Gross v. State

SALMON, J. On July 12, 2000, Charles Gross (“Gross”) entered an ABA plea 1 to the charge of possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine. In exchange for his plea, the State entered a nolle prosequi to the charges of possession of PCP with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm for use in drug trafficking, and other lesser crimes. The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County accepted the plea and, pursuant to ³²³ the plea agreement, sentenced Gross, on November 20, 2000, to five years imprisonment. No period of probation was imposed.

Gross did not file a petition for leave to appeal to this Court. Instead, he waited more than six years to take any action concerning his conviction. On February 7, 2008, he filed a petition seeking a writ of error coram nobis in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. He alleged, inter alia, that he was denied due process of law because the record failed to show that his plea was entered knowingly and intelligently.

Gross also alleged in his petition that he had recently been convicted in federal court of “conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine” and was awaiting sentencing. This presented a problem because if his “improper” conviction in Prince George’s County were allowed to stand he would be “scored as a career offender” under federal sentencing guidelines, which meant that the range of his sentences would be between 262-327 months. According to Gross, if his conviction in the subject case wrere set aside, the guidelines range “would fall dramatically to 140-175 months.” Following a hearing, the circuit court denied Gross’s coram nobis petition. Gross noted this appeal in which he argues that the circuit court erred in denying his petition because his guilty plea in the underlying criminal case was not knowingly and voluntarily entered.

He based that contention on the fact, that prior to the acceptance of the guilty plea, the plea judge did not explain to him the elements of the offense to which he was pleading guilty, nor was there a statement on the record by Gross’s counsel that he had explained the elements of the offense to his client. Appellant also contends that his guilty plea was invalid because, prior to accepting the plea, the court failed to advise him that if he had gone to trial he would have been able to invoke his right against self-incrimination. The State asks us to affirm the circuit court’s denial of the coram nobis petition for three independent reasons. First, ³²⁴ the State contends that Gross waived his right to coram nobis relief by failing to file, within 30 days of the date his sentence was imposed, a petition for leave to appeal to this Court.

Second, the State argues that, regardless of the merits of Gross’s complaint about the advice he was given prior to the court’s acceptance of the ABA plea, Gross failed to prove entitlement to relief because, at the coram nobis hearing, he put on no evidence demonstrating that he incurred any collateral consequences as a result of his Prince George’s County conviction. Third, according to the State, the record demonstrates that Gross’s guilty plea was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. I. A. The Coram Nobis Hearing Gross’s counsel introduced into evidence three exhibits, viz: 1) the transcript of the July 12, 2000 proceedings at which Gross’s plea of guilty was accepted; 2) the transcript of the sentencing hearing of November 20, 2000; and 3) an affidavit, signed by Gross. Gross’s affidavit read as follows: During my guilty plea proceeding of July 12, 2000, neither the trial judge nor my lawyer advised me of the elements of the charge to which I pled guilty.

Also, neither the trial judge nor my attorney told me that, if I went to trial, I could testify or refuse to testify. My trial attorney never advised me of the above constitutional defects in my guilty plea hearing. Trial counsel also did not: (1) consult with me about my option of seeking permission to appeal; or (2) file an Application [for] Leave to Appeal in order to challenge the knowing and intelligent nature of my guilty plea. Furthermore, at the end of my sentencing hearing on November 20, 2000, the trial judge told me that I could appeal my sentence within 30 days; the judge did not, however, inform me that I could request permission to appeal from my guilty plea itself.

Therefore, I did not understand that I could apply for leave to appeal ³²⁵ from my guilty plea. If I had known that I could challenge, via an Application for Leave to Appeal, the knowing and intelligent nature of my guilty plea, then I would have raised the above claims in an Application.[ 2 ] The transcript of the hearing at which the ABA plea was accepted shows that appellant was represented by Richard Collins, Esquire, the law partner of Joseph Vallario, Jr., the attorney who had negotiated the ABA plea. The plea was accepted by the Honorable Sheila R. Tillerson-Adams. Questioning by the judge revealed that at the time of sentencing Gross was 26 years old and was a high school graduate who could read, write and understand the English language.

