Hamilton v. Kirson Alston v. 2700 Virginia

HARRELL, J. We consolidate these two cases, Hamilton v. Kirson, No. 78, September Term, 2013, and Alston v. 2700 Virginia Avenue Associates, No. 100, September Term, 2013, for purposes of this opinion. In each case, a plaintiff or plaintiffs brought, among other claims, 1 a negligence action against landlords to recover for his or her injuries resulting from lead paint poisoning. 2 Neither plaintiff adduced direct evidence that the respective demised premise was a substantial contributor to the injuries or that the interiors of the homes contained lead paint, but rather relied on circumstantial evidence in an effort to satisfy the causation element of a prima facie negligence claim. After discovery was conducted, the landlords filed motions for summary judgment, which the Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted. In both cases, the trial judges reasoned that the respective plaintiffs failed to produce sufficient evidence to present a prima facie negligence case with regard to the causation element.

Our review on appeal focuses on evaluating what quantum or quality of circumstantial evidence in lead paint poisoning cases is sufficient to satisfy the eausa ⁵⁰⁷ tion element of a prima facie negligence claim, so as to submit the case to the fact-finder. Because the facts and issues presented in the consolidated cases differ slightly, we set forth first the background of each case. Then, we shall address collectively the shared relevant legal precedents, applying the relevant case law and legal principles to each case. I. BACKGROUND A. Alston v. 2700 Virginia Avenue Assocs.

On 26 January 2010, Candace Alston filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against 2700 Virginia Avenue Associates, Theodore Julio, Lawrence Julio, and others, alleging that the defendants acted negligently as landlords in providing premises containing chipping, peeling, and flaking lead paint in violation of the Baltimore City Housing Code (hereinafter, “Housing Code”). 3 Subsequently, an Amendment by Interlineation added to the causes of action Brian Alston (Candace’s sibling) and his claims. The Complaint and amendments alleged that Candace and Brian (hereinafter, collectively the “Alstons”) suffered lead-based paint poisoning, Candace while residing for consecutive periods at dwellings located at 2752 Virginia Avenue and 2810 Virginia Avenue and Brian at 2752 Virginia Avenue. For her part, the Alstons’ mother, Leslie Sidbury, could not remember the exact time periods and locations of their resi ⁵⁰⁸ dences during the relevant times. The Complaint alleged that the Alstons’ mother and her children resided at a number of properties between 1989 and 1995.

Specifically, Candace, who was born on 27 January 1989, “lived in the dwelling or frequented the dwelling as an invitee of the tenant during 1989-1995” for the following properties: (1) 3006 Woodland Avenue; (2) 3501 Oakmont Avenue; (3) 303 N. Gilmor Street; (4) 2752 Virginia Avenue; and, (5) 2810 Virginia Avenue. Subsequently, in the Amendment by Interlineation adding as a victim Brian Alston, who was born on 13 August 1990, the Alstons narrowed the matter somewhat that their mother lived at the 2810 Virginia Avenue property between 1992-1993. Then, they lived as a family at 2752 Virginia Avenue between 1993-1995. During the defendants’ later deposition of Ms. Sidbury, it was discovered that she did not remember the exact location of their residence, but approximated that the house was located in the 2800 block on Virginia Avenue.

Plaintiffs’ blood lead level testing slips listed, however, only 3006 Woodland Avenue as their address. During discovery, the Alstons identified Dr. Michael Weitzman as their expert witness. Dr. Weitzman opined, relying on circumstantial evidence solely, that 2752 Virginia Avenue and 2810 Virginia Avenue (hereinafter, the “subject properties”) were a source of, and a substantial contributing factor to, the Alstons’ lead paint poisoning and resulting injuries. To support this opinion, Dr. Weitzman relied on the following facts: (1) the Alstons lived in and/or visited the subject properties during the time period that they demonstrated elevated blood lead levels; (2) the residences had chipping, peeling, or flaking paint during the relevant time period; (3) the residences were older homes in Baltimore, built before 1979; 4 and (4) the Alstons exhibited elevated blood lead levels at the time they lived in the subject properties.

