Griffin v. State

HOLLANDER, Judge. A jury in the Circuit Court for Cecil County convicted Antoine Levar Griffin, appellant, of second degree murder, first degree assault, and use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or crime of violence. The convictions arose from the fatal shooting of Darvell Guest on April 24, 2005. 1 ⁵²³ On appeal, Griffin poses three questions, which we have rephrased slightly: I. Did the trial court err in admitting a page printed from a MySpace profile alleged to be that of appellant’s girlfriend?

II

Did the trial court err in permitting the prosecutor to incorrectly describe “reasonable doubt” in his rebuttal closing argument?

III

Did the trial court err in denying appellant’s request for a mistrial following an outburst by the mother of a witness? For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the convictions. I. FACTUAL SUMMARY 2 In the early morning hours of April 24, 2005, Darvell Guest was cornered, unarmed, in the women’s bathroom of Ferrari’s Bar in Perryville, where he was brutally shot seven times. Appellant was charged with the murder.

Griffin’s first trial was held in August 2006. At that trial, Dennis Gibbs, appellant’s cousin and an eyewitness to Guest’s murder, testified that he did not see appellant pursue the victim into the bathroom with a gun. The trial ended in a mistrial. At appellant’s second trial in January 2008, several witnesses testified that they saw appellant with a handgun just before the shooting, and others testified that they witnessed appellant pursue Guest into the women’s bathroom, where appellant fired his weapon.

Gibbs testified that appellant was the only person, other than Guest, in the bathroom when the ⁵²⁴ shots were fired. According to Gibbs, another cousin, George Griffin, was standing “right with me” during the shooting and did not enter the bathroom. He explained the discrepancy in his testimony at the two trials, claiming that Jessica Barber, appellant’s girlfriend, had threatened him prior to the first trial. Thereafter, the court permitted the State to introduce into evidence a redacted printout obtained in December 2006 from a MySpace profile page allegedly belonging to Ms. Barber.

The profile page, introduced for the limited purpose of corroborating Gibbs’s testimony, said, in part: “JUST REMEMBER, SNITCHES GET STITCHES!! U KNOW WHO YOU ARE!!” We shall include additional facts as they pertain to our discussion of the issues.

II

DISCUSSION A. Appellant contends that the court erred in admitting the MySpace evidence. He complains that the evidence was not properly authenticated and that its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. Before reviewing the parties’ contentions in more detail, we pause to set forth additional facts. At the second trial, Gibbs recalled that he arrived at Ferrari’s in the company of three of his cousins, Dorian Griffin, Dyrle Griffin, and George Griffin.

According to Gibbs, Guest bumped into Dorian, and the two “exchanged a few words.” They quickly shook hands, however, then “parted ways,” without further incident. A few minutes later, according to Gibbs, he saw appellant run up and punch Guest in the face. In response, the victim’s girlfriend, Kesha Bowser, grabbed appellant. A “commotion” with physical “tussling” ensued, during which appellant pulled a black handgun “from his hip” and held it out “[sjtraight in front of him,” pointing it “[towards Mr. Guest.” Guest ran into the women’s bathroom, and ⁵²⁵ appellant followed.

Although Gibbs could not see inside the restroom, he testified that he saw both Guest and appellant go into the bathroom, and that no one else went in. Gibbs then heard multiple gunshots. Gibbs conceded that his testimony at the second trial as to who entered the bathroom before the shots were fired was inconsistent with what he told police and with his testimony at the first trial. He acknowledged that, at the first trial, he had testified that appellant was outside the bathroom while the victim was in the bathroom, that he did not see appellant go into the bathroom with Guest, and that he saw his cousin, George Griffin, exit the bathroom.

On re-direct, the prosecutor asked Gibbs to explain the “inconsistencies between your testimony here in this trial and some of your earlier statements.” Gibbs replied: I had been threatened. Like right after the stuff happened I was threatened by people from across the bridge that knew Mr. Guest. That’s why I couldn’t go back to work. And then right before the last [trial] I was threatened by Antoine’s girlfriend.