At the time the plea was accepted, Gross was taking no medication and was in good health both physically and mentally, and was not under the influence of any drugs or alcohol. During the court’s questioning of Gross, the following exchange occurred: THE COURT: Have you gone over the charges with your attorney in [the subject case] and the elements of the offenses that you’re charged with? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. ³²⁶ THE COURT: It is my understanding that you’re entering a plea to Count I, Possession with Intent to Distribute Cocaine, mandatory amounts. Is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am. THE COURT: Are you entering this plea voluntarily and as a result of your own decision? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am. THE COURT: Have you been provided with a copy of the charging document, discussed the charges and possible offenses[sic] with your attorney?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am. THE COURT: Are you completely satisfied with the service of your attorney and the way hes [sic] handled your defense thus far? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am. THE COURT: Has your attorney done everything that you’ve asked with regard to conducting your defense?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am. (Emphasis added.) Before accepting the plea, Judge Tillerson-Adams also told Gross about various rights that he was giving up by pleading guilty. She told Gross, inter alia, that he had a right to a trial before a jury made up of twelve jurors, that if he had elected a jury trial he would have had a right to help pick the jury, and that the jury could not find him guilty unless all twelve jurors unanimously concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he was guilty. The court also advised appellant that if he elected to do so, he had a right to a trial before a judge who could not find him guilty unless the evidence showed that he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Gross said that he understood that he was giving up all those rights. In advising Gross of the rights just mentioned, and several others, Judge Tillerson-Adams did not tell Gross that if he had gone to trial he would have been able to invoke his right against self-incrimination. ³²⁷ Gross then told the judge that he was pleading guilty because he was guilty. Prior to accepting the guilty plea, the prosecutor read into the record the factual predicate for the plea, saying: Your Honor, had this matter gone to trial, witnesses would have testified to the following. There was an investigation that involved both 8506 Grand Haven Avenue and 8508 Grand Haven Avenue, two townhouses next to each other, Upper Marlboro, Prince George’s County, Maryland.

As a result of the investigation, search warrant was executed simultaneously on 8506 and 8508. Mr. Charles Gross was the owner and/or renter is more appropriate of 8508 Grand Haven Avenue. Seized within the house and specifically within the bedroom of Charles Gross was approximately 390 grams of cocaine spread within the bedroom, the closet, etc. There was also PCP found in the refrigerator. There were three other residents, four other residents of the house.

One hundred and fourteen point three milligrams of PCP plus an additional 11.58 grams of PCP was found in the refrigerator. Also found was $21,339, again in various parts of the house in different safes. There was a loaded gun found in Mr. Gross’s bedroom in his dresser drawer portion, pages, pagers, Pm sorry, and three scales were found in the house, two in the kitchen and one in the garage. Various documents tying Mr. Gross to the house.

The various drugs were analyzed by a certified chemist of the Prince George’s County Police, I’m sorry, a certified chemist of the Prince George’s County Police Laboratory and the amounts were found to be in fact cocaine a Schedule II substance, and PCP a Schedule II substance, and also marijuana a Schedule I substance. All events occurred in Prince George’s County, Maryland and that would be what the witnesses would have testified to. After hearing the proffer the following transpired: ³²⁸ THE COURT: Mr. Collins and Mr. Gross? MR.

COLLINS: Yes? THE COURT: Any additions or corrections to the facts of this case? MR. COLLINS: My client indicates that he would differ on a couple of issues that really wouldn’t go to the heart of the count that he’s pleading to such as the possession of the gun.

It wasn’t found in his drawer. THE COURT: Okay. MR. COLLINS: But essentially we believe the State would present enough evidence to convince Your Honor or a jury that he was guilty.

THE COURT: On the possession with intent to distribute? MR. COLLINS: Yes. THE COURT: Okay.

Okay then, now, Mr. Gross the plea agreement as I understand it is plea to Count I, Possession with Intent to Distribute Mandatory Amounts. The plea would be five years without the possibility of parole and the PSI would be ordered. It would be a straight five year sentence. And that’s it.

Other than that, is that your understanding of the plea agreement? MR. COLLINS: It is. The court next made sure that Gross understood the sentence that would be imposed pursuant to the ABA plea and advised Gross that the conviction in the subject case would result in a violation of the term of probation imposed due to a conviction in a Calvert County case.

Appellant said he understood both the plea and its consequences. Next, the court engaged Gross in the following colloquy: THE COURT: Okay. Have you understood all of my questions? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I did.

THE COURT: And were all of your answers truthful? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am. THE COURT: Do you understand that by entering a plea of guilty you’re giving up your right to a direct appeal of ³²⁹ this case but you will have a right to ask for leave to appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am THE COURT: Okay, anything further and did you want to consult with your attorney before I accept your plea?

MR. COLLINS: Any questions? THE DEFENDANT: No, ma’am. THE COURT: Okay then.