No scientific testing was ⁵⁰⁹ conducted of the paint (chipping, flaking, peeling, or otherwise) at the residences for the presence of lead. Defendants (Respondents here) filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on 22 December 2010, arguing that the Plaintiffs “failed to sustain their burden of proving that they were exposed to and ingested chipping, peeling, or flaking lead-based paint in violation of the Baltimore City Housing Code at the Defendants’ properties----” Specifically, Respondents argued that Plaintiffs’ expert relied on insufficient assumptions to provide a factual basis for his opinion that Plaintiffs were exposed to a lead paint hazard at Defendants’ properties. Respondents emphasized that there is no direct evidence that Plaintiffs resided at Defendants’ properties or “that Defendants’ properties contained lead paint hazards, or defective lead-based paint, during Plaintiffs’ alleged tenancy at the properties.” Moreover, Respondents pointed out that “Plaintiffs’ source expert also cannot eliminate [other] potential source[s] of Plaintiffs’ recorded [blood] lead levels, which precludes Plaintiffs from providing adequate circumstantial evidence of exposure at the properties.” After a hearing on the motion on 6 February 2012, the trial judge granted summary judgment, stating: In this case, the identification of the address is an interesting issue. I’m not going to grant summary judgment on that basis, because I believe that the plaintiff has come up— has come forward with, it may be the barest showing, but it’s a bare showing to tie herself to these two addresses on Virginia Avenue.

And this is unlike a case where the defendant comes forward with sworn statements in whatever form; interrogatories, affidavits, depositions that refute any possibility that the plaintiff actually lived or spent time at those addresses. So although it is extremely sketchy in this case, both the identification of the specific properties and the years when the plaintiffs were living there, I don’t think the defendant prevails on that basis. ⁵¹⁰ I do think the defendant prevails on the basis that as to these properties the plaintiffs cannot show the requisite causation of any elevated blood lead levels derived from these properties. I accept that the plaintiffs have shown that there was deteriorating paint at the properties. And I will even, for purposes of the motion go so far as to accept that the plaintiffs have shown that they exhibited elevated blood lead levels at around the time that they say they were living in these properties.

What is missing is evidence that would tie those elevated blood lead levels to the specific conditions in these properties. And I accept the possibility that that could be proven indirectly by circumstantial means. But I think the essential logical ingredient that must be present in order for Dow or a theory like Dow to apply is that logically there must be a — a very strong conclusion that the lead that the plaintiffs were experiencing had to come from this source because there is no other logical source that is available. Now, there may be a number of ways that could be done.

I’ve suggested one of them would be if there were visitation properties, that there is some evidence that tends to exclude those. There might be evidence that the paint wasn’t deteriorating in those. There might be evidence that they were built after a period when lead paint was likely present. There might be evidence that the visits were very short, were supervised closely and the children didn’t ingest paint.

There may be a number of bases that might be advanced by plaintiff. But here you simply have two wide open possible properties at the same time, either of which could have been the source of the lead that is alleged. And that is insufficient to establish the prima facie case that the plaintiff would have to show on negligence. ⁵¹¹ For those reasons, I think that the moving defendants with respect to these two addresses on Virginia Avenue are entitled to summary judgment. And I’ll grant summary judgment as to both plaintiffs as to these defendants.

(Emphasis added.) The trial judge issued a written order to like effect, stating that the Motion for Summary Judgment was granted “[f|or the reasons stated on the record at the hearing.” Plaintiffs appealed timely to the Court of Special Appeals. The intermediate appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in an unreported opinion filed on 10 July 2013. Plaintiffs-Petitioners filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, which this Court granted, 435 Md. 266 , 77 A.3d 1084 (2013), to consider the following questions: (1) By following its decision in West v. Rochkind, 212 Md.App. 164 , 66 A.3d 1145 (2013), did [the] CSA [Court of Special Appeals] [here] improperly undermine the common law principle that the law makes no distinction between the weight to be given to circumstantial evidence and direct evidence and that no greater degree of certainty is required of circumstantial evidence than of direct evidence? (2) Did [the] CSA’s decision in West improperly change a Plaintiffs burden of proof in a circumstantial evidence case from “preponderance of the evidence” to greater than “beyond a reasonable doubt?” (3) Does [the] CSA’s holding improperly require a Plaintiff in a lead-paint ease to prove that a given property was “the only possible explanation” for a Plaintiffs injuries in order to make a circumstantial case?

B. Hamilton v. Kirson On 28 May 2009, Christopher Hamilton filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City his initial complaint alleging several negligence claims against Lola Singer, the previous owner of property at 2231 Barclay Street (hereinafter, the “Singer property”), and Benjamin and Karen Kirson (hereinafter, collectively the “Kirsons”), the previous owners of property at ⁵¹² 754 Bartlett Avenue (hereinafter, the “Kirson property” or the “subject property”). According to the Complaint, these properties “contained lead-based paint in such deteriorated conditions that it was peeling, chipping and flaking from the walls, baseboards, windowsills and other areas of the premises,” as well as the presence of lead paint dust and powder. It was alleged that Christopher, while living at these residences, ingested lead-based paint chips and dust and, as a consequence, suffered permanent brain damage resulting in developmental and behavioral injuries. The Complaint alleged that Christopher resided at 2231 Barclay Street from 1992-1993, and at 754 Bartlett Avenue from 1993-1995.