She told me I might catch a bullet if I showed up in court[.] (Emphasis added.) On re-cross, the following exchange ensued: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Did you see George Griffin come out of the bathroom? [MR. GIBBS]: No, sir. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Did you tell under oath and swear to a jury that you did see him come out of the bathroom? [MR. GIBBS]: Yes, sir.... [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Now you said that the reason that you are giving inconsistencies or ... lies ... would be because his girlfriend threatened to you that you were going to get a bullet? [MR. GIBBS]: Yes, sir; and I have a witness. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: When was that, sir? [MR.

GIBBS]: It was like the week before the trial. ⁵²⁶ [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Where was that? [MR. GIBBS]: Me and my sister was right out in front of her house, and her and my sister and Jesse was on the phone together, and she was like— [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Just listen. I’m talking to you. I said where did you get that, not your sister. [MR.

GIBBS]: From the phone. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You spoke to somebody on the phone? [MR. GIBBS]: My sister was on the phone with her. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Sir, did you tell the state’s attorney? [MR. GIBBS]: Yes, on the first case, yes, I did tell whoever the state’s attorney was. I did tell him that morning---- [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: When did you tell this state’s attorney? [MR.

GIBBS]: Today____ Because you didn’t let me finish answering my question when you had asked me, and I said there was a reason behind everything.... I wanted to finish my statement, but you didn’t let me. The State also called Ms. Barber. She testified that, on the night in question, appellant was her boyfriend, and he lived with her and their two children.

Ms. Barber identified appellant’s nickname as “Boozy.” Although Ms. Barber was at Ferrari’s at the time of the shooting, she did not arrive with appellant, and claimed that she was not with him during the evening. According to Ms. Barber, she heard gunshots at the bar but did not see appellant in the bar after the shooting. On the day after Ms. Barber testified, the prosecutor sought to introduce five pages printed on December 5, 2006, from an Internet Web site 3 for a MySpace profile in the name of “SISTASOULJAH,” who was described on that Web page as a 23 year-old female from Fort Deposit. The profile page listed the member’s birthday as “10-2-83.” It also contained ⁵²⁷ a photograph posted next to the description, showing a “three-quarter view” of an embracing couple.

Counsel and the court agreed that the couple appeared to be appellant and Ms. Barber. A “blurb” posted on the profile stated as follows: I HAVE 2 BEAUTIFUL KIDS.... FREE BOOZY!!!! JUST REMEMBER SNITCHES GET STITCHES!!

U KNOW WHO YOU ARE!! The State offered the printout to rehabilitate Gibbs’s credibility, and to bolster Gibbs’s claim that Ms. Barber had threatened him before the first trial. Defense counsel objected, arguing that the State had not sufficiently established a “connection” to Ms. Barber, and had failed to question her about the MySpace profile. In response, the prosecutor asserted that the profile could be authenticated as belonging to Barber through the testimony of Sergeant John Cook, the Maryland State police investigator who printed the document.

The trial court then allowed defense counsel to voir dire Sergeant Cook, outside the presence of the jury. The following transpired: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: How do you know that this is her web page? ... [SGT. COOK]: Through the photograph of her and Boozy on the front, through the reference to Boozy, to the reference of the children, and to her birth date indicated on the form. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: How do you know she sent it? [SGT. COOK]: I can’t say that.

Sergeant Cook acknowledged that he could not determine when any particular posting was made. But, he indicated that he visited the Web site on December 5, 2006, the date that appeared on the printout. The court ruled that it would admit a single, redacted page from the MySpace printout, containing only the photo next to a description of the page creator as a 23 year-old female from Fort Deposit, and a portion of the blurb, stating: “FREE ⁵²⁸ BOOZY!!!! JUST REMEMBER SNITCHES GET STITCHES!!

U KNOW WHO YOU ARE!!” Without waiving appellant’s objection, defense counsel agreed to the following stipulation, in lieu of Cook’s testimony: If asked, Sergeant Cook would testify that he went onto the internet to the web site known as MySpace____ [Fjrom that site he downloaded some information of a posting that someone had put there. That posting contains a photograph which the witness would say he recognizes as a photograph of Jessica ... Barber, who testified, ... that she is the defendant’s live-in fiancé; and that it also contains a date of birth, to wit October 2nd, 1983, which the witness would testify is the date of birth that Jessica Barber gave as her date of birth. When this exhibit, the download, comes to you, you are going to see that it has a great — that most of its content has been redacted; this is, blacked out.

