Haas v. Lockheed Martin Corp.

DAVIS, J. This case requires us to interpret Md.Code (1998 Repl.Vol.), art. 49B, § 42 and the Montgomery County Code § 27-19 (2001) to determine when the statute of limitations begins to run on an employment discrimination claim. Suzanne N. Haas, Ph.D., appellant, filed a complaint on October 22, 2003, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, alleging disability discrimination. Lockheed Martin Corporation (Lockheed Martin), appellee and appellant’s former employer, responded to the complaint by filing a motion to dismiss. Because the motion to dismiss raised constitutional issues involving the Montgomery County Code, Montgomery County (hereinafter County) filed a motion to intervene on February 4, 2004, as well as a proposed opposition to appellee’s motion to dismiss. 1 ¹⁶⁵ Appellee filed a response to the County’s motion to intervene on February 23, 2004.

The court granted the County’s motion to intervene on March 5, 2004, and deemed the County’s opposition to appel-lee’s motion to dismiss as filed on that same date. Appellee filed a reply to the County’s opposition on March 8, 2004. On March 9, 2004, the trial court conducted a hearing and denied appellee’s motion to dismiss. The Order denying the motion to dismiss was entered on March 23, 2004.

Discovery commenced and continued until late October 2004. Appellee filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on November 1, 2004. A motion in opposition to appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on November 23, 2004, along with a Statement of Material Facts. Appellee filed a reply to appellant’s opposition on December 6, 2004.

Following a hearing on December 16, 2004, the court granted appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment. On January 10, 2005, appellant filed this timely appeal. 2 3 Appellant presents the following question for our review, which we rephrase: Did the trial court err by granting summary judgment to appellee on the grounds that the date of the commencement of the two-year limitations period for discrimination actions begins at the time notice of termination is received, rather than on the date of actual separation from employment? In support of the above assignment of error, appellant also requests that we consider whether, because other events and dates cited by appellee were non-adverse, they did not rise to the level of actionable discrimination and, as a consequence, the limitations period did not begin to run until she suffered an adverse employment action. We answer the first question above in the negative.

Because we shall hold that the statute of limitations began to run when appellant received notice of her prospective termination, ¹⁶⁶ we decline to reach the second issue above. Therefore, we shall affirm the decision of the trial court. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Appellant began working for appellee in October 1998 as a program administrator. In April of 2000, appellee created a new business area called “Corporate Shared Services,” and a new department within this business area called “Learning Services.” The new department was headed by Dr. Candice Phelan.

Appellant began working for Dr. Phelan in April or May of 2000. Sometime prior to being transferred to Learning Services, Amy Lowenstein, appellant’s previous supervisor, told Dr. Phelan that appellant had a medical condition. 3 After her transfer to Learning Services, Dr. Phelan allegedly began making comments to appellant concerning her inability to write, to handle jobs that require planning and judgment and to pay attention to detail. According to appellant, notwithstanding Dr. Phelan’s comments, she was assigned to work on presentation programs as a presenter and organizer. Appellant also claims that she was given excellent marks by individuals who attended and reviewed the programs.

On June 11, 2001, Dr. Phelan placed appellant on a Performance Improvement Plan. On June 28, 2001, Dr. Phelan met with appellant and gave her a contribution assessment in which Dr. Phelan rated appellant a “marginal contributor.” Sometime in April 2001, appellant was informed that her position was being moved to another department under the supervision of Dorothea Mahan. Appellant applied, but was not hired for the transferred position under Mahan, which allegedly included all of the duties and responsibilities appellant performed in her then current position. On September 24, 2001, appellant was removed from the Performance Improvement Plan.

By letter dated October 9, ¹⁶⁷ 2001, Dr. Phelan informed appellant that she would be eliminating appellant’s position from her division, effective October 23, 2001, due to a “reduction in force.” On October 23, 2001, appellant was terminated from her position at Lockheed Martin. On December 16, 2004, the court heard oral arguments on the Motion for Summary Judgment based on the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations. Appellant, relying on the Court of Appeals’ decision in Towson University v. Conte, 384 Md. 68 , 862 A.2d 941 (2004), insisted that the limitations period did not begin to run until she was actually discharged from her position. Additionally, she claimed that the notification letter she received on October 8 or 9, 2001, nor any of the discriminatory acts she alleges took place up to that point, were sufficient to begin the running of the statute of limitations prior to her actual discharge.

