Hamilton v. Thirston

Briscoe, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. On the" 30th of December, 1899, the appellee, Calvin B. Thirston, brought suit against the appellants, Wm. H. A. Hamilton and J. Rowland Smith, surviving administrators of John B. Thirston, in the Circuit Court for Washington County to recover damages for the breach, by the appellants intestate, of an alleged oral contract to devise to him a child’s portion of the intestate’s estate. Subsequently, the plaintiff recovered a judgment for the sum of $3,250, but upon an appeal to this Court this judgment was reversed “ with liberty to the appellee to apply for the remanding of the case, to permit him to so amend his pleadings as to declare in assumpsit for the value of any services rendered by him at the request of the intestate, during his lifetime.” ( 93 Md. 213 ).

It was held on the former appeal that while the absolute owner of property could make a valid contract for a good and sufficient consideration to execute a will giving a portion of his estate to another person, yet such contracts, when made, like those for the sale of real or personal estate inter vivos, are, when orally made, within the operation of the Statute of Frauds and their validity must be tested by its requirements. It was also held that while the alleged contract set up in the former case was clearly void, as being within the operation of the Statute of Frauds, and the appellee was not entitled to maintain an action upon it,- he could recover upon a quantum meruit the value of the services rendered by him to his uncle, for from services of this kind, even when rendered in pursuance of a contract within the statute, by one party and accepted bv the other a right to compensation arises. ²⁵⁵ On the 29th of March, 1901, the plaintiff obtained leave to amend his declaration and on the 22nd of April of the same year the declaration was amended so as to declare in assumpsit for a quantum meruit for services rendered the intestate during his lifetime. To this declaration the defendants at the second trial filed six pleas ; first, never indebted as alleged; second, never promised as alleged; third, the cause of action did not accrue within.three years before this suit; fourth, the cause of action did not accrue within three years prior to the commencement of the suit, to-wit, March 29th, 1901; fifth, accord and satisfaction ; sixth, because of the pendency of a suit in the Circuit Court, in equity, against these defendants, for the same cause of action, and seventh, plene administravit. The plaintiff for replication joined issue on the defendants’ pleas; except the fourth, the one of limitation, which was on plaintiff’s motion stricken out by the Court below.

There were two exceptions reserved by the defendants to the rulings of the Court at the second trial of the case. The first relates • to the admissibility of certain testimony and the second to the rulings on the prayers. The verdict'and judgment being for the plaintiff, the defendants have appealed. We do not deem it necessary for the purposes of the decision of this case to state at length or to review the rulings of the Court upon either the admissibility of the evidence or upon all the prayers, because we think the defense of limitations is decisive of the case.

This defense was presented by the