Grieves v. Grieves

Pattison, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Laura S. Grieves and Clarence J. Grieves, as executors- of Edward W. Grieves and as individuals, filed the bill in this case against Hannah L. Ramsey Grieves and Edward Weldin Ramsey Grieves, asking the Court to construe the will of the said Edward W. Grieves and the codicil thereto, and determine the interests- and powers* of the persons named therein. The testator, Edward W. Grieves, by the first paragraph of his will gave to a cousin the «urn of one thousand dollars, and by the second paragraph thereof he gave and devised unto his wife, the said Laura Simpers Grieves, his house on Park Avenue, 'and the* silver, paintings*, furniture and furnishings therein contained. The residue of his property ho disposed of by the third paragraph o*f his will, which is as follows: ³⁰² “3.

The rest, residue and remainder of my property, real, personal and mixed, of every kind and description, and wheresoever the same may be situate, I desire to be divided into two equal parts—one portion thereof I give, devise and bequeath unto my son, Clarence J. Grieves; the other portion I give, devise and bequeath unto my wife, Laura Simpers Grieves, for and during the term of her natural life, with power to her to dispose of such portion thereof by will as she may see fit, not exceeding however, in value the amount of eight thousand dollars and from and immediately after the death of my said wife, I desire that such portion hereby left to her which shall not have been disposed of by will, shall vest in and become the' absolute property of my son Clarence J. Grieves, his heirs and assigns; and it is my desire that all the property received from me by my son Clarence J. Grieves, either directly or otherwise through my said wife, shall pass to my grandson Edward Weldin Rom-say Grieves, if living at the time of the death of my son Clarence J. Grieves; and should my said grandson not be living at the time of the death of my son Clarence J. Grieves and should he survive his stepmother Hannah Ramsay Grieves, then I desire that she shall have the life interest in such portion, and upon her death said property shall vest absolutely in the heirs, personal representatives and assigns of the said Edward Welding Ramsay Grieves, per stirpes and not per capita. “(These provisions, however, as to my grandson and his stepmother shall not be deemed, in any manner, to restrict the proper use nor any change of investment of interest or the principal of said fund.) “In dividing my estate between my wife and my son, I desire that the life insurance which is payable to my wife, shall not be in any manner considered as a portion of the amount distributed.” The codicil thereafter made by him is in the following language: ³⁰³ “1, Edward W. Grieves, of Baltimore City, State of Maryland, having heretofore made my last will and testament, dated December 5th, 1907, and desiring to make an alteration therein, do hereby make a codicil, in form and manner following, to wit: “Eirst. I desire that the sum of eight thousand ($8,000.00) dollars mentioned in the third paragraph of my said will, as the amount which my wife may dispose of, during her life, or by last will and testament, shall be increased to twelve thousand ($12,-000.00) dollars, with the same rights of disposal as therein mentioned. “Second. I hereby ratify and confirm my said last will and testament, with all of its provisions, not inconsistent with this codicil.” The Court was asked by the bill to- decide the three following questions, to wit: “Eirst. Whether the third paragraph of said last will and testament is to be construed as giving an absolute estate in one of the two portions into which the testator directs the rest, residue and remainder of his estate to be devised to his son Clarence J. Grieves, the whole of said paragraph after the words ‘One portion thereof I give, devise and bequeath to my son Clarence J. Grieves,’ applying only to the other portion of said rest, residue and remainder given, devised and bequeathed to the testator’s wife, Laura Simpers Grieves, as therein directed, or whether the words ‘All the property received from me by my son Clarence J. Grieves, either directly or otherwise through my said wife, shall pass to my grandson, etc.,’ limit the devise and bequest of said one portion given to the son to a life estate in such portion. “Second.

