Haigley v. Department of Health

¹⁹⁸ HOLLANDER, Judge. This appeal concerns the scope of the Maryland Public Information Act (“PIA”), Maryland Code (1984, 1995 Repl. Yol., 1998 Cum.Supp.), §§ 10-611 through 10-628 of the State Government Article (“S.G.”). We must determine whether the PIA requires the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (“DHMH” or “the Department”), appellee, to release information to Susan Miller Haigley (“Ms.Miller”), 1 appellant, identifying the Baltimore County eating establishment from which appellant may have contracted hepatitis.

The Department refused to disclose the requested information, asserting that the information was “confidential” under Md.Code (1982, 1994 RepLVol.), §§ 4-101 and 4-102 of the Health-General Article (“H.G.”), and therefore not available pursuant to S.G. § 10-615. After the Circuit Court for Baltimore County affirmed the Department’s decision, appellant noted her appeal. She presents a single issue for our review, which we have rephrased slightly: Pursuant to the Maryland Public Information Act, is appellant, who contracted hepatitis from an unknown establishment in Baltimore County, entitled to information regarding the results of the investigation conducted by the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene? For the reasons that follow, we shall neither affirm nor reverse, but shall remand to the circuit court for further proceedings.

See Md. Rule 8-604(d). Factual Background 2 Appellant was diagnosed on January 28,1998, with hepatitis ¹⁹⁹ A, which she contracted in December 1997 or January 1998. 3 She was treated by physicians at the Johns Hopkins Hospital. During the course of her illness, appellant was admitted to the hospital on four occasions. She suffered the symptoms of the disease for ten weeks and, according to appellant, “became critical and ... almost died.” Upon identifying appellant’s illness, personnel at Johns Hopkins Hospital notified DHMH and the Baltimore County Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, as required by H.G. § 18-201. 4 After DHMH was notified, appellant contends that the Department conducted a “case investigation” to determine the identity of the establishment; the Department avers that it undertook a “study” to discover the reason for an increase in hepatitis A in Baltimore County. 5 As part of its inquiry, the Department interviewed appellant while she was in the hospital, and collected from her a list of eating establishments that she patronized during the time she may have contracted the disease.

Based on information the Department collected from appellant and other hepatitis patients, the Department visited a number of Baltimore County eateries in order to test their food and identify the potential source of appellant’s illness. Neither party has furnished the court with details as to how many establishments were investigated, nor what the investigations entailed. According to appellant’s brief, a Department investigator informed her in the “Spring ²⁰⁰ of 1998” that the Department had “discovered the identity of the Establishment.” Appellant asserts that she cooperated with the Department in part because the Department told her that it would reveal the identity of the offending restaurant to her; the Department denies that it made any such assurance. Appellant also asserts, and the Department denies, that DHMH investigators took “stool, blood and other samples” from her. 6 On April 14, 1998, Ms. Miller wrote a letter to Carmela Groves, Chief of the DHMH’s Division of Outbreak Investigation, requesting information related to her case.

Appellant wrote, in pertinent part: Dear Ms. Groves: I am writing to request records pertaining to the recent increase in Hepatitis A in Baltimore County. I believe I was one of the cases involved in this increase since I was diagnosed with Hepatits A on January 25, 1998 and I live in northern Baltimore County in Timonium and ate at several of the establishments that were in question during the time it was believed that the cases were infected. I have been speaking with Dave Portesi and he is aware of the severity of my case. I was ill from Hepatitis A for over 10 weeks and am still under the care of a specialist at Johns Hopkins for the illness.

I was hospitalized 4 times during the course of my illness. Because of this, I was unable to work and have incurred high medical expenses. I would like the opportunity to recoup these costs through legal action. Please provide me with this information at your earliest convenience.

