Hampson v. Owens ex rel. Stow

Bowie, J., prepared the following opinion in his lifetime, and the same being concurred in after his decease ⁵⁸⁴ by tbe Judges who participated in the hearing, it was-filed as the opinion of the Court. Suit was instituted on the 10th of July, 1819, in the Baltimore City Court, by the appellee, (in the name of John A. Owens, use of Charles W. Stow,) against Joseph Hampson and John W. Backer, co-partners, trading as the Baltimore Lock Works. The narr. contained the common counts, viz., 1st, for money payable by the defendants to the plaintiff for goods bargained and sold; 2nd, for work done and materials provided; 3rd, for money lent; 4th, for money paid by the plaintiff for defendants; 5th, for money received by defendants, for the use of the plaintiff; and 6th, for money found due from the defendants to the plaintiff on accounts stated between them, aud claimed $1200 damages. With the narr. was filed an account of the tenor following : “Baltimore, Sept., 14, 1816. “ Baltimore Lock Works. “ To John A. Owens, Dr. “To engine, boiler, shaft and hangers............$600.00 “For value received, I hereby assign to Charles W. Stow my account, dated Sept. 14, 1816, for $600, against the Baltimore Lock Works, (composed of Joseph Hampson and John W. Backer, co-partners,) for an engine, boiler, shafting and hangers, sold to said firm said date. “ John A. Owens.” [Seal.] The appellant, Hampson, appeared and pleaded that he never was indebted as alleged; 2nd, that he did not promise as alleged.

Judgment by default for want of a plea, was entered against John W. Backer. ⁵⁸⁵ Issue being joined on the pleas of the defendant, Hampson, a jury was sworn, and verdict found for the plaintiff, whereupon the appellant moved in arrest of judgment, for various reasons assigned, which motion being overruled, and judgment entered on the verdict, this appeal was taken. The appellant’s counsel in his brief, after stating in detail the reasons assigned in support of his motion in arrest, sums up their substance and object as follows: “The question intended to be presented to the Court of Appeals, is simply whether or not, since the enactment of the provisions embodied in sec. 1, Art. 9, of the Code, a party who has assigned in wilting, a chose in action, and thus parted with all interest therein, legal or equitable, can sue in his own name to the use of the assignee, as has been done in this case. The appellant respectfully maintains that he cannot. Although no case appears to have been presented to the Court, under sec. 1st, of Art. 9, of the Code, yet it is respectfully submitted, that the principle governing such cases as the one now submitted has been clearly laid down in the decisions below referred to — citing Whiteford vs. Buckmyer, 1 Gill, 145 ; Bowie, use of Ladd vs. Duvall, 1 G. & J., 175 ; Canton Nat.

Building Association vs. Weber, 34 Md., 671 .” The position of the parties in this statement is unintentionally reversed. It is not