The Court finds that the plea is freely, voluntarily, and understandably made; finds jurisdiction in the factual basis as set forth by the State. Madam Clerk (unintelligible) to reflect the Defendant withdraws any previously entered pleas of not guilty and enters a plea of guilty to Count I of this indictment, Possession with Intent to Distribute Cocaine, Mandatory Amounts. (Emphasis added.) On November 20, 2000, the court sentenced appellant in accordance with the plea amount. After sentencing, the court advised appellant as follows: THE COURT: ...

You have 30 days to appeal this sentence, 30 days to ask for a three judge panel, and 90 days to file a motion for reconsideration. (Emphasis added.) The court then asked Gross whether he understood these rights and he responded in the affirmative. At the coram nobis hearing, Gross’s counsel called Joseph Vallario, Jr., the attorney who negotiated the plea agreement and the attorney who represented Gross at his sentencing hearing back in 2000. Mr. Vallario testified that, although Mr. Collins represented Gross at the hearing at which the plea was accepted, Gross was “definitely” his client.

On direct-examination he admitted that he had no conversation, whatsoever, with Mr. Gross concerning his rights once the plea was accepted. On cross-examination, Anthony McCarthy, Esquire, the prosecutor, and Mr. Vallario had the following brief exchange: ³³⁰ Q [MR. MCCARTHY]: Okay. Therefore, your normal procedure would have been, since he was your client, to have gone over the charges with him and told him what they meant?

MR. GINSBURG [COUNSEL FOR GROSS]: Objection. THE COURT: Overruled. THE WITNESS: I’m sure— BY MR.

MCCARTHY: Q You went over the elements with him? A Yes. The circuit court denied Gross’s petition for coram nobis relief. B. The State’s Waiver Argument The State, citing Holmes v. State, 401 Md. 429 , 932 A.2d 698 (2007), contends that appellant waived his right to coram nobis relief.

The Holmes Court said: [I]f an individual who pleads guilty, having been informed of his right to file an application for leave to appeal from his conviction and sentence, does not file such an application for leave to appeal, a rebuttable presumption arises that he has waived the right to challenge his conviction in a subsequent coram nobis proceeding. Because Thomas did not rebut the presumption of waiver, nor demonstrate “special circumstances” to excuse his failure to file an application for leave to appeal, his right to challenge his conviction and sentence through a writ of error coram nobis petition was waived. Id. at 445-46 , 932 A.2d 698 . It is undisputed that Gross never filed a petition for leave to appeal to this Court.

And, as already mentioned, Judge Tillerson-Adams told appellant immediately after she accepted his plea that he had “a right to ask for leave to appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.” Gross said in response that he understood that right. After he was sentenced, appellant was told that he had “thirty-days to appeal this sentence, thirty-days to ask for a three-judge panel, and ninety-days to file a ³³¹ motion for reconsideration.” (Emphasis added). Once again, appellant said that he understood those rights. The State argues that because Gross was informed that he could file an application for leave to appeal but did not do so, he waived his right to seek a writ of eiror coram nobis.

Gross, on the other hand, emphasizes that at sentencing he was told only that he had “thirty-days to appeal this sentence,” but was not told that he had a right to file a petition for leave to appeal his conviction. And, in regard to what was said at the plea hearing, he was told that he had a “right to ask for leave to appeal to the Court of Special Appeals” but was never told that he had only thirty days to make such an application. We hold that the information given to Gross in this case on the date the plea was accepted and later at the time of sentencing was not sufficient to constitute a waiver of his right to later file a petition for coram nobis relief. Technically, appellant did not have a right to appeal “his sentence” as he was told on the date sentence was imposed.

He had a right to file a petition seeking leave to appeal the conviction and sentence. Holmes, 401 Md. at 445-46 , 932 A.2d 698 . Moreover, at no point was he told that he had thirty days to file a petition for leave to appeal. The plea in this case was taken long before Holmes was decided.

The circumstances of this case demonstrate the importance of telling any defendant who pleads guilty that he or she has “thirty days from the date of sentencing to file a petition asking the Maryland Court of Special Appeals for leave to appeal the sentence and the conviction.” If such advisement is given, coram nobis relief will be deemed waived if: 1) the defendant does not file a petition for leave to appeal within 30 days, and 2) no “special circumstances” exist. See Holmes, 401 Md. at 445-46 , 932 A.2d 698 . C. Failure to Prove Collateral Consequences The State argues that this Court should affirm the court’s denial of coram nobis relief because Gross failed to ³³² prove that he had incurred any substantial collateral consequences as a result of the guilty plea. As all parties agree, in order to be entitled to coram nobis relief, the petitioner must prove that he or she is “suffering or facing significant collateral consequences from the conviction” from which he seeks relief.

