Hamilton v. Whitridge

Tuck, J., delivered the opinion of this court. The injunction in this case was granted upon a bill stating that the appellees are owners of property in the city of Baltimore, in the immediate vicinity of a house which the appellant had purchased, and to which she intended to remove, for the purpose of keeping a house of ill-fame, in which business she had been for a long time, and was then engaged. The bill charges, also, that in addition to the wrong and injury inflicted upon them, in common with other citizens of that city, by the occupation of the premises for the unlawful and immoral purpose complained of, “the complainants will be especially wronged and injured, inasmuch as they will be severally deprived of the comfortable enjoyment of their property, and that it will be greatly depreciated and lessened in value, by the close proximity of their said property to the premises in which it is charged that the defendant is about to open a bawTdyhouse.” The defendant, by her answer, admits the averments of residence and ownership of property by the complainants, setting forth particularly their relative situation to the house she had purchased; but declines to answer the averments that she had previously kept a bawdy-house, and intended to keep one at the house mentioned in the bill. The case comes before us on appeal by the defendant from an order continuing the injunction, passed on motion to dissolve, and a hearing on bill, answer and affidavits, under the act of 1835, ch. 380.

In this stage of the cause, if the bill shows a case entitling the parties to the injunction, it will not be dissolved, if the equity is not denied by the answer. Hardy ¹⁴⁴ vs. Summers, 10 G. & J., 316 . Hutchins vs. Hope, 12 G. & J., 256 . This rule of practice is an answer to the objection taken on the part of the appellant, that the judge below had passed the order appealed from in the absence of evidence that she was, at the time of filing the bill, the keeper of a bawdy-house, and intended to pursue that business at her new residence.

But we think that the case authorizes the conclusion, as a matter of fact, that the appellant purchased and was fitting up this house for the offensive purpose stated in the bill. As late as November 1855, she had been convicted, on her own confession, of having been so employed, and two previous convictions had been obtained, in the same manner, in the years 1854 and 1855. Between the last of these convictions and the month of April 1856, when the bill was filed, not one circumstance is shown from which we can infer that she had changed her course of life. On the contrary, the inference is most strongly rebutted by her conversation with one of the witnesses, when she was having the house repaired.

This view of the case derives strength from her refusal to answer the allegations of the bill on this point. Touching, as it did, her reputation, she would doubtless have denied the fact alleged, if it had been false. By her silence, or refusal to answer, we think she subjects herself to the remarks of the late Chancellor Bland, in 3 Bland, 132 , " that a defendant who manifestly omits to answer, or answers evasively any substantial part of the bill, who evidently and purposely holds back something, cannot complain if he should find himself regarded with suspicion and distrust, and be refused that to which he may, in truth, be entitled, and, under other appearances, might have obtained.” So, in Bentley vs. Cowman, 6 G. & J., 155 , it is said, Pleadings in equity are founded in the purest principles of ethics, and marked by frankness and fair dealing.” It is no answer to say that the defendant was not obliged to criminate herself, for, conceding that this would have relieved her from answering the allegation that she was then carrying on that business, it is very clear that she would not have subjected herself to a prosecution, by denying that she had purchased this house with a view to con ¹⁴⁵ iinue it there. We are constrained, therefore, to consider the appellant as a person about to open the premises as a house of ill-fame, and the prominent question for decision is, whether the jurisdiction of courts of equity embraces the prohibition of such public nuisances, where the complaint is, that they will, by reason of their close proximity, deprive other persons of the comfortable enjoyment of their property, and greatly depreciate and lessen its value.

As was observed by the appellant’s counsel, no decision has been found in which the power was exercised in such cases as the present. Nor is there any in which the writ of injunction has been applied for and denied. But the absence of precedents, though not to be overlooked entirely, does not, of itself, determine questions of jurisdiction. We consult adjudged cases to ascertain their reason and spirit.

These are the foundation of the law. 3 Bland, 133 . Fisher vs. Prince, 3 Burr., 1364. Rust vs. Cooper, Cowp., 632. Courts are not to assume jurisdiction, but they may amplify remedies, and apply rules and general principles for the advancement of substantial justice.

Broom’s Maxims, 36. 50 Law Lib., 50. Russell vs. Smyth, 9 Mees. & Wels., 818, per Ld. Abinger. If this were not so, and courts were confined to particular precedents, there would be no power to grant relief in new cases constantly occurring.

And, hence, when they do arise, and rights can be asserted, or wrongs prevented or redressed, consistently with established principles, it would be a great failure of justice to deny relief, merely because no decision could be found in which the jurisdiction had been invoked and exercised. The point on this appeal, then, is not whether an injunction has ever issued to prevent the establishment of a public nuisance of this kind, but whether the doctrines of equity, applicable to nuisances, should be applied to the present case. Although at law, the remedy in respect to public nuisances is by