On 21 August 2009, the Complaint was amended to add a second plaintiff — Christopher’s brother, Rickey — as well as additional defendants and allegations. Specifically, the Hamiltons added allegations that they were exposed to lead-based paint at 445 E. Lanvale Street, where they lived from 1991-1992 and which was owned and managed by Ralph Small and the Patella Realty Corporation, the added defendants. On 2 April 2010, the Hamiltons amended their complaint again to add allegations involving two additional properties which Plaintiffs visited as children and which were owned and managed by other newly-added defendants. 5 Rickey was born on 5 April 1989. From his birth until approximately April of 1990, Rickey lived with his mother, maternal grandparents, sister, and uncle somewhere on the 2300 block of Barclay Street.

Rickey moved with the same family members to 445 East Lanvale Street approximately in the summer of 1990. A short time later, on 5 September 1990, Christopher was born and lived in the same house as Rickey from that point in time. At some point in 1992, the family moved to 2231 Barclay Street where they resided until ap ⁵¹³ proximately the fall of 1993, at which time the family moved again to 754 Bartlett Avenue. The family lived at that address until some point in 1995.

Then, the family moved to 1604 Gorsuch Avenue, where they resided until 1998. Between 1990 and 1994, Rickey was tested six times for blood lead levels (“BLL”). Between 1991 and 1995, Christopher was tested nine times. The results of these tests are detailed in the following chart: [[Image here]] [Editor’s Note: The preceding image contains the reference for footnotes * and * *.] * The 2231 Barclay house was owned by Singer. * * The 754 Bartlett Ave. house was owned by the Kirsons and is the subject of the present appeal.

Shaded blocks represent those test results which indicate elevated blood lead levels, 6 ⁵¹⁴ During discovery, the Hamiltons retained Arc Environmental, Inc., to survey the 754 Bartlett Avenue property for lead-based paint. On 4 March 2011, Arc tested (or attempted to test) the property and issued a report of its findings on 9 March 2011. According to the report, the X-ray fluorescence analyzer detected lead-based paint, above the Maryland standard (>0.7 mg/cm2), 7 on four of the fourteen surfaces tested— the front porch wall, the front window apron and casing, and the front basement window header. The report noted that the property is “an occupied two story brick row home.

The inspector knocked on the front door of the property and spoke with a female resident who stated that she has lived at the property for many years and subsequently denied the inspectors [sic] request to test the interior of the property, but allowed exterior testing.” Additionally, as part of discovery, the Hamiltons identified Dr. Jacalyn Blackwell-White, a board-certified pediatrician, as a medical causation expert and Dr. Robert Simon as an industrial hygiene expert and environmental lead risk assessor. Drs. Blackwell-White and Simon authored causation reports and were deposed. Dr. Blackwell-White opined: Rickey Hamilton experienced toxic levels of lead elevation during his younger years.

Within a reasonable degree of medical probability, he suffered brain damage as a result of that exposure. The most likely source/sources of Rickey’s exposure include 2231 Barclay Street and 754 Bartlett Avenue. However, the visitation properties of 417 E. North Avenue and 510 E. 20th Street cannot be excluded. There was a paucity of descriptive interior surface information, ⁵¹⁵ lead paint information and details about the visits included concerning these properties.

With regard to Christopher Hamilton, Dr. Blackwell-White opined: It is my opinion that Christopher Hamilton was exposed to sustained levels of lead at an early age. The possible sources of Christopher’s lead exposure include 445 E. Lanvale Street, 2231 Barclay Street, 754 Bartlette [sic] Avenue, 417 E. North Avenue and 510 E. 20th Street. Based on the information available to me, more likely than not, Christopher was exposed to lead based paint at 2231 Barclay Street and 754 Bartlette [sic] Avenue because he experienced a significant rise in lead levels which was sustained during his residence at these two addresses. There was no significant change in blood lead level after moving from 2231 Barclay Street to 754 Bartlette [sic] Avenue.

There is not enough information available to me to implicate the Lanvale Street property over the visitation properties as a source of lead exposure for the first three lead level elevations. It is my opinion that within a reasonable degree of medical probability, he sustained brain damage as a result of early lead exposure and that his impairment is lifelong. Plaintiffs asked Dr. Simon “to determine if [Rickey’s and Christopher’s] residency at 2231 Barclay Street and 754 Bartlett Street, Baltimore, MD, during their early childhood, were substantial contributing sources of lead exposure during that time period.” Dr. Simon stated that the 754 Bartlett Avenue house “was built in 1920 and would more likely than not have had LBP [lead-based paint] based upon the age and use of lead paint during that time period....” 8 Moreover, Dr. Simon ⁵¹⁶ noted that the 754 Bartlett Avenue house contained paint in deteriorated condition. Based on that information, Dr. Simon concluded: [T]he residences at 2231 Barclay Street and 754 Bartlett Avenue, Baltimore, MD were the substantial, contributing locations and sources for elevated blood lead levels (EBLs) and lead poisoning exposure for both Ricky, Jr. [sic] and Christopher Hamilton during the first 6+ years of their childhoods.

