Hale v. State

Murphy, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellant was convicted by the court sitting without a jury of the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and sentenced to three years under the jurisdiction of the Department of Correction. He contends on this appeal that certain incriminatory statements made by him during a custodial interrogation by the police were admitted in evidence over his objection in violation of the principles of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 . The record discloses that appellant was arrested by the police after having been apprehended in a motor vehicle reported stolen by its owner.

He was taken to police headquarters, interrogated by the investigating officers, and an oral statement taken from him. Officer Ronald Milcles testified that before appellant was interrogated he was “advised of his rights;” that “the warning card” which was kept in the interrogation room was read and explained to appellant and appellant stated that he understood; and that the warning card was actually shown to appellant and ³²⁹ he read it himself. The court inquired of Officer Mikles: “Do you have the card there?” The officer stated that he did not, but that appellant “was advised of his rights to counsel; he didn’t have to say anything and anything that he did say could be used against him in court.” In response to further inquiry by the State’s Attorney, Officer Mikles stated that he couldn’t remember if anything else was on the card. The card was neither offered nor received in evidence.

On this foundation, the appellant objected to the introduction of his oral statement, but the court nevertheless admitted it into evidence. By his statement, appellant admitted that he knew the car was stolen. In Robinson v. State, 1 Md. App. 522 , we held that where the State undertakes over objection to introduce a statement taken by police during a period of custodial interrogation, it must show that the accused had been advised prior to such interrogation of his rights under Miranda, viz., (1) that he had a right to remain silent; (2) that anything he said may be used against him in court; (3) that he had a right to have a lawyer with him during the questioning and to consult with him at that time, and (4) that if the accused was indigent, a lawyer would be appointed to represent him. In Robinson v. State, 3 Md. App. 666, 671 , we again held that in post-Miranda trials where the State seeks over objection to enter a statement taken from an accused during custodial interrogation, it must, as part of its proof of voluntariness, “affirmatively show that all warnings required to be given to an accused by that case prior to such interrogation were so given * * * and that the accused, in giving the statement, understood his rights and knowingly and intelligently waived them * * The law could hardly be clearer since the Miranda decision itself states at page 479 that “unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.” In Wiggins v. State, 4 Md. App. 95, 107 (footnote 7), we flatly held that a mere statement that the accused was “advised of his rights” would not be sufficient proof under Miranda .

At most, the record before us discloses that appellant was advised that he had a right to remain silent, a right to counsel, ³³⁰ and that anything he said could be used against him. Insofar as the record shows, he was not told that he had a right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during the interrogation,