On May 15, 1998, Ms. Groves informed appellant that although some records regarding the investigation would be available to her for a fee, the Department would not identify the establishment from which she contracted the disease. ²⁰¹ Appellant declined to receive the redacted records, and asked Ms. Groves how she could appeal the Department’s decision. On May 21, 1998, Ms. Groves wrote appellant a letter explaining the reasons for DHMH’s decision. Ms. Groves responded, in pertinent part: I am unable to comply with your request for records, as Maryland’s Public Information Act, State Gov’t § 10-615 requires that a custodian of a public record that is confidential by law deny inspection of that record. Pursuant to Md.Code Ann., Health-General (Health-General) §§ 4-101 and 4-102, any records, reports, or other information assembled for research or study by the Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene that names or otherwise identifies any person, is confidential and may not be disclosed to anyone not engaged in the research or study.

In regard to the recent increase in hepatitis A in Baltimore County, the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, Division of Outbreak Investigation conducted research or study under Health-General 4-101 and 4-102. The documents generated or received by the Division of Outbreak Investigation in conducting this research or study identify various persons. Under Health-General §§ 4-101 and 4-102, the Division is unable to release to you the identity of those persons. In addition, the files also contain medical information identified to an individual.

Furthermore, I am denying you reports pursuant to Health-General §§ 18-201, 18-202, or 18-205. Pursuant to these statutes, the records are confidential, not open to public inspection, and subject to subpoena or discovery in any criminal or civil proceeding only pursuant to a court order sealing the court record. Ms. Groves’s letter was consistent with a policy the Department had established beginning in 1991 regarding the release of what it considered as confidential information. On March 27, 1991, Diane M. Dwyer, M.D., Chief of the DHMH’s Center for Clinical Epidemiology, asked the Office of the Attorney ²⁰² General for “an official opinion ... concerning the issue of confidentiality.” Doctor Dwyer’s letter asserted that the Department was “receiving requests for release of information that ask for the ‘entire file’ rather than simply [the Department’s] ‘final report.’ ” The Department’s questions included the following: 1.

Are investigations of communicable disease outbreaks (e.g. influenza, Salmonella food poisoning, etc.) considered “research or study” and therefore covered under Health-General Article, Sections 4-101 and 4-102, Annotated Code of Maryland as a “confidential record”? 2. If investigations of communicable disease outbreaks are covered under Health-General Article, Sections 4-101 and 4-102, Annotated Code of Maryland, then are the final reports summarizing the investigation and results subject to public inspection? 6. Are the names of businesses and institutions such as hospitals, restaurants, food distributors, farms, and other establishments protected from public inspection under Health-General Article, Section 1-101, 4-101 and 4-102, Annotated Code of Maryland? The Office of the Attorney General responded to the Department’s inquiry in a letter dated April 30,1991, co-authored by Jack Schwartz, Chief Counsel for Opinions and Advice, and Helen E. Bowlus, Staff Attorney and counsel for the Department in the case sub judice.

They answered the questions set forth above in the following way: 1. Information developed as part of a study of an outbreak of communicable disease is a “confidential record” within the meaning of § 4-101 of the Health-General Article (“HG” Article).... ²⁰³ Accordingly, the information is subject to the confidentiality strictures of HG § 4-102, to be discussed in more detail in response to other of your questions. 2. A document summarizing the results of an investigation of a communicable disease outbreak may be made public, subject to the restrictions in HG § 4 — 102(b). That is, the summary report may provide as full an account of the incident as you deem desirable, so long as the report does not “disclos[e] the identity of any person who is the subject of the confidential record.” Because the terms “person” includes business entities, HG § l-101(g), the version of the report that would be publicly available should not identify, for example, the establishment that was the source of contaminated food.

Of course, a version of the report containing full details, including identification of all persons involved, may be prepared for internal use and for the limited distribution permitted under HG § 4-102(a). Thus, in answer to an individual who requests a file or report of a specific outbreak — that is, one linked to an identified person — your response would be that pursuant to HG 4-101 and 4-102, the Department must keep confidential any such records if they exist. The limitation applies to requests from the media for interviews or information about a disease outbreak. In answer to a request for information on all outbreaks of a certain disease, your response would be that pursuant to HG §§ 4-101 and 4-102, the Department may release only summary reports that do not identify any person.