That’s because some of it, in my judgment, might tend to be inflammatory without proving anything one way or the other. There is one portion of it that will not be redacted when it comes to you, and this is the only portion of it which you should consider. And you certainly should not speculate as to what any of the redacted portions may be. The portion that will not be redacted says, just remember snitches get stitches.

You will see that. The phrase is, just remember snitches get stitches____ And ... the witness would testify that the date it was retrieved was.... December 5, 2006. Thereafter, the court promptly instructed the jury regarding the limited evidentiary purpose of the MySpace printout, as follows: Now here’s a cautionary instruction.

This is being offered for a limited purpose. The limited purpose is for such weight as you choose to give it. That’s completely up to you. You will hear me say several times when I [instruct] you that I’m going to be instructing you as to the law on ⁵²⁹ various things.

It’s for you to decide what the evidence shows. And by my instructions and my cautionary instruction now you should not assume that I am implying one thing or another as to how much weight or what the evidence shows. That’s completely up to you. But it’s being offered for the proposition that this corroborates what Dennis Gibbs said about being threatened by the defendant’s girlfriend.

Now you can decide whether it corroborates that or not. You can decide what that means in the context of Mr. Gibbs’ testimony. That’s completely up to you. I’m not implying anything in that regard.

But that’s the limited purpose for which this evidence is being offered. It should be considered on nothing but that purpose. Now you may decide that it corroborates Mr. Gibbs. You may decide it does not corroborate Mr. Gibbs.

If you find that it corroborates Mr. Gibbs, then you still have to evaluate the rest of Mr. Gibbs’ testimony. That’s completely up to you. But that’s the only purpose it [sic] going offered for, because Gibbs said that he was threatened by the defendant’s girlfriend; and the [S]tate is offering this for the sole purpose of showing that on this web site as of December 5, 2006, a statement is made, just remember snitches get stitches. The defense did not present any testimonial evidence.

But, it introduced various documents. During the court’s instructions to the jury, the judge reviewed the stipulations. He stated, in part: “And that Sergeant Cook went online to the Web site My Space and downloaded an entry there, redacted version of which is in evidence, and that he would have testified that there was a photo there of Miss Barber.” In closing argument, the State relied upon the MySpace page to explain the inconsistencies in Gibbs’s testimony. After referring to Gibbs’s claim that Ms. Barber threatened him before the first trial, the prosecutor said: ⁵³⁰ Mr. Gibbs said, That’s the reason that my testimony at that trial wasn’t consistent with my testimony at this trial.

Now, is that believable, that statement from him? I suggest to you it is____ Sergeant Cook told you that he went online and went to a website called My Space and found a posting that had been placed there by the defendant’s girlfriend, Jessica Barber, recognized her picture, able to match up the date of birth on the posting with her date of birth, and the posting includes these words, “Free Boozie. Just remember, snitches get stitches. You know who you are.” In closing argument, the defense argued, in part: And I suggest to you, ladies and gentlemen, that [Gibbs] said in court last time under oath, and he told you, that he never even saw Antoine Griffin go into the bathroom.

He was standing by the bar when the shots were fired. That’s what he told another court under oath. He told you this time that George Griffin did not go into the bathroom. He told the police and someone else that George Griffin did go into the bathroom.

And he tells you that his inconsistencies and his lying under oath either today or back in August of '06 was because he was fearful. In rebuttal, the State responded: Now, were there inconsistencies between Mr. Gibbs’ testimony at the August 2006 trial and this trial? Absolutely. Absolutely.

I don’t in any way pretend there weren’t, and I talked to you a while ago about why that was.... Well, first, folks, remember ... the stipulation that we had regarding Sergeant Cook’s testimony about that page that it was only December of '06 that Sergeant Cook found the page. There’s no evidence whatsoever of when the page was created. Could have been before August 2006.

Maybe it wasn’t. But even if it wasn’t, folks, it’s not the date of creation of the page or the date of finding of the page by Sergeant Cook that’s important. What’s important is the state of mind evidenced by the person to whom the page relates, and that person was Jessica Barber, the defendant’s girlfriend, and the state of my [sic] evidence by that page is ⁵³¹ snitches get stitches. Just what Gibbs told you in regard to his explanation of why his testimony at the August 2006 trial was not consistent with his testimony at this trial.

