Hance v. Director, Patuxent Institution

Per Curiam. This application for leave to appeal from an order of the Criminal Court of Baltimore denying the applicant post conviction relief contends that: 1. The hearing court was clearly erroneous in that there was insufficient evidence to support its findings of December 8,1967. 2. The hearing court erred in that it was clearly erroneous in refusing to hear testimony at the remand hearing, in order to make explicit findings of fact and conclusions of law on the question of whether Hance’s statement was voluntary in light of the single standard governing the admission of extrajudicial statements — that of voluntariness — to be determined by all of the circumstances surrounding the making of such statement consistent with the opinion filed September 29, 1967 by the Court of Special Appeals in State v. Hance, 2 Md. App. 162 .

The petitioner was convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon in the Criminal Court of Baltimore on August 21, 1961 and was sentenced to not more than fifteen years in the Maryland State Reformatory for Males. He took no direct appeal. On July 9, 1963 he filed a petition under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. After a hearing before Judge Anselm Sodaro, relief was denied on October 24, 1963.

No application for leave to appeal was filed. On August 8, 1966 petitioner filed a second petition and a hearing thereon was held on November 3, 1966 before Judge Meyer M. Cardin. Following this second hearing, the petitioner was granted a new trial, Judge Cardin holding, inter alia, that the confession was involuntarily given and hence was inadmissible. From the order granting a new trial, the State filed an application for leave to appeal.

In State v. Hance, supra, we granted ⁵⁵⁶ the State’s application for leave to appeal, reversed Judge Cardin’s order, and remanded the case for further proceedings so that “Judge Cardin may make explicit findings of fact and conclusions of law on the question of whether Hance’s statement was voluntary in light of the single standard governing the admission of extrajudicial statements — that of voluntariness— to be determined by all of the circumstances surrounding the making of such statement.” 2 Md. App. at pages 168-169. We further noted that the court on the remand should, as a preliminary matter, rule on the question of “whether Hance knowingly and intelligently waived the voluntariness question by failing to raise it either on direct appeal, or in his first petition for post conviction