Haraszti v. Klarman

²³⁶ O’Donnell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. By Chapter 534 of the Laws of 1970, the General Assembly enacted a new Maryland Vehicle Law, codified as Maryland Code (1957, 1970 Repl. Vol.) Art. 66V2, to take effect from and after January 1, 1971. 1 Substantial portions of the new Article, including those within Subtitle 11 (Rules of the Road) were adopted from, and are identical with, corresponding portions of the Uniform Vehicle Code (1967). Here, upon the issuance of a writ of certiorari to the Court of Special Appeals, we are called upon to review, for the first time, the rights and duties of motorists under one of those sections, Art. 66V2, § 11-202 (a) (2) (i), who, upon approaching an intersection, are faced with a steady yellow traffic signal.

A brief view of the relevant facts giving rise to the questions of law in issue is necessary. At approximately 11:05 P.M., on the clear, dry, evening of June 25, 1971, the appellant (the defendant in the trial court), Dr. Joseph Haraszti, together with his wife, was operating his 1968 Oldsmobile, northbound and upgrade on Moravia Road, approaching its intersection with Sinclair Lane, in Baltimore City. At the same time, Edward L. Klarman, the appellee (the plaintiff in the trial court), en route to his employment at Washington National Airport, was operating his 1963 Volkswagen convertible, with its top down, southward and downgrade on Moravia Road. As Dr. Haraszti was making a left turn within the intersection, which was controlled by automatic traffic signals, to go westward on Sinclair Lane, the right front of his Oldsmobile collided with the front of Klarman’s Volkswagen which was proceeding through the intersection.

Sinclair Lane, both east and west of Moravia Road, was described as 114 feet in width with two driving lanes in each direction. Moravia Road was depicted as being 88 feet wide north of Sinclair Lane and 100 feet wide south thereof; it ²³⁷ accommodated, three driving lanes in each direction. Although each of the highways additionally provided left-turn lanes, adjacent to medians, there were no left-turn arrows controlling such turning vehicles. The automatic traffic signals governing motorists on Moravia Road, facing both north and southbound traffic, were suspended from a common cable hung midway across the intersection; the signals controlling traffic on Sinclair Lane were suspended from two cables located on the east and west sides of the intersection and respectively faced oncoming traffic.

The regular sequence for all the signals was from green, to yellow, to red; then from red to green. The evidence adduced at trial, though conflicting, indicated that Klarman, the plaintiff, was proceeding at “about 35 to 40 m.p.h.” southward on Moravia Road and that, when about 100 yards north of the intersection with Sinclair Lane, he observed the traffic signal as “green” for his approaching vehicle. Although he did not continue to watch the signal, he stated that, with his convertible roof down, he saw the “glow of amber” from the signal just before he entered the intersection. Aware of headlights on a vehicle advancing northward, he assumed that that vehicle was proceeding straight through the crossing.

Unfortunately, it was this car which “turned out” (in front of him). Klarman could not recall whether there had been a red vehicle, proceeding ahead of him on Moravia Road, which had come to a stop north of the intersection before he entered it. Dr. Haraszti, called as an adverse party by the plaintiff, 2 testified that he had been driving northward on Moravia Road, within its 35 m.p.h. limit; that he approached the intersection on a green signal, that his left-turn signal had been activated and that as he entered the intersection, the Moravia Road signal turned to “amber;” although he slowed down, he did not come to a stop. He noticed a red vehicle, southbound on Moravia Road come to a stop, north of the intersection line, in the easternmost of the southbound ²³⁸ lanes; as he commenced his left turn, to go westward on Sinclair Lane, his vehicle was struck by the southbound-Volkswagen.

He had not observed the Volkswagen “until a second or two before the impact, when the car was on top of him.” Mrs. Haraszti testified that as their Oldsmobile entered the intersection, the signal changed to yellow, and that thereafter the signal itself, then to the rear of their car, was no longer visible. She corroborated her husband’s testimony concerning a red vehicle, southbound on Moravia Road, which had come to a stop north of the intersection. It was her further testimony that as her husband turned left, in front of that standing car, their vehicle was struck by Klarman’s car, which she had not noticed until just before the impact. A disinterested motorist, Aaron Kammerman, facing eastward, in compliance with a red signal had stopped his vehicle on Sinclair Lane, just west of Moravia Road, where he awaited a green signal in order to turn left and proceed northward.

