Gurley v. Gurley

Finan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellant, Cynthia N. Gurley, hereinafter referred to as the wife, and appellee, Clyde C. Gurley, hereinafter referred to as the husband, were married in 1938; three daughters were born ³⁹⁵ of this union. Prior to this marriage the husband and his sister, appellee Mary Willard Gurley, hereinafter referred to as the sister, were each left an undivided one-half interest in several properties in and around Cumberland, Allegany County, Maryland, as tenants in common by the terms of their mother’s will. The sister is a spinster and it is uncontroverted that her brother has always managed her business affairs, including those concerning the Cumberland properties.

The wife owned a house in Bethesda, Maryland, title to which was acquired on the death of her first husband; title later being transferred to both the husband’s and wife’s names as tenants by the entireties. In 1956 the husband and wife separated. The husband moved into an apartment; the wife remained in the family home with their three daughters. According to the husband, this separation was the result of his wife’s instituting an action for separate maintenance and support while they were living together as man and wife.

In the fall of 1958, the husband testified that he intensified his efforts toward a reconciliation, as he was finding it impossible to maintain two-homes and send two daughters through college. At this time the husband was exploring various methods of putting his financial affairs in order. One of the elements of his plan for refinancing was to gain complete control over the Cumberland properties and in February of 1959, he consulted George Hughes, Esq., his attorney in Cumberland. As a result of his. inquiries, a deed conveying his one-half interest in the Cumberland properties to the sister and releasing the wife’s inchoate-right of dower was prepared.

The husband discussed the signing of this deed with his wife and it is admitted that prior to its. execution he told her in effect, “this deed would never make any difference as long as she behaved herself and if she did not get us into any difficulty because of her dishonesty or her lying.” He also told his wife that the purpose of this deed was to-give him the freedom to provide a secure home and provide for the education and welfare of his children, free from her capricious and embarrassing conduct regarding monetary matters. The deed, showing only nominal consideration, was executed on March 18, 1959, in the presence of a notary public, and the husband retained possession of the executed instrument in keep ³⁹⁶ ing with his practice of handling all of his sister’s business affairs. It is uncontradicted that the sister never saw the executed deed although she knew of its existence. On the 28th of April, 1959, the husband moved back into the family home where they lived together as husband and wife until July 22, 1960, when they separated again and have remained separate and apart since that time.

The husband retained possession of the deed until February 1960, when he mailed it to Hughes, the husband’s and sister’s attorney in Cumberland. According to the husband this was done for “safekeeping” and he at this time “hoped never to record it.” On March 31, 1960, the deed was recorded by Hughes and immediately thereafter a deed from the sister, conveying one of the Cumberland properties to Juliano, et ux., was placed on record. Two additional parcels of the Cumberland property were conveyed by the sister subsequent to the Juliano sale. Several other properties described in the deed remained unsold.

On June 6, 1963, the wife filed a bill of complaint in the Circuit Court for Allegany County against the husband and sister, praying that the deed of March 18, 1959, be canceled and annulled. After trial upon the merits, the bill of complaint was dismissed by order of court, dated December 10, 1965. This appeal followed. The wife rests her case on the following contentions: (1) that the challenged instrument, although in the form of a deed of conveyance, is in substance a postnuptial blanket release of the wife’s inchoate dower interest; (2) that the instrument viewed as a postnuptial release of dower is voidable because it is without consideration and unfair; (3) that the instrument is inoperative because of nondelivery to the grantee; and (4) the use to which the husband put the instrument constitutes a breach of the alleged agreement he made with the wife at the time he procured her execution of it.

I and II There is no legitimate construction that could be given the challenged instrument whereby it would be interpreted as a blanket release of the wife’s inchoate dower interest. The legal effect of the instrument was to release, or to use a more pre ³⁹⁷ cise word, to relinquish the wife’s inchoate dower interest in the specific parcels of real estate described in the deed and it does nothing more. (Art. 45, § 12 Code (1957)). The wife’s inchoate dower interest would still attach to any property of which the husband became seised in the future in his own name, or as a tenant in common, nor was dower relinquished as to any other real estate which he may have owned at the time of the execution of the deed, and title to which was vested in him individually in fee or as a tenant in common.