Whether the power given to Laura Simpers Grieves by said last will and testament to dispose of eight thousand dollars of the portion of the testator’s estate devised to her for life, as modified by said codicil, is a power to dispose of the same by will only, or whether the same is a power to dispose of the same during her life or by will. ³⁰⁴ “Third. Whether the parenthetical clause in the third paragraph' of said will, namely *(These provisions, however, as to my grandson and his stepmother shall not he deemed, in any manner, to restrict .the proper use nor ány change of investment of interest or the principal of said fund),’ apply to said fund of twelve thousand dollars, over which the said Laura Simpers Grieves has the power of disposition, or whether the same applies to the whole portion devised to her by the third paragraph of said will,” and “whether the same is sufficient in law to give to the said Laura Simpers Grieves and Clarence J. Grieves the power to change investments of the principal fund referred to.” ■ « The Record discloses that the will of Edward W. Grieves was executed on the 5th day of December, 1907, and the codicil thereto on the 10th day of October, 1916; and that he died on the 12th day of Eebruary, 1917, survived by his widow, Laura S." Grieves; his son, Clarence J. Grieves; his son’s wife, Hannah Ramsey Grieves, and his grandson, Edward W. R. Grieves, who, at that time, was sixteen years of age. The will was duly probated, and the widow and son qualified as executors. The Court below, after hearing upon bill, answer and testimony, decreed as follows: > . “By the terms of the will and codicil in this case the-testator divided his estate into two halves. “The first one he gave to his son for life, the second one he gave to his widow for life, and after her death to his son for life.

Then as to the two halves he devised them to his grandson absolutely, if he be living at the time of the death of the son Clarence <7. Grieves. “If the grandson is not living at that time, a life estate in the two halves is given to the widow, if she be alive, then on her death the two halves are devised to the heirs, etc., of the grandson absolutely. “This is subject to the'provision conferring on the widow the power to dispose of $12,000.00 of the second half by will only. ³⁰⁵ “The will does not confer power 'of sale on any of the beneficiaries. “The court so construes the will, and it is so adjudged, ordered and decreed this 21st day of August, 1917.” It is from the above decree that this appeal is taken. We will consider each of the three questions in the order in which they were presented to and passed upon by the Court below. In determining the first of these questions we must first ascertain what interests passed under the will unto Clarence J. Grieves in each of the halves of the rest and residue of the estate.

The will clearly directs that! thei rest and residue of the estate be divided into two equal parts. This direction is followed by the provision that “one portion thereof I give, devise and bequeath unto my son, Clarence J. Grieves.” This language was, no doubt, sufficient to vest in the son upon the death of the) father, a fee simple estate in such half of the rest and residue of his property, real, personal and mixed (Sec. 327 of Art. 93 of the Code of 1912; Johns Hopkins University v. Garrett, 128 Md. 347 ), unless there is found in some subsequent part of the will language clearly showing that it was not- the intention of the. testator to give or devise to his son such an estate. Duering v. Brill, 127 Md. 108 . The testator then proceeds to. dispose of the other half of the rest and residue of his estate without saying more at such time as to the disposition of the first half; and in disposing of the latter half he says, “the other portion I give, devise and bequeath unto my wife, Laura Simpers Grieves, for and during the term of her natural life, with power to her to dispose of such portion thereof by will as she may see fit, not exceeding, however, in value the amount of eight thousand dollars, and from and immediately after the death of my said wife, I desire that such portion hereby left to her, which shall not have been disposed of by will, shall vest in ³⁰⁶ and become tbe absolute property -of my son Clarence J. Grieves, his heirs and assigns.” This language, vested in the son a fee simple title in the said second half of the residue of the estate, subject to the life estate of the widow, unless there be found some qualification or limitation in the will showing with equal clearness a different intention on the part of' the testator.

It is, ’therefore, important that we should carefully consider what followed. With no greater stop than a semi-colon following the above quoted parts of the will, and with the sentence, starting with the beginning of the. third paragraph, not yet concluded, the testator proceeds by saying “and it is my desire that all the property received