With a full view of the signals controlling the intersection, it was his testimony that as the Oldsmobile entered the intersection, the signal was “amber” for vehicles on Moravia Road; that during its passage within the intersection the signal changed to “red for Moravia and green for Sinclair,” causing him (Kammerman) to commence his forward motion. At this point he noticed the Oldsmobile, within the intersection, then about 15 yards eastward and slightly to the left of his vehicle. As Kammerman, proceeding on a green signal, advanced a distance of three or four feet into the intersection, he saw “from the corner of his eye” the Klarman vehicle, coming quite fast from his left; it seemed to Kammerman that “it came through the [red] light and [that] the whole wreckage came toward me.” He described the entry of the Volkswagen into the intersection as “very fast” and equated it with “a shot in there like a bullet.” Upon this posture of the evidence, the significance of the provisions of Art. 66V2, § 11-202 (a) (2) (i) concerning the rights and duties of a motorist entering an intersection upon ²³⁹ a traffic signal showing “steady yellow,” is readily apparent. The complete subsection provides: “(2) Steady yellow indication. “(i) Vehicular traffic facing a steady yellow signal is thereby warned that the related green movement is being terminated or that a red indication will be exhibited immediately thereafter when vehicular traffic shall not enter the intersection. “(ii) Pedestrians facing a steady yellow signal, unless otherwise directed by a pedestrian control signal as provided in § 11-203, are thereby advised that there is insufficient time to cross the roadway before a red indication is shown, and no pedestrian shall then start to cross the roadway.” (emphasis added).

At trial, in the Superior Court of Baltimore City, the trial judge (Sklar, J.) related to the jury the pertinent statutory provisions, not only of § 11-202 (a) (2) (i), but as well the provisions of § 11-202 (a) (1) (i) (green signal), § 11-202 (a) (3) (i) (red signal), and those of § 11-402 (a) (the duty of a left-turning vehicle to yield the right-of-way to a vehicle approaching from the opposite direction.) 3 In expanding upon the provisions of § 11-202 (a) (2) (i), the trial court instructed the jury that if they found “that the Plaintiff entered the intersection with the amber or yellow light facing him at the time he entered . . . and that he could not stop with safety before entering . . . and the accident occurred,” their verdict should be for the plaintiff; that if they found that the traffic signal “was amber or yellow prior to the time that he ... entered the intersection, and if [they further found] that the Plaintiff could have, with the exercise of reasonable care, brought his vehicle to a safe and complete stop, prior to entering the ²⁴⁰ intersection, and thereby [have] avoided the collision,” the verdict should be for the defendant. Upon exception by plaintiffs counsel, the trial court supplemented its instructions as follows: “[I]f you should find from the evidence that the Plaintiff, Mr. Klarman, entered the intersection with the green light in his favor, then your verdict should be for the Plaintiff. If you should find from the evidence that the Plaintiff, Mr. Klarman, entered the intersection against the red light, your verdict should be for the Defendant. Now, if you should find that the Plaintiff, while proceeding south on Moravia Boulevard had the amber, that is, the yellow light facing him at the time he was entering the intersection but he could not stop with safety, then he had a light to proceed cautiously through the intersection and in that situation he would be considered as lawfully within the intersection.

Now, if you should find from the evidence that the Plaintiff, Mr. Klarman, had the yellow or amber light in his face as he was about to enter the intersection and that he could have with the exercise of reasonable care brought his vehicle to a safe and complete stop prior to entering the intersection and thereby avoiding the collision, then you should find for the Defendant.” (emphasis added). The plaintiff renewed his objection to the construction placed by the trial court on § 11-202 (a) (2) (i), in its supplementary charge, and objected as well to the failure of the trial court to grant a proffered instruction which requested that the jury be told that: “[I]f you find that the Plaintiff entered the intersection while the traffic signal for him was yellow, then your verdict must be for the Plaintiff, as a matter of law, for the proximate cause of the collision, then, would be the action of the Defendant making a left .turn.” 4 (emphasis added). From a jury verdict in favor of the defendant, Klarman appealed. ²⁴¹ The Court of Special Appeals in Klarman v. Haraszti, 24 Md. App. 483 , 332 A. 2d 291 (1975) reversed. Concluding that the trial court’s supplemental instruction was based upon the former provisions of Code (1957, 1967 Repl.

