Guardino v. State

Orth, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. A fifteen year old high school student complained that William Raymond Guardino had raped her, robbed her, and battered her. He was arrested, indicted, and tried in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. Twelve of his peers were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he had committed the crimes and found him guilty of rape in the second degree, 1 robbery, and battery.

The trial judge, merging the battery conviction into the rape conviction, sentenced him to the jurisdiction of the Division of Corrections for a total of eight years to commence at the conclusion of a sentence he was then serving. On direct appeal, Guardino does not suggest that the evidence placed before the jury was not legally sufficient to sustain the convictions. At the trial he admitted that he had vaginal sexual intercourse with the complainant but asserted that it was not by force but with her consent. But ⁶⁹⁷ there was evidence supporting her insistence that the intercourse was by force, against her will, and without her consent.

A medical examination made shortly after the incident showed that she had bruises on her neck and left shoulder and on her vulva. The bruises on her neck appeared to be fingerprint-type marks as if someone had grabbed her particularly hard. The bruises on the vulva, the examining doctor opined, could have been caused by forceful intercourse. The bruises were fresh, no more than several hours old.

The right upper area of her back, and both sides of her lower back were abraded. The victim’s wallet was found on Guardino’s person at the time of his arrest, and he admitted taking it after coitus because he needed money. Guardino attacks the judgments by way of four errors he alleges were made by the trial judge, any one of which, he implores, was so prejudicial as to require reversal of the judgments. He claims that the judge was wrong in refusing to strike two jurors for cause; that on two occasions he improperly admitted evidence adduced by the State; and that he erred with respect to one of his instructions to the jury.

We find no merit in regard to the allegations concerning the striking of the jurors and the admission of the evidence. As to the jury charge, the judge erred, but Guardino’s challenge comes too late to provide him relief. We first explain why the erroneous jury instruction does not give him succor. I. The instruction in question deals with the advisory nature of the judge’s charge to the jury.

Article 23 of the Declaration of Rights to the Maryland Constitution provides in pertinent part: "In the trial of all criminal cases, the Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact, except that the Court may pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction.” ⁶⁹⁸ Md. Rule 757 implements that provision. In the light of Art. 23, it speaks in terms of "advisory instructions” and stipulates that "[t]he court may, and at the request of any party shall, give those advisory instructions to the jury as correctly state the applicable law.” Md. Rule 757b. It mandates that "[i]n every case in which instructions are given to the jury the court shall instruct the jury that they are the judges of the law and. that the court’s instructions are advisory only.” Id. Art. 23 spells out no exception to the declaration that the jury shall be the judges of the law (although it has an exception as to the facts), and the implementing rule indicates no exception to be brought to the attention of the jury with regard either to the jury being the judges of the law or the court’s instructions being advisory only.

As recently as 1976, the Court of Appeals spoke in terms of instructions on the law under the Constitutional provision as "purely advisory” and stated that "the jury must be so informed.” Dillon v. State, 277 Md. 571, 580 , 357 A.2d 360, 366 (1976) (emphasis supplied), and, in reaffirming that the jury must be left to find their verdict in accordance with their own judgment of the law as well as the facts, observed that such an advisory instruction with respect to the law goes to the jury simply as a means of enlightenment and not, as in civil cases, as a binding rule for their government. Id., quoting Slansky v. State, 192 Md. 94, 107 , 63 A.2d 599, 604 (1949). So it was that the trial courts of Maryland generally construed the Constitutional provision as being satisfied by informing the jury in the plain language of the rule that they were the judges of the law and that the court’s instructions were advisory only. Frequently, however, there was a caution added by the court to the effect that being judges of the law did not confer upon the jury "untrammeled discretion to enact new law or to repeal or ignore clearly existing law as whim, fancy, compassion or malevolence should dictate....” See Blackwell v. State, 278 Md. 466, 479 , 365 A.2d 545, 553 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918 (1977).

The judge here charged the jury in the usual fashion: "As I mentioned before the trial began, under the ⁶⁹⁹ Constitution of the State of Maryland in a criminal case, the jury is the judge of the law as well as the facts, and for that reason, then, anything that I may say to you during my instructions is advisory only and you are not bound to follow them. You may feel free to reject my advice as to what the law is and to arrive at your own independent determination of that. At the same time, you are not free to arbitrarily interpret the law as you think it ought to be or so that it will conform to any private opinion that you may have. You have to consciously and in accordance with your oaths listen to the Court and listen to the argument of counsel and based upon that, arrive at a determination of what the law is in the state of Maryland and once having done that and having made your factual determination, which again it is your obligation to make, you will apply facts to the law and you will then, based upon that, will arrive at your verdict.

