Hall v. Hall

Morton, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellant, Arthur D. Hall, III, has appealed from decrees issued by Judge J. Albert Roney, Jr., after hearings held in the Circuit Court for Cecil County, wherein the appellant’s bill of complaint for an annulment of his marriage to the appellee, Patricia R. Hall, was dismissed; the appellee was granted a divorce a vinculo matrimonii; the ownership of properties claimed by the parties was determined; and the appellee was awarded permanent alimony in the amount of $115 per week. The appellant raises ten separate issues in this appeal and since his attack upon the decrees is largely grounded upon the asserted insufficiency of the evidence to support the chancellor’s action, we shall set forth in full Judge Roney’s findings of fact and conclusions of law: “COURT’S OPINION At 1:48 p.m., on June 28, 1974, Arthur D. Hall filed his Bill of Complaint for an annulment of his marriage to Patricia R. Hall, and at 3:36 p.m., on the same date, Patricia filed her Bill of Complaint against her husband Arthur for a divorce a vinculo. On April 3, 1975, Arthur filed an Amended'Bill of Complaint.

The cases were tried together with consent of counsel and the Court has treated them more in the nature of a Bill and Cross-Bill than as ³⁶⁵ separate cases. For the purpose of simplicity the parties will be referred to herein as Arthur and Patricia. Arthur’s Bill of Complaint for an annulment and Patricia’s Bill for divorce are both based on the fact that at the time of their marriage on June 13,1970, Arthur was still lawfully married to his first wife Helen and therefore his marriage to Patricia was bigamous. It was agreed and stipulated by the parties, however, that there was no fraud or deception on the part of either party in entering into their marriage, as both were unaware that the divorce ostensibly obtained by Arthur’s first wife Helen on October 14, 1968, in the Circuit Court for St. Clair County, Pell City, Alabama, was invalid.

In addition to asking for an annulment of his marriage Arthur prays the Court to declare all property, real and personal, titled in both their names, either as joint tenants or tenants by the entireties, as his sole property and to account for certain moneys to Arthur D. Hall, Inc. Patricia seeks, in addition to a divorce a vinculo, alimony, attorney’s fees, and a determination of the ownership of the jointly held personal property. It is imminently clear that this marriage must be dissolved because it was bigamous at its inception. The question is how it should be done — by annulment or divorce. On September 7, 1947, Arthur married one Helen S. Hall, and they thereafter lived together as man and wife until August 1966 when they mutually agreed to live separate and apart.

In December 1966 Arthur met Patricia who was living separate and apart from her husband. Each was well aware of the marital status of the other and of the proceedings by their respective spouses to obtain a divorce. On December 1, 1967, Patricia’s husband, James W. Flosdorf, was granted an absolute divorce from her by the Court of Common Pleas for ³⁶⁶ Franklin County, Pennsylvania. On October 14, 1968, Arthur’s wife Helen ostensibly obtained, an absolute divorce from him in the Circuit Court for St. Clair County, Alabama, a copy of which decree was received by Arthur from one John Ike Griffith, Attorney, Birmingham, Alabama.

Relying in good faith upon the authenticity and validity of the Alabama divorce decree, Arthur and Patricia were married on June 13, 1970, in Bucks County, Pennsylvania. After living for awhile at Washington Crossings, Pennsylvania, they purchased a 220-acre farm near Port Deposit in Cecil County, Maryland, in December, 1971, for which they received a deed, made to them as tenants by the entireties, dated April 7, 1972. The farm then became not only their residence but the principal office of A. D. Hall, Inc., an engineer and consulting business formed by Arthur and Patricia as incorporators and sole stockholders in May 1971. In a telephone conversation with his first wife Helen in August 1973, to which Patricia was listening in, Arthur and Patricia learned for the first time from a remark that Helen made that there was a possibility that the Alabama divorce was invalid.

