Griffith v. Coleman

Robinson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Mrs. Sarah A. Griffith died in 1877, leaving a paper purporting to be her last will and testament, to the probate of which a caveat was filed, and upon issues sent to the Baltimore City Court, a verdict was rendered in favor of the caveators. At the trial, exceptions were taken to the rulings of the Court, and upon appeal, these rulings were reversed, and a new trial awarded. The case was ²⁵² tried a second time, and again the verdict was in favor of the caveators.

Exceptions were also taken to the rulings of the Court in the second trial, and on appeal, the rulings were affirmed. Upon the verdict thus rendered an order was passed by the Orphans’ Court of Baltimore City, on the 21st day of July, 1883, setting aside the paper purporting to be the will of the deceased. It thus appears, a period of six years elapsed before the question of intestacy was finally determined. At the time of her death, Mrs. Griffith left five children, one son, and four married! daughters.

Pending the litigation, the son, and the husband of the appellee, Mrs. Coleman, one of the daughters, died. The sole question in this appeal is whether the appellee, Mrs. Coleman, being the only daughter unmarried, is entitled to letters of administration ? And this depends upon sec. 27, Art. 93, of the Code, which provides that, “A feme sole shall be preferred to a married woman in equal degree.” If the priority of right is to be determined by the status of the parties at the time the application is made, then the appellee is unquestionably entitled to letters, because she was the only unmarried daughter at that time. But it is argued, that this right must be determined as of the time of the death of the intestate, and the four daughters being-married at that.time, the granting of letters was a matter resting in the discretion of the Court.

We find nothing-in the Code to justify this construction. When administration is granted upon the death of the intestate, the order of priority must of course be determined at that time. If, from any cause however, the administration is delayed, and the party first entitled should die, then the next in