Harbor Bank v. Hanlon Park Condominium Ass'n

KRAUSER, Judge. We are asked to decide whether a bank is liable to a garnishor for the funds it released from the account of a judgment debtor, upon the presentation of a bona fide check drawn on that account, only a few hours after it had been served with the writ of garnishment. Holding that the bank’s liability began the moment the writ was served, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted the motion for judgment of the garnishor, appellee Hanlon Park Condominium Association, Inc. (“Hanlon Park”), and entered judgment against the gámishee, The Harbor Bank of Maryland (“Harbor Bank”). But in doing so, it erred.

The court should have considered, before ruling, whether Harbor Bank had a reasonable opportunity to act on the writ of attachment before releasing the funds in question. If it did not, then it was not liable for those funds. Hence, we shall remand this case for trial on that issue. FACTS Hanlon Park obtained a judgment against its managing agent, Canfield Property Management, Inc. and Canfield Property’s president, Torrie Johnson.

To collect that judgment, Hanlon Park served Ms. Johnson’s employer, the Sickle Cell Association of Maryland, Inc. (“Sickle Cell”) with a writ of garnishment of wages. When Sickle Cell failed to respond to ⁵⁷ the writ, the circuit court entered a default judgment against it in the amount of $51,063.97. 1 To collect the “Sickle Cell” judgment, Hanlon Park served Harbor Bank, where Sickle Cell maintained two checking accounts, with a writ of garnishment of property at 11:41 am on June 25, 2001. 2 But, at 2:14 pm that day, the Bank was presented with a Sickle Cell check in the amount of $15,000, made payable to “Petty Cash Cashier” and signed by Torrie Johnson in her capacity as an officer of Sickle Cell. In accordance with that check, Harbor Bank released $15,000 from Sickle Cell’s account and those funds were then converted into a cashier’s check made payable to “Torrie Johnson” and endorsed by her. Sometime later, Harbor Bank answered the writ of garnishment, stating that it was “in possession of $5,600.58 in assets” of the judgment debtor, Sickle Cell.

When Hanlon Park challenged Harbor Bank’s confession of assets, it was disclosed that the Bank had released $15,000 from Sickle Cell’s accounts approximately two and a half hours after it had been served with Hanlon Park’s writ of garnishment. That caused Hanlon Park to move for judgment against Harbor Bank. At the hearing on that motion, Harbor Bank argued that it was not liable to Hanlon Park for disbursing those funds because it was not given a reasonable amount of time to place a “hold” on Sickle Cell’s accounts before the funds were withdrawn. According to Harbor Bank, “[i]t takes at least two or three days before a writ of garnishment can be effectuated throughout the bank.” Declaring “I do not see that the law permits the bank any time” the circuit court held Harbor Bank liable for releasing the debtor’s assets “from the ⁵⁸ moment that the writ of garnishment [was] served.” It then granted Hanlon Park’s motion and entered a judgment for $15,000 plus pre-judgment interest in favor of Hanlon Park. 3 DISCUSSION I Harbor Bank contends that the circuit court erred in granting Hanlon Park’s motion for judgment because two and a half hours was not a reasonable amount of time for it to process the writ of garnishment and place a “hold” on Sickle Cell’s accounts.

Initially, we note that “garnishment is a form of attachment.” Simpson v. Consol. Constr. Servs., Inc., 143 Md.App. 606, 619 , 795 A.2d 754 (2002), aff'd in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 372 Md. 434 , 813 A.2d 260 (2002); Catholic Univ. of Am. v. Bragunier Masonry Contractors, 139 Md.App. 277, 293 , 775 A.2d 458 (2001), aff'd, 368 Md. 608 , 796 A.2d 744 (2002). “It is ‘a means of enforcing a judgment,’ which ‘allows a judgment creditor to recover property owned by the debtor but held by a third- party, the garnishee.’ ” Simpson, 143 Md.App. at 619 , 795 A.2d 754 (quoting Parkville Fed. Sav. Bank v. Md. Nat’l Bank, 343 Md. 412, 418 , 681 A.2d 521 (1996)).

A writ of garnishment “preserve[s] the assets of the judgment debtor by creating an ‘inchoate lien’ thát is binding and prevents the garnishee from disposing of those of the assets in his possession until such time as a judgment is entered in the garnishment proceeding.” Catholic Univ., 139 Md.App. at 294 , 775 A.2d 458 . The general rule is that “[o]nce the writ of garnishment is issued and laid in the hands of the garnishee, he is bound to safely keep the assets of the debtor in his possession, together with any additional assets that ⁵⁹ come into his possession up to the time of trial.” Id. at 293 , 775 A.2d 458 . “Hence, if the garnishee surrenders the property after service of the writ but prior to judgment, the garnishee is liable to the judgment creditor for the value of the debtor’s property released.” Parkville Fed. Sav. Bank, 343 Md. at 419 , 681 A.2d 521 . But there is at least one exception to this rule.and that exception is set forth in Md.Code (1975, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 4-303(a) of the Commercial Law Article (“CL”), which is almost a word-for-word adoption of § 4-303(a) of the Uniform Commercial Code.

See U.C.C. § 4-303(a) (1990). CL § 4-303(a), redacted to exclude extraneous verbiage, states: [A]ny ... legal process served upon, ... a payor bank, comes too late to terminate, suspend, or modify the bank’s right or duty to pay an item or to charge its customer’s account for the item, if the ... legal process is received or served and a reasonable time for the bank to act thereon expires ... after the earliest of the following: (1) The bank accepts ... the item (2) The bank pays the item in cash;.... (Emphasis added). In interpreting statutory language, “we look first to the words of the statute,” giving them their “natural and ordinary signification, bearing in mind the statutory aim and objective.” Richmond v. State, 326 Md. 257, 262 , 604 A.2d 483 (1992). “If the words of the statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written.” Jones v. State, 336 Md. 255, 261 , 647 A.2d 1204 (1994).

The words of CL § 4-303(a) plainly require a bank to secure funds it holds within a “reasonable time” after being served with legal process—in this case a writ of garnishment—to prevent the payment of an item. The “item” in this instance was the Sickle Cell check presented by Ms. Johnson, ordering Harbor Bank to disburse $15,000 of Sickle Cell’s ⁶⁰ funds. 4 The unexpressed but implied corollary of this rule is that if the bank is presented with an “item” before it has had a reasonable amount of time to respond to a writ of garnishment, it may properly