Arthur instigated an immediate investigation into the matter and the invalidity of the Alabama divorce was confirmed by a certificate of the Register of the Circuit Court for St. Clair County, Alabama, in Equity, dated September 26, 1973, which was forwarded to Arthur by his attorney on October 2, 1973. Arthur immediately filed suit on October 10,1973, against Helen S. Hail in the Circuit Court for Cecil County, Maryland, for a divorce a vinculo on the ground of separation of the parties since August 1966, and he was awarded an absolute divorce by decree of the Court dated December 21,1973. Except for three occasions when Patricia left Arthur for a brief period of time (not more than a week or ten days at the longest), the ³⁶⁷ parties lived together as man and wife until May 4, 1974, when Patricia left the domicile and they have lived separate and apart ever since. The fact that Arthur married Patricia while his marriage to his first wife was still in effect makes the marriage void ab initio.

The Court therefore can either annul the marriage or dissolve it by granting a divorce. Article 16, Sec. 24. Clayton v. Clayton, 231 Md. 74 . It is conceded that the parties entered into the marriage in good faith.

Thereafter they pursued a rather normal marital relationship for almost four years during which time they sincerely believed they were legally married. An annulment of the marriage fails to recognize any marital relationship between the parties, while a divorce, on the other hand, does recognize the marital relationship. It can hardly be denied that a normal marital relationship did exist between the parties to this cause, even after Arthur obtained a divorce from his first wife in December 1973. Under such circumstances this Court believes that the dissolution of the marriage by divorce is more appropriate than by declaring it annulled.

In his amended Bill of Complaint Arthur alleges, in addition to the marriage being bigamous, that Patricia perpetrated a fraud upon him in that she was guilty of adulterous conduct while married to her former husband which he did not discover until after he married her, and that had he known of her prior adulterous conduct he would not have married her. The Court is not so convinced. He was fully aware of the pending divorce action of Patricia and her former husband in which the husband was the complaining party. He accompanied her on visits to her attorney and they discussed the divorce action on several occasions.

He certainly must have been aware of all the details of the divorce. Furthermore, it was admitted that ³⁶⁸ he and Patricia carried on an intimate relationship while both were still married. If she would carry on an adulterous relationship with him, it certainly should have come as no surprise and shock to him to learn that she may have had an adulterous relationship with others. The court is just not persuaded that he would not have married her had he known of her prior adulterous conduct.

The burden is on him to prove his allegation of fraud to entitle him to an annulment of his marriage, and he has failed to do so. The Court will therefore deny the prayer in Arthur Hall’s Amended Bill of Complaint for an annulment of the marriage and grant the prayer of Patricia Hall for a divorce a vinculo. The Court next considers Patricia’s prayer for alimony. In the Clayton case, supra, it was established that alimony could be awarded incident to a divorce granted on the ground that the husband had another wife living at the time of the marriage.

Arthur challenges her right to alimony on two grounds, namely, that she is the party at fault in deserting her husband, and secondly, that alimony may not be awarded in cases of divorce based on nonculpatory grounds. The case of Flanagan v. Flanagan, 270 Md. 335 , puts to rest the second argument. The Court stated (page 338) that: ‘We have consistently construed this section (Sec. 3 of Art. 16) when applied in connection with divorces on nonculpatory grounds to permit an allowance of alimony to the wife regardless of who originally initiated the action. * * * Therefore, in any suit for divorce on nonculpatory grounds, dissolution of the marriage permits the court to consider the granting of alimony so long as the question is put in issue by either the original bill or a ³⁶⁹ cross-bill, or by requesting such affirmative relief in an answer.’ Arthur’s argument that Patricia is the party at fault in bringing to an end their marital relationship because she deserted him without just cause or reason is not supported by the facts. The one thing above all others that disrupted this marriage and was directly responsible for it ending in divorce was the shocking revelation that they were and had been living together while not legally married to each other because of the invalidity of the divorce proceedings instituted by his first wife.