There was no indication in the data file that any other locations contributed to their EBLs [elevated blood lead levels] and lead poisoning during this time period. After discovery was completed, the Kirsons moved for summary judgment on several grounds. First, they argued that there was no Housing Code violation demonstrating a negligent act on the part of Defendants and, thus, Plaintiffs did not have an actionable negligence claim. Specifically, the Kirsons pointed out that Plaintiffs’ medical causation expert, Dr. Blackwell-White, stated that the blood lead levels were consistent with exposure to airborne lead dust.

Plaintiffs’ negligence claims, however, are based on violations of the Housing Code’s prohibition of peeling or chipping paint. Second, the Kirsons argued that summary judgment was appropriate because there was no direct evidence that the subject property was the source of the Hamiltons’ lead poisoning and, moreover, Plaintiffs’ source experts’ opinions that the ⁵¹⁷ Hamiltons’ blood lead levels were caused by exposure to lead hazards at the subject property, 754 Bartlett Avenue, had an insufficient factual basis. The Kirsons maintained that, in order for the Hamiltons to prove that the property had lead-based paint, testing was required for the specific locations alleged as peeling, flaking, or chipping at the time of Plaintiffs’ elevated blood lead levels. The testing undertaken by Plaintiffs, however, was only of locations on the exterior of the subject property.

The Hamiltons’ mother stated in her deposition that the exterior of the house was not in disrepair and, thus, according to the Kirsons, the Hamiltons failed to produce the direct evidence that they were exposed to hazardous lead-based paint at the subject property. Moreover, the Kirsons argued that the Hamiltons’ experts based their opinions of the source of the Hamiltons’ lead exposure on the assumption that, if the exterior of the house had lead paint, the interior of the house also contained lead-paint. According to the Kirsons, the experts based this assumption (and, therefore, their opinions) on the age of the house, the condition of the house, and the age and recorded blood lead levels of the Hamiltons at the time of the tenancy. Such assumptions, it was claimed, were insufficient to form the factual basis of an expert opinion.

Additionally, the Kirsons contended that the Hamiltons’ source experts lacked a sufficient factual basis to conclude that the subject property was the source because they “did not rule out other potential sources of Plaintiffs’ blood lead levels that were recorded while they lived at [the subject property].” Specifically, the Kirsons pointed out that the Hamiltons’ source experts failed to consider the three other properties that the Hamiltons visited frequently or lived in during the time period before and during their lead poisoning 9 and failed to rule out that the ⁵¹⁸ blood lead levels were the result of environmental or ambient sources, even though both experts acknowledged that lead poisoning may be caused by these other sources. The Hamiltons filed a Response in Opposition to the Kirsons’ Motion for Summary Judgment, insisting that a sufficient factual basis existed to support the opinions of their experts. The Hamiltons emphasized that experts are permitted to use a combination of direct and circumstantial evidence to support their opinions. They maintained that, particularly in cases such as lead-paint poisoning, where often injured persons do not have the ability to obtain direct evidence through testing of the properties contemporaneously with their tenancy or afterwards in certain circumstances, circumstantial evidence is the only recourse.

Specifically, in this case, the Hamiltons stated: [T]he subject property was built in 1920, circumstantially leading to a finding that the structure contained lead-based paint. Both Christopher and Rickey Hamilton ate paint chips while living there. During their tenancy, Plaintiffs’ blood lead levels remained elevated; significant because of Dr. Simon’s testimony regarding the half-life of lead in a person’s blood. Neither Plaintiff had enough contact with the visiting properties to allow those houses to be considered significant contributing factors.

Lastly, a 2010 ARC Environmental test of the exterior of the property found lead-based paint. Thus, according to the Hamiltons, “there is sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence to support the opinions of Dr. Blackwell-White and Dr. Simon.” The Circuit Court held a hearing on 10 August 2011. After hearing argument, the Circuit Court stated, in pertinent part, on the record: I’m going to grant the motion. I’m, you know.