In this situation you would release one or more reports, each addressing an outbreak of disease associated with a restaurant not identified in the summary. A request from the media for an interview or information about all outbreaks could be addressed in this same manner. We note, however, that the Secretary is charged by HG § 18-103 with the duties of obtaining accurate and complete reports on communicable diseases in Maryland, determining the prevalence of each communicable disease, and “[d]e- ²⁰⁴ vis[ing] means to control communicable diseases.” In order to safeguard the public health, the Secretary may determine that it is necessary to release information to the public that identifies a person. This release of information may be accomplished, for example, through press releases or media interviews and may alert the public to health-threatening products or conditions.

Such disclosure is authorized by law, and, in appropriate circumstances, would supersede the general bar to the disclosure of the identity of persons in HG §§ 4-101 and 4r- 102. 6. As discussed in response to your second question, the names of business entities or similar establishments are protected from public inspection pursuant to HG §§ 1— 101(g), 4-101 and 4-102. We hope that this letter of advice, although not an opinion of the Attorney General, is fully responsive to your inquiry. Please let us know if we may be of further assistance.

(Emphasis added). On April 20, 1993, the Department’s Epidemiology and Disease Control Program published and disseminated its “Guidelines for Release of Confidential Communicable Disease Information” (“the Guidelines”). That document, which “outline[d] how to process requests for confidential communicable disease information,” echoed the interpretation articulated in the Attorney General’s letter of advice. It stated, in part: ROUTINE AND OUTBREAK-RELATED INSPECTIONS While routine facility inspections are releasable, the inspection reports generated either in response to a complaint resulting in an outbreak investigation or as a part of the outbreak investigation itself are part of the outbreak file and are therefore confidential.

The Guidelines also included a diagram illustrating the Department’s procedure for “Processing Requests for Confidential Communicable Disease Information”, which we have at ²⁰⁵ tached as an Appendix. By all accounts, the Department handled appellant’s request according to the Guidelines. On June 19, 1998, appellant filed a petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, pursuant to S.G. § 10-623. 7 On September 10, 1998, after the parties submitted memoranda of law in support of their respective positions, the court conducted a hearing. Acknowledging that the issue was one of first impression, the court held the matter sub curia.

On September 25, 1998, the court filed a written Memorandum and Order, stating, in pertinent part: The legislative history and plain meaning of [S.G. § 10-615 and H.G. §§ 4-101, 4-102] make clear that, under the circumstances of this case, the identity of the person or persons involved in the investigation cannot be disclosed to the Plaintiff and that the legislative history as argued by the Plaintiff does not change this plain meaning. Perhaps the most important reasons for not divulging such information concern public policy. In carrying out its duties of determining the cause of disease, controlling disease, and otherwise protecting the public health pursuant to Health-General §§ 18-101 through § 18-103, DHMH gathers extensive information from many different sources, and medically, scientifically, and statistically analyzes this information to arrive at facts and conclusions about a disease outbreak. These facts and conclusions enable the health department to take measures to protect the public health and to recommend to those associated with the outbreak how illness can be prevented in the future.

Maintaining confidentiality will allow the health department to gain and keep the cooperation of individuals and entities implicated in the outbreak so that information and bodily specimens and food samples for testing may be ²⁰⁶ forthcoming. The information gathered and the resulting tests are crucial in carrying out a disease outbreak investigation for the protection of the public. Furthermore, DHMH has determined that devising means to control communicable diseases, as required by Health-General § 18-103, is an overriding health concern, and, to that end, provides outbreak information to any entity implicated in the outbreak to educate them about safe food handling practices in order to prevent subsequent outbreaks and to any federal agency that requires outbreak information for statistical or other public health purposes. In deciding whether or not to divulge confidential information, DHMH had determined, pursuant to Health-General §§ 4-102, 18-101, 18-103, and 18-208, that those “engaged in the research” do not include an individual who may have been ill or provided a bodily specimen for testing.

