Hampton v. University of Maryland

CATHELL, Judge. Chonita L. Hampton, appellant, was employed as an Office Secretary III by the University of Maryland at Baltimore (UMAB), appellee, commencing September 21, 1993. At that time, appellant began a six-month probationary period. UMAB notified appellant, on March 21, 1994, that her initial probationary period was being extended for an additional six months.

On June 20, 1994, appellant was notified that her employment was being terminated. Appellant filed a timely appeal of UMAB’s decision with the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). At the hearing thereon, appellant moved to dismiss UMAB’s rejection on probation, arguing that her probation had ended on March 20, 1994, and, thus, she was no longer on probation when discharged. In its Final Decision, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted appellant’s motion to. dismiss and denied UMAB’s proposed rejection on probation.

On appeal to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City (Caplan, J., presiding), finding that the ALJ’s conclusions were not supported by substantial evidence, the court reversed the ALJ’s decision. In this appeal from the judgment of the circuit court, appellant presents the following issues: 1. Whether there was sufficient evidence presented at the Administrative Law Hearing to support the Administrative Law Judge’s decision!)] 2. Whether the “six-month” probationary period for a University of [Maryland] classified employee in this case ended on a Sunday or on the next business day, Monday[.] 3.

Whether an employee waives any complaint regarding a personnel action if no grievance is filed with[in] 30 days of the personnel action, as required by statute[.] ³⁰¹ We hold that the ALJ’s decision was affected by an error of law—namely, the failure to apply Maryland Code (1957, 1995 Repl.Vol.), Art. 94, § 2 to compute the dates of appellant’s probationary period. Accordingly, we shall affirm the reversal of the ALJ’s decision by the circuit court. Our decision makes discussion of appellant’s first issue unnecessary. Appellant’s third issue is a statement, not an allegation of error.

This issue was originally presented to the ALJ by UMAB, not appellant. The ALJ found for appellant on other grounds and did not resolve that issue in its Final Decision. Thus, as to it, there appears to be nothing for us to review. In any event, we perceive no error on the part of the circuit court.

Factual and Procedural Background Appellant was hired as an Office Secretary III in the Office of the Dean of the School of Social Work at UMAB on September 21, 1993. As an employee of the University of Maryland system, appellant was a classified state employee, Md.Code (1978,1992 Repl.Vol., 1995 Supp.), § 12—111(b) of the Education Article, and, pursuant to Maryland Code (1993), §§ 4^401, 4-403 of the State Personnel and Pensions Article (SP), appellant was placed on an initial probation period of six months, 1 which, at UMAB’s election, could be extended for an additional six months. On Monday, March 21, 1994, appellant was notified in writing that her initial probationary period was being extended for another six months, through September 21, 1994. On the written notification, which appellant signed, she noted that ³⁰² she disagreed with the decision to extend her probation.

Appellant did not, however, file a formal written grievance challenging that decision. On June 20, 1994, appellant was notified in -writing that she was being discharged during her probationary period based upon her inability to perform the essential duties and responsibilities of her position, to be effective July 8, 1994. Appellant filed a grievance with UMAB on June 23, 1994. She thereafter filed an appeal with OAH.

At the administrative hearing, neither party presented testimony or argument regarding the propriety of appellant’s dismissal. Instead, appellant moved for dismissal of UMAB’s rejection on probation on the grounds that her probation had ended on March 20,1994, and, therefore, she was no longer on probation on June 20, 1994, when UMAB dismissed her. UMAB opposed appellant’s motion, contending that it had validly extended appellant’s probationary period on March 21, 1994. UMAB argued that this procedural issue was not properly before the ALJ because appellant failed to file a timely grievance following the extension of her probation.

(As we have indicated, we shall not address this issue.) The ALJ found that appellant was hired on September 21, 1993, and, therefore, her six-month probationary period expired on March 20, 1994, although that day was a Sunday. The ALJ concluded, consequently, that the attempt to extend appellant’s probationary period on Monday, March 21, 1994 was ineffectual. Thus, according to the ALJ, because appellant became a permanent state employee “as of the close of business on March 20,1994,” UMAB’s attempt to reject her on probation was ineffective. The ALJ’s decision did not address UMAB’s waiver argument. 2 ³⁰³ Following an unsuccessful motion for reconsideration, UMAB appealed to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.

The circuit court found that the ALJ had committed reversible error in two respects: first, by failing to consider the issue presented to it by UMAB as to whether appellant had waived her right to appeal by failing to file a grievance regarding the extension of her probation when the probationary period was extended; and, second, by finding that appellant’s probationary period had expired on a Sunday, rather than extending to the next business day. Appellant has filed a timely appeal therefrom. Standard of Review Judicial review of an administrative agency’s decision is authorized by Maryland Code (1984, 1995 Repl.Vol.), § 10-222 of the State Government Article (SG). Under subsection (h), when exercising such review, the court may: (1) remand the case for further proceedings; (2) affirm the final decision; or (3) reverse or modify the decision if any substantial right of the petitioner may have been prejudiced because a finding, conclusion, or decision: (i) is unconstitutional; (ii) exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the final decision maker; (in) results from an unlawful procedure; (iv) is affected by any other error of law; (v) is unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in light of the entire record as submitted; or ³⁰⁴ (vi) is arbitrary or capricious.