The other reasons assigned by Patricia for leaving, namely, the alleged sexual advances of Arthur toward her daughter, and his abusive and violent conduct toward her were too remote in time to have been instrumental in causing her to leave when she did. The discovery of the invalidity of Arthur’s divorce from his first wife directly precipitated the separation. Upon learning of it their relationship was never the same thereafter. It is not surprising that when she learned in February 1974 that Arthur had not revealed to her that he had obtained a divorce from his first wife in December 1973 that she should be extremely upset and have reason to question his intentions of marrying her as he had agreed to do when the divorce proceedings were instituted.

Under these circumstances it could hardly be expected that she would continue living with him. It is conceded that the parties hereto entered into their marriage in good faith and that no fraud can be attributed to either party in entering into the marriage contract. At the time of their marriage both parties undoubtedly looked forward to and expected a long and happily married life together. Their relationship toward each other, working together in carrying on the business, purchasing ³⁷⁰ and maintaining a large and beautiful home, and sharing in the activities of both business and pleasure together indicates a normal marital relationship.

There is nothing to indicate that they were not sincerely in love with each other when they married and to all intents and purposes expected their marriage to be a long and happy one. It offered security for Patricia, and not only companionship for Arthur but valuable assistance to him as well in the conduct of his business affairs. While it is difficult to predict what another woman might do under the circumstances, and while it might reasonably be argued that a faithful wife would not leave her bigamous husband if she were truly in love with him, it is difficult to blame Patricia for leaving her husband when she did and under the conditions then existing. Fault is only one of several factors to be considered in properly awarding alimony in a nonculpatory as well as a culpatory divorce.

Flanagan v. Flanagan, supra. In this case it is difficult to assign any real or significant fault to either party for their eventual separation. However, the separation may not have occurred had Arthur acted promptly upon obtaining his divorce from his first wife in so informing Patricia and remarrying her as he had promised. This was the direct cause of her leaving and for this he was at fault.

Finding it difficult to assign any particular blame or fault on the part of Patricia for the dissolution of the marriage the Court believes that she is entitled to receive alimony, if she is otherwise justified. As it has often been stated by our courts, ‘alimony is based upon need and is never a punitive measure.’ The factors that the court should consider in arriving at a proper award of alimony were enumerated in Timanus v. Timanus, 178 Md. 640 , as follows: ‘It is a general rule that a court, before ³⁷¹ determining the award of alimony, should consider the maintenance of the wife in accordance with the husband’s duty to support her suitably, together with the husband’s wealth and earning capacity. In addition to the financial circumstances of the parties, the court should also usually consider their station in life, their age and physical condition, ability to work, the length of time they lived together, the circumstances leading up to the separation, the fault which destroyed the home, and their respective responsibilities for the care and support of the children.’ The testimony given in this case would permit the court to consider all the facts aforementioned, except that there is no testimony before the court upon which the court can determine Patricia’s present and future needs. She stated that she is now living with a friend and is using the balance of the money she received from the settlement with her first husband for her subsistence, but she did not testify, and the court has no way of knowing, what her present living expenses amount to, and whether or not they are reasonable.

The court should not speculate upon such an important matter. The court will therefore reserve unto Patricia the right to alimony pending a hearing before this court to determine the amount, if any, to be awarded. The court now turns to the question of the division of the jointly owned property of the parties. Section 3-603 of Courts & Judicial Proceedings, Annotated Code of Maryland, provides: ‘(a) In general. — A court of equity has jurisdiction in an action for divorce, alimony, or annulment of marriage.

The court shall hear and determine a case of alimony in as full and ³⁷² ample manner as such case could be heard and determined by the Ecclesiastical Courts of England. ‘(b) Determination or division of personal property. — A court granting a limited or absolute divorce may determine the ownership of personal property, other than chattels real, held, possessed, or claimed by a party to the divorce proceedings, and in accordance with that determination may: (1) Make a division of personal property between the parties. (2) Order a sale of personal property and a division of proceeds; or (3) Make any other disposition of personal property it deems proper.’ Both parties have prayed the court to determine the ownership of the real estate held by the parties as tenants by the entireties. Involved is the 221.74 acre farm located near Port Deposit and an unimproved building lot in Elkton. Under the aforementioned statute the court has no jurisdiction in a divorce proceeding to make that determination, in the absence of proof of fraud by one of the parties in bringing about the marriage.