Actually, I guess, eventually we’re going to get some more on a post-Dow[ ⁵¹⁹ 10 ]. cases from the Appellate Courts. But basically, my understanding, this is not enough for the circumstantial evidence.... [T]he Court’s not convinced that there’s enough circumstantial evidence under Dow and I realized that that’s something that, you know, as a city, eventually we’ve got some clarification. But it’s my understanding that there’s sufficient, based upon the record here, that there’s sufficient evidence about so many other, not abstract sources, but very real sources, that it’s not sufficient. So for that reason, I will grant the motion.

On the next day, 11 August 2011, the Circuit Court entered an order granting the Kirsons’ Motion for Summary Judgment “for the reasons stated on the record in open court.” The Hamiltons appealed timely. On 30 April 2013, the Court of Special Appeals issued an unreported opinion affirming the Circuit Court’s judgment granting summary judgment. We granted a Writ of Certiorari, on the Hamiltons’ petition, 433 Md. 513 , 72 A.3d 172 (2013), to consider the following questions: (1) Did the trial court err by refusing to allow plaintiffs’ expert witnesses to testify that the defendant’s property was a substantial contributing cause to plaintiffs’ injurious lead exposure on the grounds that they did not sufficiently rule out other potential sources of lead exposure? (2) Did the trial court err by granting summary judgment for defendant on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence as to causation?

(3) Is a Daw analysis applicable to a lead paint claim involving possible exposure at multiple properties? C. Consolidation We consolidate these cases for decision because they present a common, over-arching inquiry — under what circumstances, if any, will circumstantial evidence alone of the possible presence of lead-based paint inside a residential property ⁵²⁰ be sufficient to survive a defense motion for summary judgment challenging the sufficiency of proof of the causation element of a negligence claim against the landlord. There is much recent case law, particularly from the Court of Special Appeals, on the proof of lead paint poisoning causation through circumstantial evidence. We aspire here to consider these cases, add our judicial gloss to them, and resolve any inconsistencies.

II

STANDARD OF REVIEW In the present cases, the Circuit Court granted defense motions for summary judgment, concluding that Plaintiffs failed to produce sufficient circumstantial evidence to make out a prima facie case regarding the causation element of a negligence claim. The Circuit Court, in granting the motions for summary judgment, rejected implicitly or explicitly Plaintiffs’ experts’ conclusions that the subject properties were a substantial contributing source of Plaintiffs’ injuries. The Court of Special Appeals, in its unreported opinion in Hamilton, noted aptly the dual nature of the Circuit Court’s decision: The Hamiltons argue that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment because their experts had a sufficient factual basis for their opinions. They further assert that even without expert opinions, the other evidence was sufficient to show that the Bartlett address was a substantial contributing cause of their injuries.

These two arguments go hand in hand because the evidence that the Hamiltons presented on causation was the same evidence the experts used to form their opinions. Thus, the circuit court decision contains two findings: 1) that the experts did not have a sufficient factual basis for their conclusions that the Bartlett property was a substantial contributing source, and 2) that the evidence the experts used as their factual basis was not enough to independently establish causation. Hamilton v. Kirson, No. 1530, September Term, 2011, slip op. at 14-15 (Md.App. April 30, 2013), cert. granted, 433 Md. 513 , 72 A.3d 172 (2013). Regardless of the dual nature of the ⁵²¹ decision, the case involved the grant of summary judgment and we review it as such. 11 A circuit court may grant a motion for summary judgment, entering judgment in favor of the moving party, “if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute ⁵²² as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Md. Rule 2-501(e).

Maryland’s summary judgment rule makes clear that “a trial court determines issues of law; it makes rulings as a matter of law, resolving no disputed issues of fact.” Beatty v. Trailmaster Products, Inc., 330 Md. 726, 737 , 625 A.2d 1005, 1011 (1993) (citing Heat & Power v. Air Products, 320 Md. 584, 591 , 578 A.2d 1202 (1990)). “In this regard, the standard for appellate review of a trial court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment is simply whether the trial court was legally correct,” id. (citations omitted), and is subject to no deference. Tyler v. City of Coll. Park, 415 Md. 475, 498 , 3 A.3d 421, 434 (2010) (citations omitted).

As such, in reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we review independently the record to determine whether the parties generated a dispute of material fact and, if not, whether the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Charles County Commis. [v. Johnson], 393 Md. [248,] 263, 900 A.2d [753,] 762 [ (2006) ]. We review the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and construe any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the well-plead facts against the moving party. Conaway [v. Deane], 401 Md. [219,] 243, 932 A.2d [571,] 585 [ (2007) ]; Charles County Commis., 393 Md. at 263, 900 A.2d at 762 Id., 415 Md. at 498-99 , 3 A.3d at 434 .