B. As noted, appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting the redacted printout from the MySpace page. He asserts: “The State came nowhere near authenticating the contents of the MySpace page as statements by Barber.” Claiming that it provided adequate authentication under Md. Rule 5 — 901(b)(4), the State posits: “The foundational evidence the State provided was sufficient to support a reasonable inference by the jury that the printout was what it purported to be — Jessica Barber’s MySpace website.” Moreover, it contends that the only issue pertains to whether the MySpace page belonged to Barber, because the defense “stipulated to the process by which [the State] obtained the information from the website.” As to the adequacy of the prosecution’s authentication, the State points to the content of the profile, which included Ms. Barber’s photograph, her date of birth, and the references to her children. Further, it asserts: Three other considerations support the trial court’s determination that the State had offered sufficient authentication evidence. In her testimony, Barber confirmed that Griffin sometimes went by the nickname “Boozy,” the name used on the MySpace page.

Additionally, Sergeant Cook’s testimony should be deemed sufficient given that a MySpace website is a personal profile containing text and image content supplied not by MySpace itself, but rather by the site’s individual users. The judge, moreover, provided a detailed limiting instruction clarifying the purpose for which the statement could be used and emphasized that the MySpace page should be afforded only “such weight as [the jurors] choose to give it.” Maryland Rule 5-901 governs authentication. Notably, the authentication concerns attendant to the use of evidence print ⁵³² ed from a social networking Web site such as MySpace is a topic on which there is no Maryland precedent and scant case law from other jurisdictions. Under Rule 5 — 901(a), “[t]he requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Moreover, Md. Rule 5-901(b)(4) provides, “[b]y way of illustration,” that “[c]ircumstantial evidence, such as appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, location, or other distinctive characteristics,” may be sufficient to establish “that the offered evidence is what it is claimed to be.” See, e.g., Knoedler v. State, 69 Md.App. 764, 772-74 , 519 A.2d 811 (1987) (holding that telephone conversations were admissible where direct or circumstantial evidence was presented “ ‘to establish the identity of the other person to the conversation,’ ” and noting that “[s]uch authentication can be found either from evidence that the witness was familiar with and recognized the voice of the alleged caller, or, in the absence of such recognition, ‘sundry circumstances....’”) (citations omitted).

Whether there is sufficient authenticating evidence to admit a proffered document is a preliminary question to be decided by the court. See Md. Rule 5-104(a). The court must make its threshold determination of whether there is sufficient authenticating evidence on the basis of admissible evidence that the jury may later consider in making its ultimate determination of authenticity. See Lorraine v. Market Am.

Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 539-40 (D.Md.2007) (construing and applying analogous federal rules in determining admissibility of electronic communications). However, “the burden of proof for authentication is slight, and the court ‘need not find that the evidence is necessarily what the proponent claims, but only that there is sufficient evidence that the jury ultimately might do so.’ ” Dickens v. State, 175 Md.App. 231, 239 , 927 A.2d 32 (2007) (quoting United States v. Safavian, 435 F.Supp.2d 36, 38 (D.D.C.2006)) (emphasis in Safavian). When a proponent makes a prima facie showing that a prof ⁵³³ fered document is genuine, the “ ‘writing or statement comes in, and the ultimate question of authenticity is left to the jury.’ ” Gerald v. State, 137 Md.App. 295, 304 , 768 A.2d 140 (citation omitted), cert. denied, 364 Md. 462 , 773 A.2d 514 (2001).

We review a decision to admit such evidence for abuse of discretion. Id. at 305, 768 A.2d 140 . As indicated, this case involves a profile posted on a social media networking site, MySpace. Such Web sites, which include Facebook, Linkedln, Plaxo, and Twitter, are increasingly popular vehicles for the dissemination of personal information posted on individualized profiles.