The Plaintiff argues that, the samples that she provided to DHMH were crucial in their investigation and discovery of the offending entity and that without the information from DHMH she will be severely hampered in her attempts to recover for her losses. However, it must be remembered that it is not the duty of the health department in carrying out a disease investigation to act as an investigative arm for those seeking evidence, even for the purpose of litigation---- Rather, it is the duty of DHMH to protect the public welfare by ensuring that the offending “person” is stopped from engaging in the particular practice that is or has the potential to cause harm. A thorough examination of all the pertinent statutes and terms lead[s] to the logical conclusion that the information sought by Ms. Haigley is in fact confidential, is not open to public inspection, and is subject to subpoena only pursuant to a court order sealing the court record. Therefore, the records can be used under court supervision only in enforcement procedures but are not available to Ms. Haigley for purposes of pursuing litigation. ²⁰⁷ Thereafter, appellant timely noted this appeal. 8 We shall include additional facts in our discussion.

Discussion In 1970, the Maryland General Assembly enacted the PIA in order to “provide the public the right to inspect the records of the State government or of a political subdivision” within the State. Faulk v. State’s Attorney for Harford, County, 299 Md. 493, 506 , 474 A.2d 880 (1984); see 1970 Md. Laws, Chap. 698; AS. Abell Publ’g Co. v. Mezzanote, 297 Md. 26, 32 , 464 A.2d 1068 (1983). State Government § 10-612 provides, in pertinent part: General Right to Information.

(a) General right to information. All persons are entitled to have access to information about the affairs of government and the official acts of public officials and employees. (b) General Construction. To carry out the right set forth in subsection (a) of this section, unless an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of a person in interest would result, this Part III of this subtitle shall be construed in favor of permitting inspection of a public record, with the least cost and least delay to the person or governmental unit that requests the inspection.

A “person in interest” is defined in S.G. § 10-611(e)(l) as “a person or governmental unit that is the subject of a public record or a designee of the person or governmental unit.” (Emphasis added). In Kirwan v. The Diamondback, 352 Md. 74 , 721 A.2d 196 (1998), the Court of Appeals reiterated that “ ‘ “[t]he provisions of the Public Information Act reflect the legislative ²⁰⁸ intent that citizens of the State of Maryland be accorded wide-ranging access to public information concerning the operation of their government.” ’ ” Id. at 81 , 721 A.2d 196 (quoting Fioretti v. Maryland State Board of Dental Examiners, 351 Md. 66, 73 , 716 A.2d 258 (1998)(further citations omitted)). Moreover, the provisions of the statute must be “ ‘liberally construed ... in order to effectuate the Public Information Act’s broad remedial purpose.’ ” Kirwan, 352 Md. at 81 , 721 A.2d 196 (quoting Mezzanote, 297 Md. at 32 , 464 A.2d 1068 ); see Faulk, 299 Md. at 506-507 , 474 A.2d 880 (stating that “the basic policy” of the PIA is “in favor of disclosure”); see also Fioretti, 351 Md. at 76 , 716 A.2d 258 ; Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Maryland Committee Against the Gun Ban, 329 Md. 78, 80-81 , 617 A.2d 1040 (1993); Cranford v. Montgomery County, 300 Md. 759, 771 , 481 A.2d 221 (1984). State Government § 10-613 mandates that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, a custodian shall permit a person or governmental unit to inspect any public record at any reasonable time.” A “public record” is defined in S.G. § 10-611(g)(1) as the original or any copy of any documentary material that: (i) is made by a unit or instrumentality of the State government or of a political subdivision or received by the unit or instrumentality in connection with the transaction of public business; and (ii) is in any form, including: 1. a card; 2. a computerized record; 3. correspondence; 4. a drawing; 5. film or microfilm; 6. a form; 7. a map; 8. a photograph or photostat; 9. a recording; or 10. a tape. ²⁰⁹ Under the PIA, there are four provisions that may authorize the denial of a request for inspection.