See Skok v. State, 361 Md. 52, 79 , 760 A.2d 647 (2000). In his brief, Gross argues: Although Appellant has long since served his sentence in this case, he is suffering significant collateral consequences as a result of his conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine—mandatory amounts. Appellant currently is serving a sentence in a federal drug conspiracy case. As a result of his conviction in this case, Appellant was scored as “career offender” under Section 4B1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines; consequently, his federal sentence was premised on a guidelines range of 262 months to 327 months.

If his wrongful conviction in this case were vacated, however, then his guidelines range would fall dramatically to 140 months to 175 months. See Parker [v. State], 160 Md.App. [672] at 687 [ 866 A.2d 885 (2005) ] (holding that appellant stated cause of action for coram nobis relief by alleging that he faced longer term of imprisonment under federal Sentencing Guidelines due to his guilty pleas, which were not entered knowingly and intelligently, in three state cases). Gross does not say in his opening or reply brief, nor does the record reveal, what sentence was actually imposed in federal court. At oral argument, however, Gross’s counsel advised us that in July 2008, his client received a 188 month sentence in the federal case.

The sentence was below federal sentencing guidelines because he cooperated with the Government and for other reasons concerning bad prison conditions he experienced during pre-trial detention. The State points out, accurately, that although Gross alleged in his petition for coram nobis relief that he was suffering significant collateral consequences as a result of his ³³³ conviction, he failed to prove such collateral consequences at the post-conviction hearing. Mere allegations, according to the State, are insufficient and therefore Gross failed to sustain his burden on this issue. If the argument that the State now makes had been put forth at the hearing on Gross’ petition for coram nobis relief, the State’s argument might well have been grounds for an affirmance, assuming the court did not allow Gross to reopen his case.

But this argument was not raised or decided below. Moreover, if the issue had been raised in the circuit court there is a good chance that the coram nobis Court would have granted Gross permission to reopen. Thus, we hold that this issue is waived. See Maryland Rule 8-131(a) (ordinarily, except for jurisdictional issues, an appellate court will not decide any other issue that is neither raised or decided in the circuit court).

See also Rivera v. State, 180 Md.App. 693, 715 , 952 A.2d 396 , cert. granted, 406 Md. 112 , 956 A.2d 201 (2008); Abrams v. State, 176 Md.App. 600, 625, n. 16 , 933 A.2d 887 (2007).

II

Analysis of the Merits of Appellant’s Contentions A. Failure to Advise Appellant as to the Nature of the Charges to Which He Was Pleading Guilty Relying on Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175 , 125 S.Ct. 2398 , 162 L.Ed.2d 143 (2005), and Abrams v. State, supra, Gross contends that his guilty plea was constitutionally invalid because Judge Tillerson-Adams failed to either: 1) tell him the elements of the charge to which he was admitting guilt, or 2) obtain assurance on the record from his counsel that he (defense counsel) had explained to Gross the elements of the crime. Before discussing, in detail, the merits of appellant’s argument, it is useful to first analyze the cases of State v. Priet 289 Md. 267 , 424 A.2d 349 (1981), and Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422 , 103 S.Ct. 843 , 74 L.Ed.2d 646 (1983). The Priet case ³³⁴ involved three pleas accepted by circuit court judges in three separate cases. Id. at 269 , 424 A.2d 349 .

In all three cases, the convictions were reversed by this Court (one reported and two unreported decisions) because the guilty pleas were accepted without a showing, on the record, of a discussion with the defendant concerning the nature of the charges. Id. at 271, 273-274 , 424 A.2d 349 . In the reported decision by this Court, Priet v. State, 45 Md.App. 1, 3 , 410 A.2d 1107 (1980), we had held that a plea judge could not accept a guilty plea without knowing what was told to the defendant. 45 Md.App. at 3 , 410 A.2d 1107 . The Court of Appeals consolidated the cases, granted certiorari, and reversed the decisions in all three cases. 289 Md. at 293 , 424 A.2d 349 .

