Grubb Contractors v. Abbott

ROSALYN B. BELL, Judge. In this appeal,.we define a single family dwelling as it appears in the mechanic’s lien law, but only as it is used in that law. The appeal arises from the denial of a subcontractor’s petition to establish a mechanic’s lien for work done on the residence of Donald and Paola Abbott, appellees. In September, 1987, the Abbotts contracted with John H. Matherly, designer/builder, to construct an addition to their home.

The addition included a garage and several rooms that Mr. Abbott’s mother was to use. The original agreement anticipated completion of the work in 45 days at a cost of $44,142.00. Over the next several months, the Abbotts advanced $21,292.00 to Matherly for the purchase of materials and supplies. Matherly, however, had neither delivered supplies to the site nor begun work on the project.

In fact, Mather ³⁸⁷ ly signed another agreement with the Abbotts in July, 1988 to commence work and complete the project in 21 days. As part of the agreement, the contract was reduced $3,000 as compensation for Matherly’s past delays. Matherly then contracted with Grubb Contractors (Grubb), appellant herein, to commence construction of the addition. Kevin Grubb testified that Matherly “begged us to come down and do the job, to start the job, get him out of the hole____” Although Grubb had never worked on any other projects in Howard County, it agreed to perform the construction as a favor to Matherly. 1 Grubb began construction on August 4, 1988 without requiring an advance payment from Matherly for labor and materials.

On September 9,1988, Grubb submitted a bill to Matherly for $2,329.66. Matherly did not pay the bill, telling Grubb that the Abbotts had no funds. Grubb did not question the Abbotts about Matherly’s explanation. Grubb continued to work on the project and on October 25, 1988 presented another bill to Matherly for $11,611.62.

This included the previous bill. Notwithstanding Matherly’s failure to pay this bill, Grubb continued to accrue charges for work done on the project. On November 2, 1988, Grubb rendered a final bill to Matherly for $11,801.71. This was also never paid. 2 Grubb told the Abbotts they would continue to work on the project but wanted the Abbotts to pay the $11,801.71 Matherly owed them before work would resume.

The Abbotts, however, hired Natale Construction Co. to complete the job. Grubb subsequently sent the Abbotts, by certified mail, a Notice of Intention to Claim a Lien within the required time limit under Md. Real Prop.Code Ann. § 9-104 (1974, 1988 ³⁸⁸ Repl.Vol.). Mr. Abbott’s mother received and accepted the notice on December 15, 1988. At trial, the court denied Grubb’s petition to establish and enforce a mechanic’s lien.

From this ruling, Grubb appeals, contending: —the trial court erred in denying its petition for a mechanic’s lien since the Abbotts acted in bad faith; and —the construction on the Abbotts’ home was not construction on a single family home as required by the statute. We affirm. BAD FAITH Grubb first contends that the Abbotts acted in bad faith in permitting the subcontractor to perform services and provide materials on the project. Specifically, Grubb complains that since Matherly never delivered materials and supplies to the site and never performed any work, although the Abbotts had made advance payments of $21,292, the Abbotts knew or should have known before Grubb started to work on the project that Matherly had defrauded them.

Grubb further alleges that the Abbotts were reckless and grossly negligent in making payments to Matherly and hence, acted in bad faith when they “sought restitution through the work of the unsuspecting Grubb, and they encouraged Grubb to do yet more work on the project knowing that Matherly would not pay [it].” Upon our review of the record extract, we do not find, nor does Grubb direct us to, where this issue was presented for the trial judge’s determination during the trial. The only indication that the issue was raised is in Grubb’s Motion for New Trial and to Alter or Amend a Judgment. Moreover, the record shows that a hearing was held on this motion on August 4, 1989. Grubb, however, did not provide us with a transcript of those proceedings in its record extract.

Since that hearing is the only place the ³⁸⁹ issue was ever discussed, that transcript is necessary for us to make a determination on the issue Grubb presents. Rule 8-501(c) provides in pertinent part: “The record extract shall contain all parts of the record that are reasonably necessary for the determination of the questions presented by the appeal. It shall include the judgment appealed from; the opinion or jury instructions of the trial court____” Rule 8-501(l) permits us to make any appropriate order with respect to the case as a sanction for noncompliance with Rule 8-501. Since the August 4, 1989 transcript was not provided, we need not reach the question of bad faith.