Nevertheless, because the PIA “establishes a public policy and a general presumption in favor of disclosure of government or public documents,” Kirwan, 352 Md. at 80 , 721 A.2d 196 , the exemptions are interpreted narrowly. Fioretti, 351 Md. at 77 , 716 A.2d 258 . When a public official denies a request for records under the PIA, he or she bears the burden of showing, upon judicial review, “that the requested records are within the scope of a statutory exemption.” Faulk, 299 Md. 493, 507 , 474 A.2d 880 (1984); accord, Fioretti, 351 Md. at 78 , 716 A.2d 258 . We turn to review the exemptions.

First, S.G. § 10-616 requires a custodian to deny inspection of specific types of public records, including records related to adoption, retirement, and public personnel. Second, S.G. § 10-617 requires custodians to deny inspection of records that contain medical, psychological, or sociological information about a person, or that contain confidential commercial information, including trade secrets. Third, S.G. § 10-618 permits a custodian to deny inspection of particular types of public records if the custodian “believes that inspection ... would be contrary to the public interest.” S.G. § 10-618(a). The fourth exception, which is relied upon by the Department here, is found in S.G. § 10-615.

That section provides: Required denials — In general. A custodian shall deny inspection of a public record or any part of a public record if: (1) by law, the public record is privileged or confidential; or (2) the inspection would be contrary to: (i) a State statute; (ii) a federal statute or a regulation that is issued under the statute and has the force of law; (iii) the rules adopted by the Court of Appeals; or (iv) an order of a court of record. ²¹⁰ Recently, in Gallagher v. Office of the Attorney General, 127 Md.App. 572 , 736 A.2d 350 (1999), we noted that the purpose of the PIA is “ ‘virtually identical’ to that of the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552 and that interpretations of the federal statute are ordinarily persuasive.” Id., at 584 , 736 A.2d 350 (quoting Fioretti, 351 Md. at 76 , 716 A.2d 258 ). Therefore, we adopted “the standard of review applied by federal courts of appeals involving claims under the FOIA, which is (1) whether the trial court had an adequate factual basis for the decision rendered and (2) whether upon this basis the decision reached was clearly erroneous.” Id. In contrast, “Pure legal errors ... are reviewed de novo.” Id.

The Department claims that inspection of the documents requested by appellant is prohibited by S.G. § 10-615, because they are- “confidential,” pursuant to H.G. §§ 4-101, and not subject to disclosure under H.G. § 4-102. Health-General §§ 4-101 and 4-102 are found in Subtitle 1 of Title 4 of the Health-General Article. Title 4 is captioned “Statistics and Records”; Subtitle 1 is labeled “Confidential Research Records.” Because our discussion focuses on the provisions of Subtitle 1, we reproduce it below in its entirety: § 4-101. “Confidential record” defined. In this subtitle, “confidential record” means any record, report, statement, note, or other information that: (1) is assembled or obtained for research or study by: (1) The Drug Abuse Administration; or (ii) The Secretary; and (2) Names or otherwise identifies any person.

(Emphasis added). § 4-102. Confidential records protected. (a) Custody and use generally restricted. — (1) Each confidential record shall remain in the custody and control of: (i) The Drug Abuse Administration, if that Administration assembled or obtained the confidential record; or ²¹¹ (ii) The Secretary or an agent or employee of the Secretary, if the Secretary assembled or obtained the confidential record. (2) The confidential record may be used only for the research and study for which it was assembled or obtained.