That our appellate review is premised on assumptions favoring the non-moving party does not mean that the party opposing the motion for summary judgment prevails necessarily. Rather, in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must show that there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact by proffering facts which would be admissible in evidence. Consequently, mere general allegations which do not show facts in detail and with precision are insufficient to prevent summary judgment. ⁵²³ [T]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiffs’ claim is insufficient to preclude the grant of summary judgment; there must be evidence upon which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. Anderson [v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,] 477 U.S. [242,] 252, 106 S.Ct. [2505,] 2512 [ 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ].

We recognized in Clea v. City of Baltimore, 312 Md. 662, 678 , 541 A.2d 1303 (1988), that while a court must resolve all inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment, “[t]hose inferences ... must be reasonable ones.” (Emphasis in original.) In that case, we quoted Professor Wright, as follows: “It is frequently said that summary judgment should not be granted if there is the ‘slightest doubt’ as to the facts. Such statements are a rather misleading gloss on a rule that speaks in terms of ‘genuine issue as to any material fact,’ and would, if taken literally, mean that there could hardly ever be a summary judgment, for at least a slight doubt can be developed as to practically all things human. A better formulation would be that the party opposing the motion is to be given the benefit of all reasonable doubts in determining whether a genuine issue exists.” 312 Md. at 678 , 541 A.2d 1303 , quoting C. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts § 99, at 666-667 (1983). Beatty, 330 Md. at 737-39 , 625 A.2d at 1011-12 (some internal citations omitted).

Furthermore, “it is a settled principle of Maryland appellate procedure that ordinarily an appellate court will review a grant of summary judgment only upon the grounds relied upon by the trial court.” Bishop v. State Farm, 360 Md. 225, 234 , 757 A.2d 783, 787 (2000); see also Lovelace v. Anderson, 366 Md. 690, 695-96 , 785 A.2d 726, 729 (2001).

III

DISCUSSION Generally, “[t]o state a claim for negligence a party must show ‘1) that the defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, 2) that the defendant breached that duty, 3) that the plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss, and 4) that the loss or injury proximately resulted from the defen ⁵²⁴ dant’s breach of the duty.” Taylor v. Fishkind, 207 Md.App. 121, 148 , 51 A.3d 743, 759 (2012) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 335 Md. 58, 76 , 642 A.2d 180 (1994)). Where an applicable statutory scheme is designed to protect a class of persons which includes the plaintiff, “the defendant’s duty ordinarily ‘is prescribed by the statute’ or ordinance and ... the violation of the statute or ordinance is itself evidence of negligence.” Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. 70, 78 , 835 A.2d 616, 620 (2003) (quoting Brown v. Dermer, 357 Md. 344, 358-59 , 744 A.2d 47, 55 (2000), overruled in part on other grounds by Brooks, 378 Md. at 72 , 835 A.2d at 617 ). This Court set out in Brooks the requirements for a plaintiff to make out a prima facie showing in a statutory violation lead paint poisoning negligence action: [I]n order to make out a prima facie case in a negligence action, all that a plaintiff must show is: (a) the violation of a statute or ordinance designed to protect a specific class of persons which includes the plaintiff, and (b) that the violation proximately caused the injury complained of. Proximate cause is established by determining whether the plaintiff is within the class of persons sought to be protected, and the harm suffered is of a kind which the drafters intended the statute to prevent....

It is the existence of this cause and effect relationship that makes the violation of a statute prima facie evidence of negligence. 378 Md. at 79 , 835 A.2d at 621 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Once a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in negligence, i.e., where he or she produces “evidence that the violation of the statute proximately caused the plaintiffs injury,” such evidence is sufficient so as to “ ‘warrant the court in submitting the case to the jury on the question of the [defendant’s] negligence.’ ” 12 Id. (alterations added in Brooks) ⁵²⁵ (quoting Crunkilton v. Hook, 185 Md. 1, 4 , 42 A.2d 517, 519 (1945)). Then, “[t]he trier of fact must ... evaluate whether the actions taken by the defendant were reasonable under all the circumstances.” Id.

(citations omitted). 13 In the present cases, the plaintiffs relied upon violations of the City Housing Code 14 to establish the landlord’s or homeowner’s prima facie negligence. In Brooks , we summarized that, to establish a prima facie negligence case for lead-paint poisoning based on violation of the Housing Code, a plaintiff must show that there was flaking, loose, or peeling paint: In sum, the presence of flaking, loose, or peeling paint is a violation of the Housing Code. Brown v. Dermer, 357 Md. at 361 , 744 A.2d at 56-57 (“To be a violation, all that must be shown is that there was flaking, loose or peeling paint”). As earlier pointed out, certain provisions of the Housing Code were clearly enacted to prevent lead poisoning in children.