Vol.) Art. 66V2, § 193 (b) (1) and was erroneous, that court held, that under § 11-202 (a) (2) (i) “a motorist facing the yellow light is entitled to enter the intersection and having thus entered the intersection legally is entitled to proceed through regardless of a change in the traffic signal from yellow to red during the course of his passage;” it was further adjudged that the trial court had erroneously rejected the plaintiffs requested instruction. Prior to 1971, our statute, as it related to an “amber” signal, set forth in Art. 66V2, § 193 (b), provided as follows: “(b) Amber alone or ‘caution’ when shown following the green or ‘go ’ signal. “(1) Vehicles facing the signal shall stop before entering the nearest crosswalk at the intersection, but if sunk stop cannot be made in safety a vehicle may be driven cautiously through the intersection. “(2) Pedestrians facing such signal are thereby advised that there is insufficient time to cross the roadway, and any pedestrian then starting to cross shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles.” (emphasis added). In Eastern Contractors, Inc. v. State, Use of Seifert, 225 Md. 112, 120 , 169 A. 2d 430, 433 (1961), our predecessors pointed out that under the provisions of Art. 66V2, § 193 (b) (1): “[t]he amber interval affords vehicles facing it an opportunity to stop and requires that they stop, ‘but if such stop cannot be made in safety a vehicle may be driven cautiously through the intersection.’ ” Similarly, in Baltimore Transit Co. v. Putnam, 250 Md. 19, 23 , 241 A. 2d 586, 588 (1968), this Court observed that: “[a] vehicle would be lawfully in the intersection if the driver had either entered it on a green light or if after seeing the signal change to amber he was unable to stop with safety, whereupon he would be permitted to continue ‘cautiously’ through the intersection.” See also Perlin Packing Co. v. Price, 247 Md. ²⁴² 475, 485, 231 A. 2d 702, 708 (1967). Although infrequently construed by our predecessors, the dear import of former § 193 (b) (1) commanded that “[a] vehicle facing the green light must stop when it turns to amber, but if it cannot stop safely, then it may be driven cautiously through the intersection.” Webb, “Bothersome Boulevards,” 26 Md. L. Rev. 111 , 119 (1966).

It was recognized in Eastern Contractors, Inc. v. State, Use of Seifert, supra, that “[i]f the amber interval is insufficient in the case of wide streets or long or ponderous vehicles, the mere fact that the light may have turned green in favor of traffic moving along the intersecting street does not alter the right to complete the passage.” 225 Md. at 120-21 , 169 A. 2d at 433 . See also Perlin Packing Co. v. Price, supra; Durham v. United States, 174 F. Supp. 410, 411-12 (D. Md. 1959); cf. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 172 Md. 24, 29 , 190 A. 768, 770 (1937). Just as the prior provisions of § 193 (b) (1) and (2), enacted by Chapter 1007 of the Laws of 1943, were identical with § 34 (b) (1) and (2) of the Uniform Vehicle Code (Rev. ed. 1938), the new statute adopted by Chapter 534 of the Laws of 1970, now codified as § 11-202 (a) (2) (i) and (ii), sets forth verbatim the provisions of § 11-202 (b) (1) and (2) of the Uniform Vehicle Code (1967). See also Traffic Laws Annotated, § 11-202 (b) (1972).

In undertaking to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly when it enacted § 11-202 (a) (2), we are here afforded a facility not customarily found in such judicial processes, by recourse to the reports of committees of the Legislative Council, appointed in connection with the revision of the Motor Vehicle Laws, as well as by an Historical Note accompanying § 11-202 (b) (1) of the Uniform Vehicle Code (1967). On September 1, 1968, when a special committee, appointed by the Legislative Council, popularly referred to as the Warnken Commission, 5 following three years of ²⁴³ intensive study and consideration, submitted its report of recommended Code revisions to the Council, it urged that the “Rules of the Road” (Subtitle 11) in Art. 66V2 — within which § 11-202 (a) (2) is included — should be made to conform as closely as possible with the provisions of the Uniform Vehicle Code. The Warnken Commission emphasized that: “This is the area of vehicle law in which the need for national uniformity is greatest, and the UVC [Uniform Vehicle Code] has set the standard.” Thereafter, a special legislative committee, appointed by the Council, undertook, during 1969, a detailed review of the Warnken Commission’s recommendations. Even though that Committee advocated a number of departures from the provisions set forth in some of the sections of the Uniform Vehicle Code, and made changes to reflect recent revisions in that Code, the provisions of Uniform Vehicle Code § 11-202 (b) (1) and (2) (1967) went unchanged and were adopted by the legislature for codification as § 11-202 (a) (2) (i) and (ii) of the new Art. 66V2.

The content of the Historical Note accompanying Uniform Vehicle Code § 11-202 (b) (1) is of significance. It reads as follows: “The historical development of Code provisions on the meaning of a yellow signal following a green one indicates a significant change in the behavior expected of a driver facing such a signal. “The difference between the 1962 Code and the original Code provisions on the meaning of a yellow signal can readily be seen by comparing the two. UVC Act IV, § 12 (a) (Rev. ed. 1930) provided: “Yellow or ‘Caution,’ when shown alone following the green or ‘Go’ — Traffic facing the signal shall stop before entering the nearest cross walk at the intersection unless so close to the intersection that a stop cannot be made in safety. ²⁴⁴ “The 1934 and 1938 Codes made the 1930 provision on yellow signals more explicit. Those editions provided: “(b) Yellow alone or ‘Caution’ when shown following the green or ‘Go’ signal. “1.