(3) A person may not disclose any confidential record to any person who is not engaged in the research or study project. (b) Exceptions as to summaries or references. This section does not apply to or restrict the use or publication of any statistics, information, or other material that summarizes or refers to confidential records in the aggregate, without disclosing the identity of any person who is the subject of the confidential record. (Emphasis added). § 4-103.

Penalties. A person who violates any provision of this subtitle is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to a fine not exceeding $1,000. As the parties point out, Maryland’s appellate courts have not yet interpreted H.G. §§ 4-101 and 4-102. Nor have we uncovered a Maryland case defining the terms “research” or “study.” The DHMH contends that the information sought by appellant was “obtained for research for study” because, in the course of carrying out its duty to protect the public health, the Department “gathers extensive information from many different sources and analyzes this information medically, scientifically, and statistically to arrive at facts and conclusions about a disease outbreak.” In particular, the Department contends that the information it possesses about the source of appellant’s exposure to hepatitis A was gathered as part of “research” and “study” focusing on the increase in hepatitis in Baltimore County, and not in connection with an investigation of appellant’s particular illness.

Indeed, it notes that appellant was one of several people whose illness was investigated by the Department. Moreover, appellee contends that the ²¹² information was collected in connection with “research” and “study” because the results of its investigation are used not only to confront health violations at the particular facility that may have transmitted the disease to appellant, but also to “identify and devise means to address new problems in food preparation, new disease agents and their sources, and new vehicles that transmit diseases.” The Department insists that, to the extent its investigations contain identifying information, such as the eating establishment from which appellant may have contracted her illness, these records must be kept confidential. Appellee states: Maintaining ... confidentiality allows the health department to gain and keep the cooperation of individuals and entities implicated in the outbreak so that information, including bodily specimens and food samples for testing, is forthcoming. The information and test results obtained are crucial for DHMH to carry out not only the investigation of a specific disease outbreak but also to learn the information necessary to help prevent future outbreaks and thus protect the public health.

In effect, the Department’s policy is to treat as confidential under H.G. § 4-102 any information “about outbreak investigations or other communicable disease investigations.” This is because the Department construes the terms “research” and “study” to cover almost any investigative step taken in response to a report of food-borne illness. The Department’s Guidelines, for instance, instruct DHMH staff to ask the following question in determining how to respond to a PIA request: “Is the requested information about outbreak investigations or other communicable disease investigations (i.e., considered ‘study’) ? ” (Emphasis added). Appellee argues that we should defer to the Department’s construction of the terms “research” and “study.” See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 , 104 S.Ct. 2778 , 81 L.Ed.2d 694 , reh’g. den. 468 U.S. 1227 , 105 S.Ct. 28 , 82 L.Ed.2d 921 (1984). Citing Webster’s New World Dictionary (2d ed.1986), the Depart ²¹³ ment avers that “research” means “careful, systematic, patient study and investigation in some field of knowledge, undertaken to discover or establish facts or principles.” The word “study” is defined in that dictionary as “careful attention to, and critical examination and investigation of, any subject [or] event.” 9 Appellant counters with numerous arguments to support her position that H.G. §§ 4-101 and 4-102 do not preclude the Department from disclosing to her the information generated or gathered by DHMH.

In appellant’s view, the Department’s objective in its investigation was to correct health code violations that constitute a threat to public safety, not to conduct a “research project” on hepatitis A in Baltimore County. Claiming that the Department would not have begun an investigation had her doctor not reported her illness, appellant argues that the investigation conducted by the Department was authorized and controlled by Title 18 of the Health-General Article, entitled “Disease Prevention,” and Subtitle 3 of Title 20, entitled “Nuisance Control.” Moreover, despite the broad language contained in appellant’s initial letter to the Department, Ms. Miller contends that the limited information she requested related only to the identity of the establishment from which she may have contracted hepatitis. 10 Therefore, appellant argues that disclosure would not jeopardize the privacy rights of a “person in interest” as defined in S.G. § 10 — 611(e)(1). Appellant also asserts that the trial court’s “concern for public policy” was “misplaced”, because the Department wields enormous power over its regulatees, so that disclosure would have a negligible effect on the Department’s ability to enforce health code laws and regulations. As we see it, the Department’s view is at odds with the purpose of the PIA and H.G. §§ 4-101 and 4-102.