Therefore, the plaintiff ... is in the class of people intended to be protected by the Housing Code, and his injury, lead poisoning, is the kind of injury intended to be prevented by the Code. This is all that the plaintiffs must show to establish a prima facie case sounding in negligence. Therefore, the notices of violation issued to Lewin Realty by the Department of Housing for unrelated properties were irrelevant and there should be a new trial as directed by the Court of Special Appeals. 378 Md. at 89 , 835 A.2d at 627 (footnote omitted). Although peeling, chipping, or flaking paint (of any kind) constitutes a violation of the Housing Code, such a Code ⁵²⁶ violation permits merely an inference of prima facie negligence on the part of the homeowner or landlord.

Such an inference, however, does not eliminate the requirement that the plaintiff prove that the landlord’s negligence caused proximately the injury. As the Court of Special Appeals explained in Hamilton v. Dackman, 213 Md.App. 589, 613 , 75 A.3d 327, 340-41 (2013) (hereinafter, “Raymond Hamilton”), “although the Court of Appeals suggested in Brooks that a statutory violation may constitute a prima facie case of negligence, 378 Md. at 79 , 835 A.2d 616 , that holding does not relieve a plaintiff of the obligation to establish causation.” More specifically, the intermediate appellate court stated: Brooks eliminated notice of a lead-paint violation as one element of a negligence claim. 378 Md. at 72 , 835 A.2d 616 . The Court of Appeals explained that the plaintiffs did not have to provide notice and could submit their claim to the jury without proving that the landlord had notice “if the plaintiffs can establish a violation of the Housing Code which proximately caused [plaintiffs] injuries.” Id. at 81 , 835 A.2d 616 (emphasis added). This meant, in Brooks , that where a child had been seen chewing repeatedly on a windowsill in a home that upon later inspection specifically was found to contain lead-based paint, id. at 73-74 , 835 A.2d 616 (and whom the record did not reflect lived or visited any property other than the one that was the subject of the litigation), she could submit her case to the jury without having to show that the defendant had notice of the condition.

Id. at 72 , 835 A.2d 616 ; see also Polakoff v. Turner, 385 Md. 467, 483 , 869 A.2d 837 (2005) (permitting the plaintiff to submit her case to the jury if she “could establish a violation of the Code which proximately caused her injuries” (emphasis added)). Raymond Hamilton, 213 Md.App. at 613 , 75 A.3d at 341 (emphasis added in original). In the present cases, because we elect to resolve the cases on the issue of causation, we accept the premise that the subject properties were afflicted with peeling, chipping, or flaking paint. Accepting such premise, the Hamiltons and the ⁵²⁷ Alstons made out prima facie cases that the defendants — the owners and/or landlords of the residences — committed negligent acts in violation of the Housing Code.

Thus, we address what quality or quantum of circumstantial evidence of causation is sufficient to make out a prima facie showing for that element of the negligence case. A. Causation Analysis in Maryland Lead Paint Cases “It is fundamental that in a negligence action the plaintiff has the burden of proving all the facts essential to constitute the cause of action.” Peterson v. Underwood, 258 Md. 9, 15 , 264 A.2d 851, 854 (1970). One element of a negligence case is that the defendant’s negligence was a proximate cause of the accident or injury. See, e.g., Raymond Hamilton, 213 Md.App. at 613 , 75 A.3d at 341 .

The inquiry here focuses on “causation in fact,” one aspect of proximate cause, “concerned with the more fundamental (and some have thought metaphysical) inquiry of whether defendant’s conduct actually produced an injury.” Peterson, 258 Md. at 16-17 , 264 A.2d at 855 . We have recognized repeatedly that a plaintiff may prove causation in fact through circumstantial evidence, as well as direct evidence or a mixture of the two. For example, in Peterson , the Court stated: If lay testimony together with reasonable inferences does not directly show this causal relation (such as a witness’s observing a brick hurled through a plate glass window) it may be shown in a number of other ways. The most familiar method today is through the opinion of the expert who states that, based on facts in evidence, X was the efficient cause of the injury.

Such opinion testimony is not always required, and the plaintiff produces legally sufficient proof to get to the jury once he shows it is more probable than not that defendant’s act caused his injury. This does not mean plaintiff is required to exclude every other possible cause of the accident. But where plaintiff by his own evidence shows two or more equally likely causes of the injury, for only one of which defendant is responsible, ⁵²⁸ plaintiff can not recover. The situation before us is somewhat analogous, except that instead of showing two evenly balanced probable causes, plaintiff has shown none.