The testimony indicates that there was no additional property of which the husband was seised, other than that described in the deed to his sister; however, in the event that there was, the wife’s inchoate dower would attach. Furthermore, there was no relinquishment of the wife’s dower interest in the husband’s estate (Art. 46, § 4 and Art. 93, § 329 Code (1957)), in the event he should predecease the wife. Accordingly, the protestation in the appellant’s brief that the challenged instrument constitutes a postnuptial release of dower is clearly fallacious. Bringing the instrument into proper focus as a deed wherein the wife relinquished her inchoate dower interest in real property specifically described therein, was it without consideration and unfair ?

The execution of the deed by the wife was a voluntary act. The Chancellor, who heard the testimony, stated in his written opinion: “The evidence indicated that the Complainant understood the significance of the deed and she voluntarily executed it.” Counsel for the wife stresses the need for adequate consideration in this transaction and emphasized the alleged lack of it, relying heavily on Levy v. Sherman, 185 Md. 63 , 43 A. 2d 25 (1945) ; Ortel v. Gettig, 207 Md. 594 , 116 A. 2d 145 (1955) ; Livingston v. Hall, 73 Md. 386 , 21 A. 49 (1891); and Reed v. Reed, 109 Md. 690 , 72 A. 414 (1909). A study of these cases reveals that none of them have any controlling effect on the case at bar. In both Levy , and Ortel , the Court was confronted with antenuptial agreements wherein the wife had relinquished all inchoate right of dower, not only in property presently vested in her husband, but in all property of which ³⁹⁸ in the future he might become seised, as well as all dower interest in his estate should the wife survive him.

A comparison between such cases and the one at bar cannot be fairly drawn. In Livingston , a bill quia timet, wherein the wife conveyed to the husband for “natural love and consideration, and one dollar,” property which she had purchased “out of her own separate money and estate,” for “her sole and separate use,” falls far short of resembling a case where the wife relinquishes her inchoate dower interest in specific property of the husband acquired by him through inheritance. In Reed , we find, if anything, a case helpful to the appellee. There the wife purchased property in 1896 for $14,500 — a respectable sum in those days; and directed that title be vested in herself and her husband as tenants by the entireties.

Later they were divorced in England and subsequently she endeavored to have the Maryland Courts restore complete fee simple title to her. This Court held that as a result of the divorce the parties held the property as tenants in common, but it did remand the case to the lower court for further proceedings as to the existence of any evidence of undue influence and coercion. Again, we are referred to a case, in which a basic distinction can be made between it and the case at bar, wherein we are concerned with a wife relinquishing her inchoate dower interest in specific property owned by the husband. The most that any of these cases offer, insofar as assisting in the denouement of the issues before us, is that they buttress the well known and oft repeated principle of law that the Court recognizes the existence of a confidential relationship where transactions between husband and wife are concerned.

In Manos v. Papachrist, 199 Md. 257, 262 , 86 A. 2d 474, 476 (1952), Judge Delaplaine speaking for the Court aptly expressed it: “Ordinarily the relationship of husband and wife is a confidential one. Of course, in any given case it is a question of fact whether the marital relationship is such as to give the husband dominance over his wife or to put him in a position where words or persuasion have undue weight.” In summation, the law and factual situations, as found in the ³⁹⁹ authorities offered by the appellant, do not reach this case as to either the law or the facts. This Court does feel that Mueller v. Fid.-Balto. Bank, 226 Md. 629 , 174 A. 2d 789 (1961) is most apposite to the case at bar.

Although this case involved real estate situated in New Jersey, it was noted by the Court at p. 634, 174 A. 2d 792 , that: “The statutes of that State [New Jersey] as to how a wife can release dower, N.J.S.A. (1954 Supp.), Secs. 37:2-18 and 18.1, have essentially the same effect as those of Maryland, Code (1957), Art. 45, Sec. 12 and Sec. 20.” In this case the wife executed a deed together with her husband and others whereby certain lands in the estate of her father-in-law were to be sold and her husband was to receive one-third of the proceeds. The husband received the checks representing his share of the proceeds, forged his wife’s signature and cashed them; the