Social media Web sites offer users multi-faceted avenues to “network” with fellow users, along with control over the content of their profiles. 4 The Court of Appeals explained in Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 407 Md. 415 , 424 n. 3, 966 A.2d 432 (2009): “Social networking sites and blogs are sophisticated tools of communication where the user voluntarily provides information that the user wants to share with others.... The user can choose what information to provide.... ” Moreover, the Brodie Court recognized that these Web sites offer users the opportunity to post messages for the world to see, as well as the option “to tightly control the dissemination of [posted] information.” Id. 5 ⁵³⁴ Typically free to users, social networking sites “can serve as an online newsletter or as a personal journal — where an individual can post concerns, ideas, opinions, etc. — and it can contain links to web sites or can use images or video.” Id. at 424 , 966 A.2d 432 . But, in the absence of limitations imposed by the user, “whatever is posted [is] available to the world at large.” Id. at 424 n. 3, 966 A.2d 432 . Moreover, the development of Web sites like YouTube allows users to upload streaming video, so that personal statements may be recorded and disseminated.

Thus, such online networking communities have led to an expanding universe of shared information, and have been aptly characterized as “soda fountains for the twenty-first century.” See, e.g., John S. Wilson, MySpace, Your Space, or Our Space? New Frontiers in Electronic Evidence, 86 Or. L.Rev. 1201, 1219-24 (2007) (reviewing the history of social networking sites). With respect to MySpace, the particular social media Web site at issue here, one court has explained, using MySpace’s own words: MySpace is “an online community that lets you meet your friends’ friends.” Most aptly described as a social networking site, individuals can create “profiles” listing their interests in books, television, music, movies, and so forth, as well as posting pictures, music, and videos.

MySpace allows its members to control who can view the entirety of their “profile.” On all “profiles,” certain information is displayed to other members and visitors that “allows our users to identify each other and expand their network of friends.” MySpace users have a choice to make their “profiles” public or private. For example, if a member wishes to restrict public access to her “profile,” she may make it viewable to only those that she has accepted as friends, but information ⁵³⁵ such as the member’s photo and first name are still displayed for public view. A.B. v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1223, 1224 (Ind.2008) (footnotes and citations omitted). The design and purpose of social media sites make them especially fertile ground for “statements involving observations of events surrounding us, statements regarding how we feel, our plans and motives, and our feelings (emotional and physieal)[.]” Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 569 .

For that reason, both prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys are increasingly looking for potential evidence on the expanding array of Internet blogs, message boards, and chat rooms. See, e.g., Nelson, supra, at 13 (“It should now be a matter of professional competence for attorneys to take the time to investigate social networking sites.”); Seth P. Berman et al., Web 2.0: What’s Evidence Between “Friends”?, 53 B.B.J. 5, 6 (Jan/Feb 2009) (social networking sites “may record people’s thought processes and impressions in unguarded moments, exactly the sort of evidence that can be invaluable during litigation”); Kathrine Minotti, Evidence: The Advent of Digital Diaries: Implications of Social Networking Web Sites for the Legal Profession, 60 S.C. L. REV. 1057, 1059-61, 1066-68, 1071-73 (2009) (“Prosecutors are gathering information from social networking web sites for evidence.... ”). As indicated, users of social media Web sites, blogs, chat rooms, and discussion forums may post messages anonymously or under pseudonyms. See Wilson, supra, at 1220.

The Court observed in Brodie, 407 Md. at 425 , 966 A.2d 432 : “Since the early 1990’s, when Internet communications became available to the American public, anonymity or pseudonymity has been a part of the Internet culture.” The MySpace profile at issue here illustrates that a user “can choose not to provide” the user’s real name. See id. at 424 n. 3, 966 A.2d 432 . Instead, users may join the online community anonymously, by registering under password and ⁵³⁶ user names that are self-selected and confidential. 6 Access to the profile may be obtained by logging in on the Web site with the confidential user name and password. Other social networking site features preserve the veil of anonymity or pseudonymity, by allowing members to communicate electronically using their chosen screen names, both via private message sent to other members, as an alternative to traditional e-mail in which “users generally know with whom they are communicating!,]” id. at 422 , 966 A.2d 432 , and via an “in-house” instant messaging option that allows members to conduct real-time “chats” with other members, by use of their screen names.

See Wilson, supra, at 1220. In Brodie, 407 Md. at 419 , 966 A.2d 432 , the Court held that a company that commissioned an Internet forum allowing participants to post messages under screen names could not be required to identify those participants in the circumstances of that case. In doing so, the Court recognized the increasing difficulty in ascertaining the identity of a person posting a message on an Internet site under a screen name. Id. at 424-25 , 966 A.2d 432 .