In the trial below plaintiff apparently relied on an inference that defendants’ acts were the cause or proximate cause of the injury. An ‘inference’ is a deduction or conclusion which reason and common sense lead a jury to draw from the facts proved. United States v. Schneiderman, 106 F.Supp. 906, 928 (S.D.Cal.1952), cf. 21 Words and Phrases, ‘inference’ (1960). This attempted reliance amounts to proof of causation by circumstantial rather than direct evidence.

In accordance with the general rules stated above, this type of evidence is not inherently insufficient; all that is necessary is that it amount to a reasonable likelihood or probability rather than a possibility. 258 Md. at 17 , 264 A.2d at 855 (emphasis added) (some internal citations omitted). When a plaintiff does not offer a direct explanation of the cause of the injury or accident, a plaintiff is “compelled to rely entirely on the inference.” Peterson, 258 Md. at 18-19 , 264 A.2d at 856 . The validity of an inference “depends on commonly experienced relationships of acts and forces,” id., 258 Md. at 18 , 264 A.2d at 856 , or “depends on logical deduction from an established fact.” Id., 258 Md. at 19 , 264 A.2d at 856 . Certain sets of facts may make an inference less valid than other sets of facts.

See, e.g., id., 258 Md. at 21 , 264 A.2d at 857 (concluding that the passage of time between the negligent act and the injury rendered the inference of causation illogical and thus concluded that the trial court’s granting of summary judgment was proper). The conclusion that an inference is not valid due to a lack of supporting facts or an articulable logical relationship does not mean that we place greater weight on direct evidence than on circumstantial evidence. Rather, it means that we require inferences to be sound logically, and we refuse to allow a jury of laymen to engage in “ ‘guesswork, speculation and conjecture.’ ” Id., 258 Md. at 21 , 264 A.2d at 857 (quoting Wilhelm v. State Traffic Safety Comm., 280 Md. 91, 101 , 185 A.2d 715, 719 (1962)). ⁵²⁹ In the context of lead paint cases, this Court’s next most recent decision on causation is Ross v. Housing Authority of Baltimore City, 430 Md. 648 , 63 A.3d 1 (2013). In Ross , the Court recognized aptly that, in the typical lead-paint case, 15 the theory of causation has multiple analytical layers: The theory of causation presented in this case can be conceived of as a series of links: (1) the link between the defendant’s property and the plaintiffs exposure to lead; (2) the link between specific exposure to lead and the elevated blood lead levels, and (3) the link between those blood lead levels and the injuries allegedly suffered by the plaintiff.

To be a substantial factor in causing Ms. Ross’ alleged injuries, the Payson Street home must have been a source of Ms. Ross’ exposure to lead, that exposure must have contributed to the elevated blood lead levels, and the associated increase in blood lead levels must have been substantial enough to contribute to her injuries. Ross, 430 Md. at 668 , 63 A.3d at 12-13 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). In the present cases, we are concerned with the first link. To prove this link, circumstantial evidence may be used, “so long as it creates ‘a reasonable likelihood or probability rather than a possibility’ supporting a ‘rational inference of causation,’ and is not ‘wholly speculative.’ ” West, 212 Md.App. at 170-71 , 66 A.3d at 1150 (citations omitted).

The Hamiltons’ and Alstons’ cases hinge on that fine distinction between circumstantial evidence that amounts to a reasonable likelihood or probability and circumstantial evidence that amounts only to a possibility and speculation. To connect the dots between a defendant’s property and a plaintiffs exposure to lead, the plaintiff must tender ⁵³⁰ facts admissible in evidence that, if believed, establish two separate inferences: (1) that the property contained lead-based paint, and (2) that the lead-based paint at the subject property was a substantial contributor to the victim’s exposure to lead. At times, these separate inferences may be drawn from the same set of facts, but parties would do well to remember that these inferences are separate and often will require different evidentiary support. In an effort to contribute to clarification of any confusion, we consider first Dow v. L & R Properties Inc., 144 Md.App. 67 , 796 A.2d 139 (2002), which represents a scenario where multiple inferences seek to draw succor from the same factual reservoir: In [Dow], a child and her mother sued their landlord for injuries the child allegedly suffered as a result of ingesting lead paint in their home.

The discovery materials and an affidavit of the mother indicated that the home had been built prior to 1950 and thus likely had lead paint, that there was chipping and peeling paint in areas where the child played and that the child placed paint chips in her mouth, that the child spent most of her time in the home while she lived there and did not have contact with other sources of lead during that period, and that the child developed lead poisoning. The landlord in Dow moved for summary judgment, arguing that (1) the plaintiff had not identified an expert who would testify that there was lead paint on the premises and (2) there was no other direct evidence that the paint contained lead. As a result, the landlord argued, there was