Griffin v. Board of Trustees of St. Mary's College

McWilliams, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. In the dead of winter, February 1966, the appellee (the College) employed the appellant (Griffin) as a teacher “for the school year beginning in September 1967” at an annual salary of $13,000. The contract of employment ²⁷⁷ provided for its continuance “from school year to school year unless terminated by either party giving to the other a written notice to terminate * * * on or before the 1st day of June of the year in which the contract is to be terminated.” In February 1968 Griffin filed suit in the Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County against May Russell, the president of the College. He set forth in his declaration statements attributed to her which are alleged to be defamatory.

The ad damnum paragraph in each of the five counts demands $500,000 compensatory damages and $1,000,000 punitive damages. On 10 May 1968 Miss Russell served written notice on Griffin that she did “not plan to recommend * * * [his] contract for renewal for 1969-70.” On 15 May Griffin wrote to Wm. Aleck Loker, Esq., the chairman of the Board of Trustees of the College, requesting a “hearing before the Board with reference to * * * [his] discharge from the faculty to take effect a year hence.” He was advised by Mr. Loker that the Board would hear from him and his witnesses on 14 June but that no formal charges would be filed against him. Griffin, still insisting that he be furnished with a list “of the charges against him” appeared with his attorney at the scheduled meeting of the Board.

His attorney subjected the Board to a lengthy and somewhat irrelevant harangue. He suggested an absence of “basic American fairnesshe questioned the good faith “of the institution itselfhe inveighed against the Board’s lack of “Americanism” equating it with the “hot dog on the Fourth of July at the ball game;” suggesting that “milk * * * [had been] spilled on the table” he insisted he and his client were “entitled to th[e] opportunity to see who is going to wipe it up;” he charged the Board with being “afraid to set forth what the charges are and have a hearing;” he demanded, in conclusion, that the Board “let some fresh air in.” Mr. Loker, for the Board, replied that they were “very happy” to have heard from him; he assumed they wouldn’t “hear anything from Dr. Griffin.” Counsel replied, “Not ’til we know, sir, what he is charged with.” He did have his client deny, however, that he had ²⁷⁸ done anything “that would be ground for * * * [his] dismissal.” On the following day, 15 June, Mr. Loker wrote to Griffin formally notifying him that the Board had affirmed Miss Russell’s decision not to renew his contract for “the school year 1969-70.” The record does not disclose all that transpired during the succeeding months but it seems that the Board offered, on 28 September, to renew Griffin’s contract for the 1969-70 school year if he would dismiss the libel suit. Apparently he declined to do so and the offer was withdrawn some months later. On 28 February 1968 the Board adopted a “policy statement.” The parties seem to consider that only the portion quoted below has any relevance here: “Termination for cause of a continuous appointment, or the dismissal for cause of a teacher previous to the expiration of a term appointment, or nonrenewal of the contract of a teacher who alleges a prima facie case of a violation of academic freedom shall be considered by both a faculty committee and the governing Board.

If the teacher has tenure or an unexpired appointment extending beyond the period of the proposed dismissal, the burden of proof is upon the administration to show adequate cause why he should be dismissed. If he does not have tenure, but contends that the nonrenewal of his contract constitutes a violation of his academic freedom, the burden of proof is upon the faculty member. In all cases where the facts are in dispute, the accused teacher should be informed in writing before the hearing of the charges against him and should have the opportunity to be heard in his own defense by all bodies that pass judgment upon his case. He should be permitted to have with him an advisor of his own choosing who may act as counsel.