Clearly, ²¹⁴ the Department’s exegesis of H.G. §§ 4-101 and 4-102 has controlled its application of the provisions of the PIA. The deference we would ordinarily accord to the agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is tempered by our obligation to safeguard the objectives of the PIA, which instructs us to construe its provisions “in favor of permitting inspection of a public record.” S.G. § 10-612(b). Considering that the Department bears the burden of establishing an exception to the liberal disclosure provisions of the PIA, see Faulk, 299 Md. at 507 , 474 A.2d 880 ; Fioretti, 351 Md. at 78 , 716 A.2d 258 , we believe the agency’s position with respect to appellant’s request conflicts with the Legislature’s intent to make confidential only those documents actually related to “research” and “study.” We explain further. In resolving the parties’ dispute, we must apply the well-honed principles of statutory construction.

These principles undergird our resolution of the thorny issue presented here. “ ‘The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.’ ” Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 417 , 722 A.2d 887 (1999)(quoting Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35 , 660 A.2d 423 (1995)); see also Roberts v. Total Health Care, Inc., 349 Md. 499, 523 , 709 A.2d 142 (1998); Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Cassidy, 338 Md. 88, 93 , 656 A.2d 757 (1995); Privette v. State, 320 Md. 738, 744 , 580 A.2d 188 (1990); McGraw v. Loyola Ford, Inc., 124 Md.App. 560, 592 , 723 A.2d 502 , cert. denied, 353 Md. 473 , 727 A.2d 382 (1999). As the Court recently said in Martin v. Beverage Capital Corp., 353 Md. 388, 399 , 726 A.2d 728 (1999), “[i]n determining legislative intent, we must never lose sight of the overriding purpose and goal of the statute.” This is because “the search for legislative intent is most accurately characterized ‘as an effort to “seek to discern some general purpose, aim, or policy reflected in the statute.” ’ ” Id. (quoting Kaczorowski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513 , 525 A.2d 628 (1987)(in turn quoting Melvin J. Sykes, A Modest Proposal for a Change in Maryland’s Statutes Quo, 43 Md. L.Rev. 647, 653 (1984))). ²¹⁵ To determine legislative intent, we look primarily to the statute itself. Catonsville Nursing Home, Inc. v. Loveman, 349 Md. 560, 570 , 709 A.2d 749 (1998); Allied Vending Inc. v. City of Bowie, 332 Md. 279, 306 , 631 A.2d 77 (1993); State v. Patrick A., 312 Md. 482, 487 , 540 A.2d 810 (1988); Jones v. State, 311 Md. 398, 405 , 535 A.2d 471 (1988).

In doing so, “the Court considers the language of an enactment and gives that language its natural and ordinary meaning.” Montgomery County v. Buckman, 333 Md. 516, 523 , 636 A.2d 448 (1994); see Lewis v. State, 348 Md. 648, 653 , 705 A.2d 1128 (1998); Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. v. Dir. of Fin., 343 Md. 567, 578 , 683 A.2d 512 (1996); Carroll County Ethics Commission v. Lennon, 119 Md.App. 49, 67 , 703 A.2d 1338 (1998); Dept. of Econ. and Employment Dev. v. Taylor, 108 Md.App. 250, 267 , 671 A.2d 523 (1996), aff'd, 344 Md. 687 , 690 A.2d 508 (1997). Moreover, when analyzing a statute, “we seek to avoid constructions that are illogical, unreasonable, or inconsistent with common sense.” Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 137 , 647 A.2d 106 (1994); see also State v. Thompson, 332 Md. 1, 7-8 , 629 A.2d 731 (1993) (courts must reach a statutory interpretation compatible with common sense). As the Court said in