Vehicular traffic facing the signal shall stop before entering the nearest cross walk at the intersection, but if such stop cannot be made in safety a vehicle may be driven cautiously through the intersection. “UVC Act V, § 32 (b) 1 (Rev. ed. 1934); UVC Act V, § 34 (b) 1 (Rev. ed. 1938). The first Code provisions on a steady yellow signal following a green one thus provided that, as a general rule, drivers should not proceed through the intersection. The 1962 Code, on the other hand, provides that a steady yellow signal warns a driver that a red signal will be exhibited immediately at which time he shall not enter the intersection. The tacit assumption of the 1962 Code is, of course, that a driver may lawfully enter the intersection on a yellow signal and lawfully continue across it even though a red signal may be shown during the time of such crossing.

See UVC § 11-202 (a) 1 (Rev. ed. 1962) requiring drivers facing a green signal on an intersecting street to yield the right of way to vehicles ‘lawfully within the intersection.’ “Actually, except for circumstances that would make it unsafe to stop, the original Code provisions on yellow signals required the same conduct on the part of drivers as the Code provision on red or stop signals. Thus, it was not surprising that in 1944, the National Committee substantially amended the Code’s yellow signal provision: “Vehicular traffic facing the signal is thereby warned that the red or ‘Stop’ signal will be exhibited immediately thereafter and such vehicular traffic shall not enter or be ²⁴⁵ crossing the intersection when the red or ‘Stop’ signal is exhibited. (Emphasis added.) “UVC Act V, § 34 (b) 1 (Rev. ed. 1944). This provision remained in the Code without amendment until 1962 and, in fact, served as the basis for the 1962 Code provision.

UVC Act V, § 34 (b) 1 (Rev. eds. 1948, 1952); UVC § 11-202 (b) 1 (Rev. eds. 1954, 1956, 1962). The 1962 Code, however, contains one very substantial change. The italicized clause, ‘or be crossing,’ was deleted by the National Committee in 1962 so that a driver may now both legally enter the intersection on yellow and legally clear the intersection for use by traffic on intersecting streets even though a red signal is displayed while he is in the intersection. See discussion by Fisher, Vehicle Traffic Law 417 (1961).” (emphasis added).

It thus seems clear from the evolution of the provisions of § 11-202 (b) (1) of the Uniform Vehicle Code, and its adoption verbatim by the General Assembly in recognition of a need for national uniformity, that it was clearly intended to annul the requirement of former § 193 that a motorist facing a steady yellow signal be required to stop and only be permitted to cautiously proceed through such intersection when a stop could not be made in safety. See Harry Berenter, Inc. v. Berman, 258 Md. 290, 298 , 265 A. 2d 759, 764 (1970). As the Court of Special Appeals cogently pointed out, while § 11-202 (a) (2) (ii) directing a pedestrian not to “start to cross the roadway,” continues the proscription set forth in former § 193 (b) (2), a motorist, under § 11-202 (a) (2) (i) is no longer required to attempt to stop upon a yellow signal, but may lawfully proceed through the intersection. In addition to this legislative history, the General Assembly set forth a clear directive in Art. 66V2, § 19-101, that “[t]he portions of this article which are identical with corresponding portions of the Uniform Vehicle Code shall be interpreted and construed to make uniform the law of those states which enact them.” Hence, the decisions of those ²⁴⁶ states which have adopted provisions identical with, or substantially identical with, our § 11-202 (a) (2) (i) are helpful in our construction of the statute. 6 ²⁴⁷ Although there is a dearth of decisional law interpreting the import of the change reflected in § 11-202 (b) (1) of the Uniform Vehicle Code, those jurisdictions which have been called upon to interpret the same or substantially similar language have come to conclusions compatible with the intent expressed in the Historical Note, i.e., that a steady yellow signal permits lawful entry into an intersection and merely warns of the impending display of a red signal.

In Case v. Carter, 103 Ohio App. 11 , 142 N.E.2d 670 (1956), at a time when the Ohio statute (R.C. § 4511.13 (B) (2) read: “(B) Yellow alone or ‘caution’ when shown following the green or ‘go’ signal: (2) All other traffic facing the signal is warned that the red or ‘stop’ signal will be exhibited immediately thereafter . . .,” the Ohio Court of Appeals approved a jury instruction which provided: “When the yellow or caution light is shown following the green or go signal, a vehicle facing such yellow signal may enter the