Even if we could reach this question, Grubb’s contention is without merit. In support of its contention, Grubb relies on J.L. Purcell, Inc. v. Libbey, 111 Conn. 132 , 149 A. 225 (1930). Purcell, however, is factually inapposite to the instant case. There, the trial court found that the owner knew and intended that no money would be available on the contract to pay the subcontractors.

On one occasion, for example, the owner gave the contractors a check which was simultaneously endorsed back to the owner. The trial court concluded that the owner had acted fraudulently, and that the fraudulent representations of the contractor induced the subcontractor to furnish the material for which he filed his lien. Here, the record — at least so much of it as we have — does not reveal any fraudulent behavior. Instead, the Abbotts attempted to ascertain whether the proceeds had been utilized for the purchase of materials and equipment.

The Abbotts reasonably believed that the purchases were made because Matherly showed them copies of bills and cancelled checks for suppliers. Moreover, the owner does not bear the burden for negligent payment. Maryland Real Prop.Code Ann. § 9-114 (1974, 1988 Repl.Vol.) shifts the responsibility for insuring that subcontractors are paid from the owner to the prime contractor. Ridge Sheet Metal Co. v. Morrell, 69 Md.App. 364, 374 , 517 A.2d 1133 (1986). ³⁹⁰ We therefore conclude that Grubb’s first contention is without merit.

SINGLE FAMILY DWELLING Grubb next argues that Md.Real Prop.Code Ann. § 9-104(f)(3) (1974, 1988 RepLVol.) does not protect the Abbotts from attachment of a mechanic’s lien. Section 9-104(f) provides: “(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section to the contrary, the lien of the subcontractor against a single family dwelling being erected on the land of the owner for his own residence shall not exceed the amount by which the owner is indebted under the contract at the time the notice is given.” Grubb contends that the improvements done for the Abbotts consisted of an independent dwelling for Mr. Abbott’s mother. 3 The Abbotts, on the other hand, point out that the purpose of the work was to improve the property and make room for Mr. Abbott’s mother at the residence. They argue that the addition of Mr. Abbott’s mother as a resident does not disqualify the home as a single family dwelling since the use of the home is “solely for the use of the Abbotts’ nuclear family and is not to be used by anyone other than the Abbott family.” The resolution of this dispute requires us to construe “single family dwelling” as used in § 9-104(f)(3). “Single family dwelling” is not defined in the mechanic’s lien statute; nor did we find any cases in Maryland that define the term. We need, therefore, to ascertain the meaning the Legislature attached to that term as used in the statute.

In search of that meaning, we need to ferret out the “ ‘general purpose, aim or policy’ ” of the statute. Kaczo ³⁹¹ rowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513 , 525 A.2d 628 (1987) (citation omitted). When interpreting legislation, we look to the plain meaning of the words and, if clear, that generally completes our inquiry. The plain meaning rule, however, is not inflexible.

As the Court of Appeals observed in Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co., 308 Md. 69, 75 , 517 A.2d 730 (1986): “We also recognize the rule that where a statute is plainly susceptible of more than one meaning and thus contains an ambiguity, courts consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose of the enactment. In such circumstances, the court, in seeking to ascertain legislative intent, may consider the consequences resulting from one meaning rather than another, and adopt that construction which avoids an illogical or unreasonable result, or one which is inconsistent with common sense.” (Citations omitted.) Continuing its examination of the statute in question, the Court in Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 514-15 , 525 A.2d 730 , explained: “[T]he plain-meaning rule does not force us to read legislative provisions in rote fashion and in isolation. What we are engaged in is the divination of legislative purpose or goal. Indeed, as we have explained, the plain-meaning rule ‘is not a complete, all-sufficient rule for ascertaining a legislative intention____’ The ‘meaning of the plainest language’ is controlled by the context in which it appears.

The aim or policy of the legislation, against which we measure the words used, is ‘not drawn ... out of the air; it is evinced in the language of the statute as read in the light of other external manifestations of that purpose.’ Or as Justice Holmes once put it, ‘the general purpose is a more important aid to the meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down.’ More recently, the Supreme Court has stated the proposition thus: ‘We agree ... that “[t]he starting point in every