The Court found that Conte was decided in the context of an employment contract case, not a case involving discrimination, such as the case at issue here. Instead, relying on two Supreme Court opinions, Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 , 101 S.Ct. 498 , 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980) and Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6 , 102 S.Ct. 28 , 70 L.Ed.2d 6 (1981)(per curiam), the court granted appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that the statute of limitations began to run when appellant was notified that she would be laid off. This appeal followed. LEGAL ANALYSIS STANDARD OF REVIEW Summary judgment motions are governed by Md. Rule 2-501(e), which provides that “[t]he court shall enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if the motion and response show there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” We review the motion and response in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.

Messing v. Bank of America, 373 Md. 672 , ¹⁶⁸ 688-84, 821 A.2d 22 (2003). It is not disputed by either party that appellant received a letter on October 8 or 9, 2001, notifying her that she would be terminated as of October 23, 2001. It is also undisputed that appellant left the employment of appellee on that date. When the material facts are not in dispute, we review the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to determine if it was legally correct.

Id. at 684 , 821 A.2d 22 . The standard of review for a grant of summary judgment on the law is de novo. Id. I Appellant has asked this Court to conclude that the term “discharge,” as that term is used by the Montgomery County Council in Section 27-19 of the Montgomery County Code, means “actual discharge.” Appellant claims, in her brief, that the meaning of “discharge” is at the heart of this appeal.

More specifically, she contends that [the trial judge] found that the limitations period began after the time Dr. Haas was notified of her prospective discharge — October 9, 2001 — instead of from the date on which she was actually discharged — October 23 in 2001. In support of her assignment of error, she contends In the instant case, there is no proper construction of the term “discharge” other than “actual discharge or termination of the employment relationship.” Had the County Council wished to make the notification of a prospective discharge a discriminatory practice, it might easily have done so. In this case, it did not____ Without question, construing the term “discharge” to mean notification of a discharge that may occur some future time would amount to such a forced interpretation. If the word “discharge” is determined to mean “actual discharge,” as appellant urges, then the statute of limitations period would not begin to run until her employment “actually” ends.

In the alternative, if the word “discharge” means “notice of discharge,” then the statute of limitations would begin to ¹⁶⁹ run when appellant received the notice that she would be laid off. Montgomery County Code § 27-19 provides the cause of action authorized by Article 49 § 42(a) and states in pertinent part: (a) A person must not because of the race, color, religious creed, ancestry, national origin, age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, family responsibilities, or genetic status of any individual or disability of a qualified individual, or because of any reason that would not have been asserted but for the race, color, religious creed, ancestry, national origin, age, sex, marital status, disability, sexual orientation, family responsibilities, or genetic status: (1) For an employer: (A) fail or refuse to hire, fail to accept the services of, discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment; or (B) limit, segregate, or classify employees in any way that would deprive or tend to affect adversely any individual’s employment opportunities or status as an employee ... (b) The term “discriminate” in subsection (a) includes excluding, or otherwise denying, equal job opportunity or benefits to, a qualified individual because of the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or association. Although this is a case of first impression for Maryland appellate courts, we are not the first jurisdiction to consider the important question of when the statute of limitations begins to run in an employee’s action based upon termination of employment.

See Towson University v. Conte, 384 Md. 68, 116-21 , 862 A.2d 941 (2004) (Eldridge, J., Dissenting). In Conte , the Court of Appeals stated that the limitations period in a breach of contract action did not begin to run until the contract was actually breached. Id. at 96 , 862 A.2d 941 . Conte involved the breach of an employment contract.

Id. at 71-72 , 862 A.2d 941 . In Conte, Judge Eldridge maintained in ¹⁷⁰ dissent that the statute of limitations had expired on Conte’s claim, relying on two Supreme Court cases, Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6 , 102 S.Ct. 28 , 70 L.Ed.2d 6 (1981); and Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 , 101 S.Ct. 498 , 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980). Id. at 116-17 , 862 A.2d 941 . In those cases, the Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations begins to run when the employee is notified of the termination.

Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258 , 101 S.Ct. 498 ; Chardon, 454 U.S. at 8 , 102 S.Ct. 28 . The Ricks and Chardon cases involved allegations of discrimination, which led to adverse employment actions. The majority in Conte , in response to Judge El-drige’s dissent, held that “Ricks and Chardon are inapposite to the case at bar. There is no allegation of discrimination or deprivation of civil rights.” Conte, 384 Md. at 97 , 862 A.2d 941 .

The instant case involves a claim by appellant that she was terminated for a discriminatory purpose. We also note that the language of the Montgomery County Code mirrors the language used in the Federal statute as well as the State statute. 4 Therefore, Ricks and Chardon are both persuasive authorities in this case. ¹⁷¹ Ricks involved an allegation that the appellant, Columbus Ricks, was discriminated against when he was denied tenure at Delaware State College. 449 U.S. at 252 , 101 S.Ct. 498 . As a result of his denial of tenure, Ricks filed a grievance with the College Board of Trustees Educational and Policy Committee. Id.

The college had a policy of offering junior faculty members, such as Ricks, a one-year terminal contract when they are denied tenure. Id. at 253 , 101 S.Ct. 498 . Prior to the end of the one-year contract, Ricks was notified that his grievance was denied. Id. at 254 , 101 S.Ct. 498 .

Ricks filed a complaint in the United States District Court alleging he had been discriminated against. The District Court found that Ricks’ claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 254 , 101 S.Ct. 498 . The Court found the only unlawful employment practice was the college’s decision to deny Ricks tenure, and the statute of limitations on that claim began to run at the time he was denied tenure.

Id,, at 254-55, 101 S.Ct. 498 . The ¹⁷² Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the District Court and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at 256 , 101 S.Ct. 498 . The Supreme Court concluded that determining the timeliness of a lawsuit requires precise identification of the unlawful employment practice.

Id. at 257 , 101 S.Ct. 498 . The Court focused on Ricks’ complaint, in which Ricks alleged that discrimination on the part of the college motivated the college to deny him tenure. Id. On appeal, Ricks then complained that discrimination not only motivated the college to deny him tenure, but to also terminate his employment.

Id. The Court determined that Ricks was, in effect, claiming a “continuing violation” of the civil rights laws, such that the statute of limitations would not begin to run until his terminal contract with the College had expired. Id. This was clearly at odds with the allegations of Ricks’ original complaint.

Id. Additionally, the Court concluded, the only alleged discrimination occurred at the time the tenure decision was made and communicated to Ricks, and that is when the statute of limitations began to run. Id. at 258 , 66 L.Ed.2d 431 . Less than a year later, the Supreme Court decided Char-don.

Chardon involved a claim by a group of non-tenured administrators in the Puerto Rico Department of Education that their terminations were in violation of their civil rights. Chardon, 454 U.S. at 6 , 102 S.Ct. 28 . Each of the administrators received a notice from the Puerto Rico Department of Education that his appointment would terminate on a specified date. Id. at 7 , 102 S.Ct. 28 .

The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concluded that the limitations period did not begin running until the appointment ended, rather than from the date of notification. Id. In reaching that decision, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concluded that Chardon was distinguishable from Ricks on the ground that the unlawful employment practice in Ricks was the denial of tenure. Id.

In Chardon , the administrators complained that termination of their employment was unlawful. Id. at 7-8 , 102 S.Ct. 28 . The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court stating that Ricks ¹⁷³ was indistinguishable from Chardon. Id. at 8 , 102 S.Ct. 28 .

The Court explained: The fact of termination is not itself an illegal act. In Ricks, the alleged illegal act was racial discrimination in the tenure decision. [In Chardon ], respondents allege that the decision to terminate was made solely for political reasons, violative of First Amendment rights. There were no other allegations, either in Ricks or in [Chardon ], of illegal acts subsequent to the date on which the decisions to terminate were made. Id. at 8, 102