Recounting the development of anonymous communications on the Internet, the Court said, id. at 425-27 , 966 A.2d 432 : Generally, first exposure to communications on the Internet was through the use of a dial-up online access providers, such as America Online (“AOL”) or Prodigy. These online access providers permitted subscribers to choose “screen names” to represent their online identities. When users logged-on using their screen names, they reached a home page presenting them with a host of communications services — from e-mail to chatrooms to instant messaging to forums — all of which were provided by the online access provider and all of which were accessed by using the online access provider’s sereen name. Thus, for example, under the AOL regime, an account held by John Smith might have had the screen namefiog-in of “Jsmithl417,” the e-mail ⁵³⁷ address of “[email protected],” and any statement posted in a chatroom, during an instant message exchange or in a forum, would be posted under the screen name “Jsmithl417.” Under this configuration, subscribers enjoyed a degree of anonymity, because they were permitted to use a screen name wholly distinct from their real name, but their screen names also were easily traceable, because they were linked to an Internet access account.

Full-service online access providers, like AOL or Prodigy, presently no longer dominate the Internet communications market, and at-home access to the Internet is often achieved through broadband services, provided by local cable or phone companies. These broadband companies, unlike former online access providers, usually do not require the registration of a screen name and generally provide Internet access without any other services. Most communications services, moreover, such as those that provide e-mail, instant messaging, chatrooms or forums, are accomplished through a website hosted by a third-party on the World Wide Web. Thus, today, the hypothetical Internet user John Smith might gain access to the Internet through his local cable company, might obtain the e-mail address JSmithl747 over the World Wide Web through Google’s “gmail,” or a like service, and might participate in an Internet forum regarding a topic of interest under the registered username “crazyCOAcommentator.” When registering for this forum, John Smith might even obfuscate his true identity, making it even more difficult to trace his statements to him.

In short, unlike former days when a user’s posts were easily traceable through the online access provider’s billing records, today, the World Wide Web host of an e-mail, instant messaging, forum or chatroom service obtains only as much information about an individual as it requires for registration, and even then, there are few checks to ensure the validity and accuracy of that information. (Emphasis added; footnotes omitted.) The anonymity features of social networking sites may present an obstacle to litigants seeking to authenticate mes ⁵³⁸ sages posted on them. See, e.g., Paul W. Grimm et al., Back to the Future: Lorraine v. Market American Insurance Co. and New Findings on the Admissibility of Electronically Stored Information, 42 Akron L.Rev. 357, 370-71 (2009) (“Chat room and text or instant messaging ‘dialogues’ ... pose unique challenges to authentication due in large part to the fact that they typically are created by parties using anonymity-protecting ‘screen names’ on websites where the host cannot be assumed to know the content.”). That is the issue we encounter here: whether the State adequately established the author of the cyber message in question.

Despite the pervasive popularity of social networking sites and their potential as treasure troves of valuable evidence, Maryland appellate courts have not yet addressed the issue of authenticating anonymous or pseudonymous documents printed from social media Web sites. Notably, neither the Maryland Rules of Evidence nor the Maryland Rules of Procedure specifically address the authentication of such evidence. Perhaps this is because courts that have generally considered the issue of authentication of electronic communications have concluded that they may be authenticated under existing evidentiary rules governing authentication by circumstantial evidence. In the leading case of Lorraine v. Market Am.

Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534 (D.Md.2007), Magistrate Judge Paul Grimm, a noted authority on electronic discovery, offered well-reasoned methods to authenticate various types of electronically stored information, including e-mails, text messages, chat room logs, and “Internet Website Postings.” Although Lorraine recognized that such evidence “may require greater scrutiny than that required for the authentication of ‘hard copy* documents/3 ” the court suggested that the existing rules governing authentication provide an adequate analytical framework to determine the admissibility of such evidence. Id. at 542-43 . In particular, the Lorraine Court cited Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)(4), the federal analogue to Md. Rule 5-901(b)(4), as “one of the most frequently used to authenticate ⁵³⁹ e-mail and other electronic records.” Id. at 546 .

It observed: “ ‘[T]he characteristics of the offered item itself, considered in the light of circumstances, afford authentication techniques in great variety,’ including authenticating an exhibit by showing that it