In Priet, each of the three defendants was represented by counsel when their pleas were accepted and each defendant acknowledged discussing the case with his counsel. Id. at 290, 424 A.2d 349 . Nevertheless, prior to accepting the plea, .the court did not discuss the nature of the charge with the defendants and the “record did not particularize the precise basis of the [appellees’] claimed knowledge that [they] understood the nature of the offense.” Id. The Court of Appeals in Priet upheld the validity of the guilty pleas entered by all three defendants, saying: Consistent with the principles espoused in the majority of these state and federal cases, and with the rationale underlying our decision in Davis [v. State, 278 Md. 103 , 361 A.2d 113 (1976) ], rule 731(c) [predecessor to the current 4-242(c) ] does not impose any ritualistic or fixed procedure to guide the trial judge in determining whether a guilty plea is voluntarily and intelligently entered.

Id. at 287-88, 424 A.2d 349 . Instead, the plea was to be viewed under the “totality of the circumstances as reflected in the entire record.” Id. at 276 , 424 A.2d 349 (quoting Davis v. State, 278 Md. at 103, 109 , 361 A.2d 113 (1976)). The Priet Court, speaking specifically to the issue of whether a detailed recitation by the court of the ³³⁵ elements of the crime was necessary for a guilty plea to be voluntarily and intelligently entered, stated: The Rule [731(c) ] does not require that the precise legal elements comprising the offense be communicated to the defendant as a prerequisite of the valid acceptance of his guilty plea. Rather by its express terms, the rule mandates that a guilty plea not be accepted unless it is determined by the court, after questioning of the defendant on the record, that the accused understands the ‘nature’ of the charge.

This of course, is an essential requirement of the rule and must be applied in a practical and realistic manner. It simply contemplates that the court will explain to the accused, in understandable terms, the nature of the offense to afford him a basic understanding of its essential substance rather than of the specific legal components of the offense to which the plea is tendered. 289 Md. at 288 , 424 A.2d 349 . The Court then said: [T]he observation made by the Supreme Court in Henderson [v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647 , 96 S.Ct. 2253 , 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976) ], that unless the contrary clearly appears from the record (as was true in Henderson ), “it may be appropriate to presume that in most cases defense counsel routinely explain the nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give the accused notice of what he is being asked to admit.” ... The test, as we have indicated, is whether, considering the record as a whole, the trial judge could fairly determine that the defendant understood the nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty.

Id. (citation omitted). See also Rivera, 180 Md.App. at 711-12 , 952 A.2d 396 . (discussing Priet).

In Marshall v. Lonberger, supra, decided about two years after Priet, the Supreme Court once again set forth the rule to be applied when deciding if a guilty plea was knowingly entered. 459 U.S. 422, 436 , 103 S.Ct. 843 , 74 L.Ed.2d 646 (1983). In deciding that issue, Justice Rehnquist, speaking for ³³⁶ the majority, made it clear that, in most cases, the court could rely upon the presumption mentioned in Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647 , 96 S.Ct. 2253 , 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976), i.e. that defense counsel routinely explain to their clients “the nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give to the accused notice of what he was being asked to admit.” 459 U.S. at 436 , 103 S.Ct. 843 . Lonberger was convicted of murder by an Ohio trial court. The Ohio prosecutor introduced evidence that, three years before the date that the Ohio murder was committed, the defendant had pled guilty in Illinois to the charge of attempted murder.

Id. at 426 , 103 S.Ct. 843 . In a later habeas corpus action, Lonberger contended that he did not realize, when he pleaded guilty in the Illinois proceeding, that he was pleading guilty to attempted murder and therefore evidence of the Illinois conviction should not have been admitted in his Ohio trial. Id. at 432-33 , 103 S.Ct. 843 . The Supreme Court said: It is well established that a plea of guilty cannot be voluntary in the sense that it constitutes an intelligent admission that the accused committed the offense unless the accused has received “real notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the first and most universally recognized requirement of due process.” Smith v. O’Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 [ 61 S.Ct. 572 , 85 L.Ed. 859 ] (1941), quoted in Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S., at 645 [, 96 S.Ct. 2253 ].

In Henderson v. Morgan, we went on to make the following observations: Normally the record contains either an explanation of the charge by the trial judge, or at least a representation by defense counsel that the nature of the offense has been explained to the accused. Moreover, even without such an express representation, it may be appropriate to presume that in most cases defense counsel routinely explain the nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give the accused notice of what he is being asked to admit. Id. at 647 [, 96 S.Ct. 2253 ]. Applying this standard to the factual determinations arising from the state-court proceedings which were ‘fairly ³³⁷ supported by the record’ within the meaning of U.S.C. § 2254(d), we disagree with the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in its conclusion that respondent’s plea to the Illinois charge was not ‘voluntary’ in the constitutional meaning of that term.