If you find that there was a conflict, and in many cases there will not be a conflict between what I tell you and what both counsel will tell you about the law, but if there is a conflict, then it will be your duty to resolve that conflict.” The same day the jury in the case before us was charged, the Court of Appeals decided Stevenson v. State, 289 Md. 167 , 423 A.2d 558 (1980). Stevenson declared that "the jury was not granted, by Article 23, the power to decide all matters that may be correctly included under the generic label — 'law.’ Rather, its authority is limited to deciding 'the law of the crime,’ . . . or 'the definition of the crime,’ as well as 'the legal effect of the evidence before [the jury].’.. . And this Court has consistently interpreted this constitutional provision as restraining the jury’s law deciding power to this limited, albeit important, area.” Id. at 178 , 423 A.2d at 564 (citations omitted). ⁷⁰⁰ Since the jury’s judicial role is limited to the "law of the crime,” all other legal issues are for the judge alone to decide. Thus, both the judge and the jury have a law-judging function, and the jury, as well as the court, must know what its respective function is.

Therefore, the Court said, the trial judge should inform the jury what it was called upon to do and what it could not do: "[I]t is incumbent upon a trial judge to carefully delineate for the jury the following dichotomy: (i) that the jury, under Article 23, is the final arbiter of disputes as to the substantive 'law of the crime,’ as well as the 'legal effect of the evidence,’ and that any comments by the judge concerning these matters are advisory only; and (ii) that, by virtue of this same constitutional provision, all other aspects of law (e.g., the burden of proof, the requirement of unanimity, the validity of a statute) are beyond the jury’s pale, and that the judge’s comments on these matters are binding upon that body. In other words, the jury should not be informed that all of the court’s instructions are merely advisory; rather only that portion of the charge addressed to the former areas of 'law’ may be regarded as non-binding by it, and it is only these aspects of the 'law’ which counsel may dispute in their respective arguments to the jury. On the other hand, the jury should be informed that the judge’s charge with regard to any other legal matter is binding and may not be disregarded by it.” Id. at 180 , 423 A.2d at 565 (footnote omitted). Montgomery v. State, 292 Md. 84 , 437 A.2d 654 (1981), further restricted the law-judging function of the jury.

It announced that the application of the rule implementing Art. 23 "is limited to those instances when the jury is the final arbiter of the law of the crime.” At 89. It explained: "Such instances arise when an instruction culminates in a dispute as to the proper inter ⁷⁰¹ pretation of the law of the crime for which there is a sound basis. Under such circumstances, counsel are granted leave to argue contrary to the court’s instruction on the law of the crime and this is the occasion when Article 23 and Rule 757 b require the court’s instruction to be advisory. Even here, counsel may not in their arguments attempt to persuade the jury to enact new law or repeal or ignore existing law.

However, in those circumstances where there is no dispute nor a sound basis for a dispute as to the law of the crime, the court’s instructions are binding on the jury and counsel as well.” At 89 (emphasis in original). 2 An instruction on "the law of the crime,” Montgomery notes, "must contain a definition or explanation of the offense charged in language setting forth the essential elements thereof, along with such additional explanation of the law pertaining to the criminal agency of the accused as may be necessary.” At 88-89. Unlike Stevenson, Montgomery did not specifically state nor demonstrate that its doctrine was reflected in the prior decisions of the Court. But it is silent as to its retroactive effect. 3 As it serves to explicate Stevenson , we assume that its teachings, no less than Stevenson’s, are an affirmation of prior decisions, in accord with established law consistently ⁷⁰² followed by the Court of Appeals, even though not recognized in practice by many of the trial courts. It is readily apparent that the charge in the case before us was erroneous in that it was not in conformance with Stevenson and Montgomery .

The charge as made carried with it a blanket statement that the instructions were advisory. There was no indication that the comments of the judge as to the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof, for example, were binding on the jury. From the arguments of counsel, it may be that there was no dispute with respect to some aspects of the law of the crimes charged, but there was a dispute as to other aspects of them. The court, however, made no distinction in connection therewith in regard to the jury’s function.

Guardino concedes that with respect to the advisory nature of the instructions, he did not object below to them as required by Md. Rule 757 f, nor did he request a proper instruction. He, thus, falls squarely within Md. Rule 757 h so that his objection on appeal is not reviewable as of right. He requests us, however, despite his failure to object timely, to exercise the discretion conferred on us by section h of the Rule and to take cognizance of the error. We decline to do so.

We appreciate that both the bench and the bar are charged with having knowledge of the law. But in light of Rule 757 h, the failure of the trial judge to recognize that the Court of Appeals had "consistently interpreted” Art. 23 as "restraining the jury’s law deciding power,” limiting it to the law of the crime, cannot excuse the failure of defense counsel to recognize that restraint and interpose a timely objection when the trial judge failed to abide by it. This is in accord with Scarborough v. State, 50 Md. App. 276 , 437 A.2d 672 (1981). We find support for our position in Stevenson .

The majority declined to review the propriety of the individual instructions given there because no question had been raised thereon except the failure to inform the jury that all instructions on the law were binding on it. 289 Md. at 171 , 423 A.2d ⁷⁰³ at 561. The dissenting members of the Court hotly disputed this, stating that "[a] review of the record demonstrates that there was an objection to the advisory instruction given, and