Maryland case law › Hall v. Baughman

Hall v. Baughman

35 Md. App. 292 (1977) · Maryland Court of Special Appeals
Maryland Court of Special AppealsDisposition: ReversedMenchine, J.✓ Good law
HoldingE.

Menchine, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. E. William Hall, Jr. (husband) filed an amended bill of complaint in the Circuit Court for Howard County against his former wife, Sandra Hall, now remarried and known as Sandra Baughman (but to be described herein as “wife”). The amended bill in substance alleged that husband had executed a deed whereby the title to 9522 Good Lion Road, in Howard County, Maryland, had been granted and conveyed to the wife; that execution of the deed had been made upon condition that an acceptable separation agreement between husband and wife could be reached; and that delivery of the deed to the wife was not intended to occur until such condition had been met. The wife’s answer denied that execution of the deed was conditional or that delivery of the same was not intended.

On May 21, 1976, testimony by husband and witnesses in his behalf was taken in open court with certain documentary evidence filed as exhibits. After husband rested, counsel for wife moved for dismissal of the bill of complaint pursuant to Maryland Rule 535. The motion was granted by the chancellor. In the face of such a motion, husband “was entitled to have the chancellor consider the evidence and all logical and reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in a light most favorable to him.” Price v. Levin, 248 Md. 158, 160 , 235 A. 2d 547, 548 (1967).

We shall examine the record in the light of that entitlement. Appellant produced uncontroverted evidence that on November 22, 1974, he met his wife at the offices of her attorney. Certain documents were prepared at that time. In the course of discussions husband telephoned his attorney, telling her that he was about to execute a separation agreement and a deed concerning jointly held real property.

His lawyer advised that he bring her the 294 documents for her review. Appellant thus detailed his actions upon receiving that advice: “Q And what did you tell [counsel for wife]? A That after discussion with Miss Brooks that I felt that it would be very important, that she had insisted that I bring back the documents for her review before we let the agreement and the deed be entered, because she felt that I might not be aware of many of those things. Things that might be important for my protection.

Q And were you ever given a package of documents? A Yes, I was. Q Who gave you those package of documents? A The then Mrs. Hall.

Q And what did she — did she say anything to you when she gave you the package? A No. It was my understanding I had all the documents.” He explained that he had signed the deed “because there was a notary there it seemed convenient to sign it there, and I simply was going to take it back and have it reviewed. Sort of like signing a check that you aren’t going to give to somebody and, having the documents reviewed.” Other testimony by appellant to similar effect included the following: “Q Now you say you had the idea that you, that you could always tear up this deed if you didn’t — like a check you had written out and hadn’t passed it, if you didn’t like it later? Is that what you thought?

A Yes, Your Honor, because I thought I had all the copies of the deed with me when I went over to Rockville to Miss Brooks’s office. 295 Q You thought you could tear up a deed you had executed to somebody else, without their consent? A Yes, I did.” Appellant called as a witness the attorney who represented him at the time. She said that husband had brought to her office the documents she believed to have been signed by her client and then said: “A I redrafted the agreement containing most of the major things that they had in mind when they had evidently talked about it and rewrote the waiver of alimony paragraph in particular. Q And did you send that agreement to Mr. Vaughan?

A Yes, I did. That’s the agreement I sent him on November 26th, that was totally rewritten and, retyped. Q And Exhibit Number Eight which I am now showing you was the letter which you sent to Mr. Vaughan [wife’s counsel] and the agreement which you then revised. A Yes.

Q Now, within that agreement did you deal with the transfer of the house? A Yes, I did. A I never had any idea that the house had been transferred between the parties. Throughout the entire case, I always was under the impression that they both jointly owned the real estate property.

Q In your negotiations with your client, and Mr. Vaughan, was the house a very important factor? 296 A It was a major factor, it was the only thing they had that was of any value, everything else was debt. Q After November 22, 1974 were you still negotiating regarding the transfer of the house as a part of the separation of the parties'? A Yes, I was.” (Emphasis added.) Appellant also testified that about October 1, 1975, he learned for the first time that the executed deed had not been included among the papers brought from Vaughan’s office and delivered to appellant’s counsel. He brought the subject action on October 27,1975.

Appellant testified that many discussions concerning title to the house were had after the date of the execution of the deed. He said that in March, 1975, he met with Mrs. Hall and

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