We think that the application of the principles enunciated in Henderson v. Morgan, supra, lead inexorably to the conclusion that the plea was voluntary. We think a person of respondent’s intelligence and experience in the criminal justice system would have understood, from the statements made at the sentencing hearing recorded in the transcript before us, that the presiding judge was inquiring whether the defendant pleaded guilty to offenses charged in the indictment against him. This is evident from the references in the proceeding by the judge to the fact the respondent’s counsel’s stipulation that the indictment sustained the plea of guilty. Supra, at 427-28.

Under Henderson , respondent must be presumed to have been informed, either by his lawyers or at one of the presentencing proceedings, of the charges on which he was indicted. Given this knowledge of the indictment and the fact that the indictment contained no other attempt charges, respondent could only have understood the judge’s reference to ‘attempt on Dorothy Maxwell, with a knife’ as a reference to the indictment’s charge of attempt to kill. It follows, therefore, both that respondent’s argument that his plea of guilty was not made knowingly must fail, and that the admission in the Ohio murder trial of the conviction based on that plea deprived respondent of no federal right. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 , 87 S.Ct. 648 , 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967).

The judgement of the Court of Appeals is accordingly reversed. 459 U.S. at 436-88 , 103 S.Ct. 843 (emphasis added). It is clear that as of 2000, when Gross’s plea was accepted, Judge Tillerson-Adams complied with the dictates of Pnei and Lonberger because the court was entitled to presume that Gross’s counsel explained to him the charges to which he pled guilty in sufficient detail to give Gross notice of what he was being asked to admit. See Rivera, 180 Md.App. at 713 , 952 A.2d 396 , (holding that, as of the time the plea was accepted ³³⁸ [i.e., pre Bradshaw] the plea court could presume that the defendant knew the elements of the crime because the defendant told the court, on the record, that he had discussed the charges with his attorney). In this regard, it is important to stress that prior to accepting the plea, Gross told Judge Tillerson-Adams that he: 1) had been provided with a copy of the charging document; 2) had “gone over” the charges and the elements of the offenses with his lawyer; 3) had “discussed” the charges with his attorney with whom he was “completely satisfied,” and 4) he was pleading guilty to the charges in Count I because he was guilty of that charge.

In Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. at 178 , 125 S.Ct. 2398 , one of the questions presented to the Supreme Court was whether the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had erred when it held that the defendant, Stumpf, had not entered his guilty plea to “aggravated murder” voluntarily and knowingly. The Sixth Circuit had ruled that Stumpf, who was not a principal in the first-degree, had pleaded guilty to “aggravated” murder without understanding that a specific intent to cause death was a necessary element of that crime under Ohio law. The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Stumpf v. Mitchell, 367 F.3d 594 (6th Cir.2004), and held that the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary because at the plea hearing Stumpf s attorneys had represented to the court that they had explained the elements of “aggravated” murder to their client. In reaching that conclusion, and speaking to the requirement that a guilty plea must be made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, the Supreme Court said: In [appellant’s plea hearing, his attorneys represented on the record that they had explained to their client the elements of the aggravated murder charge; [appellant] himself then confirmed that this representation was true.

While the court taking a defendant’s plea is responsible for ensuring a record adequate for any review that my be later sought, we have never held that the judge must himself explain the elements of each charge to the defendant on the record. Rather, the constitutional prerequisites of a valid ³³⁹ plea may be satisfied where the record accurately reflects that the nature of the charge and the elements of the crime were explained to the defendant by his own, competent counsel. Cf. Henderson, [ 426 U.S. at 647 , 96 S.Ct. 2258 ] (granting relief to a defendant unaware of the elements of his crime, but distinguishing that case from others where “the record contains either an explanation of the charge by the trial judge, or at least a representation by defense counsel that the nature of the offense has been explained to the accused”).

Where a defendant is represented by competent counsel, the court usually may rely on that counsel’s assurance that the defendant has been properly informed of the nature and elements of the charge to which he is pleading guilty. 545 U.S. at 183 , 125 S.Ct. 2398 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). Relying, presumably, on the fact that the letters “cf ’ appear before the cite to Henderson v. Morgan, Gross contends that the presumption mentioned in Henderson can no longer be relied upon by a plea judge. In Abrams , this Court discussed Bradshaw and Priet in detail. Abrams, 176 Md.App. at 620-24 , 933 A.2d 887 .

In the Abrams