidence the excerpt from the letter on the basis that it constituted an admission by the appellant which was relevant to the issue of the bus driver’s negligence.

We cannot agree, as appellant argues, that this was error. In IV Wigmore, Evidence § 1048 (Chadbourn rev. 1972), it is stated: “The statements made out of court by a party-opponent are universally deemed admissible, when offered against him.” This generalization is later qualified with the proviso that the out-of-court statement by the party-opponent must exhibit “the quality of inconsistency with the facts now asserted by him in pleadings or in [his] testimony.” That the position taken by Greyhound in its letter to the bus driver is inconsistent with its position at the trial below where it asserted “that there was no evidence of negligence on the part of its driver” is self-evident. We think it is entirely clear that the statements in the letter were material and relevant for they tended to prove the very fact at issue — the negligence of the bus driver — which appellant now disputes. In Brumage v. Blubaugh, 204 Md. 144 , one of two drivers involved in a collision advised the other, at 147: “He would see that it was fixed — told me to get it fixed, and he would see that it was paid for.” Later, the same driver who had made the gratuitous statement sued for property damage to his automobile.

The statement was held to be admissible as an implied admission of fault, affecting the weight of the party-opponent’s cause of action. See also Gordon v. Opalecky, 152 Md. 536 . ²⁸³ We cannot agree with the appellant’s contention “that the letter in question cannot be construed as an admission since it merely states the company’s opinion that their driver failed to exercise some unknown, unspecified ‘defensive and professional driving practices’ which were never introduced into evidence.” The company arrived at the conclusion expressed in the letter after “[i]nvestigation of this accident” and while it may not be an expressed admission of the bus driver’s negligence, it is certainly relevant to that issue. In 31A C.J.S., Evidence § 277, it is stated: “It is not necessary that the statement should be a direct admission; it may be an indirect admission, as where it bears on the issue incidentally or circumstantially. [Footnote omitted.] And further, in Simmons v. Haas, 56 Md. 153 , the Court of Appeals held simply, at 161: “Letters of the adverse party are admitted in evidence against those writing them, as admissions against their interest, under the condition that they refer to the matter in controversy, and the whole admission is to be taken together.” We think the excerpt from the letter was properly admitted into evidence and the weight to be accorded its contents was a matter for the jury. In assessing the soundness of appellant’s contention that the trial judge erred in denying the motion for judgment n.o.v., because there was insufficient evidence of negligence to support the jury’s verdict, we start with the proposition that the truth of all credible evidence on the issue of the bus driver’s negligence and all inferences fairly deducible therefrom must be examined and considered in the light most favorable to the appellees. “ ‘If there is any competent evidence, however slight, leading to support the plaintiff’s right to recover, the case should be submitted to the jury,’ and a motion for judgment n.o.v. denied.

Belleson v. Klohr, 257 Md. 642, 646 .” Miller v. Michalek, 13 Md. App. 16, 18 . ²⁸⁴ Judged by these standards, we think the trial judge properly submitted the case to the jury and properly denied appellant’s motion for judgment n.o.v. There is the testimony of the passenger, Donnellan, who testified that the pick-up. truck was some 40 or 50 yards from the bus when it pulled into the fast lane from the median crossing. The colloquy between counsel and the witness bears repeating: “[Mr. Intrater, Counsel for appellees Alderson, et al.] Q. During that period of time after the truck straightened out what did the driver of the bus do? [Witness Donnellan] A. Nothing. Q. When you first saw that truck pull out onto the highway and start moving south did the bus driver at that time in any way start to slow the bus? A. No, sir.

Q. Did the