As already stated, there has been a finding by this Court that no fraud was involved here. Where ‘people living together as husband and wife, and in good faith believing themselves to have that status, acquire property by their joint labor and enterprise, take title to the same as tenants by the entireties.’ [ 1 ] Hutson v. Hutson, 168 Md. 182 ; Donnelly v. Donnelly, 198 Md. 341 . It is well settled that the effect of the granting of a divorce upon real estate held by the parties as tenants by the entireties is to convert their respective interests ³⁷³ therein to that of tenants in common. See Wright v. Wright, 2 Md. 429 , and Keen vs. Keen, 191 Md. 31 .

The personal property held by the parties jointly includes: Household furnishings at the farm house at Port Deposit, Maryland 1000 shares — Arthur D. Hall, Inc. 100 shares — Singer Co. 100 shares — Syntex 100 shares — Union Oil of California 11 shares — General Instrument 200 shares — Standard Oil of California Account No. 876-45007, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. ($25,000) Trustee Account, proceeds of redemption of $40,000 Treasury Bills The division of the personal property depends upon the degree of ownership of the respective parties therein. A court of equity, when sitting as a divorce court, may not transfer the property of one spouse to the other or otherwise dispose of it. However, as stated in Abell vs. Abell, 12 Md. App. 99 , ‘having found that the personal property was owned equally by the parties, the Chancellor was powerless to do anything more under the terms of Section 29 than to make an equal division between the parties of the jointly owned property or, in the alternative, to order a sale of the property or such part thereof deemed necessary to effectuate an equal division, and to order the proceeds of sale to be equally divided between the parties.’ Arthur contends that their assets hereinbefore listed ‘were purchased with money either owned by Arthur individually prior to his marriage to ³⁷⁴ Patricia, * * * or with money earned entirely by Arthur after their marriage, and set aside for specific purposes, i.e., income taxes, patent expense, payments due first wife, etc., and that he merely put them in joint names to quell Patricia’s fears of his predeceasing her and everything being tied up in his estate,’ and therefore all the assets are his sole property. The facts do not bear this out.

At the time of their marriage in June 1970 Arthur was employed by the SCM Corporation at a yearly salary of $48,000. Under an agreement with his first wife he was required to pay her $660 per month for support and provide a $40,000 educational trust for his children. He had at the time an equity of about $17,000 in a home in Pennsylvania, an airplane which he sold for $7,000, AT&T stock valued at $10,000, an automobile and some cash. Patricia was at the time receiving $200 per month child support from her first husband; she owned a 1968 Chevrolet, SCM stock valued at $1,800, and about $6,500 which she received as a settlement from her first husband.

Some months later his employment with SCM was terminated. He and Patricia then-formed the Arthur D. Hall corporation which involved the sale of the expertise of Arthur in the field of tele-communications. Arthur was President and Patricia was Secretary and 1000 shares of stock was issued to each as tenants by the entireties. Each contributed by their joint efforts to the success of the business.

According to his 1971 tax return his income for the year was $8,077.87. Compensation paid to Patricia by the corporation that year was $1,700. Corporate tax returns indicate that they each devoted 100 percent of their time to the business of the corporation. The business grew and prospered through their joint efforts until the time of their separation in May 1974.

During this time, as the records indicate, she ³⁷⁵ was paid by the corporation for her services. Arthur contends that these payments to her were part of a scheme to make his income appear to be less than it really was so that his first wife could not claim additional alimony. The corporate income tax returns made under oath show payments made to Patricia for her services to the corporation, and this Court accepts them as correct. Arthur can hardly deny what he has sworn to on the income tax returns.

During this time they acquired the assets hereinbefore listed with the fruits of their joint endeavor and these were put in their joint names as owners. Patricia sold her SCM stock for $550 and the money received therefrom was pooled