In general, [a] court’s role is limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency’s findings and conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law. United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. People’s Counsel, 336 Md. 569, 577 , 650 A.2d 226 (1994); Ward v. Department of Pub. Safety & Correctional Servs., 339 Md. 343, 347 , 663 A.2d 66 (1995). We must determine in each case whether the agency’s decision is “in accordance with the law or whether it is arbitrary, illegal, and capricious.” Moseman v. County Council, 99 Md.App. 258, 262 , 636 A.2d 499 , cert. denied, 335 Md. 229 , 643 A.2d 383 (1994); Curry v. Department of Pub.

Safety & Correctional Servs., 102 Md.App. 620, 626-27 , 651 A.2d 390 (1994), cert. denied, 338 Md. 252 , 657 A.2d 1182 (1995). Our review of the agency’s factual findings entails only an appraisal and evaluation of the agency’s fact-finding and not an independent decision on the evidence. Anderson v. Department of Pub. Safety & Correctional Servs., 330 Md. 187, 212 , 623 A.2d 198 (1993).

This examination seeks to find the substantiality of the evidence. “That is to say, a reviewing court, be it a circuit court or an appellate court, shall apply the substantial evidence test to the final decisions of an administrative agency....” Baltimore Lutheran High Sch. Ass’n v. Employment Sec. Admin., 302 Md. 649, 662 , 490 A.2d 701 (1985); Anderson, 330 Md. at 212 , 623 A.2d 198 ; Bulluck v. Pelham Wood Apts., 283 Md. 505, 511-13 , 390 A.2d 1119 (1978); Moseman, 99 Md.App. at 262 , 636 A.2d 499 . In this context, “ ‘[substantial evidence,’ as the test for reviewing factual findings of administrative agencies, has been defined as ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion^]’ ” Bulluck, 283 Md. at 512 , 390 A.2d 1119 (quoting Snowden v. Mayor of Baltimore, 224 Md. 443, 448 , 168 A.2d 390 (1961)). In terms of fact-finding, we must emphasize that under no circumstances may we substitute our judgment for that of the agency.

Anderson, 330 Md. at 212 , 623 A.2d 198 . On the other hand, “[w]hen reviewing issues of law, ... the court’s review is expansive ³⁰⁵ and it may substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Curry, 102 Md.App. at 627 , 651 A.2d 390 ; Columbia Rd. Citizens’ Ass’n v. Montgomery County, 98 Md.App. 695, 698 , 635 A.2d 30 (1994). Appellant’s Probationary Status Appellant contends that her probation ended on Sunday, March 20, 1994, and, therefore, when she was terminated, on June 20, 1994, she was no longer a probationary employee and could only be terminated for cause.

We disagree. Two separate provisions of a statute relating to the computation of time dictate otherwise. We shall first address appellant’s primary contention. In support of her position, appellant cites SP § 4-401, which states that “[a]n employee shall be placed on probation when the employee is first appointed to the classified service.” In conjunction with this section, appellant cites Yingling v. Smith, 259 Md. 260 , 269 A.2d 612 (1970), where the Court of Appeals applied Maryland Code (1957, 1995 Repl.Vol.), Art. 94, § 2 to determine what constitutes a six-month period of time for statute of limitations purposes.

Article 94, § 2 states, in appropriate part: In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default, after which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included. The last day of the period so computed is to be included unless: (1) It is a Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day, which is neither a Sunday or a holiday[.] The purpose of this section “was to establish ‘a uniform method of computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by the rules of any court, or by order of Court, or by any applicable statute.’ ” Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the United States v. Jalowsky, 306 Md. 257, 262 , 508 A.2d 137 (1986). A uniform procedure for computing statutory periods is equitable for two reasons. “First, a set method of time computation brings a degree of certainty to the law. Second, ³⁰⁶ by excluding the first day and counting from the first whole day following the event, a party will not be prejudiced if the triggering event occurs toward the end of the day.” Id. at 265 , 508 A.2d 137 .

In Yingling , “[t]he narrow legal question presented [to the Court of Appeals] ... [was] whether or not a bill of complaint filed September 20, 1968, satisfies the statutory requirement of ‘filing within six calendar months after’ the appointment of an executor on March 19, 1968.” 259 Md. at 261 , 269 A.2d 612 . Applying Art. 94, § 2, the Court excluded March 19, 1968, the day the executor was appointed, from the measuring of the prescribed period because the day of the event that triggers the statutory period is “not to be included.” The Court held “that a calendar month is the period of time running from the beginning of a certain numbered day up to, but not including, the corresponding numbered day of the next month.” Id. at 263, 269 A.2d 612 . Using this formula, the Court held that the six-month limitations period ran from March 20, 1968 through September 19,1968. Id.

Applying Art. 94, § 2 and Yingling to the case sub judice, we